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ABSTRACT 
Questioning the Social Desirability of Product Liability Claims 
 
This thesis seeks to answer the primary question as to whether Product Liability 
Claims are socially desirable by reference to three Product Liability case studies 
and a survey of 132 archived Product Liability claims. These constitute a 
representative random sample of Product Liability cases handled by the Author’s 
Legal Practice. This practice has provided a window through which serious 
failings are identified in  
(i) the strict liability based Product Liability Directive; 
(ii) tort itself as a mechanism for compensating injured persons; and 
(iii) the procedural infrastructure in which claims are made, as recently reformed 
in accordance with Lord Justice Jackson’s recommendations. 
 
This thesis tests Product Liability claims against the objectives of tort: deterrence; 
corrective justice; retribution and vindication; distributive justice and 
compensation. It is found that Product Liability claims fail to meet the defined 
standard of social desirability.  
 
There is nothing special about products to necessitate or justify a bespoke system 
of liability. Product Liability claims for damages represent in microcosm the 
broader picture of personal injury claims as a whole. This thesis highlights the 
failings of a system which relies heavily on gambling upon outcomes; perpetuates 
a ‘have a go’ culture; rewards the lucky few; builds in an unacceptable element 
of moral hazard and tolerates and generates the costs of a high volume of claims 
which serve no practical or legal purpose.  
 
It is concluded that  
1. The Product Liability Directive was introduced as an emotive response to the 
Thalidomide tragedy but it would fail to provide a remedy in a similar disaster. 
Instead it treats sufferers of minor mishaps as victims and contributes to a 
litigation industry that inculcates in society a false and unnecessary sense of 
entitlement.  
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2. The Product Liability Directive should be repealed as a flawed and 
misconceived piece of legislation that fails to achieve its key goal of protecting 
consumers and harmonising the law. 
3. Support is found in this practical research for much of what Atiyah advocated 
in his seminal work The Damages Lottery. The possibility of an all-embracing no-
fault liability system should be reconsidered subject to strict controls, including 
thresholds, to ensure that it compensates and rehabilitates only those with 
genuine needs.  
4. A first party insurance market would have to develop to fill the gaps. 
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CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, no one to our knowledge has attempted 
to examine the question whether, or in what circumstances, 
product liability is socially desirable, considering its major 
benefits and costs.1 
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell (2009) 
 
This is a PhD in Legal Practice and the subject matter is viewed from the perspective 
of the author’s legal practice. This introductory chapter explains the research 
questions that this thesis addresses, the methodology applied to answer the questions 
and the way the answers have been organised in the subsequent chapters.  
 
1.1 The Central Questions and their importance 
Polinsky and Shavell ask, above, whether, or in what circumstances, product liability 
is socially desirable. This thesis explores the social desirability of UK product liability 
(‘PL’) claims. Whilst some issues are identified as peculiar to PL, in many of the 
matters explored, PL is merely the window through which the system for making tort 
based claims is viewed. Thus it deals not only with the substantive legal theory of PL 
but also with deficiencies of tort based claim and the practical procedural framework 
in which tort claims operate. The first seven chapters deal with substantive law issues 
arising from the choice of strict liability for defective products. The subsequent 
chapters consider a combination of substantive and procedural matters relating to the 
system by which personal injury claims (of which PL is a small subset) are made.  
 
This research is important, relevant and topical for three reasons. First, the UK was 
the first EU Member State to transpose the PL Directive (‘the PL Directive’).2 The PL 
Directive introduced a system of quasi-strict liability (i.e. strict liability with certain 
                                                          
1 A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, ‘The Uneasy Case for Product Liability’ Discussion Paper 
No. 647 09/2009 Revised November 19, 2009 Harvard Law School Cambridge, MA 02138 The Harvard 
John M. Olin Discussion Paper Series: 
 < http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1468562  > accessed 18 June 2015 - ‘Uneasy 
Case’ 
2 COUNCIL DIRECTIVE of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products (85/374/EEC) 
(OJ L 210, 7.8.1985, p. 29)  
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limited statutory defences) upon the producer, which includes the manufacturer or the 
importer into the EU, for damage (including death and injury) caused by a defect in his 
product.3 Thus, an injured party only needs to prove the existence of the defect and 
that it caused his injury. Taking fault out of the substantive law equation simplifies the 
making of claims by reducing the elements of proof and the variability of judicial 
perception of what amounts to negligent conduct. The advent of the The Civil 
Procedure Rules 1998 (CPR), in the wake of the Woolf Reforms,4 in turn simplified the 
procedural aspects of making claims and minimised the costs risks for the claimant. 
PL claims constitute a small proportion of the overall spread of claims for personal 
injury5 but in the last decade they have played their part in the personal injury litigation 
bonanza. The PL Directive having developed from US law, these claims form a central 
part of the debate about whether the UK is gripped by ‘compensation culture’ imported 
from the US.  
 
Second, on 1 March 2013 the PL Directive reached the landmark of being in force in 
the UK for 25 years. Thus it might be expected that there is a considerable volume of 
data available from which to judge its success or failure. There is not. 
 
Third, PL falls into the general category of personal injury for procedural purposes and 
is therefore subject to the reforms stemming from the Review of Civil Litigation Costs 
by Lord Jackson6 (‘the Jackson Report’) in the same way as motor claims and 
employer’s liability claims. It is therefore of topical interest to see how these reforms, 
which came into force on 1 April 2013, impact on PL. This inevitably illuminates the 
wider topic of personal injury claims as a whole. 
 
                                                          
3 Article 1 PL Directive (n. 2) 
4 The Right Honourable the Lord Woolf, Master of the Rolls Access to Justice Final Report, July 1996, 
(The Woolf Report)  
< http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/final/contents.htm >  
5 According to the Compensation Recovery Unit for the year 2014/2015 out of 998,359 injury claims 
registered 76.3% were motor claims, 10% public liability and 10.4% employers’ liability. These figures 
may include some PL claims but the precise number is not recorded.  see 
< https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/424356/cases-
registered-cru-2014-15.csv/preview  > accessed 18 June 2015  
6 See Right Honourable Lord Justice Jackson, Review of Civil Litigation Costs, Final Report, December 
2009 (The Jackson Report) <http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications-and-reports/reports/civil/review-
of-civil-litigation-costs/civil-litigation-costs-review-reports> accessed 8 November 2011 and the Legal 
Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 
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In seeking to answer the question posed by Polinsky and Shavell, in the context of 
English law7 and procedure, this thesis explores and offers reasoned answers to the 
following central questions: 
 
Does PL achieve the socially beneficial goals of tort? It is first necessary to explore 
what these goals are by reference to academic authority. Having established the main 
objectives of tort, it is considered whether in practice PL attains them. In doing this, 
false assumptions underlying the perceived desirability of PL are highlighted. 
 
Why is strict liability perceived to be needed? This is important because the 
imposition of strict liability presupposes that there must be a special need to interfere 
with the usual burden of proving fault: such as the protection of a vulnerable section 
of society. 
 
Does PL actually compensate injury?   
Article 9 of the PL Directive Art 9 provides that damage means damage caused by 
death or personal injuries but that ‘This Article shall be without prejudice to national 
provisions relating to non-material damage’. It is necessary therefore to examine, in 
the context of the English legal system why society awards monetary damages for 
injury – particularly pain suffering and loss of amenity unaccompanied by special 
damage? The payment of damages can be traced back to the end of the third 
millennium BCE.8  This suggests that the need for compensation and the so called 
‘compensation culture’ is not solely the product of the current legal system. 
 
These questions involve a mixture of substantive and procedural law. In this regard 
PL law produces an interesting paradox. As far as the substantive element is 
concerned,  PL is treated as sui generis but as Stapleton observes ‘...the fact that PL 
can be defined as a distinct legal category does not itself establish the wisdom of 
                                                          
7 More specifically the Laws of England and Wales 
8 Ca 2050 BC, King Ur-Nammu, who reigned during the Sumerian Third Dynasty of Ur, established and 
regulated an unchangeable, consistent, uniform and predictable standard of weights and measures 
based on ‘Shekels’ of silver, which enabled specific values to be ascribed to rights. King Hammurabi 
reigned from 1792 until 1750 BC during the first dynasty of Babylon. His legal code, dating from around 
1750 BC, written in cuneiform on stone stele, (an example of which can be seen in the Louvre Museum, 
Paris) sets out a table of compensatory payments for a variety of wrongs from personal injury to 
nuisance. 
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separating it out from the general organisation of civil obligations.’9 Procedurally, 
however, PL is typically treated in the same way as any other form of personal injury. 
 
This thesis argues: 
 
1. The perceived need for PL is based on headline cases such as the Thalidomide 
tragedy, with complex causation and multijurisdictional reach but these are extremely 
rare and could be better managed by social welfare. 
2. The need for damages for pain and suffering is based on public perception of 
necessity. Society is guided by the legal profession which faces a conflict of interests 
as litigation is a source of business. The rhetoric underlying the need for compensation 
focuses on major cases involving serious injuries and wrecked lives. 
3. The real world of personal injury consists of a welter of small and often trivial claims, 
benefiting the fortunate few at a cost to the many through insurance premiums and 
uplifts to prices to pay not only for the compensation but also for the disproportionate 
transactional costs. 
4. The traditionally recognised benefits of tort law such as deterrence, retribution, 
vindication and satisfaction or correcting wrongs fail to justify PL litigation.  
5. Reforms have concentrated on limiting and reallocating costs rather than 
questioning the benefits of claims, with the undesirable effect of causing claims to be 
rubberstamped.  
6. This is an inefficient and undesirable distribution of rights. 
 
1.2 Starting Point 
 
The title of this thesis is ‘Questioning the Social Desirability of Product Liability claims’. 
‘Social desirability’ is not a term of art. It is borrowed it from a polemical debate 
between Professors A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell on the one hand and 
Professors John C.P. Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky on the other. It is set out in 
the former's ‘The Uneasy Case for Product Liability’10 (the Uneasy Case), from which 
the quotation at the beginning of this introduction is taken, and the latter’s ‘The Easy 
                                                          
9 Jane Stapleton, Product Liability Butterworths 1994 ISBN 0-406-03503-2, p. 3 
10 Uneasy Case (n. 1) p. 3 
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Case for Products Liability Law: A Response to Professors Polinsky and Shavell’,11 
(the Easy Case). The former have the last word in ‘A Skeptical Attitude About PL is 
Justified: A Reply to Professors Goldberg and Zipursky’12 
 
In these papers Polinsky and Shavell argue that that the social case for PL is doubtful 
and Goldberg and Zipursky defend the benefits of PL. The Uneasy Case is that on a 
cost/benefit analysis ‘there are strong reasons for doubting [PL’s] desirability’: 
 
- In relation to high volume products, the need for PL to encourage safety is 
reduced considerably by market forces and regulation; 
- Price signalling benefits are limited and largely if not entirely offset by price 
distortions arising from litigation costs and awards for non-pecuniary loss; 
-  PL does not substantially promote compensation because this is achieved to 
a significant extent by insurance; 
- Indeed, it detracts from the compensation goal because it provides damages 
for non-pecuniary loss (which plaintiffs do not really want – otherwise they 
would buy insurance for such losses); 
- The costs of the system are disproportionately large. 
 
The Easy Case, in response, is that PL is beneficial to society because: 
 
- PL is an amalgam of negligence, misrepresentation and warranty that holds 
manufacturers accountable to injury victims; 
- It empowers and enables victims so that they are able to vindicate their rights; 
- It ‘instantiates notions of equality’ and reinforces norms of responsibility; 
- It deters [making bad products]; 
- It provides welfare enhancing compensation. 
 
This debate is the starting point for the investigations underpinning this thesis. In the 
UK, Atiyah’s book ‘The Damages Lottery’13 picks up the major themes, in the wider 
                                                          
11 John C.P. Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky, ‘The Easy Case for Products Liability Law:  A 
Response to Professors Polinsky and Shavell’ Electronic copy available at: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1577653  > accessed 19 June 2015 - ‘Easy Case’ 
12 Uneasy Case (n. 1) p. 1949 
13 P.S. Atiyah, The Damages Lottery Hart Publishing 2000  ISBN 1-901362-05-1  
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context of personal injury litigation, from the perspective of a leading academic. Atiyah, 
predating two decades of procedural reforms, reaches the heterodox conclusion that 
‘the action for damages for personal injuries should simply be abolished, and first-
party insurance should be left to the free market.’14  
 
This thesis takes up the challenge in relation to PL claims from the perspective of a 
practitioner who deals on a daily basis with personal injury claims. The legal basis for 
PL is viewed through the prism of the experience of a small firm of solicitors with a 
particular specialisation in PL (the Practice),15 by reference to 3 case studies and to a 
wider review of 132 closed PL cases from the Practice’s archives. 
 
1.3 Comparative law elements 
 
It is necessary to consider a number of elements of comparative law. It shall become 
apparent that strict liability for defective products is a creation of, and an import from, 
the US. This thesis draws heavily from US literature on the substantive law of PL as 
the US shares the UK’s Common Law tradition.  
 
Differences in approach between the US and the UK are discussed. PL in the US is 
wider in scope than in the UK. According to the Easy Case, in the US, ‘in addition to 
asserting claims of product defect, the complaint may also contain counts for 
negligence and breach of warranty, as well as fraud, negligent misrepresentation, 
consumer fraud, civil RICO16, and/or medical monitoring.’17 It is not merely the 
differences in substantive law that are of interest and relevance. Procedural 
differences abound and there is an exploration into whether these differences explain 
some of the anomalies of UK PL law. Obvious examples of these are punitive 
damages, contingency fees18 and costs generally.  
                                                          
14 The Damages Lottery (n. 13) p. 189 
15 See <http://www.foxhartley.com/product.htm> accessed 30 January 2015. The Practice was 
established in 2000. The author is the Senior Partner and has specialised in this area of law since 
qualifying as a Solicitor in 1987. 
16 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 84 Stat. 922-3 the idea being that the product 
is so bad that is was simply designed as a mechanism for defrauding consumers of their money. 
17 Easy Case (n. 11) p. 6 Medical monitoring claims are for the cost of monitoring a plaintiff’ medical 
condition where the defendant’s tort has not actually caused an injury but has put the plaintiff at risk. 
18 Only relatively recently permissible in the UK under The Damages-Based Agreements Regulations 
2013 SI 2013/609. 
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The cost of litigation (described by Lord Jackson as ‘grotesque’)19 distinguishes the 
English system from the US and indeed the other members of the EU. This is in the 
process of major reform, following the Jackson Report. This thesis will comment on 
the social desirability of the cost structure of litigation. 
 
Reference is also made to other Common Law jurisdictions: Australia and New 
Zealand. These are of special interest, because of divergences from the UK legal 
system. Examples of this are the no-fault system introduced in New Zealand and 
thresholds for recoverability of damages introduced in Australia. 
 
Comparisons also have to be drawn with other European jurisdictions. The UK enjoys 
the distinction of being one of only two Common Law jurisdictions out of the 27 
Member States of the EU (the other being Ireland).20 Thus the UK has become 
accustomed to the difficulties inherent in harmonising laws across Europe. Again, an 
explanation is offered for some of the anomalies of UK PL Law by reference to 
differences between UK law and the laws of other European Member States. A prime 
example of this is the disparity between the methods of calculation of damages across 
Europe. 
 
1.4 Product Liability 
 
In the UK, in common with the rest of the EU, the principal legal basis of PL is quasi 
strict liability for defective products under the PL Directive - referred to as PL 
throughout this thesis.  The PL Directive is transposed into UK law by the Consumer 
Protection Act 1987.  Some familiarity with the history of the evolution of the PL 
Directive will help in understanding its shortcomings, which become apparent as this 
thesis develops. 
 
                                                          
19 James Pankhurst v Lee White, Motor Insurers Bureau [2010] EWCA Civ 1445 [52]. 
20 To be strictly accurate, according to the University of Malta website, Maltese Law is ‘a "mixed" legal 
system, which blends Common and Civil law elements’: see < http://www.um.edu.mt/laws  > 
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As observed by the American Law Institute, the choice of strict liability often owes 
more to history than legal principle.21 Strict liability is applied to a number of scenarios 
with particular elements that a Plaintiff must prove to bring the rule into play.   
 
Just as there is no single rule of strict liability in tort, but rather a range of 
specific strict-liability doctrines, so it is appropriate to observe that there is 
no single theory for strict liability in tort. While a number of rationales and 
policies are generally available in explaining both the coverage and the 
limits of strict-liability doctrines, each of the particular doctrines may 
balance or accommodate these rationales and policies in its own 
distinctive way… Moreover, each of these doctrines has its own history…22 
 
 
This theory is exemplified by PL in Europe. 
 
1.4.1 The Strasbourg Convention holds the key to European thinking on PL 
 
The Strasbourg Draft Convention23 holds the key to European thinking on the subject.  
It was promulgated by the Council of Europe in the 1970s and the final draft open for 
signature in 1977 requiring three ratifications to come into force. It was only ever 
signed by Austria, France, Belgium and Luxembourg and was not ratified by any 
Member State, presumably because it was ultimately superseded by the draft EEC 
Directive24 largely based on the modified Strasbourg Draft Convention. The 
Strasbourg Draft Convention introduced the following key concepts: 
 
- Strict liability by reference to a defective product (Article 3); 
- Defect defined by reference to safety (Article 2c) 
  
                                                          
21 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM ch. 4 scope note (Proposed 
Final Draft No. 1, 2005). American Law Institute ISBN: 978-0-314-23194-3  
<http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publications.ppage&node_id=61 > accessed 17 June 2015 
22 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM ch. 4 (n.21)  
23 Strasbourg Draft Convention 1977, Appendix B to Law Commission Working Paper No 64; The 
Scottish Law Commission Memorandum No 20 Liability for Defective Products) Printed in England for 
Her Majesty's Stationery Office by Oyez Press Limited Dd 506997 K24 6/75,  pp. 127-133  
24 EEC Draft Directive, memorandum, text and explanatory note, Appendix C to Law Commission 
Working Paper No 64; The Scottish Law Commission Memorandum No 20 Liability for Defective 
Products Printed in England for Her Majesty's Stationery Office by Oyez Press Limited Dd 506997 K24 
6/75  pp. 153-172) 
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- Circumvention of horizontal and vertical privity of contract, placing liability on 
the producer, labeller, importer or supplier who does not identify the producer 
(Article 2b and 3(2)) 
- Longstop 10 year extinction of right of action (Article 7) 
- Optional contributory negligence (Article 4) 
- Optional limitation of liability - to 200,000DM per person or 30,000,000DM for 
“batch” liability. (ANNEX 2) 
 
The Draft Explanatory Report25 on the Strasbourg Draft Convention records the 
genesis of the text. The first concern was that industrial development and 
technological progress had led to producers’ liability acquiring an ‘international aspect’. 
It was noted that most Member States had no discrete PL law as such but showed a 
‘tendency in judicial decisions to impose greater liability on producers…’26 This 
translated directly into the later draft EEC Directive:  
 
a trend towards such stricter liability has been developing in all those 
Member States both in the practice of the courts and in academic opinion 
generally27 
 
A committee of experts was set up in 1970 to exchange views on the basis of a 
comparative study produced by Unidroit, on the legal position in the different States 
relating to producers' liability28 and to propose measures with a view to ‘harmonising 
the substantive law of the Member States in the area of producers’ liability’29. 
Numerous non-European countries were invited as observers (including USA and 
Japan) and written observations sought from some major industrial organisations 
including the European Association of Aerospace Manufacturers and the European 
Council of Federations of Chemical Industry. 
 
Drafting took place over seven meetings spread out over 3 years to 1975. The difficulty 
of overcoming differences between Member States in relation to both contractual and 
                                                          
25 Strasbourg Draft Convention, Draft Explanatory Report, (n. 23) pp. 134-152  
26 Draft Explanatory Report (n. 23) p. 134 
27 Appendix C, EEC Draft Directive, (n. 24) p. 162  
28 Strasbourg Draft Explanatory Report (n. 25) p. 134 [4] 
29 Strasbourg  Draft Explanatory Report (n. 25) p. 134 [2] 
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non-contractual liability was dealt with by inventing a completely new overriding 
‘special unitary system of liability’. 
 
As for liability generally the  
 
the majority of the Committee agreed that the notion of "fault" - whether 
the burden of proof lay with the person suffering damage or with the 
producer - no longer constituted a satisfactory basis for the system of 
products liability in an era of mass-production, where technical 
developments, advertising and sales methods had created special risks, 
which the consumer could not be expected to accept.30 
 
As for the specific basis of liability, a number of mixed views are recorded as being 
held by the experts on the Committee: 
a. that a list of potentially dangerous products could be constructed.  
 
 
This solution would have the advantage of indicating clearly the reason 
for the existence of a system of strict liability in respect of damage caused 
by products, namely the "risk" inherent in them.31 
 
b. the notion of ‘dangerous product’ was equivocal and unsatisfactory because of the 
difficulty of deciding at the outset what products were dangerous; 
 
c. a list of dangerous products would be arbitrary and incomplete; 
 
d. liability based on defect was more sound as a manufacturer would not be liable for 
all damage but just that arising from a defect; 
 
e. this might be too restrictive in excluding a product that causes injury by reason of 
its dangerous nature. 
 
Ultimately the solution was a compromise retaining the dangerous characteristics and 
the defect. The final version was to rely on ‘defect’ defined as ‘absence of safety which 
a person is entitled to expect’.32 This appeared in the Strasbourg Draft Convention:  
 
                                                          
30 Strasbourg  Draft Explanatory Report (n. 25)  p. 136 [10] 
31 Strasbourg  Draft Explanatory Report (n. 25)  p. 137 [12] 
32 Strasbourg  Draft Explanatory Report (n. 25)  p. 137  [12-15] 
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a product has a "defect" when it does not provide the safety which a 
person is entitled to expect, having regard to all the circumstances 
including the presentation of the product33 
 
This leaves a considerable margin of uncertainty yet justifies the imposition of strict 
liability on the basis of a perceived developing academic and judicial trend towards 
stricter liability.  
 
1.4.2 The EEC Draft PL Directive  
 
The first draft of the PL Directive and explanatory memorandum are appended to the 
Law Commission consultation paper,34 which explains the rationale behind the draft 
PL Directive to be the generalisation that modern products were perceived to be 
‘technically complicated and specialised’ and ‘therefore involve the risk of defects 
more than the simple hand-made products of past eras.’ Types of defects anticipated 
include inadequate design and defective manufacture. It was also noted that with 
highly technical products the defectiveness may only emerge after further scientific 
development (the Thalidomide tragedy being cited as an example) with wide reaching 
consequences compared with ‘previous eras’.35 
 
The European Commission was influenced by two major disasters of the time. The 
first was the Paris Air Disaster of 1974 in which a Turkish Airlines DC10 crashed in the 
Ermenonville Forest as a result of a defect in the rear cargo door latching system 
(resulting not so much from a product defect as from the ‘incomplete application of 
Service Bulletin 52-37’ and from ‘incorrect modifications and adjustments’)36 causing 
346 fatalities, the largest number in a single air crash at the time. The second was the 
Thalidomide (Contergan) tragedy of the early 1960s (in relation to which litigation is 
still pending). Both of these disasters were referred to in the original explanatory 
memorandum accompanying the Draft PL Directive.37 
                                                          
33 Strasbourg Draft Convention Article 2  (n. 23) p. 128 
34 Preliminary Draft Directive, (n. 24) p. 153  
35 Preliminary Draft PL Directive (n. 24) p. 154 
36 See Department of Trade Accidents Investigation Branch Turkish Airlines DC-10 TC-JAV Report on 
the accident in the Ermenonville Forest, France on 3 March 1974 (Translation of the report published 
by the French Secretariat of State for Transport) 
<http://www.aaib.gov.uk/sites/aaib/cms_resources/8-1976%20TC-JAV.pdf> accessed 24 January 
2012 
37 Preliminary Draft PL Directive (n. 24) pp. 153 & 154 
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Against this background the memorandum explains that the legal situation of an 
injured person varies from state to state. Initial consultations were held with Member 
States’ representatives with a view to Community legislation designed to approximate 
the Member States’ laws. 
 
1.4.3 Principles underlying PL 
 
In July 1978 the Economic and Social Committee delivered its opinion on the draft 
Directive.38 The Committee set out the principles upon which a PL law should be 
based: 
 
- Enabling effective and more rapid remedies; 
 
- Apportioning in an optimum manner, i.e. in the least costly but most 
equitable way, both the financial burden of the damage caused by 
defective products to their users and the expenses incurred in 
spreading the cost of such damages; 
 
- Eliminating, or at least reducing, the number of defective products 
coming on to the market, without curbing the marketing of safe 
products; 
 
- Not giving rise to (or maintaining) distortions of competition between 
firms; 
 
- Following developments in the field of liability for defective products in 
both international law and national law... 
 
As for strict liability, it is said of the manufacturer, ‘If it is impossible for him to avoid a 
manufacturing defect despite careful checks, it does not seem unfair that he should 
                                                          
38 Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee (161st plenary session, Brussels 12 and 13 July 1978) 
Official Journal of the European Communities No C 114/16 7.5.79 
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also bear the burden of the consequences of unavoidable defects in order to protect 
the consumer’.39 
 
It is suggested first that a buyer’s decision where to buy goods may be influenced by 
what protection the buyer has from financial loss:40 
 
When deciding from which sub-contractor to obtain semi-finished 
products, the manufacturer of the end product will also be guided by a 
consideration of the extent to which the sub-contractor is liable to him for 
damage. He will favour those who are exposed to the greatest liability 
while those who are not liable to an equivalent extent could be 
discriminated against. This can result in trading relationships which are 
economically unjustifiable insofar as they are caused by differences in the 
rules governing liability in individual states.41 
 
The directive goes on to claim that liability without fault is the ‘sole means of solving 
the problem peculiar to our age of increasing technicality, of a fair apportionment of 
the risks inherent in modern technological production’.42 
 
It is argued below that strict liability for defective products was misconceived, 
inappropriate and ultimately unnecessary, with the result that it fails to satisfy the 
balance of social desirability. 
 
1.5 Existing Research and the importance of the subject 
 
Existing research on the PL Directive is not extensive. The Directive itself requires 
periodical reporting to the European Commission: ‘Every five years the Commission 
shall present a report to the Council on the application of this Directive and, if 
necessary, shall submit appropriate proposals to it.’43 
 
The earliest report was the first five year review of the application and implementation 
of the PL Directive, The Hodges Report of May 1994.44 At that time only ten Member 
                                                          
39 Preliminary Draft PL Directive (n. 24) p. 157 
40 Preliminary Draft PL Directive (n. 24) p. 158 
41 Preliminary Draft PL Directive (n. 24) p. 159 
42 PL Directive Recital 2 (n. 2) 
43 PL Directive Article 21 (n. 2) 
44 Report for the Commission of the European Communities on the Application of Directive 85/374/EEC 
on Liability for Defective Products. Study Contract No. Etd/93/B5-3000/MI,06, McKenna & Co, May 
1994 
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States had implemented the PL Directive. There were only three reported cases. 
Hodges explained that experience was limited and likely to develop slowly. Information 
was gathered by way of a survey containing a mixture of purely factual questions, e.g. 
Has there been an increase in the number of claims resulting from the implementation 
of the Directive? and open questions tending to court opinions e.g. What comments 
do you have on the use in practice of the Directive in your or any other Member State 
of the Community? In which situations has it been used or useful? (p47) 
 
The report concluded: 
 
It is clear that there has not been a significant increase in product liability 
claims, with the possible exception of small claims. (p41) 
 
The Green Paper in 1999 was the Commission’s attempt at a wide ranging data 
capturing exercise in order to review the operation of the PL Directive over the previous 
15 years leading up to its Second Report in 2000, to meet its obligations for periodic 
reviews set out in article 21 of the PL Directive. 
 
It set out guidelines for discussion of the most potentially contentious issues including 
burden of proof; the development risks defence; financial limits; limitation and 
settlements. 
 
One of the primary objectives of the Green Paper was to establish whether the 
application of the PL Directive has ‘brought more benefits than costs.’45 It is not clear 
how such the benefits were to be evaluated or quantified in a way that could be 
compared with the costs or how the ‘costs’ of the application of the Directive could be 
calculable. It was conceded: ‘However, it is quite difficult to put an exact figure on 
these costs and to assess their impact on competitiveness…’46 The Commission 
acknowledged ‘One of the difficulties in assessing the impact of the Directive remains 
the lack of reliable data because of the absence of an analysis methodology to 
measure its effects.’47 
 
                                                          
45 Commission of the European Communities Green Paper Liability for Defective Products, Brussels, 
28.07.1999 COM(1999)396 final, p. 8 
46 Green Paper (n. 45) p. 16 
47 Green Paper (n. 45) pp. 8 & 9 
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There is no obligation on producers to keep records of claims against 
them; nor are the national authorities obliged to keep track of the number 
of cases reported.48 
 
Survey methodology 
 
In the absence of reliable hard data, those responsible for reporting on the PL Directive 
have turned to a survey methodology to gather information. The second report in 2001 
reviewed information gathered in response to the Green Paper.49 
 
In reaching its conclusion the Commission said: 
 
Many observations indicate that the Directive functions properly in 
practice. This is considered to be due to the fact that it has created a well-
balanced and stable legal framework which takes into account the 
concerns of both the consumers and the producers. However, it is 
important to note that only little information about the application exists and 
statistics, if available, are not complete.50 
 
The Law firm Lovells was commissioned to make a study of PL systems across the EU 
Member States in 200151. The study included not only the application of the Directive 
but also existing domestic provisions still having effect under Article 13. The objectives 
were put as follows:  ‘The Study considered the extent to which there was a need 
further to harmonise PL laws in the EU, or to make any amendments to the Directive.’ 
A principal aim was to establish to what extent the potential liability of producers and 
                                                          
48 Green Paper (n. 45) p. 28 
49 EU Commission Second Report, on the application of Directive 85/374 on Liability for Defective 
Products Brussels, 31.1.2001 COM(2000) 893 final p. 7 
‘The Commission received some 100 comments in response to the Green Paper 
emanating from four different groups: 
 
– national and European consumer organisations; 
 
– national industry associations as well as national and European unions representing 
sectors of industry concerned (in particular pharmaceuticals, cars, insurance, chemicals, 
agricultural products, electrical equipment); 
 
– public administrations of Member States (Austria, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, 
Netherlands, Greece, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom) and other European countries 
(Iceland, Norway, Slovenia, Switzerland); 
 
– bodies specialising in PL (e.g. Pan-European Organisation of Personal Injury Lawyers, US 
Defense Research Institute, Special Committee on European PL Law).’ 
50 EU Commission Second Report, (n. 49) p. 8 
51 Lovells, PL In The European Union A report for the European Commission February 2003 European 
Commission Study MARKT/2001/11/D  
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suppliers varied between Member States and by extension how opportunities for 
compensation differed. 
 
The Lovells report acknowledged both the difficulty in gathering data on numbers of 
PL claims and amounts of damages concluding that such data ‘would in itself be of 
limited practical value, even if it could be reliably gathered.’52 The study was based 
largely on a survey of four categories of interested participants: 
 
- Consumers 
- Producers and suppliers 
- Insurers; and  
- Lawyers 
 
In response to a question about the legal bases upon which PL claims are brought 
Lovells stated: 
 
Whilst a good number of participants were prepared to provide estimates 
in response to the question, many did not have sufficient experience of PL 
to do so. There was also a lack of consistency in the answers of those who 
did comment. Caution should be taken in interpreting the answers.53 
 
This is not surprising as it is rare to find ‘PL specialists’ in European jurisdictions. More 
typically European lawyers have a wider practice of which the occasional PL claim may 
form a part. Indeed, it is unusual in the UK to have a practice based largely on PL work. 
In the circumstances it is suggested that the responses to all the questions about PL 
and the incidence of claims should be treated with caution. Where questions require 
the participant to give an answer based on opinion, the responses are predictably 
partisan. For example, in relation to the burden of proof: 
 
There remains a perception on the part of some Consumer Representatives 
that consumers are unfairly disadvantaged by the burden of having to prove 
defect and/or causation in PL claims … Producers and Insurers, on the other 
hand, are concerned that any relaxation of the rules relating to the burden 
of proof might have the effect of encouraging "spurious claims".54 
 
                                                          
52 The Lovells Report, (n. 51) p. 6 
53 The Lovells Report, (n. 51) p. 37 
54 The Lovells Report (n. 51) p. v 
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In 2002, the Rosselli Institute was appointed by the Commission to study the economic 
impact of the Development Risks Defence and particularly whether removal of the 
defence would stifle innovation.55 There are a number of flaws in the whole concept of 
their investigation: 
 
- The impact of the clause will inevitably vary enormously from industry to industry 
and product to product. Therein lies a fundamental issue with the Directive itself 
applying across the whole spectrum of manufactured products. 
 
- Any research lacks empirical data and is therefore purely theoretical. The defence 
virtually never applies in practice. 
 
- Innovation is driven by competition: the need to produce new, better, more attractive 
products which are cheaper to make. If, hypothetically the cost of insurance were 
increased materially for a particular product because of the removal of the 
development risks defence, then this would apply to all manufacturers of that type 
of product. It ought not per se to stifle innovation as manufacturers would still need 
to innovate to keep up with or ahead of the competition.  
 
In describing its methodology, Rosselli made attempts to elicit original data through 
desktop research and then by questionnaires, each of which failed. The information 
provided in response to the first set of questionnaires was ‘incomplete, partial and 
superficial.’56 A subsequent simpler questionnaire and telephone interviews was said 
to be more effective and was deemed by it a reliable basis for its conclusions - although 
the response rate was not high enough to allow ‘proper statistical estimation and 
generalisation of results’.57 
 
                                                          
55 Fondazione Rosselli, Analysis of the Economic Impact of the Development Risk Clause as provided 
by Directive 85/374/EEC on Liability for Defective Products Study for the European Commission 
Contract No. ETD/2002/B5 
56 The Rosselli Report (n. 55) p. 13 
57 The Rosselli Report (n. 55) p. 13 
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It is evident from Rosselli’s summary of responses to its research58 that a significant 
number of those asked (35.9%) expressed no opinion - suggesting that it was not 
considered an important issue by them. 35% opined that removing the defence would 
hinder innovation. However we do not know the basis for this opinion: whether it was 
suggested to them, thought up independently, or based on supposition or hard 
evidence. Similarly with regard to the opinion that it would be impossible to insure 
development risks (10.7%) it is not known how this conclusion was reached. It may be 
conjecture. 13.6% of those asked felt that society benefits from innovation and should 
accept the development risks.    
 
As for the period monitored by the EU Commission Fourth Report (2006-2010) there 
is little information about the sources of data surveyed, beyond that they came from 
‘national experts and advisory groups’. The Commission states that it ‘sent a 
questionnaire to the Member States and the members of informal advisory groups 
requesting information, in particular concerning the issues raised in the previous 
report.’  
 
Using the same methodology as for the third report, in the Fourth Report 
the Commission invited the national authorities and interested parties who 
are members of the informal advisory groups to express their opinions on 
the application and effectiveness of the Directive during the reference 
period. The task was to assess the practical impact of the Directive and 
the issues raised in the previous report, the different interpretations of 
which by national courts could at times lead to differences in the 
application of the Directive from one Member State to another.59  
 
On the basis of such data, it concluded that in some states there has been an increase 
in the absolute number of PL cases and an increase in the use of the PL Directive in 
contrast with other causes of action. It is submitted however that the basis for this 
conclusion lacks scientific rigour. This is a longstanding problem in the field of PL. 
 
The reasons for this are that:  
 
                                                          
58 The Rosselli Report (n. 55) p. 34 
59 EU Commission Fourth Report, on the application of Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 
on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States 
concerning liability for defective products amended by Directive 1999/34/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 1999, Brussels.9.2011 COM(2011) 547 final pp. 6 & 7 
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- Historically there have not been any reliable systems of data capture; 
- It will always be difficult to capture data on PL because the concept of a product 
is so wide that it overlaps with other areas of legal categorisation. For example, 
a vehicle collision caused by brake failure might be captured by one method as 
a motor claim and by another as a PL claim; 
- Existing data capture systems in this jurisdiction glean very little information 
about claims. It is inconceivable that any ‘informal advisory group’ in the UK 
would pick up information on all PL claims rejected or settled privately by 
insurers;  
- Using Law Reports as a basis for information is unreliable. Only a negligible 
proportion of cases go to court. Many of these are not reported and those that 
are reported are not necessarily representative of PL cases generally; 
- Within the UK one of the most useful data capture tools is the CRU 1 form used 
by the Compensation Recovery Unit of the Department of Work and Pensions 
in order to recover certain sums paid to claimants by way of state benefits and 
NHS charges whether a case is fought or settled.60 This has provided reliable 
data for statistics. However the options for describing the ‘type of liability’ are 
Employer; Public; Motor; Clinical Negligence; and Other. PL claims might fall 
into any of these five categories; 
- There is no reliable means of capturing property damage claims due to PL. 
 
This thesis has the benefit of being able to refer to actual data on PL cases handled 
by the Practice over the past fifteen years. The data sample is inevitably small and 
heavily biased towards one sector of products: automotive. It must therefore be 
acknowledged that there are limitations on the scientific value of this exercise. 
Nevertheless, the quality of the data should be recognised as it adds to the overall 
benefit of the project.  
 
The lack of data also reflects the fact that PL is not a major area of law in the UK. This 
does not mean it is unimportant. On the contrary: 
 
                                                          
60 Social Security (Recovery of Benefits) Regulations 1997 Regulation 6 - Any person receiving a claim 
has a statutory duty to compete this form. 
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a) On 25 April 2013 the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 achieved Royal 
Assent. Section 69 amended section 47 Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 with 
effect from 25 April 2013 to remove civil liability for breach of Health and Safety 
Regulations,61 some of which impose strict liability, unless specific regulations are 
made imposing liability. This leaves injured employees to rely on a cause of action in 
negligence. The arguments which led to this radical change in the substantive law of 
Employers’ Liability,62 including the interaction between strict liability and the 
perception of a ‘compensation culture’, resonate within the field of PL. However, strict 
liability for defective products could not be removed without legislation at European 
level.  
 
Note, however, that a claimant can still make a claim under the (now almost forgotten 
but still in force) Employers Liability (Defective Equipment) Act 1969. However, the 
important point about these Regulations is that they only apply to defective equipment 
– which essentially means products.63  
 
It is arguable that if the manufacturer supplies a defective product such as would give 
rise to liability under the Consumer Protection Act 1987, then this is an ‘act or omission 
                                                          
61 Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 s 47 (2A) ‘Breach of a duty imposed by an existing statutory 
provision shall not be actionable except to the extent that regulations under this section so provide…’ 
62 See Professor Ragnar E Löfstedt, Reclaiming health and safety for all: An independent review of 
health and safety legislation November 2011 Cm 8219. 
< https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/reclaiming-health-and-safety-for-all-lofstedt-report > 
accessed 1 May 2013 and  
Lord Young, Common Sense Common Safety: A report by Lord Young of Graffham to the Prime 
Minister following a Whitehall-wide review of the operation of health and safety laws and the growth of 
the compensation culture. Cabinet Office October 2010  
< https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/common-sense-common-safety-a-report-by-lord-
young-of-graffham > accessed 1 May 2013 
63 The Employers Liability (Defective Equipment) Act 1969 provides: 
1 Extension of employer’s liability for defective equipment. 
(1) Where … 
(a) an employee suffers personal injury in the course of his employment in consequence 
of a defect in equipment provided by his employer for the purposes of the employer’s 
business; and 
(b) the defect is attributable wholly or partly to the fault of a third party (whether identified 
or not), the injury shall be deemed to be also attributable to negligence on the part of the 
employer (whether or not he is liable in respect of the injury apart from this subsection), 
but without prejudice to the law relating to contributory negligence and to any remedy by 
way of contribution or in contract or otherwise which is available to the employer in respect 
of the injury. 
… 
“fault” means negligence, breach of statutory duty or other act or omission which gives rise to liability in 
tort in England and Wales or which is wrongful and gives rise to liability in damages in Scotland; 
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which gives rise to liability in tort’. Thus the employer would be strictly liable for the 
defective product. This places accidents caused by products in a separate liability 
category from other work accidents. The relaxation of the law on employer’s liability is 
defeated in cases that arise from defective products. This is potentially an anomaly. 
Professor Löfstedt,64 in his review for the Government of the burden of health and 
safety legislation on business, referred specifically to the case of Stark v The Post 
Office65 in which an employer was held strictly liable under Reg 6(1) of the Provision 
and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1992 (then in force) for the injury sustained 
by a postman whose bicycle collapsed due to a hidden defect in the frame. Professor 
Löfstedt said  
 
It is not clear that the outcomes are either reasonable or what the 
Government intended. In some cases these duties may be necessary and 
in other cases may be required to comply with a European Directive, but 
awarding compensation on the basis of a technical breach where there is 
no opportunity for the defendant to be aware of the danger, and no actions 
could have been taken to prevent the accident, clearly has the potential to 
stop employers taking a common sense approach to health and safety.66 
 
This was a motivation for the legislative change. However, Stark would probably still 
succeed if he pleaded the Defective Equipment Act. 
 
b) PL is a sub-order of personal injury generally and observations on the costs of 
litigation and on the ability of the legal system to deliver compensation are applicable 
equally to other bases of liability for personal injury;  
 
c) The mere fact that the issues may be relatively small does not mean they should be 
ignored any more than medical science should decline conducting research on a 
disease because it is rare;  
 
d) The Practice is small – 13 fee-earners: there are many other firms of lawyers and 
loss adjusters handling PL cases, in addition to the customer services departments of 
manufacturers and distributors fielding routine complaints extending to many other 
types of product. 
                                                          
64 Löfstedt Report (n. 62)  
65 Stark v Post Office [2000] P.I.Q.R. 105 
66 Löfstedt Report (n. 62)  p. 92 
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METHODOLOGY 
The methodology in this thesis is designed to introduce an original perspective on the 
above questions by  
 
- Establishing a definition of social desirability;  
- Testing three representative case studies from the Practice against this yardstick.  
- Analysing a sample of 132 closed PL files handled over the past 15 years. 
 
1.6 Defining Social Desirability 
 
Social Desirability is intended to convey a measure of the social utility of the matter 
under consideration weighed in the balance against the cost. Fletcher expresses it 
thus: 
 
If the risk yields a net social utility (benefit), the victim is not entitled to 
recover from the risk-creator; if the risk yields a net social disutility (cost), 
the victim is entitled to recover.67 
 
It must be recognised that this is a thesis in ‘Legal Practice’ rather than legal theory. 
In practical terms the social desirability of a law boils down to whether it is good for 
society in the sense that it is a fair distribution of rights taking into account the cost to 
society, not merely financial but in terms of other rights which are compromised. This 
means weighing up whether: 
 
- PL deters accidents;  
- safety and quality of products can be regulated effectively through private 
litigation; 
- imposition of strict liability is apt to correct wrongs; 
- litigation is suitable for public recognition of rights; 
- private revenge is appropriate to a modern society when compared to the built 
in protections of a criminal legal system with its wide range of punishments; 
- Defective products warrant the special protection of a bespoke system of 
liability; 
                                                          
67 George P. Fletcher, ‘Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory’ Harvard Law Review Vol. 85 No. 3 (Jan 
1972), 537-573, p. 542 
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- PL provides necessary compensation for the injured. 
 
Nevertheless, it is important that the practice is firmly grounded in sound legal theory 
to avoid falling foul of Atiyah’s criticism that ‘English lawyers are not only more inclined 
to the pragmatic and somewhat hostile to the theoretical approach, but positively glory 
in this preference.’68 
 
Stapleton explains that whilst introduction of strict liability for defective products in the 
1960s in the US and then in the 1980s in the UK was essentially pragmatic – to protect 
consumers - it is important to examine to what extent it fits into the wider theory of law 
in order to evaluate the law normatively and to interpret difficult cases purposively.69   
 
It is axiomatic that laws provide the framework of rights and duties upon which societal 
relationships are constructed. Laws provide the series of commands to be obeyed to 
enable society to establish controlling norms of behaviour and the rules which enable 
individuals and facilitate the ‘structure of rights and duties for the conduct of life’.70 It 
can reasonably be assumed as a starting point, therefore, that tort law is intended to 
benefit society. 
 
There is a wealth of academic literature on the purposes of tort. The approach 
followed, therefore, has been first to seek to identify the aims which academic writings 
ascribe to the law of tort – and by extension, to the sub-order of PL. Then, the extent 
to which PL achieves these traditional purposes of tort is judged in the context of the 
case studies. The principles distilled from this initial phase of research into the key 
goals of tort, against which PL is measured, are set out as part of this methodology. 
 
Clerk and Lindsell describes the functions of tort as compensation, vindication, 
corrective justice, distributive justice and retribution (tempered by justice, morality and 
                                                          
68 P S Atiyah, ‘Pragmatism and Theory in English Law’ The Hamlyn lectures, Thirty-ninth Series, Pub. 
Stevens 1987 p. 3 
69 Jane Stapleton, Product Liability (n. 9) p. 90 et seq. 
70 H. L. A. Hart ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ Harvard Law Review, Vol. 71 (1958), 
593-529 p. 604 
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policy).71 Atiyah, in ‘Accidents Compensation and the Law’, in a chapter entitled 
‘Functions of Compensation’, describes corrective compensation, redistributive 
compensation, equivalent compensation, substitute and solace, risk allocation, 
punishment, vindication and satisfaction, deterrence and prevention and accident 
prevention.72 It is evident from these descriptions that whether compensation is treated 
as a means to one of the other goals of tort or as a primary goal itself, the following 
key concepts emerge: deterrence and consumer protection; corrective justice; 
retribution; vindication; compensation and distributive justice. These terms are 
explored in more detail in Chapter 2. 
 
1.7 Case Studies 
 
These are sample PL cases that have been handled by the author and are since 
closed and archived. They have been anonymised to preserve client confidentiality. 
Each case study has been placed immediately before the section of the thesis which 
it most directly illustrates, although later sections also refer back to earlier case studies 
where especially relevant. The three studies comprise: 
 
- a claim involving the alleged failure of a hand brake in a car whilst stationary 
on a hill (immediately before Chapter Three on Deterrence) exemplifying the 
lack of deterrent value of UK claims; 
 
- a fatal aircrash in which the controls became jammed by the passenger’s 
harness (immediately before Chapter Five on Corrective Justice). This study 
shows that in complicated cases – such as those involving aviation and 
pharmaceuticals – the outcome is unlikely to be a simple as attributing liability 
to the manufacturer of the defective product. There is a concatenation of 
events and errors. Many parties may potentially be brought in, some facing 
strict liability and other fault based liability. There is no logical reason why 
the manufacturer should be deemed to have perpetrated a wrong in need of 
                                                          
71 Anthony Dugdale and Michael Jones, Clerk and Lindsell on Torts 20th Ed. Chapter 1 ‘Principles of 
Liability in Tort’ (Sweet & Maxwell; 20th Revised edition (22 Oct 2010) ISBN-13: 978-1847037961) p. 7 
et seq 
72 Peter Cane (ed), Atiyah’s Accidents Compensation and the Law 7th Ed. (Cambridge University Press 
2006 ISBN 978-0-521-68931-1) 
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corrective justice whilst fault must be proved in respect of other agents in the 
causal chain, such as the pilot. The PL Directive does nothing to simplify and 
reduce costs in practice. 
 
-  a car engine mounting failure leading to whiplash claims with psychological 
issues (immediately before Chapter Seven on Compensation). This case 
study focuses on the system of compensatory damages under the English 
legal system and whether claims for such damages are socially desirable. 
 
1.8 PL Claims Survey 
 
This is a survey of PL cases handled by the Practice that have been closed and 
archived. The paper files were retrieved from archives and reviewed. The sample 
represents approximately 10 cases per year ranging from the smallest soft tissue 
injuries to paraplegic and fatal cases. These cases are used throughout the thesis to 
illustrate points. Appendix 4 is an Excel Spreadsheet recording the data captured from 
the review of these files. Sheet 1, entitled ‘SURVEY’, contains the criteria examined. 
These include 
 
- Details for identification (subsequently removed for client confidentiality); 
- The date of the accident, the claim and closure; 
- The allegations made; 
- The outcome; 
- The value of the case (assuming liability was not in issue). Where the file 
contained an evaluation of quantum, this was used. Where there was no 
valuation a rough assessment was made using the 12th Edition of the 
Judicial College Guidelines for the Assessment of General Damages.73 The 
post Jackson figures have been used for consistency. These are 10% 
higher than the pre-Jackson figures but the difference is not material in the 
context of the research which is the subject of this thesis. Where there is a 
range of figures, the approach has been reasonably generous to the 
                                                          
73 Guidelines for the Assessment of General Damages in Personal Injury Cases, OUP Oxford; 12 edition 
(19 Sept. 2013), ISBN-10: 019968782X, ISBN-13: 978-0199687824 
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claimant, assuming the higher end of the bracket. If a less generous 
approach had been taken, a few more cases would have fallen into the 
lowest value bracket, but the numbers are not material; 
- Whether any particular aspect of the case had a special relevance to the 
subject matter of this thesis; 
- Whether causation was in issue; 
- Whether a ‘nuisance value offer’ was made, meaning an offer to dispose of 
the case regardless of the actual liability; 
- The division between non-pecuniary damages and pecuniary damages 
claimed. 
 
On sheet two of the Excel file, ‘COUNT’, a further spreadsheet was created converting 
the data into yes/no answers. A ‘yes’ answer is represented by a ‘1’ and a ‘no’ answer 
is represented by a ‘0’. This enabled simple counts to be made. For example it could 
be determined easily that the number of cases worth less than £5,000 was 86 or that 
the number of cases in which overall costs exceeded the ultimate value of the claim 
(taking into account the actual outcome) was 119. 
 
A summary of the analysis of the data together with the full methodology can be found 
at page 327 (immediately before Chapter 11). The raw number of cases is relatively 
small. It is not suggested that there is a flood of PL cases. However the volume of 
cases must be seen in the context of personal injury claims as a whole. A research 
project of the Legal Aid Board Research Unit analysing 762 injury cases identified only 
8 as being PL claims.74 Therefore the figures can be scaled up to reflect the wider 
cross section of personal injury claims.75  
 
 
                                                          
74 Pascoe Pleasence, Legal Aid Board Research Unit, Report of the Case Profiling Study, Personal 
Injury Litigation in Practice, Research Paper 3, (1998) ISBN 0 9529882 2 4 pp. 47-51 & pp. 59-62. 
75 It is also important to note that the one major PL group action handled by the Practice was left out of 
account because it consisted of almost 800 individual claims arising from a common alleged defect. 
The claims failed in their entirety. They were however atypical in that most PL claims involve a single 
claimant; Group Actions are extremely rare; and this would have completely skewed the figures and led 
to misleading results. 
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ORGANISATION OF CHAPTERS 
Chapter 2 defines more clearly the goals of tort by which PL’s desirability is judged. 
Chapter 3 considers whether PL is an effective deterrent against manufacture of 
dangerous products and so protects consumers. It is then asked in Chapter 4 whether 
this is a necessary role in light of the deterrent power of regulation and market forces. 
Chapter 5 tackles the issue of whether PL is required to intervene correctively in the 
manufacturer/consumer relationship and whether it can be said to be correcting a 
wrong when liability is applied strictly, irrespective of fault.  
 
In Chapter 6 the claimant’s need for satisfaction by way of vindication of rights and 
retribution against the wrongdoer is considered. The role of PL in this process is 
questioned both in terms of its ability to fulfil this function and whether society has 
better means of achieving this goal. It is explained in Chapter 7 why strict liability under 
the PL Directive was a mistaken choice for dispensing distributive justice as it was 
founded on confused ideology. 
 
The thesis then turns to the remaining goals of torts that are mainly matters of 
procedural law. Chapter 8 examines the practical implementation of distributive justice 
as delivered by recent reforms. This is necessary because the desirability of PL claims 
cannot be judged without examining the overall system within which claims are 
pursued. The arguments extend beyond PL to tort based personal injury claims 
generally.  
 
The most recognised aim of PL (and tort claims generally) is addressed in Chapter 9: 
to compensate the injured person. The chapter focuses on damages for non-pecuniary 
loss (which make up a considerable proportion of all personal injury damages 
awarded, and the vast majority of damages in smaller claims) and evaluates the 
perceived need for such compensation.  
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This exercise of establishing the jurisprudential basis for damages is contrasted with 
practice in Chapter 10 which demonstrates how compensation in low value76 personal 
injury claims has become a ‘commodity’.  
 
Chapter 11 reaches conclusions as to the shortcomings in the social desirability of PL 
which has failed to deliver compensation in the major inter-jurisdictional cases and 
instead has become a vehicle for generating low value claims of doubtful social 
benefit. 
 
                                                          
76 ‘Low value’ implies that such claims have some value – which might be taken as prejudging the 
fundamental question in this thesis. However, this is more or less a term of art today and so it will be 
used interchangeably with ‘small claims’. 
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CHAPTER TWO - THE SOCIALLY DESIRABLE GOALS OF TORT EXPLAINED 
This Chapter introduces the key goals of tort thought to be socially desirable and 
clarifies their definition for the present purposes. This is important because these goals 
are the benchmark for judging whether PL is socially desirable. The case studies will 
be evaluated by reference to these goals. This analysis is to be preferred to previous 
reviews of PL which are considered to be unreliable because of the lack of robust data 
available or clear criteria upon which to judge PL. 
 
2.1 Deterrence and safety enhancement 
 
A perceived principal benefit of PL is enhanced product safety through deterrence 
against producing dangerous products.  
 
Deterrence works in two ways. The first is a direct effect. A manufacturer who 
produces a defective product may be liable to pay an injured person damages. 
Therefore the manufacturer is discouraged from making defective products and takes 
care. This is the theory underpinning the PL Directive: 
 
Whereas protection of the consumer requires that all producers involved 
in the production process should be made liable, in so far as their finished 
product, component part or any raw material supplied by them was 
defective.77 
 
As James put it 
  
to cut down accidents … the manufacturer is in a peculiarly strategic 
position to improve the safety of his products, so that the pressure of strict 
liability could barely be exerted at a better point ...78 
 
The second means of deterrence is by indirect economic effect. This theory came to 
prominence in the US in the 1970s. The traditional test of negligence was set out in a 
formula known as the ‘Learned Hand Formula’, so-called after the dictum of a judge of 
that name in United States v Carroll Towing, in which he explained that negligence is 
                                                          
77 PL Directive Recital 4 (n. 2) 
78 Fleming James, Jr., ‘General Products — Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without Negligence?’ 24 
TENN. L. REV. 923 (1957); (cited by Easy Case p. 47) 
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a function of three variables: (1) The probability of the accident occurring; (2) the gravity 
of the resulting injury; and (3) the burden of adequate precautions: 
 
… if the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability 
depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < 
PL.79 
 
Calabresi and Hirschoff explain that if the Learned Hand test is applied perfectly, it 
accomplishes the goal of minimising the sum of accident costs and the costs of 
accident avoidance:  
 
By placing the costs of the accident on the injurer when and only when it 
was cheaper for him to avoid the accident costs by appropriate safety 
measures than to pay those costs. Assuming injurers had the requisite 
foresight, this would cause potential injurers to avoid all accidents worth 
avoiding, i.e., those where avoidance costs less than the accident, and to 
have only those accidents not worth avoiding.80 
 
According to Landes and Posner, economic efficiency is a normative foundation for 
tort. For them economic theory provides the complete rationale for causation: 
 
If the basic purpose of tort law is to promote economic efficiency, a 
defendant's conduct will be deemed the cause of an injury when making 
him liable for the consequences of the injury would promote an efficient 
allocation of resources to safety and care; … the injurer ‘causes’ the injury 
when he is the cheaper cost avoider…81 
 
Fundamental to this theory is the concept that ‘costs should be borne by the activity 
which causes them’.82 Thus the economic theory of tort is based on targeting the 
source of accidents and internalising the costs of accident avoidance. Atiyah explains 
how this is supposed to work as a deterrent: 
 
The basic idea is that making people pay for the accidents they cause is 
not so much a deterrent to particular accidents, but is a way of persuading 
them to spend the appropriate levels of money on safety…83 
 
                                                          
79 United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). 
80 Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, ‘Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Tort’, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 
(1972) p. 1057  
81 William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, ‘Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach’ The 
Journal of Legal Studies Vol. 12 No. 1 (Jan 1983) pp. 109-134.  
82 Jane Stapleton, Product Liability (n. 9), p. 102 note 14, citing Calabresi ‘Some thoughts on Risk 
Distribution and the law of Torts’ (1961) 70 Yale LJ 499, 533 
83 P.S. Atiyah, The Damages Lottery (n.13) pp. 165 & 167 
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A simple criticism of this theory is that it fails to explain why liability falls on one of the 
litigants rather than on a third party who might be the cheapest cost avoider: 
 
Economics, in other words, cannot explain the most basic feature of tort 
law, namely, the implicit decision to allocate losses as between respective 
litigants.84   
 
This requisite allocation is explained by Coleman in terms of the need to annul wrongful 
losses and gains: in other words, corrective justice. 
 
2.2 Corrective Justice 
 
The concept of corrective justice is fundamental to tort theory.  It is best explained by 
Weinrib who contrasts two approaches to tort law. The first sees tort as a vehicle for 
achieving independent perceived socially desirable goals (such as, inter alia, 
deterrence). The second envisages tort as a normative force: 
 
Liability reflects a normative relationship between a particular plaintiff and 
a particular defendant. The idea of a wrong in tort law must be understood 
in as giving legal expression to the requirements of fairness between the 
parties and of conceptual coherence within their relationship. On this view, 
tort law involves not the specification of independently desirable goals but 
the disclosure of the normative structure that, as a matter of fairness and 
coherence, is immanent within the relationship of plaintiff and defendant. 
This second approach is what Aristotle termed “corrective justice.”’85 
 
Gardner asks whether corrective justice can properly be called a goal of tort and refers 
to Coleman and Weinrib thinking of tort ‘performing a constitutive as opposed to an 
instrumental role’. However he concludes that: 
 
to fulfil its morally constitutive role, tort law’s norm of corrective justice must 
be evaluated as an instrument … of improved conformity with the very 
moral norm that it helps to constitute.86 
 
The basic precept is that the law intervenes in the ‘relationship’ between the injurer 
and the injured and makes an adjustment to right the wrong. The adjustment is made 
                                                          
84 Jules Coleman, ‘Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain’, The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2 
(Jun., 1982), pp. 421-440 p. 442 footnote 5 
85 Ernest Weinrib, ‘Tort Law as Corrective Justice’:      
<http://ivr-enc.info/index.php?title=Tort_Law_as_Corrective_Justice> accessed 2 November 2011  
86 John Gardner, ‘What is Tort Law For? Part 1: The Place of Corrective Justice’ Legal Research Paper 
Series Paper No 1/2010 January 2010 <  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1538342 > accessed 19 October 
2013 
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on basis of wider deontological considerations than the fortuity of the particular 
accident or injury. As corrective justice is a legal intervention between the claimant 
and defendant, it will be of prime importance in the investigation of the subject of 
compensatory damages.  
 
For corrective justice, the correlative structure of liability matches the 
structure of the injustice that liability corrects…the injustice done by the 
defendant and the injustice suffered by the plaintiff are not independent 
items. Rather, they are the active and passive poles of the same 
injustice...87     
 
Posner88 explains Aristotle’s conception of corrective justice as seeking to equalise a 
disruption of the relationship between the injurer and the injured. The correction is not 
to the wrong per se but to the effect of the wrong. As Aristotle put it: 
 
… it makes no difference whether a good man has defrauded a bad man 
or a bad man a good one … the law looks only to the distinctive character 
of the injury, and treats the parties as equal…89  
 
This is further illustrated by tort’s ‘eggshell skull rule’ which suggests that the rights of 
the injured have primacy over the character of the wrongdoer’s breach of duty. Here 
the damages are unforeseeably higher than would be incurred if the injurer injured an 
ordinary person, yet the injured person is entitled to such damages.  
 
The importance attached to correction of wrongs is evidenced by the contrast between 
the perceived need for compensation for a tortious injury and the absence of need to 
compensate a family when the bread-winner dies of natural causes or as a result of 
an accident with no third party to blame. This may be explained by the absence of 
insult to fairness or justice in the case of a non-negligent injury or illness. Anyone might 
succumb to illness and so there is nothing intrinsically unjust about it. Cane describes 
this thus: ‘by awarding compensation the law aims to restore and redress the balance 
of fairness or justice which the tortfeasor has upset by negligence or by creating risk 
of injury.’90 Lord Bingham explains why it is of benefit to society for the law to intervene, 
                                                          
87 Ernest Weinrib, ‘Tort Law as Corrective Justice’(n. 85) 
88 Richard A. Posner, ‘The Concept of Corrective Justice in Recent Theories of Tort Law’ The Journal 
of Legal Studies Vol. 10 No. 1 (Jan 1981) pp. 187-206. 
89 Aristotle, The Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle (Peters Translation) 14th Edition, Kegan Paul, 
Teench, Trubnee & Co., Ltd. London Book V p. 148 
90 Peter Cane (ed), Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law (n. 72) 
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in terms of the need for justice to be available to people, so that grievances are not 
allowed to build up over unrectified wrongs: 
 
Tort law is about compensating those who are wrongfully injured. But even 
more fundamentally…righting wrongful conduct by one person or a group 
of persons that harms others. If tort law becomes incapable of recognising 
important wrongs and hence incapable of righting them, victims will be left 
with a sense of grievance and the public will be left with a feeling that 
justice is not what it should be.  
 
Per Lord Bingham in Fairchild v Glenhaven91(quoting McLachlin J, extra-
judicially)92 
 
What Lord Bingham seems to be saying is that rights need to be vindicated. Those 
who are wronged must have the means to right the wrong and society must be able to 
see that the wrong has been righted. This cultivates trust in the system and belief that 
the system will be there for everyone if and when they need it. 
 
2.3 Vindication 
 
The rationale for vindication may be twofold and is perhaps best summarised by Lord 
Hewart’s aphorism that it is ‘of fundamental importance that justice should not only be 
done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.’93 The doing of 
justice satisfies the injured person; the visibility of justice being done satisfies society. 
 
It is easy to understand that vindication goes to the root of a tort such as defamation 
but perhaps more difficult to be certain that it has a role in tort generally. However, 
there is a recent striking example of how vindication may have a place in tort, in Ashley 
v Chief Constable of Sussex.94 Here a police officer, PC Sherwood, shot James Ashley 
during a night-time raid on his flat. He was acquitted of murder on the basis of self-
defence. Ashley’s father and son brought a civil action for tortious assault and battery, 
negligence and false imprisonment. The defendant admitted negligence and false 
imprisonment and agreed to pay all damages flowing from the incident, but denied 
                                                          
91 Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd and others Fox v Spousal (Midlands) Ltd Matthews v 
Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (1978) Ltd and others  [2003] 1 AC 32 p. 45 
92 McLachlin J Negligence Law—Proving the Connection, in Mullany and Linden Torts Tomorrow, A 
Tribute to John Fleming LBC Information Services 1998, p. 16 
93 R v Sussex Justices Ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256 p. 259 (Lord Hewart CJ) 
94 Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex [2008] UKHL 25 
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liability for assault and battery on the grounds of self-defence. The House of Lords had 
to consider whether the assault claims should be allowed to proceed to trial. Lord Scott 
of Foscote said that the purposes of damages ‘are not confined to a compensatory 
purpose but include also … a vindicatory purpose’.95  
 
He explained, citing Lord Hope of Craighead in Chester v Afshar,96 that ‘the function 
of the law is to enable rights to be vindicated and to provide remedies when duties 
have been breached.’ The Ashleys were motivated to have the trial not to obtain 
greater damages but to secure ‘public vindication’.97 Lord Carswell considered that 
vindicatory damages should only be available when there is no other remedy which 
will meet the case.98 Using the civil courts to conduct public inquiries was an abuse 
but he did recognise vindication as a goal of tort in some limited circumstances.  
 
Lord Neuberger also acknowledged the principle that there may be appropriate cases 
for a court to allow a case to proceed ‘to vindicate a contention’.99 
 
So whilst the vindicatory nature of damages is acknowledged, it is clear that this role 
is relatively minor and it would be truly exceptional for the courts to allow a claim to 
proceed merely on the basis of vindication. From the claimant’s point of view, his rights 
are vindicated if the wrongdoer is punished or found liable to pay compensation. 
 
2.4 Retribution 
 
The concept of retribution - literally payback – as a goal of tort is one of the major 
differences between the US and UK legal systems. In the UK the paths of retribution 
and compensation diverged long ago. Retribution is a matter for the criminal law in the 
UK.  In the US, punitive damages may be available for PL claims (although not in every 
State) as a means of the jury expressing its outrage at the wrong.100 
 
                                                          
95 Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex (n.94) Lord Scott of Foscote [22] 
96 Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134, [87] 
97 Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex (n. 94) Lord  Scott of Foscote [23] 
98 Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex (n. 94) Lord Carswell [80] 
99 Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex (n. 94) Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury [108] 
100 See generally Helmut Koziol, ‘Punitive Damages - A European Perspective’, 68 La. L. Rev. (2008) 
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Kotler is a lone voice in arguing that punishment is fundamental to tort. He rejects 
instrumentalist theories of tort based on social utility or economic efficiency and argues: 
 
… the development of tort doctrine as a whole can be seen as an attempt 
to punish conduct which violates certain core values that comprise the 
underlying basis of moral intuition. Punishment in this context is not a 
means of accomplishing some other goal - efficient cost allocation or 
accident reduction, for example - but a means of exacting revenge or 
retribution.101 
 
There is perhaps wider support for retribution playing a small subsidiary role in tort. 
Perry suggests retribution may pay a significant role in the layman’s understanding of 
tort.102 He cites a fascinating insight from plaintiff trial lawyer Rheingold, who explains 
that plaintiff lawyers prefer to run a negligence case than one based on strict liability 
because: 
 
It is easier to prevail by showing that the defendant did something wrong 
than that there is something technically defective about the product. It is 
easier to win (and collect substantial damages) by showing that a drug 
company concealed information about side effects than to show that in fact 
there was no warning on the labeling about the risks.103 
 
 
Perry says: 
 
 ‘Empirical evidence suggests that juries do not attempt to promote optimal 
deterrence, but to “punish” wrongdoing, with at most a signal designed to 
ensure that certain misconduct will not happen again.’104 
 
This emphasises a difference between the UK and the US, in that UK lawyers do not 
have to appeal to a Jury.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
101 Martin A. Kotler, ‘Utility, Autonomy and Motive: a Descriptive Model of the Development of Tort 
Doctrine’ Cincinnati Law Review, Vol 58, 1990  1231 – 1281 p. 1232 
102 Ronen Perry, ‘The Role of Retributive Justice in the Common Law of Torts: A descriptive Theory’, 
Tennessee Law Review Vol 73:163 177-236 p. 189 
103 Paul D. Rheingold, ‘The Expanding Liability of the Product Supplier: a Primer’ 2 Hofstra L. Rev. 521 
1974 p. 531 
104 Ronen Perry, ‘The Role of Retributive Justice’ (n.102) p. 228 
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2.5 Distributive justice 
 
 
It can be argued that whatever the specific purposes of tort these fit within an 
overarching scheme of distributive justice. Distributive justice is about the 
apportionment of rights between social groups, whether drivers and pedestrians or 
manufacturers and consumers. Aristotle put it this way: 
 
But of justice as a part of virtue, and of that which is just in the 
corresponding sense, one kind is that which has to do with the distribution 
of honour, wealth, and the other things that are divided among the 
members of the body politic (for in these circumstances it is possible for 
one man's share to be unfair or fair as compared with another's) …105 
 
Cane sees it as a principle of distributing rights and remedies but also as a burden.106  
In tort the right is not to be harmed and the right to corrective justice. The reciprocal 
burden is not to harm and to supply safe products and to repair harm done. Cane 
explains distributive justice as the distribution of the resource and burden of liability.107  
 
the activities of making rules and principles that define the grounds and 
bounds of tort liability and of choosing the rule to be applied to any 
particular case are matters of distribution, while doing corrective justice 
involves applying those rules and principles to individual cases108 
 
The legislature makes decisions of a distributive nature and the courts in their quasi-
legislative role (or clarificatory role – such as defining the extent of the duty of care) 
dispense distributive justice. In their judicial function the courts give effect to corrective 
justice - ‘distributive justice redone following a disruptive intervention’.109 
 
Gardner distinguishes between tort’s role in distributing rights and duties and any 
‘hubristic’ claim that it is has the ability to distribute risks of loss. ‘So tort law is not the 
only (and in some societies may not even be the main) institutional distributor of the 
risk of tortious losses, never mind losses more generally.’110 The point made is that 
                                                          
105 Aristotle, The Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle (n. 89) Book V pp. 143 -144 
106 Peter Cane, ‘Distributive Justice and Tort Law’ 2001 N.Z. L. Rev. 420 2001 p. 401  
107 Peter Cane, ‘Distributive Justice and Tort Law’ (n.106) p. 405 
108 Peter Cane, ‘Distributive Justice and Tort Law’ (n. 106) p. 416 
109 John Gardner, ‘What Is Tort Law For? Part 2. The Place of Distributive Justice’  University of Oxford 
Legal Research Paper Series Paper number 62/2013 (May 2013) Social Science Research Network 
electronic library at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2269615  p. 11 
110 John Gardner ‘What Is Tort Law For? Part 2. The Place of Distributive Justice’  (n. 109) pp. 28 & 29 
45 | P a g e  
 
there are other institutions within society that may pick up losses without the need to 
find a tortfeasor to blame. 
 
However, regardless of whether a particular piece of law has distributive intentions, 
‘tort law has distributive effects that need to be justified if tort law is to be judged an 
acceptable legal and social institution.’111 
 
The relevant social desirability question to be drawn out of this vast area, for present 
purposes, is whether the distribution of rights effected by PL law is objectively fair. 
Harm yields an unfair distribution.112 It is a fundamental principle of law that ‘corrective 
justice involves appealing at a certain stage to the just distribution of risk in a 
society.’113 The question is ‘whether the system justly distributes access to the 
corrective justice it dispenses.’114  
 
This thesis concentrates on the distribution of rights of those injured by products. How 
rights are distributed in society is a matter of politics, reflecting the choices of 
society.115  Cane describes Weinrib’s conception of the distinction between private 
and public law thus: ‘A judgment that a situation is distributively just cannot be made 
without reference to some 'extrinsic' principle of distribution; and such a principle is 
'political'’.116 
 
That is not to say it has no moral basis. Political targets must be grounded by probity 
in addition to economic prudence. The political advancement of the PL Directive 
undoubtedly had a strong moral basis: 
 
                                                          
111 Peter Cane, ‘Distributive Justice and Tort Law’ (n. 106) pp. 404/405 
112 Gregory C. Keating, ‘Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law of Accidents’ (74 SO. CAL. 
LAW REV. 193 (2000)) p. 202 
113 ‘The Morality of Tort Law: Questions and Answers’ in Honoré, Responsibility and Fault (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing 1999), 67 p. 80 
114 John Gardner, ‘What Is Tort Law For? Part 2. The Place of Distributive Justice’  (n. 109) p. 11 
115 John Rawls, ‘Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical’ Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 14, 
No. 3. (Summer, 1985), pp. 223-251; Ernest  J Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law Oxford University 
Press 2012 ISBN 978-0-19-966479-5 p. 210 
116 Peter Cane, ‘Corrective Justice and Correlativity in Private Law The Idea of Private Law by Ernest J 
Weinrib Review’ Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Autumn, 1996), pp. 471-488 p. 425 
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all consumers will be contributing through the prices that they pay for the 
compensation to a few unfortunate injured victims. I do not think that 
anyone would quarrel with that concept. 117 
 
Typically activities subsidised by society as a whole must benefit society as a whole. 
Activities whose benefits are limited in scope to individuals must be paid for privately. 
Examples include healthcare and education. Society is willing to pay for a basic level 
of care and education through taxation. It benefits the whole of society that its 
members are cared for in sickness and are educated. Society will pay for medical 
treatment of even rare diseases, though only a few may require it, because it benefits 
society as a whole to know that should they contract the disease, they will be 
protected. Avraham claims that ‘… few egalitarian theorists, if any, would disagree that 
bodily integrity falls within the core of interests that must be collectively insured, that 
is, inside the DJ machine.’118 
 
However, if individuals want to go beyond the basic levels available to all, and have 
private rooms in hospitals or low teacher/pupil ratios in the classroom, they must pay 
privately. PL does not fit this pattern. Society meets the basic costs of injuries through 
the NHS and sickness benefits. However, individuals do not top up their benefits 
through first party insurance. Perversely, PL insurance is an example of potential 
victims insuring each other rather than themselves. Premiums cannot be geared to the 
amount the potential victim has at stake.119 Consumers cannot opt out.120 Moreover, 
benefits and NHS charges paid by the state are recoverable by the state from the 
compensator.121 
 
At this stage it will help to explain the current disposition of injured persons’ rights. In 
essence, those rights are controlled by a combination of i) social welfare; ii) first party 
insurance; and iii) third party insurance in conjunction with Tort law. 
 
                                                          
117 Mrs Sally Oppenheim, Minister for Consumer Affairs,  
< http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1980/nov/04/european-community-product-liability>  
[1111/2] accessed 17 June 2015 
118 Ronen Avraham ‘Accident law for egalitarians’ Legal Theory 2006, 12(3), 181-224 p. 190 
119 P. S. Atiyah, ‘Compensating the Accident Victim’ The Australian Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Jun., 
1971), 16-24 pp. 17/18 
120 P.S. Atiyah, The Damages Lottery (n. 13) p. 128 
121 The Social Security (Recovery of Benefits) Act 1997 and the Road Traffic (NHS Charges) Act 1999 
47 | P a g e  
 
2.5.1 Social Welfare 
 
Welfare benefits fall under the aegis of the Department of Work and Pensions.122 The 
Department lists among its responsibilities ‘encouraging disabled people and those 
with ill health to work and be independent’ and as a priority ‘helping to reduce poverty 
and improve social justice’ and ‘enabling disabled people to fulfil their potential’.123  
 
Whilst the underlying theme is rehabilitation, the Department also pays benefits for 
those who cannot work or who need assistance to enable them to work. Benefits 
include weekly cash sums and tax exemptions. The following is a brief summary of the 
benefits: 
BENEFIT SUMMARY 
  
Disability Living 
Allowance  
(being replaced by Personal Independence Payment) 
Care component up to £81.30 pw 
Mobility component up to £56.75 pw 
Carer’s Allowance £61.35 pw to help look after someone with substantial 
caring needs 
Employment and 
Support Allowance 
Up to £106.50 pw if illness or disability affects ability to work 
Access to Work A grant for, inter alia, adaptations to equipment; special 
equipment; fares to work 
Attendance 
Allowance 
Up to £81.30 pw to help with personal care due to disability. 
Blind Person's 
Allowance 
Personal tax threshold of £2,230 
Carer’s Credit Credit in respect of National Insurance contributions 
Coal health 
compensation claims 
British Coal and National Coal Board employees affected by 
pneumoconiosis can claim compensation through the Coal 
Workers Pneumoconiosis Scheme (CWPS). 
Disability Living 
Allowance (DLA) for 
children 
Up to £81.30 pw care and £56.75 mobility 
Disability premiums 
(Income Support) 
Up to £31.00 pw 
Disabled Facilities 
Grants  
Help towards the costs of adaptations to housing 
Disabled Students' 
Allowances 
Up to £20,520 pa 
                                                          
122 The DWP is also responsible for Health and Safety. 
123 See DWP website < https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-work-
pensions/about > accessed 26 April 2014  
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Industrial Injuries 
Disablement Benefit 
Up to £166 pw 
Constant Attendance 
Allowance 
Up to £129.40 for care and attention 
VAT Relief VAT exemption on certain goods and services for person 
with disability or long term illness. 
Disabled Child 
Benefits 
Includes childcare; education support; home adaptations; 
care at home; short breaks 
Child Tax Credit Up to £3,100 for a disabled child plus £1,255 if severe 
Incapacity Benefit Being replaced with Employment and Support Allowance  
Income Support Up to £72.40 pw 
Independent Living 
Fund 
Assistance to employ a carer or personal assistant or care 
agency to provide personal care and help with domestic 
duties (now closed)  
Personal 
Independence 
Payment (PIP) 
Replaces Disability Living Allowance (DLA) up to £81.30 pw 
daily living component, £56.75 mobility component 
Reduced Earnings 
Allowance 
Up to £64.64 pw where earnings reduced due to work 
related accident or disease 
Severe Disablement 
Allowance  
Replaced with Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) 
Vaccine Damage 
Payment  
 
One-off tax-free payment of £120,000 for person severely 
disabled as result of vaccination against diphtheria; tetanus; 
pertussis; poliomyelitis; measles; mumps; rubella; 
tuberculosis; haemophilus influenzae type B; meningitis C; 
pneumococcal infection; human papillomavirus; swine flu; 
smallpox 
Table 1 Source DWP https://www.gov.uk 
It is apparent from this brief summary of benefits that the sums might fairly be 
described as the ‘bare minimum’. There is no sum equivalent to general damages for 
pain and suffering and loss of amenity. The sums are more akin to special damage.124 
However, they reflect subsistence amounts for basic needs rather than seeking to 
replace the actual earnings lost through accident, in the way that damages would in 
litigation.  
 
From the following chart it can be seen that that the overall annual budget for disability 
and carer benefits is £21.7bn and working age benefits £19.3bn (after deducting 
Jobseekers Allowance from the total of £24.6bn). Between February 2011 and May 
2012 the average number of benefit claimants (excluding those solely on jobseekers 
                                                          
124 By comparison the basic State Pension at the time of writing is £113.10 pw and Jobseeker’s 
Allowance (unemployment benefit) up to £72.40 pw. 
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allowance or widows benefit) was 4,301,471125 (out of a total population of 63.61 
million 2012.)126  On that basis the average annual benefit is a little under £9,000. 
 
Figure 1 Source DWP http://transparency.number10.gov.uk/assets/client/pdf/dwp-
expenditure.pdf  accessed 21 April 2014 09:02 
It will be considered in Chapter 7 whether an extension of the system to cover accident 
claims currently dealt with by tort, along the lines of the no-fault accident compensation 
system in place in New Zealand,127 might be more desirable than the existing system. 
 
2.5.2 First Party Insurance 
 
First Party insurance is a term for insurance that pays the insured in respect of loss or 
damage to the insured property, in contrast with third party insurance which 
indemnifies an insured in relation to the insured’s liability to a third party. A typical 
motor policy is a combination of first and third party insurance. The first party element 
pays out the value of the loss where the insured’s vehicle is damaged or stolen.  
 
                                                          
125 <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/about-ons/business-transparency/freedom-of-information/what-can-i-
request/previous-foi-requests/economy/gdp/benefits-data.xls accessed 26 April 2014  
126 < http://data.worldbank.org/country/united-kingdom  >accessed 26 April 2014  
127 See Accident Compensation Corporation website <http://www.acc.co.nz/  > accessed 26 April 2014  
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First party insurance is available to cover a number of potential losses suffered by an 
insured. Relevant examples include: Health Insurance; Personal Accident Insurance; 
Life Insurance; and Property Insurance. Critical Illness cover can also be purchased. 
Atiyah observes: ‘Whatever the reason may be, few people insure their own earning 
capacity although this is by far the most valuable asset that the ordinary person has.’128 
Polinsky and Shavel make the point that people do not generally buy first party 
insurance for pain and suffering – because they do not want it.129 The reality may be 
that if tort did not exist, a market would be generated for such insurance and it would 
become more sophisticated and more easily available. At present typical Personal 
Accident policies pay small sums and require serious incapacitating injuries, such as 
death, loss of one or more limbs, loss of sight and permanent total inability to attend 
any occupation or business.130 
 
First party insurance may be either indemnity insurance or contingency insurance.131 
The difference may be explained as follows: indemnity insurance indemnifies the 
Insured up to an agreed amount in respect of a particular provable loss in the event 
that the loss is suffered, whereas contingency pays out an agreed sum in respect of a 
loss that has no specific value, in the event that a contingency occurs. By way of 
illustration, private medical insurance (such as BUPA) is indemnity insurance whereas 
life and personal accident insurance is contingency insurance. The significance here 
is that indemnity insurance is taken into account in a tort claim in the sense that the 
insurer who pays out becomes subrogated to the insured’s right of recovery in tort. 
Therefore the injured insured can only recover his actual loss. If he has the benefit of 
insurance, he recovers his loss from the insurer who then has the option of recovering 
the same from a liable third party. However, in the case of accident insurance, the 
insurer does not have a right of subrogation. Therefore the injured insured may recover 
twice. He may collect his payment under the insurance and additionally recover 
damages in tort from a responsible third party. 
 
… an accident insurance policy, the moneys from which he can deploy as 
he cares between the payment of his medical expenses and the 
                                                          
128 P. S. Atiyah, ‘Compensating the Accident Victim’ (n. 119) p. 20 
129 Uneasy Case (n. 1) p. 31 
130 See for example  < http://www.theaa.com/insurance/car-insurance-motor-accident-plan.html > 
accessed 8 April 2015 
131 See Malcolm A. Clarke, The Law of Insurance Contracts, 4th Ed 2002, ISBN 1-84311-170-5 p. 111 
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replenishment of his lost earnings, or which indeed he may spend in any 
other way he chooses. Here there should be no deduction …132 
 
 
2.5.3 Third Party Insurance and Tort  
 
Recovery in tort is inexorably bound up with the incidence of insurance: whether 
indirectly - because liabilities are usually insured; or directly - because the courts might 
go so far as to consider the availability of insurance in reaching their decisions on legal 
duties. 
 
… the number of comments indicating that the existence of liability 
insurance is a relevant consideration, made both before and after 1995 is 
now too large to be dismissed summarily.133 
 
If the overall policy of distribution of rights in PL is based on tort backed by insurance, 
it is submitted that it is an excessively permeable policy. There is no compulsory 
insurance in the field of PL, as there is in the fields of Motor Insurance and Employers’ 
Liability. The relevance of this is that whilst it might be argued that there is a coherent 
policy of distributive justice in relation to road traffic accidents and accidents at work, 
no such case can be made in respect of PL. Some defendants may not have liability 
insurance for a variety of reasons and this could leave the injured party with nothing 
more than a paper judgment. PL Claimants face a greater degree of recovery risk than 
those injured on the road or in the workplace. 
 
Reliance on the law of tort introduces a high degree of chance, not merely in 
causation134 but also in the procedure of civil litigation. The nature of a trial is such that 
there is a considerable element of chance. Unless there are special reasons for going 
to trial it might be presumed that both parties have been advised that they have better 
than even prospects of winning. One side will lose. Most cases do not reach court but 
the costs risks engineered by CPR Part 36 render injury litigation a calculated gamble. 
In considering the social desirability of PL, a relevant question is whether a remedy is 
necessary or merely a desirable bonus or windfall. If it is necessary, then why should 
                                                          
132 Harvey McGregor, McGregor on Damages Eighteenth Edition 2009 ISBN13: 9781847034984 
ISBN: 1847034985  35-225 p. 1429; see also Tettenborn, ‘Case Comment Personal injury claims and 
assignment: interesting times?’ P.N. 2012, 28(1), 61-66 p. 65 notes 24 to 29. 
133 Merkin, ‘Tort, Insurance and Ideology: Further Thoughts’ (2012) 75(3) MLR 301–323 p. 323 
134 Tony Honoré, Responsibility and Luck, L.Q.R. 1988, 104(Oct), 530-553 
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recovery be subject to a gamble, rather than by way of a straightforward right, 
enforceable procedurally with certainty? 
 
It is submitted that if one were to design from scratch a system of distribution of rights 
arising from injuries, the idea of introducing an element of gambling in the procedure 
might be considered strange. Fairness demands certainty, yet a claimant faces an 
artificial obstacle to recovery. If damages for PL are necessary, then it is even more 
curious that such an obstacle would be put in the way of recovery.  
 
The need for lawyers in the process is also a factor to take into account in judging 
desirability. Tort involves heavy transactional element. Bringing a claim usually 
requires a claimant to employ a lawyer. The Jackson Reforms are focused on trying 
to rationalise minimise and distribute the burden of the costs of that process. By 
comparison, if PL were simply a matter of making an insurance claim under an 
Accident Insurance policy, it would not be necessary to involve a lawyer to pursue the 
claim. Lawyers would only rarely be involved in a small minority of claims where a live 
dispute arose. Making a claim would be procedural and usually non-contentious. 
However, Lord Justice Jackson’s reforms did not start with a blank canvas. He had the 
task of balancing the interests of all those already involved in the litigation industry: 
not merely a distribution of rights between claimants and defendants but also between 
lawyers, doctors, court staff and insurers. What is wrong, it may be asked, with these 
professionals making an honest living? If society considers that these transactional 
costs are justified in providing rights of recovery to injured claimants then, superficially, 
nothing is wrong. However the situation is more complicated than this: 
 
a) People may not understand the costs involved in litigation. In the experience of the 
Practice, insured defendants who have not had experience of the litigation process 
are often horrified by the process and the costs involved; 
 
b) Wealth maximisation must not trump morality. Posner seeks to justify a market in 
‘Babies and Body Parts’. He explains that, at the time of his article, there was a 
shortage of babies for adoption and says that for an economist, for whom wealth 
maximisation is the guiding normative principle, there is no immorality in the sale of 
babies. A regulated market would be preferable to a black market. Likewise where 
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there is an acute shortage of kidneys, a free market in kidneys would be ‘wealth 
maximising and a good thing’. Posner acknowledges contradictory arguments such as 
the psychological effect on the babies having been bought, and the potential 
encouragement of eugenic breeding but dismisses them as ‘thin and unconvincing’.135  
Moazid is critical of Posnerian wealth maximisation:  
 
…the economic calculus treats human beings as mere numerical units like 
any other fungible commodity, and is consequently able to override 
morality and legal rights in the interest of efficiency...136 
 
It is submitted that Posner fails to consider the undesirability of a potential army of 
‘baby farmers’ or ‘kidney farmers’ canvassing people with a view to persuading them 
to sell a kidney or a baby in the way that ‘claims farmers’ have been able to market 
their services in the name of Access to Justice. An acknowledgement that such 
activities may be a ‘problem’ and may need to be regulated has been made in the 
court of Appeal by Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers CJ on behalf of himself and 
Longmore LJ: 
 
I accept that the activities of “ambulance-chasing” claims farmers may 
have an adverse effect but it seems to me that the way to deal with that 
problem is by the regulation of their activities rather than by taking 
measures affecting the substantive law.137 
 
Chapter 8 examines key parts of the Jackson reforms that have a major impact on the 
distribution of rights between claimants and defendants and reviews whether the 
procedures now in place represent a fair distribution of rights. 
 
 
2.6 Compensation   
 
Compensation developed as a substitute for talionic punishments.138 The theory is that 
both punitive and compensatory remedies evolved from the lex talionis: the retaliatory 
laws described in Exodus. Talionis means ‘of such kind’. It denotes retaliation on a 
                                                          
135 Richard A. Posner, ‘Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory’ The Journal of Legal Studies Vol. 
8 No. 1 (Jan 1979) pp. 103-140 
136 Ali Moazed, ‘Posner in pursuit of wealth: taking rights seriously’ UCL Juris. Rev. 1997, 4, 1-24 p. 22 
137 Rothwell v Chemical & Insulating Co Ltd and another [2006] I.C.R 1458 at [140] 
138 Francesco Parisi, ‘The Genesis of Liability in Ancient Law’ American Law and Economics Review, 
Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 82-124, 2001 
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kind for kind basis (an eye for an eye; a tooth for a tooth).139 Parisi explains that the 
transition from unregulated retaliation to monetary compensation was a gradual 
endogenous evolutionary process – from personal revenge to measured pecuniary 
penalties. Compensation replaced retribution. 
 
There are two distinct academic approaches to the purpose of compensation in 
modern times. The first sees compensation as one of several goals of tort: deterrence; 
retribution; vindication and satisfaction; correcting wrongs; compensating loss. 
Weinrib says: ‘One approach sees tort law as forwarding independently desirable 
goals (such as loss spreading, compensation, economic efficiency, deterrence, and 
punishment)...’140 
 
Fletcher, comments:  
 
The fashionable questions of the time are instrumentalist:  What social 
value does the rule of liability further in this case? Does it advance a 
desirable goal, such as compensation, deterrence, risk-distribution, or 
minimization of accident costs?141  
 
Honoré goes further in asserting the primacy of compensation as a goal of tort. Clerk 
& Lindsell borrows heavily from Honoré’s work describing the function of tort as ‘to 
define and give content to people’s rights by providing them with a mechanism for 
protecting them and securing compensation if their rights are infringed’.142 Thus 
compensation is seen not merely as a tool of tort law but as the ultimate objective of 
tort.  
 
The second approach is that compensation is merely one of the means by which tort 
seeks to achieve its goals, rather than a goal in its own right. In other words it may be 
that wrongs can be righted without compensation. If this is correct it is necessary to 
consider the relative merits of compensation and other means by which the goals of 
tort are achieved. Certainly this understanding is consistent with Atiyah in Accidents 
                                                          
139 ‘23  And if any mischief follow, then thou shalt give life for life, 
24  eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, 
25  burning for burning, wound for wound, stripe for stripe.’  Exodus 21:23 
140 Ernest Weinrib, Tort Law as Corrective Justice (n. 85) p. 85 
141 George P. Fletcher, ‘Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory’ (n. 67) p. 538 
142 Honoré, ‘The Morality of Law in Owen (ed), Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law’ Oxford (1995), 
p. 75. 
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Compensation and the Law143  when he describes, in a chapter entitled ‘Functions of 
Compensation’: corrective compensation, redistributive compensation, equivalent 
compensation, substitute and solace, risk allocation, punishment, vindication and 
satisfaction, deterrence and prevention. In other words compensation is the means by 
which to achieve these separate goals. 
 
Both Fletcher and Weinrib above (page 54) assumed the desirability of compensation. 
Weinrib writes of ‘independently desirable goals’ and Fletcher starts with the 
fundamental assumption that compensation is a ‘desirable goal’ in itself. Importantly, 
Fletcher uses the term by way of contrast with deterrence. 
 
The significance of these points should not be underestimated. The perception that 
compensation is a socially desirable goal in its own right permeates substantive and 
procedural policy. In terms of substantive law, it underpins the PL Directive: 
 
The right to compensation of a victim who has suffered damage through 
using or consuming a defective product, or through exposure to a defective 
product, is essential in a single market open to everyone.144  
 
Not merely compensation but full compensation is needed:  
 
protection of the consumer requires that the injured person should be able 
to claim full compensation for the damage …145  
 
As far as procedural reforms are concerned, both the Jackson Reforms and the Woolf 
Reforms before them are predicated on this misconception. They assume that 
compensation is unquestionably of benefit to society and merely modify the procedure 
by which litigation delivers that compensation. This is one of the unlearnt lessons of 
the failure of the Woolf Reforms, perpetuated in the Jackson reforms. 
 
However, it will be argued that it should not simply be assumed that compensation is 
desirable per se. Furthermore, even if compensation is desirable (as it undoubtedly is 
in many cases), it is not necessarily a rationale for PL law. The questions that need to 
                                                          
143 Cane (ed), Atiyah’s Accidents Compensation and the Law (n. 72) 
144 Green Paper (n. 45) p. 6 
145 PL Directive Recital 5 (n. 2) 
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be answered are what purpose does compensation actually fulfil? Does it make good 
the damage suffered? If not, why is it deemed to be necessary? 
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Case Study 1: Deterrence  
 
Martin v Kudo (GB) Motor Company146 
 
This claim began with a request to Kudo to examine a vehicle that had been involved 
in an incident on 14 April 2007 in which the vehicle’s handbrake had allegedly failed. 
 
Kudo inspected the vehicle on 18 April 2007. It took the car to an independent MOT 
test station who confirmed that the parking brake efficiency was 26%, this being 10% 
above the required legislation. The parking brake adjustment/travel was checked 
against the factory specifications of 4-6 clicks at 20Kgf. 
 
The incline where the vehicle had been parked was measured and found to be at 4°. 
The parking brake was applied in the following sequence and the result noted. 
Table 2 Handbrake test results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On 31 July 2008 Kudo received a solicitor’s letter claiming that Martin had parked his 
Kudo vehicle on an incline with the hand brake applied and whilst he was at the rear 
of the vehicle with his daughter and wife, the vehicle began to roll backwards. They 
allege negligence and lack of fitness for purpose and enclose an engineer’s report. It 
was alleged that Martin injured his back as a result of the incident and also suffered 
time off work due to the injury. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
146 See Appendix 1 for verbatim extracts from the key documents in the case. The only alteration is to 
the parties’ names for anonymity. 
Parking lever 
clicks 
Result 
1 Vehicle Moved 
2 Vehicle Moved 
3 Vehicle Moved but parking brake 
could be felt to be operating 
4 Vehicle held stationary 
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The engineer measured the force required to raise the hand brake a click at a 
time: 
 
Table 3 handbrake application force measurements 
Number of Clicks  Force 
1 Click 5.56 Kgf 
2 Clicks 6.21 Kgf 
3 Clicks 10.23 Kgf 
4 Clicks 24.71 Kgf 
5 Clicks 16.74 Kgf 
6 Clicks 30.00 Kgf 
 
 
Martin was asked to park the car on a 15° incline and the brake pulled on ‘normally’. 
After standing for 10 minutes, no movement of the car was detected. 
 
Critically, Martin’s expert stated that he could find no mechanical fault with the parking 
brake which operated both near side and off side rear brakes as designed. However, 
he reported that it became more difficult to pull the brake up, the further the hand brake 
was pulled past the fourth click. This position on the hand brake would not fully hold 
the vehicle on the 15° slope, and a further click requiring 24.71 Kgf was needed to 
retain the car fully in its position.  
 
Martin found some papers in the car which had been left there inadvertently by the 
Kudo engineer who inspected it. Martin’s expert referred to these and in particular a 
Kudo campaign which required this model to be checked for braking efficiency and, if 
it was below the MOT standard, a process of buffing and bedding in the shoes was 
required. In addition, the papers included a note from a Kudo engineer expressing an 
unfavourable opinion about the strength required to pull a hand brake on to hold a car 
on a 12° hill. 
 
Kudo’s expert could not usefully examine the car as his involvement (due to the issue 
of proceedings) was some 3 years after the event. However, using Martin’s own test 
data he observed that Martin’s expert failed to equate his physical effort with the 
parking brake’s efficiency. In fact Martin’s expert had established little more than that 
once the brake shoes were in contact with the drum it became harder to pull up the 
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lever (i.e. more force was required), which is to be expected because pulling the lever 
upwards tensions the parking brake cables. 
 
Once the car started to move, it would have been relatively difficult for anybody to stop 
it moving by pulling up the parking brake lever, because parking brakes are not 
designed or intended to be used efficiently to bring moving vehicles to a standstill. 
 
Proceedings were issued alleging that Kudo (GB) was the manufacturer of the vehicle 
purchased by Martin’s wife. The vehicle had been parked on an incline with the hand 
brake applied but the hand brake failed so that the vehicle began to roll backwards. 
Martin was putting his daughter into a pram and attempted physically to arrest the roll 
of the vehicle and in doing so suffered injury. 
 
Martin pleaded specifically that the brake was defective under the Consumer 
Protection Act 1987 because it took ‘5 clicks on the ratchet’ to hold it on a 15° slope 
which required a force of is 24.7I Kgf and that this was because the friction surface of 
the brake had required buffing and bedding in, relying on the document inadvertently 
left by the engineer. Alternatively it was claimed that Kudo was negligent in fitting a 
hand brake which required excessive force to retain the vehicle on a slope, and failing 
to recall the vehicle. 
 
Martin’s injuries were pleaded as soft tissue injuries to the neck, back, upper limbs 
and lower limbs; pain, discomfort and restriction of movement; shock and upset. There 
were special damages: 
 
Table 4 Special damages 
Damage to pram £90.00 
 
Miscellaneous travel expenses, 
telephone calls, postal charges etc 
£50.00 
Loss of earnings (details awaited from 
Claimant's employer) 
£ TBA 
   
  
In its defence Kudo pleaded that the vehicle had been checked at an MOT test station 
and passed the test: the brake did as a matter of fact operate to specification. Mr 
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Martin’s contributory negligence was put in issue, in failing to apply the handbrake 
properly and failing to leave the vehicle in gear when parking on a slope in accordance 
with the Highway Code.  
 
A nuisance value CPR Part 36 offer of £2,000 plus costs to be assessed was made 
on 17 May 2010 and when this was rejected, the offer was withdrawn and the defence 
was amended to plead that the design complied with the EU Directive147 (the Braking 
Devices Directive) specifying the limits of force allowed to apply a hand brake, which 
permits a design which requires up to 400N of input force (equivalent to approximately 
40.8 kgf). 
 
Martin was invited on 6 August 2010 to discontinue in the face of this pleading, on the 
basis that Kudo would bear its own costs. This met a detailed reply from Martin’s expert  
that the brakes had not been 'buffed' or 'bedded in' properly as evidenced by the fact 
that Martin said he applied the brake in his ‘normal way’ but it failed to hold the car. 
He claimed that the VOSA Type Approval manual requires that the brake be capable 
of being ‘operated and released whether the vehicle is stationary or moving’ and that 
the car failed to hold when Martin’s wife applied the brake: thus it failed to conform to 
the manual. 
 
As for the MOT test, he speculated as to whether the tester would have used one hand 
or two to pull the brake on, concluding that testers ‘do have a tendency to use both 
hands …’. 
 
He refused to accept that the specification in the Braking Devices Directive was 
appropriate, questioning the figure of 40 kgf or 400N and referred to guidance on 
handling weights while seated in the Manual Handling Operations Regulations 1992. 
 
Finally he explained that as Martin’s representatives were not present at the MOT 
testing of the car, ‘it could well be’ that the brakes were ‘buffed in’ before the test.  
 
                                                          
147 COUNCIL DIRECTIVE of 26 July 1971 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to the braking devices of certain categories of motor vehicles and of their trailers (71/320/EEC) 
OJ L 202, 6.9.1971, p. 37)  
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Martin’s medical evidence comprised a report from a GP listing numerous minor 
injuries to his neck, shoulders, back, spine, legs, elbows, wrists, knees, heels and toes 
as reported to him by Martin, and moderate to severe anxiety whilst driving (all this 
one year and four months after the incident). 
 
Martin is said to have been on sick leave from his job as a financial advisor for the past 
two months. His injuries are claimed to have affected his ability to lift, his ability to look 
after his children, his sex life, management of his personal care, and his ability to play 
a range of sports. 
 
The doctor’s opinion was that ‘some of the symptoms are not related to the accident’ 
and recommended examination by a rheumatologist. He added that ‘perseverance of 
travelling will improve self confidence in travelling and hence will also help him with 
his psychological recovery.’ 
 
On 4 October 2010 a Calderbank offer of £5,000 inclusive of costs was made by Kudo. 
On 15 December 2010 Martin made a CPR Part 36 offer to accept £2,000 plus costs. 
The damages were equal to Kudo’s original withdrawn offer but Martin’s costs were 
by then considerably higher. Martin’s solicitors indicated that their disbursements 
exceeded £4,000. Kudo responded with an all-inclusive Calderbank offer of £7,500 on 
1 March 2011. This was not accepted. 
 
The case proceeded to trial and judgment was given for Kudo with costs assessed at 
£20,000. 
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CHAPTER THREE – PL FAILS TO DETER 
 
‘…dans ce pays-ci, il est bon de tuer de temps en temps un amiral pour 
encourager les autres’ 
                 Voltaire, 1759148 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
3.1 Consumer Protection means deterrence. 
 
The fourth recital to the PL Directive states that ‘protection of the consumer requires 
that all producers involved in the production process should be made liable, insofar as 
their finished product…was defective…’ This implies that there must be a correlation 
between liability and consumer protection. It is not expressly explained how the 
Directive provides ‘protection of the consumer’. Whilst damages may compensate an 
injured claimant, it is not clear that this protects them in any way. Protection suggests 
a preventative element. If the making of defective products is deterred, consumers in 
general will be protected. Indeed one of the bases on which Goldberg and Zipursky 
justify PL is that ‘it contributes in direct and indirect ways to deterrence’.149 
 
Deterrence is arguably a more important justification for PL than individual 
compensation, in the sense that it benefits society as a whole, whereas compensation 
benefits only the few individuals who have cause to bring a claim. 
 
This chapter considers whether, in the UK, PL law acts as a deterrent against making 
defective products and thus protects consumers. The key questions are a) whether PL 
is effective as a direct or indirect deterrent; and b) whether there are better deterrents, 
rendering nugatory PL’s deterrent qualities.  
 
It will be argued in this chapter that PL’s deterrent effect in the UK is subliminal. There 
are a number of reasons for this, some of which are which are particular to the UK PL 
regime and others of which apply more generally. These include the following: 
                                                          
148 Voltaire, Candide, ou L’Optimisme, Paris 1759 
149 The Easy Case (n.11) 
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- Awards in the UK are too small to hurt any but the smallest manufacturers, in 
comparison with the US, where the principal reason that tort acts as a deterrent is 
that awards may be large enough to damage the defendant;  
- Strict Liability under the PL Directive is inapt to incentivise the producer to take 
care; 
- PL is indiscriminate in its effect and fails to target the decision makers able to 
affect the safety of the product; 
- PL may ‘over-deter’ so that producers abandon production of products involving 
risk, to the detriment of the consumer; 
 
SCALE OF AWARDS 
3.2 By comparison with US awards, UK damages awards are too small to deter 
 
Products liability verdicts have become so run-of-the-mill that even nine-
digit verdicts and their aftermath receive only local or specialty press 
coverage, with cursory national coverage150 
 
It is unsurprising to find that PL awards have a deterrent effect in the US. The scale of 
awards and potential awards is so great that they cannot be ignored. In contrast, 
awards in the UK are too small to have any appreciable deterrent effect. In the Kudo 
Case Study, damages were eventually agreed, subject to liability, at £2,000: a sum 
that bears no comparison with damages in US PL claims where ‘The possibility of 
jackpot-size damages gives an incentive to plaintiffs’ attorneys to pursue cases of 
questionable social utility and merit’151 – in addition, presumably, to claims of 
unquestionable social utility and merit. In the PL Claims Survey (Appendix 4) 65.6% 
of all claims were quantified at less than £5,000. 
 
There are two main reasons for the disparity between US and UK awards. The first is 
that punitive damages may be available in PL claims in many States and these are out 
of proportion to compensation levels for injuries in the UK. Second, class actions in PL 
                                                          
150 Ted Frank, ‘Rollover Economics: Arbitrary and Capricious PL Regimes’, AEI OUTLOOK SERIES 
(Am. Enterprise Inst. for Pub. Pol’y Res., AEI Online, Wash., D.C.) Jan. 4, 2007, page 1 available at 
<http://www.aei.org/outlook/25395 > accessed 12 November 2012  
151 Ted Frank, ‘Rollover Economics: Arbitrary and Capricious PL Regimes’ (n. 150) 
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cases in the US can generate huge damages awards due to the sheer number of 
claimants within a class.  
 
3.2.1 Punitive damages may be available in the US but not in the UK 
 
The first significant punitive damages award in a PL claim was in 1978 in Grimshaw v 
Ford Motor Co152 when a jury awarded $125m in a case arising from the death of a 
driver and serious injury to a passenger when their Ford Pinto burst into flames after 
being struck from behind, due to the location of the fuel tank. The jury found that Ford 
knew about the danger and had an inexpensive remedy for it which it failed to apply 
because of the cost. The award was ultimately reduced to $3.5m, still a substantial 
sum in the 1970s, which was affirmed by the California Court of Appeals, 
characterising Ford’s behaviour as ‘reprehensible in the extreme’.153 Owen concluded 
that punitive damages constitute a beneficial ‘tool of legal control over corporate 
abuses’ but also expressed concerns about abuses of the punitive damages doctrine. 
He saw punitive damages as having a place in appropriate cases as a matter of 
principle but noted that large awards were becoming ‘almost common’ and might at 
some stage threaten the stability of industry.154 Punitive damages are recoverable in 
all but 5 States according to a comprehensive state by state review of punitive 
damages by US PL law firm Wilson Elser.155 Furthermore, punitive damages are 
uninsurable as being against public policy (unless imposed vicariously), in about 20 
States.156  
 
Such awards are made by juries to reflect reprehensible conduct by the defendant and 
act as a strong deterrent against delinquency. In Buell-Wilson v Ford Motor Co157 a 
jury awarded $368m to the plaintiff, who was paralysed when her SUV overturned in 
                                                          
152 Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Company  No. 19-77-61 (Super. Ct., Orange Cty., Cal., Feb. 7, 1978), 
aff'd as amended, 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981). 
153 Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Company (n.152) p. 388 
154 David G. Owen, ‘Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective 
Products’ 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 1982 p. 59  
155 Wilson Elser Punitive Damages Review 
< http://sites.wilsonelser.vuturevx.com/26/373/landing-pages/web-form-12-2013.asp  > accessed 8 
April 2015 
156 Dan A. Bailey, ‘Insuring Uninsurable Punitive Damages’ <www.baileycavalieri.com > accessed 10 
June 2013  
157 Buell-Wilson v. Ford Motor Co., 141 Cal. App. 4th 525 (2006). 
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swerving to avoid a piece of metal falling from a motor-home. The California Court of 
Appeals decided that this Award was the “product of passion and prejudice” and 
reduced the total non-economic damages to $23 million, with another $55 million in 
punitive damages - still a sum larger by orders of magnitude than would be awarded 
in a UK case.  
 
3.2.2 The arbitrariness of punitive damages awards enhances their deterrent effect 
 
Frank observes that the arbitrariness of such awards ‘… is highlighted by the appellate 
court’s reasoning that damages should be capped at $18 million because that was all 
that the plaintiffs’ attorney thought to ask for in his closing argument…’.158 By contrast, 
it has been argued that emphasis on the arbitrariness of damages and the comparison 
between damages and a lottery159 is misleading ‘aimed at undermining public 
confidence in the tort system in order to strengthen popular support for various 
reforms.’160 The argument is that the outcome of litigation ‘is far from being a lottery-
like system of random outcomes’. Whether or not this is accepted, the sums potentially 
involved certainly have the flavour of lottery wins. Unlike a lottery, however, in which 
the lottery organiser controls the amount of money paid out and so always wins, in 
litigation the defendant may involuntarily be drawn into the plaintiff’s gamble. In this 
way the defendant stands to lose a large (or possibly enormous) sum of money. That 
is the deterrent. 
 
3.2.3 There is no equivalent to US punitive damages in the UK 
 
There is nothing remotely similar to US style punitive damages in the UK, the closest 
concept being exemplary damages, which are trivial in comparison and limited in 
application.161 Indeed as a matter of European Law, punitive damages are generally 
discouraged. According to Recital 32 of Rome II: 
 
                                                          
158 Ted Frank, ‘Rollover Economics: Arbitrary and Capricious PL Regimes’ (n. 150) 
159 See generally P.S. Atiyah, The Damages Lottery (n. 13) 
160 Timothy D. Lytton Robert L. Rabin and Peter H. Schuck, ‘Tort as a Litigation Lottery: A Misconceived 
Metaphor’ Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:267] p. 278 
161 See generally The Law Commission Item 2 of the Sixth Programme of Law Reform: Damages 
Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary Damages LC 247  
<http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc247_aggravated_exemplary_and_restitutionary_damage
s.pdf > accessed 27 May  
66 | P a g e  
 
In particular, the application of a provision of the law designated by this 
Regulation which would have the effect of causing non-compensatory 
exemplary or punitive damages of an excessive nature to be awarded 
may, depending on the circumstances of the case and the legal order of 
the Member State of the court seised, be regarded as being contrary to 
the public policy (ordre public) of the forum.162 
 
Moreover, it is acknowledged that ordinary damages (non-punitive damages) do not 
have a deterrent effect: 
 
Damage awards equal to the victim's damages provide inadequate 
deterrence against such deliberate, concealed harms, since the 
wrongdoer's expected damage payment is frequently less than his 
immediate gain.163 
 
3.2.4. US class actions may generate huge awards which cannot fail to deter 
 
The position is magnified in class actions: collective actions which can pull in hundreds 
or thousands of plaintiffs.164 The highest reported class action award by a jury is 
$144.8bn against ‘the tobacco industry’165 - although this was ultimately overturned by 
the Florida Supreme Court. That is not the end of the story, however, as the main 
players in the US tobacco industry entered into an industry-wide Master Settlement 
Agreement166 with 46 States to settle Medicaid costs and fund anti-smoking 
advertising in return for immunity from suit, under which each manufacturer agreed 
with various States to pay its market share of around $8bn per annum, totalling in 
excess of $200bn. Unsurprisingly, there has been litigation over the exact payments 
under this agreement. 
 
                                                          
162 REGULATION (EC) No 864/2007 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 
11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) Official Journal of the 
European Union L 199/40 31.7.2007 
163 William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, ‘New Light on Punitive Damages’ Regulation, 
September/October 1986 33 p. 33 
164 See generally for a concise description of the US Class Action: Michael Black QC Ingrid Gubbay His 
Honour Judge Graham Jones Alistair Kinley Professor Rachael Mulheron Robert Musgrove John 
Sorabji Improving Access to Justice through Collective Actions: Developing a More Efficient and 
Effective Procedure for Collective Actions  A Series of Recommendations to the Lord Chancellor Civil 
Justice Council Final Report November 2008 
<http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/judicial-
institute/files/Improving_Access_to_Justice_through_Collective_Actions_-_final_report.pdf > accessed 
4 February 2015  
165 Brian H. Barr, ‘Engle v. R.J. Reynolds: the Improper Assessment of Punitive Damages for an Entire 
Class of Injured Smokers’ Florida State University Law Review 2001 [Vol. 28:787] 
166 RJ Reynolds Tobacco Company, Master Settlement Agreement Text  
<  http://www.rjrt.com/MSAFullText.aspx > accessed 21 April 2015 
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Whilst the popularity of class actions has waned and the courts have acted to decertify 
areas of litigation such as tobacco related injury167 and legislation has been introduced 
to curb excesses,168 they remain a serious deterrent in the US not least because of 
the sheer potential size of awards they might generate. Depending on one’s view point, 
that is either the basis for ‘prudent corporate decisions’169 or ‘legalized blackmail’.170 
The social benefit or otherwise of the class action, per se, however, is not the issue 
here: it is merely that the scale of awards acts as a deterrent. 
 
3.2.5 By contrast, Group Actions in the UK have been unsuccessful and unpopular 
 
The closest equivalent in the UK is the Group Litigation Order.171 Group Litigation 
Orders provide for the management of claims which give rise to common or related 
issues of fact or law. Once a group is established, ordered and registered it is 
publicised and, ultimately, judgments bind all members of the group. Group Litigation 
Orders are listed on the HM Courts and Tribunals Service website172 from which data 
the following chart is derived. There have been 77 Group Litigation Orders registered 
since the procedure first became available. The chart shows the numbers of Group 
Litigation Orders by year. The total number of Group Litigation Orders is shown in blue 
and those related specifically to PL in red.  
 
                                                          
167 See particularly for a history of US tobacco litigation Henderson, James A. Jr. and Twerski, Aaron, 
‘Reaching Equilibrium in Tobacco Litigation’ (2010). Cornell Law Faculty Publications. Paper 175. 
<http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/175 > accessed 25 May 2012   
168 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) 
169 Myriam Gilles, ‘Opting out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class 
Action’ Michigan Law Review, Vol. 104, No. 3 (Dec., 2005), pp. 373-430 – ‘My intuition, again, is that 
class actions do far more good than harm; that many prudent corporate decisions are made precisely 
because the palpable threat of class action liability hangs in the boardroom’.  
170Milton Handler, ‘The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits’ - The Twenty-
Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV.1, 9 (1971).   ‘Any device which is workable only 
because it utilizes the threat of unmanageable and expensive litigation to compel settlement is not a 
rule of procedure--it is a form of legalized blackmail.’ See also for a detailed explanation of the class 
action blackmail issue: Thomas S. Ulen, ‘An introduction to the law and economics of class action 
litigation European Journal of Law & Economics’ 2011, 32(2), 185-203 
171 CPR 19.10: A Group Litigation Order (‘GLO’) means an order made under rule 19.11 to provide for 
the case management of claims which give rise to common or related issues of fact or law (the ‘GLO 
issues’). 
172 <http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/rcj-rolls-building/queens-bench/group-litigation-orders > accessed 
17 June 2015 
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Figure 2: Group Litigation Orders from 1999 to 2012 
 
The use of such orders has seen a steady decline.173 Given that virtually everyone 
uses motor vehicles as a consumer and that they obviously have the significant 
potential to injure if defective, it might seem surprising that there has only ever been 
one motor related PL Group Action since the procedure has been available.174 
Mulheron insists, of Group Litigation Orders, ‘This is not a “solution in search of a 
problem”’.175 It would seem however that the Group Action is unpopular. The following 
reasons might explain this: funding of Group Actions has been problematic with a 
number of such actions collapsing when funding was withdrawn;176 there is no 
incentive for a claimant to join a group if he can obtain individual no risk funding (such 
as became available with the advent of ATE insurance); it is unattractive to a claimant’s 
lawyer to hand a client over to the Group’s lawyer and lose out financially. 
 
                                                          
173 LSC figures suggest a similar decline in LSC funded multi-party actions which would presumably 
include actions where no GLO was obtained – see See Hodges Global Class Actions Country Report: 
England and Wales 
 <http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/England_Country%20Report.pdf 
> accessed 4 February 2015  
174 Scania 4 Series Group Litigation (in which the Practice represented Scania):  
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110110161730/http:/www.hmcourts-
service.gov.uk/cms/150_529.htm > accessed 17 June 2015 
175 Michael Black et al, Improving Access to Justice through Collective Actions (n.164) p. 101 
176 see Jon Robins, ‘Group Litigation: the coming of class actions?’ Law Society Gazette Thursday 11 
December 2008 
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In the US the class action is seen as a ‘normative polestar’ in forcing defendants to 
internalise the social costs of their actions.177 In the UK the Group Action is little more 
than a procedural umbrella under which like-minded claimants can simplify their 
litigation by having common issues tried together. It has been observed wryly, in the 
context of the EU Commission’s Green paper on collective redress,178  that whilst 
improving claimants’ access to the machinery of justice and incentivising the bringing 
of claims and penalising wrongdoing may be beneficial, ‘It is naïve to believe that more 
litigation would improve an economy’.179 
 
3.2.6 The adoption of elements of US litigation could affect the deterrent quality of PL 
 
It has been suggested that the European courts are less likely than US courts to hand 
out ‘unpredictable and disproportionate damage judgments’180 for the following 
reasons: 
- Absence of contingent fees  
- Loser pays winner’s attorney fees  
- Discouragement of massive discovery filings  
- Lower damage judgments  
- Absence of punitive damages  
- Non-use of juries in civil cases181  
- Lower expectations of damages 
Presser advocates harmonising the US PL law with Europe. Ironically, while the US 
Supreme Court, State Courts and Federal Courts have striven to limit the effect of 
                                                          
177Myriam Gilles Gary B. Friedman, ‘Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: the Social Utility 
of Entrepreneurial Lawyers’ 104 University of Pennsylvania LAW review [vol. 155]: 103 p. 105 
178 EU Commission Green Paper On Consumer Collective Redress Brussels, 27.11.2008 COM(2008) 
94 final 
179 Christopher Hodges, ‘From class actions to collective redress: a revolution in approach to 
compensation’ C.J.Q. 2009, 28(1), 41-66 p. 66 
180 Stephen B Presser, ‘How Should the Law of Products Liability Be Harmonized? What Americans 
Can Learn from Europeans’ Global Liability Issues. Vol. 2 February 2002. 
181 The use of a jury to make damages awards does not automatically mean that the awards will be 
disproportionate. Scotland still uses civil juries and in the Report of the Scottish Civil Courts Review 
‘the allowance of jury trial, or the possibility of it, has a significant influence in the 
maintenance of settlements in personal injury cases at realistic levels. There seems to 
be a general tendency for judge‐made awards of damages to fall behind the level of jury 
awards as time goes by, with the result that it takes the occasional large jury verdict to 
return negotiated settlements to realistic levels. In our view, jurors in such cases have 
often had a more perceptive appreciation of the value of damages than the courts over 
the years.’  (Report of the Scottish Civil Courts Review 2009 ISBN: 978-0-9552511-2-2 
Volume 1 of 2 RR Donnelley B60185 9/09) 
But see Harvey McGregor, McGregor on Damages (n. 132) [39-023] et seq for an account of runaway 
jury awards in libel cases in the 1980s. 
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punitive damages and class actions,182 the UK has opened its doors to elements of 
the US litigation system: including in particular contingency fees and Qualified One-
Way Costs Shifting.183 It is foreseeable that this could in appropriate cases make 
Group Actions more attractive. The Civil Justice Council Working Party on Damages 
Based Agreements reported in July 2012 that special controls are necessary where 
large numbers of claimants are involved and funding options very limited but that 
lawyers who wish to use a DBA to fund a collective action should apply to the Court 
for approval of the level of the contingency fee within the regulated cap on the 
deduction from damages. However they concluded that ‘the collective action is 
precisely the type of civil claim that will benefit from the introduction of DBAs to ensure 
access to justice’.184 
 
Subsequently the EU Commission has issued a memo stating: 
 
To counter possible abuses of collective redress, the European 
Commission is recommending a number of important procedural 
safeguards. Member States should for example not permit contingency 
fees for legal services.185 
 
At the time of writing, in the UK, Damages Based Agreements are permissible for 
Group Litigation. If, hypothetically, there had in fact been a defect in the Kudo 
handbrake which caused 5,000 claimants to suffer minor injuries worth £2,000 each, 
Kudo would face an exposure of £10m plus costs. A solicitor could surely be found 
who would take on a group action for £2.5m (25% of the general damages).186  
 
The Scania Group Litigation (see footnote 174 above) was funded by a Trade Union. 
There were almost 800 claimants. The case collapsed and the successful defendants 
                                                          
182 See generally Francis E. McGovern, ‘Punitive Damages & Class Actions’ Louisiana Law Review 
2010 Vol 70 435-462; and Myriam Gilles ‘Opting out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise 
of the Modern Class Action’ (n. 169) pp. 373-430 
183 Qualified One-way Costs Shifting or QOCS is a procedural rule which provides that subject to certain 
exceptions a successful defendant may not recover its legal costs from the unsuccessful claimant. The 
implications for PL are explored in Chapter 8. 
184 Civil Justice Council Report of the Working Party on Damages Based Agreements (Contingency 
Fees) 25th July 2012 
<http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/CJC/Publications/Pre-
action+protocols/contingency-fees-working-party-report1.pdf >  accessed 12 June 2013 22.29 
185 Frequently Asked Questions: European Commission recommends collective redress principles to 
Member States MEMO/13/530 Strasbourg 11/06/2013 <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-
13-530_en.htm?locale=en > accessed 12 June 2013  
186 The Damages-Based Agreements Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/609) Reg 4(2) (b) 
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were awarded costs, ultimately paid by the funding Union. Had the claim proceeded 
on a contingency basis with Qualified One-Way Costs Shifting, meaning that even if 
the defendant had succeeded at trial, it would not have been awarded its costs, the 
dynamics of settlement would have been entirely different. The claimants would have 
had a greater incentive to proceed to trial and the defendants would have been under 
more pressure to settle a claim with no merit so as to avoid further irrecoverable costs. 
 
The closer the UK system comes to the US system (with the introduction of Conditional 
Fee Agreements and subsequently Damages Based Agreements) the more spurious 
claims will have to be defended or bought off by defendants. It is noted that in the PL 
Claims Survey at Appendix 4, half of the cases were abandoned and nuisance value 
offers were made in approximately a quarter. It is to be expected that with the advent 
of Qualified One-Way Costs Shifting, fewer cases will be abandoned, because of the 
decreased risk of having to pay the defendant’s costs and potentially more nuisance 
value offers will be made to avoid further irrecoverable costs being increased. This 
does not deter the making of bad products: it merely adds a valueless overhead to the 
manufacturing cost. The unresolved debate over class actions in the US has been 
described thus: 
 
While there are those who see it as a socially beneficial practice that 
allows, for example, appropriate redress to small claimants against major 
corporations, there are those who see class action litigation as socially 
costly in that it fosters frivolous litigation that threatens to erode business 
confidence and competitiveness.187 
 
Thus any benefit as a deterrent must be weighed against this extra cost. It is 
foreseeable that without serious controls on contingency fees in collective redress this 
kind of ‘frivolous litigation’ could multiply. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
187 Thomas S. Ulen, ‘An introduction to the law and economics of class action litigation European 
Journal of Law & Economics’ (n. 170) 
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STRICT LIABILITY FAILS TO DETER 
3.3 Strict Liability is a Less Effective Deterrent than Fault Based Liability  
 
Fault based liability is more conducive to deterring accidents than strict liability for two 
reasons. First, the large damages awards which are supposed to create an indirect 
deterrent by internalising the costs of accidents, are dependent on fault; and second 
it is implicit in the concept of fault that the defendant ought by his conduct to be able 
to prevent or minimise accidents.  
 
3.3.1 Punitive awards are based on fault 
  
The superlative awards reported in US PL cases are not typically based on strict 
liability. This is because punitive damages are awarded ‘"where the defendant's 
wrongdoing has been intentional and deliberate, and has the character of outrage 
frequently associated with crime," or where it indicates "such a conscious and 
deliberate disregard of the interests of others that the conduct may be called willful or 
wanton," or "reckless," which means "proceeding with knowledge that the harm is 
substantially certain to occur."’188 
 
Key differences between the US and the UK are illustrated by the pleadings in the 
Kudo Case Study. Here the allegations are of breach of section 2 Consumer Protection 
Act 1987 and simple negligence. In contrast, the Complaint in a dismissed US class 
action against alcoholic beverage manufacturers included the following allegations: 
‘deceptive trade practices, unjust enrichment, negligence, public nuisance and 
fraudulent concealment’.189  The aim of these proceedings was to persuade a jury that 
the alcohol industry has cheated the public out of their money and that their ‘ill-gotten’ 
gains should be liberated or ‘disgorged’. Similarly the California Court of Appeals 
findings in Grimshaw show that strict liability was not the issue. The key findings were 
of institutional callous indifference to public safety: 
 
                                                          
188 William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, ‘New Light on Punitive Damages’ (n. 163) p.133 (citing 
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts ISBN-13: 978-0314748805). 
189Jacquelyn L. Tomberlin v Adolph Coors Company, et al State of Wisconsin, Court of Appeals District 
IV, Appeal Number 2006AP1302 
< http://www.wicourts.gov/ca/opinion/DisplayDocument.html?content=html&seqNo=30706 > accessed 
17 June 2015  
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the conduct of Ford's management was reprehensible in the extreme. It 
exhibited a conscious and callous disregard of public safety in order to 
maximize corporate profits.190 
 
The limited basis of PL in the UK does not give rise to findings of unconscionable 
conduct worthy of public censure and no such allegations were raised in any of the 
cases within the PL Claims Survey at Appendix 4. 
 
3.3.2 Direct deterrence is based on fault 
 
Direct deterrence is predicated on the assumption that tort embodies ‘the socially 
valuable principle that, where a person negligently or intentionally caused injuries to 
another, amends should be made for the consequences of his fault’.191 Liability for 
fault fosters 
 
a sense of responsibility for the effect of one’s actions on others, and a 
sense that one does have a duty of care towards one’s fellow citizens, is 
an essential element in a civilised community, and a lapse in the discharge 
of that responsibility is a matter of blame – in other words fault or culpa.192 
 
If a person faces paying for the consequences of his fault then he ought to be 
motivated to take care. Where strict liability is applicable, taking care will not 
necessarily protect a person from the risk that they will have to pay liability claims. 
Therefore there is less incentive to take care where the regime of liability is strict as 
under the PL Directive than when it is fault based.  
 
In the Kudo Case Study there were two key causes of action: first is strict liability for a 
defect under the PL Directive193 and second is negligence in failing to warn after having 
been aware of a design defect.194 If it is assumed for the moment that both allegations 
were proved to be true, Kudo (fearing an onslaught of claims) might be motivated to 
take extra care to warn customers of the known brake problem. However, as far as 
                                                          
190 Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Company (n. 152) [34] 
191 See Report of the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury (Ch 
Lord Pearson) (March I978) Cmnd 7054 Vols I-III p. 362 [1716]  
192 Pearson Commission (n. 191) p. 363 [1717] 
193 Consumer Protection Act 1987 s 2 
194  Walton v British Leyland (UK) Ltd, Dutton Forshaw (North East) Ltd and Blue House Lane Garage 
Ltd (12 July 1978 unreported PL Casebook 131, ed Stuart Ashworth (1984), Lloyd’s of London Press 
and (brief summary) Law Society Gazette 28 March 1990 and Alan Carroll and Others v Lundy Fearon 
and Others; Astrid Barclay and Another v Dunlop Limited and Another [1998] PIQR P416, CA 
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strict liability for the defect goes, there is not much that Kudo could have done directly 
to improve the quality of build of the product as they were merely an importer.195 
Therefore fault is the greater motivator. 
 
3.3.3 So-called strict liability for defective products in the US is not really strict 
 
Goldberg & Zipursky seek to explain strict PL in deontological terms.  
 
In fact, we think that the case for allowing persons injured by defective 
products to obtain redress is very easy. It rests on the idea that a 
manufacturer bears a responsibility to avoid causing injury by sending a 
dangerously defective product into the stream of commerce and is 
supported by principles grounded in negligence and warranty, even 
though it extends those principles in certain ways.196 
 
If this is correct, it provides some basis upon which threats to the defendant could act 
as a deterrent. The position must be considered for the different bases of PL: defective 
design; defective manufacture and defective instructions/warnings. In the US the legal 
position was, at the time of the introduction of the PL Directive in Europe, summarised 
by the Second Restatement Torts (1965). As for design defect the Second 
Restatement reads: 
 
402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or 
Consumer 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably 
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability 
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to 
his property… 
… dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by 
the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge 
common to the community as to its characteristics.197 
 
 
It has been argued that this is merely negligence by another name.198 That is probably 
overstating the position. At least, whether a product is unreasonably dangerous might 
                                                          
195 PL Directive Article 3 (2)  (n. 2) provides that: ‘any person who imports into the Community a product 
for sale, hire, leasing or any form of distribution in the course of his business shall be deemed to be a 
producer within the meaning of this Directive and shall be responsible as a producer.’ 
196 Easy Case (n. 11) page 1944 
197 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) 
198 Wade, ‘Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers’ 19 Sw. LJ. 5, 15-17 (1965) 5  
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have nothing to do with the conduct of the manufacturer or seller.199 The test that was 
applied might be described as the Consumer Expectation Test. 
  
The Third Restatement of Torts (1998) puts the issue beyond doubt:  
 
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it contains 
a manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective because of 
inadequate instruction or warnings. A product: 
 
(a) contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs from its 
intended design even though all possible care was exercised in the 
preparation and marketing of the product; … 
  
(b) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of the harm posed by 
the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a 
reasonable alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or a 
predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of 
the alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe; 
 
(c) is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when the 
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced 
or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the 
seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of 
distribution, and the omission of the instructions or warnings renders the 
product not reasonably safe...200 
 
So a manufacturing defect gives rise to strict liability but as far as design or warnings 
are concerned, liability depends on a) foreseeable risks of harm and b) what the seller 
could have done to avoid these risks. David Owen puts it thus: 
 
The requirements of “foreseeability” and “reasonableness” in subsections 
2(b) and 2(c) effectively reconvert the products liability standard for these 
types of cases to one of negligence - a rather remarkable retreat from 
section 402A’s explicitly “strict” standard of liability of the Second 
Restatement that most courts boldly purported to apply to design and 
warnings cases for thirty years. Thus, . . . subsections 2(b) and 2(c) of the 
Third Restatement abandon the strict liability concept and employ 
negligence principles in design and warnings cases.201 
 
                                                          
199 See Sheila L. Birnbaum, ‘Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to 
Strict Liability to Negligence’ 33 Vand. L. Rev. 593 1980 
200 Restatement (Third) of Torts §2 PL (1998) 
201 David Owen, ‘Products Liability Law Restated’ 49 S.C. L. REV. 273, 285 (1998) 
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Ironically, therefore, in the US, from where strict liability for defective products 
emanated, there has been a clear retreat from strict liability towards a fault based 
standard. The contrary is true in the UK. 
 
3.3.4 UK Strict Liability based on the PL Directive is strict 
 
In Europe, the PL Directive adopted the Consumer Expectation Test.  
 
Article 6 
1. A product is defective when it does not provide the safety which a person 
is entitled to expect, taking all circumstances into account, including: 
 
(a) the presentation of the product; 
(b) the use to which it could reasonably be expected that the product would 
be put; 
(c) the time when the product was put into circulation.202 
 
This translates in the UK, under section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act 1987, as 
follows: 
 
3. Meaning of “defect”. 
 
(1) Subject to the following provisions of this section, there is a defect in a 
product for the purposes of this Part if the safety of the product is not such 
as persons generally are entitled to expect; and for those purposes 
“safety”, in relation to a product, shall include safety with respect to 
products comprised in that product and safety in the context of risks of 
damage to property, as well as in the context of risks of death or personal 
injury. 
 
(2) In determining for the purposes of subsection (1) above what persons 
generally are entitled to expect in relation to a product all the 
circumstances shall be taken into account, including— 
 
(a) the manner in which, and purposes for which, the product has been 
marketed, its get-up, the use of any mark in relation to the product and any 
instructions for, or warnings with respect to, doing or refraining from doing 
anything with or in relation to the product; 
 
(b) what might reasonably be expected to be done with or in relation to the 
product; and 
 
(c) the time when the product was supplied by its producer to another; 
 
                                                          
202 PL Directive Article 6  (n. 2) 
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and nothing in this section shall require a defect to be inferred from the 
fact alone that the safety of a product which is supplied after that time is 
greater than the safety of the product in question.203 
 
 
3.3.5 The defendant’s conduct and avoidability of defect irrelevant 
 
There are two important considerations in deciding whether liability under the PL 
Directive’s consumer expectation test acts as a deterrent. The first is whether the 
avoidability of the defect is taken into account under the PL Directive in determining 
liability. If the defendant is liable for unavoidable accidents then imposing liability is not 
deterring the supply of defective products. The second is whether the potential 
wrongdoer’s conduct is taken into account in assessing liability. If Kudo’s conduct is 
not taken into account in determining its liability then there is no obvious incentive for 
Kudo to modify its conduct in such a way as to prevent accidents.  
 
The leading UK decision on the consumer expectation test is that of Burton J in A v 
National Blood Authority.204 114 claimants had been infected with Hepatitis C through 
blood transfusions with infected donors’ blood. It had been known since the 1970s, by 
blood producers and the medical profession, that a small percentage of blood (thought 
to be between 1% and 3%) was infected with Hepatitis C. The defendants argued that 
‘such risks so known, which they allege to be impossible to avoid or prevent, affect the 
legitimate expectation of the public’ so that there was no defect.  Burton J held that  
 
The question to be resolved is the safety or the degree or level of safety 
or safeness which persons generally are entitled to expect… safety is not 
what is actually expected by the public at large, but what they are entitled 
to expect.205 
 
He went further, stating 
 
In my judgment it is as inappropriate to propose that the public should not 
'expect the unattainable'--in the sense of tests or precautions which are 
impossible--at least unless it is informed as to what is unattainable or 
                                                          
203 Consumer Protection Act 1987 CHAPTER 43  
204 A v National Blood Authority [2001] 3 All E.R. 289 per The Honourable Mr Justice Burton; the case 
also deals with the ‘development risks defence’ but this can be ignored in the context of the deterrence 
of PL. It will be discussed later in relation to strict liability more generally. 
205 A v National Blood Authority [2001] (n. 204) p. 311 
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impossible, as it is to reformulate the expectation as one that the producer 
will not have been negligent or will have taken all reasonable steps.206 
 
Burton J made it clear that the conduct of the producer was irrelevant in determining 
the expectations of the consumer, demonstrating his ‘commitment to eschewing a 
negligence-based standard from interpretation of the strict liability standard in the 
Directive’207 and to realising ‘the reforming purposes intended by the Directive’.208 
 
The claimants argued that the fact that such risks are unavoidable is irrelevant to 
consumer expectations on the basis that ‘the exercise of considering what could or 
should have been done by the producer is an impermissible and irrelevant exercise, 
which lets questions of fault back in by the back door.’209 Burton J found that the 
objectively assessed legitimate expectation of consumers may ‘accord with actual 
expectation; but it may be more than the public actually expects, thus imposing a 
higher standard of safety, or it may be less than the public actually expects. 
Alternatively the public may have no actual expectation — e.g., in relation to a new 
product’.210 The legitimate expectation is as to safety, not what tests could or could not 
have been carried out or what those test might reveal. This evinces a clear intention 
to avoid the terminology and connotations of negligence and fault. He concluded most 
strikingly: ‘I conclude therefore that avoidability is not one of the circumstances to be 
taken into account within art 6’. 
 
Mildred observes,  
 
He went on to construe “all circumstances” to be taken into account under 
Art.6.1 narrowly, holding that avoidability of the defect by the producer, 
safety precautions taken and the utility of the product to society were all to 
be left out of account. The first two of these presumably reflect the 
necessity for focus upon the safety of the product rather than the conduct 
of the producer.211 
 
                                                          
206 A v National Blood Authority (n. 204) p. 335 
207  Shanti Williamson, ‘COMPENSATION FOR INFECTED BLOOD PRODUCTS: A and others v 
National Blood Authority and Another’ vol 7.5 Electronic Journal Of Comparative Law, (December 
2003), <http://www.ejcl.org/ejcl/75/art75-5.html> accessed 1 June 2013 at page 4 
208 Shanti Williamson, ‘COMPENSATION FOR INFECTED BLOOD PRODUCTS: A and others v 
National Blood Authority and Another’ (n. 207) p. 3 
209 A v National Blood Authority (n. 204) p. 316 
210 A v National Blood Authority (n. 204) p. 311 
211 Mark Mildred, ‘Pitfalls in Product Liability’ Journal of Personal Injury Law 2007, 141 
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On this basis, if the conduct of the producer is not taken into account in determining 
liability, then imposing PL ought not to induce the producer to alter its conduct.  
 
The position has been confused slightly by the subsequent judgment of Field J in Sam 
Bogle v McDonald’s.212 The Claimants had suffered burns from spilled hot drinks at 
McDonald’s restaurants. In addition to allegations of negligence it was pleaded that 
the drinks were defective. Field J stated ‘what the court is concerned with is the 
ultimate safety of the product and not what considerations the producer gave to its 
safety’. The objectively assessed legitimate expectation test of Burton J was gratefully 
adopted by Field J in Bogle, as he explained ‘and whilst those expectations may 
accord with actual expectation, they may be more than what the public actually 
expect’. Field J adopted Burton J’s distinction between standard and non-standard 
products. The infected blood in the Hepatitis C litigation was a non-standard product 
as the standard product was intended not to be infected. On the contrary the hot drinks 
were a standard product as they were intended to be hot enough to scald: ‘This alone, 
on the face of it is sufficient to explain the different outcome as to what consumers 
generally are entitled to expect’.213 
 
It might be argued that Field J did in fact take the conduct of McDonald’s staff into 
account because in giving reasons for his finding that the drinks ‘met the legitimate 
expectations of persons generally’ at paragraph 77 (et seq) he went into considerable 
detail about the training of the serving staff as to the secure capping of the drinks and 
the content of the training manual and regular staff appraisals. If McDonald’s had failed 
to train their staff in this way, by implication, the product might not have met the 
legitimate expectation test: thus the conduct of McDonald’s was a material factor in 
the safety of the product. However the judge, went on, (having set out these details, 
and having accepted evidence that a risk assessment had been carried out and that 
this led to the warning in McDonald’s Health and Safety Manual), to make it plain that 
‘even if this step had not been taken, the omission in itself would not be relevant, since 
in my opinion what the court is concerned with is the ultimate safety of the product and 
                                                          
212 Sam B and Others v McDonald's Restaurants Limited [2002] EWHC 490 (QB) per The Honourable 
Mr Justice Field 
213 Tony Cherry, ‘Case Comment Personal injury - hot drinks - burns & scalds’ Journal of Personal Injury 
Law  2002, 3, 327-330 p. 329 
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not what considerations the producer gave to its safety’.214 Field J has served to muddy 
the water but there are two further points to take into account. First, this was essentially 
a case alleging numerous counts of negligence with the Consumer Protection Act 
1987 pleaded as an alternative. Therefore, the evidence necessarily dealt extensively 
with the conduct of McDonald’s. Field J simply confused matters by giving the conduct 
of McDonald’s in relation to training as a ‘reason’ for the finding that the product met 
the legitimate expectation test – and then stating, in terms, that conduct was irrelevant. 
Second, the nature of this particular product has to be considered. This is not a product 
bought in a shop and used at home. It is something served to be consumed on the 
premises. Therefore the actions of the staff in serving it are necessarily a part of the 
‘presentation of the product’.215 Insofar as the conduct of the defendant was relevant 
to the liability under the PL Directive, it was just as relevant or even more so to the 
allegations of negligence. Therefore, there is no reason why strict liability should act 
as a better deterrent than fault based liability. 
 
3.3.6 Warnings 
 
Even where a product is potentially harmful, PL encourages the producer to apply an 
appropriate warning so that accidents are avoided.216 Whilst the definition of defect in 
the PL Directive does not expressly mention warnings and instructions (merely the 
‘presentation of the product’),217 the Consumer Protection Act 1987 does refer to ‘any 
instructions for, or warnings with respect to, doing or refraining from doing anything 
with or in relation to the product…’218 Situations may readily be envisaged in which the 
provision of a warning could prevent a product from being defective under the PL 
Directive. Indeed in A v National Blood Authority the position might have been different 
if the claimants had been informed about the risk. Similarly, the result may have been 
different in Sam B v McDonald’s if hot liquid were provided in a container that gave no 
warning of its hot contents.219 However, warnings are not the be all and end all. Clearly 
                                                          
214 Sam B and Others v McDonald's Restaurants Limited (n. 212)  [77] and [78]  
215 PL Directive Article 6 (1) (a) (n. 2) 
216 Worsley v Tambrands Ltd [2000] P.I.Q.R. P95 (QBD) and similarly by Dutch District Court of Zwolle 
in X -v- Johnson and Johnson, Rb. Zwolle 24 April 2002, Praktijkgids 2002, 5921 (helpfully summarised 
in English in Dissertation of Sanne Barbara Pape ‘Warnings and PL Lessons learned from cognitive 
psychology and ergonomics’  Erasmus University 2011 ISBN 978-94-90947-42-2  pp. 75 & 76) 
217 PL Directive Article 6 (1) (a) (n.  2) 
218 Consumer Protection Act 1987 s 3(2)(a) 
219 HHJ Field found essentially that in this case no warning was necessary as consumers could be 
taken to know that coffee or tea served in a polystyrene cup would be hot – and if this was not enough 
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the consumer expectation test would not be satisfied if a manufacturer supplied bottles 
of squash with a warning label that the contents may contain broken glass or carbolic 
acid.220 Perhaps the best that can be said is that fear of PL may be an incentive to 
drafting clear warnings. It is certainly true that the Practice has from time to time been 
asked to review warnings and instructions with a view to the potential for accidents to 
occur. But is cannot be said here that it would make any difference whether the 
potential liability were strict or fault based. 
 
DOES PL REGULATE SAFETY? 
3.4 PL in the UK is too unstructured and unfocused to affect product safety 
 
3.4.1 The safety debate in the US is inapplicable to the UK 
  
The stated purpose of PL is ‘protection of the consumer’,221 in the sense of improving 
the safety of products which they consume or use, by deterring the supply of defective 
products. The important question, therefore, is whether PL improves safety? Whether 
or not PL leads to enhanced safety is difficult to measure. In the US, where PL has 
the potential, through the jury system, to act as a super-regulator, the issue is keenly 
debated by the authors of the Uneasy Case and the Easy Case respectively. 
 
Easy cites Graham as searching for a correlation between crashworthiness judgments 
and safety improvements which had concluded that PL law was ‘one of several forces 
that induce manufacturers to consider making pro-safety decisions in the marketplace’ 
and also as accelerating pro-safety developments…’222  Uneasy cites a number of 
studies as evidence that PL in particular industries has had no noticeable impact on 
                                                          
‘McDonald's were entitled to assume after 1995 that the words: “Caution: Contents Hot!” and 
“Caution: Hot!” would have warned those likely to be buying tea and coffee that a serious burn could 
be suffered if the drink was spilled onto someone's skin.’ 
220 See Daniels and Daniels v R White & Sons Ltd and Tarbard [1938] 4 All ER 258 
221 See PL Directive recitals 
222 Easy Case (n. 11) p. 1928 citing John D. Graham, ‘PL and Motor Vehicle Safety’, in The Liability 
Maze: The Impact of Liability Law on Safety and Innovation 120 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 
1991). 
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product safety.223 Uneasy further cites papers224 on the general aviation industry in the 
US in support of the proposition that safety may in fact have deteriorated as a result 
of PL. There is no doubt that PL harmed the general aviation manufacturing industry 
with the consequence that the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA), 
was passed to introduce (subject to certain exceptions) an 18 year statute of repose 
(from first delivery) on actions against aircraft and aviation component 
manufacturers.225 An explanation of why PL might actually have increased the 
accident rate is that ‘it depressed sales of new planes and led individuals to fly older 
and more dangerous planes.’226 Whatever these studies prove in the US (and clearly 
it is a matter of debate) no such similar studies exist in the UK. This is no doubt 
because there are simply too few cases to be able to infer a relationship between PL 
and a particular improvement in the safety of a particular product or to draw any 
meaningful conclusions. Out of the 132 cases in the PL Claims Survey at Appendix 4, 
only 3 went to full trial. 
 
3.4.2 As a deterrent, PL is inapt to regulate 
 
the effectiveness of the tort system as a deterrent depends crucially on the 
ability of the potential tortfeasor to take steps in advance to prevent the 
damage or injury occurring.227 
 
Even if potential liability under the PL directive ought theoretically to discourage 
manufacture of defective products, there is a practical reason why it might not. The 
globalisation or internationalisation of industry was one of the driving factors leading 
to the Strasbourg Convention, the predecessor of the PL Directive: 
 
Introduction 1. Industrial development and technological progress have 
increasingly involved cases of producers’ liability and the growth of inter-
                                                          
223 George L. Priest, ‘Products Liability Law and the Accident Rate’ in Liability: Perspectives and Policy 
184, 187-94 (Robert E. Litan & Clifford L. Winston eds., 1988) 
224 Uneasy Case (n. 1) pp. 18 & 19 n 66-69 [Andrew Craig ‘PL and Safety in General Aviation’ in The 
Liability Maze: The Impact of Liability Law on Safety and Innovation 456-77 (Peter W. Huber & Robert 
E. Litan eds., 1991); Robert Martin, ‘General Aviation Manufacturing: An Industry Under Siege’ in The 
Liability Maze: The Impact of Liability Law on Safety and Innovation 478-99 [Ibid] 
225 For a brief summary of the history of introduction of the Act see Kerry V. Kovarik, ‘A Good Idea 
Stretched Too Far: Amending the General Aviation Revitalization Act to Mitigate Unintended Inequities’ 
Seattle University Law Review 2008 Vol. 31:973 p. 975. 
226 Randy A. Nelson & James N. Drews, ‘Strict Liability and Product Safety: Evidence from the General 
Aviation Market’ 46 Econ. Inquiry 425 (2008)  
227 Peter Cane (ed),  Atiyah’s Accidents Compensation and the Law (n. 72) p. 425 
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State commercial trade has resulted in the problem of producers’ liability 
acquiring in certain cases, an international aspect.228  
 
Indeed the two main examples cited in the Explanatory memorandum to the 
Strasbourg Convention, the Paris DC10 disaster and the Thalidomide/Contergan 
tragedy, are by their nature paradigms of the internationality of PL. The internationality 
of products has two important consequences. The first is that international 
corporations who sell their products in the US will be far more concerned about 
potential PL in the US than in the UK. If there were a technical problem with the Kudo 
vehicle, Kudo would be more likely to fear claims in the US where they sell the same 
vehicle. Thus the potency of UK PL claims as a deterrent would be seriously 
attenuated.  
 
The second is that for PL to be an effective deterrent, its impact must reach the 
decision maker with the ability to make the necessary changes to products to affect 
their safety. The PL Directive seeks to impose its uniform standard of liability 
regardless of whether the product was made within or outside the EU. It achieves this 
in relation to a product made outside the EU by treating the importer into the EU as 
the producer.229 In the Kudo Case Study, the manufacturer of the vehicle was Kudo 
Japan. The vehicle was imported into the EU by Kudo GB, which is treated as the 
producer for the purposes of the PL Directive. The logic is that the consumer has a 
simple right of action in the UK (or the EU) regardless of where the product was made. 
Where the importer into the EU has assumed liability, it may of course pass that liability 
on through the contractual chain. That is of no concern to the consumer. If the importer 
cannot enforce a contractual right to indemnity, this is its own look out - it chose to 
import the defective product. This is, nonetheless, highly significant in terms of the 
deterrent value of PL. Kudo GB may have limited input into the manufacturing process. 
In a multinational corporation, its influence over production changes may be minimal 
in the absence of a major PL issue. PL may therefore, as in the Kudo case Study, 
target entirely the wrong person.  
 
 
 
                                                          
228 Draft Strasbourg Convention (n. 23) p. 134 
229 PL Directive Article 3(2) (n. 2) 
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3.4.3 PL is unstructured in deterring carelessness 
 
Irrespective of how much care Kudo took or whether exercise of care would have 
prevented an accident, had there been a defect, Kudo would have been liable. The 
focus is on compensating consumers rather than preventing accidents. PL only comes 
into play after an accident has occurred rather than establishing consistent standards 
to guide manufacturers. It is subject to the uncertainties and fortuities of the litigation 
process. It would on that basis be remarkable if it had any perceptible positive effect 
on product safety. 
 
3.4.4 Economic deterrence 
 
The general principle of indirect deterrence is that strict liability achieves its deterrent 
purpose by placing the cost of accidents on the ‘cheapest cost avoider’ because if the 
costs of personal injuries are placed on the cheapest cost avoider, he will have an 
incentive to prevent similar future losses by taking cost-justified precautions.230 ‘The 
question for the court reduces to a search for the cheapest cost avoider.’ 231 The theory 
has waned in popularity and ‘it has very little utility in the real world ...’.232 It fails on a 
theoretical and practical level. 
 
a) UK PL fixes the producer as the cheapest cost avoider irrespective of whether it is 
 
As far as the theory is concerned, the PL Directive fixes liability on the ‘producer’ who 
is typically the manufacturer or the importer into the EU. This is based on a public 
policy theory that manufacturers are in the best position to ‘control and eliminate risks 
that might roll off the assembly line’ and where a defect slips through without the fault 
of the manufacturer, that manufacturer can shoulder the burden better than the 
consumer.233 There is no flexibility to accommodate a situation where this party 
happens not to be the cheapest cost avoider. In the case of Kudo, the importer, it may 
not be the cheapest cost avoider. As has been indicated above Kudo may have very 
little control over ‘avoidance’. 
                                                          
230 Jane Stapleton, ‘Liability Reform--Real or Illusory?’ Oxford Journal of Legal Studies’ Vol. 6, No. 3 
(Winter, 1986), 392-422, p. 395. 
231 G Calabresi and J Hirschoff ‘Toward a Test for Strict Liability In Torts’ (n. 80) p. 1060 
232 P.S. Atiyah, The Damages Lottery (n. 13) 
233 Sheila L. Birnbaum, ‘Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict 
Liability to Negligence’ (n. 199) p. 596 
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b) Insurers pay the compensation 
 
At a practical level, whoever is liable, the reality is that compensation is usually paid 
by insurers. The role of insurance in PL is paradoxical. It is one of the possible 
justifications for the imposition of strict liability on the manufacturer. It is argued ‘The 
manufacturer can spread the risk through insurance and price adjustments, whereas 
the injured individual might suffer a crushing financial blow underwriting the loss 
himself.’234  On the other hand, the fact that the manufacturer may have insurance 
militates against the argument that liability in tort is a deterrent against designing, 
making and supplying defective products because the manufacturer trades the 
certainty of a small manageable loss against the risk of a large unmanageable loss. 
With this comes moral hazard. 
 
The disutility the injurer suffers because of exposure to risk is exactly 
needed to give him correct incentives for caretaking. If risk is fully removed 
from the injurer and shifted to the insurer the injurer will indeed miss the 
incentive for caretaking that was exactly given to him by the deterrent 
effect of having to pay compensation in case of an accident.235 
 
Kudo might face the moral dilemma of deciding whether to spend its own money on a 
recall or (having bought insurance) insurers’ money on its estimated number of claims. 
In this instance it had already made the recall. 
 
c) Internalisation fails with PL insurance  
 
Economic deterrence is supposed to work by internalising the costs of accident 
avoidance to the industry manufacturing the product.  It is argued (by way of example 
in relation to motor claims) that Liability Insurance does not undermine the internalizing 
function of tort law because the costs of accidents, although spread widely, are 
nevertheless borne by motorists as a group.236 
 
                                                          
234 Sheila L. Birnbaum, ‘Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict 
Liability to Negligence’ (n. 199) p. 596 
235 Michael Faure,  ‘Interdependencies between Tort law and Insurance’ Maastricht University Risk 
Decision and Policy 2 (2),193-210 (1997) p. 195 
<http://arnop.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=7692 > accessed 24 April 2013  
236 Craig Brown, ‘Deterrence in Tort and No-Fault: The New Zealand Experience’ California Law 
Review, Vol. 73, No. 3, Symposium: Alternative Compensation Schemes and Tort Theory (May, 1985), 
pp. 976-1002 
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However, PL can be contrasted with Motor or Employer’s Liability Insurance. The latter 
are compulsory schemes and they generate homogeneous risk pools. Products are 
heterogeneous. PL insurance is often an adjunct to Public Liability Insurance, 
purchased voluntarily. The cost cannot be internalised within the specific industry. It is 
not even possible to calculate the cost of PL premiums in the way that it can be done 
with Employers’ Liability or Motor Liability. Moreover, it has been suggested that that 
there is little correlation between premiums and ‘changes in the content of tort rules’ 
compared with other factors such as 
 
‘the levels of damages which the courts are prepared to award, the ease 
with which claimants are able to operate the machinery of the 
administration of justice and economic, cultural and social factors that 
influence accident victims’ propensity to claim.’237  
 
If this is correct, risky activities may not be discouraged. They are in fact subsidised. 
The more an activity is subsidised, the less deterrence exists. Welfare insurance is the 
paradigm. It permits absolutely no deterrent qualities. An alcoholic smoker is as 
entitled to welfare as a teetotal non-smoker. So any deterrence must come from 
elsewhere. The net result is that the risk is spread through insurance more widely 
across industry. This may have the beneficial effect for manufacturers of high risk 
products that their PL is subsidised by manufacturers of all products.  
 
This "subsidy" causes a misallocation of resources. The activity continues 
without taking its injury costs into account. Since more of the activity will 
be conducted than its true costs warrant, there is an underincentive to 
reduce accident costs. 238 
 
 
The more extensive the insurance coverage, the less the deterrent effect. Ultimately 
the welfare state removes deterrence to such an extent that people become 
dependent on it. Lord Pearson wished to see tort’s continued existence within a no-
fault system as a ‘safeguard against a system of total dependence on the state.’239  
 
                                                          
237 Christopher Parsons, Office of Fair Trading, An Analysis of Current Problems in the UK Liability 
Insurance Market (London, OFT659a, 2003) citing W Pfennigstorf & D G Gifford, A Comparative Study 
of Liability Law and Compensation Schemes in Ten Countries and the USA (1991) pp 134-6.) 
238 Craig Brown, ‘Deterrence in Tort and No-Fault: The New Zealand Experience’ (n. 236) p. 977 
239 Pearson Commission (n. 191) p. 362 [1716]  
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Looked at from the perspective of a consumer, it might be considered undesirable that 
the manufacturer is passing on to him the increased premiums the manufacturer pays 
to subsidise high risk products that the consumer does not use. 
 
d) The divide between theory and practice 
 
Routine UK PL claims in the real world have little to do with the costs of accidents. The 
Kudo claim might have settled, pre-action, for less than £10,000. Yet as the judgment 
showed this would have been paying a claim with no merit, to avoid incurring penal 
costs. The Kudo case was all about gambling or ‘having a go’240  and nothing to do 
with safety. The claimant had no incentive to drop the case. He had nothing to lose. 
The claimant’s lawyers did not engage in any legal debate because this was typical of 
volume litigation run by unqualified staff. Whenever any serious legal issue was raised, 
the file would be passed for action to a qualified member of staff who had no day to 
day connection with the case, and no doubt it sat in a large pile of similar files. There 
was little opportunity to agree anything and limit issues. The case was effectively 
pursued by Martin’s expert acting as an advocate. He lacked objectivity. He was 
evidently not advised on the law and the precise technical questions he needed to 
answer and so he guessed incorrectly at the relevant law, ignored the relevant 
Directive and tried to find something else to make the case. This litigation strikes not 
at unsafe products but simply adds a layer of cost to the manufacturing process with 
the potential risk of threatening the supply of products. 
RISK OF OVERDETERRENCE 
3.5 Deterrence lacks subtle control and may lead to loss of choice 
Supporters of the theory that strict liability acts as a deterrent will say that where the 
cost of taking preventative measures is disproportionately high in relation to an activity, 
the cost will be driven up and fewer people will participate, thus reducing the number 
of accidents.   
 
Under a full strict liability regime … the defendant will be forced not only to 
consider the cost effectiveness of his precautions but also to evaluate the 
optimum level of his activity, since even with the utmost care he will still 
                                                          
240 See David Arculus and Teresa Graham, Better Routes to Redress, Better Regulation Task Force 
May 2004, ISBN: 0 7115 0457 1 p. 5 
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incur liability for unpreventable risks, and the cost of his liability will be 
proportional to the level of his activity.241 
 
There are four potential outcomes for Kudo: 
a) They may persuade the manufacturer to improve its process; 
b) They may be completely ignored; 
c) They may decide to stop importing this type of car; 
d) They may decide to stop selling cars altogether. 
 
Only options c) and d) are matters within the control of the importer. It is likely therefore 
that if PL has a deterrent effect in such a case, the result will simply be to reduce or 
terminate the activity of selling these products. This leads to a risk of removal of a 
product that the consumer wants. Field J alluded to this in the Bogle judgment: 
 
[Consumers] expect precautions to be taken to guard against this risk but 
not to the point that they are denied the basic utility of being able to buy 
hot drinks to be consumed on the premises from a cup with the lid off.242 
 
There are many products which carry serious health risks, from tobacco to alcohol to 
transport. It should not be down to sporadic litigation to regulate these industries. This 
would be entirely contrary to the resurgent243 constitutional principle of the separation 
of powers between the legislature and the judiciary. The risk of officious judicial 
intervention was identified by Lord Nimmo Smith in McTear v Imperial Tobacco Ltd 
 
Tobacco and tobacco products have at all material times lawfully been sold 
to adult members of the population in the United Kingdom. The 
manufacture and sale of tobacco products support a substantial industry. 
ITL are a substantial company with numerous employees and their 
activities no doubt make a substantial contribution to the economy. The 
demand for their products may be related to the evidence that smoking 
gives pleasure and may have social benefits… ‘… primarily in the area of 
mental health’. … The government … have left it to individuals to decide 
whether or not to smoke cigarettes.244 
 
                                                          
241 Jane Stapleton, ‘Products Liability Reform Real or Illusory?’ (n. 230) pp. 395-396 
242 Sam B and Others v McDonald's Restaurants Limited (n. 212) [80] 
243 See N. W. Barber, ‘The Separation of Powers and the British Constitution’ Legal Research Paper 
Series Paper No 03/2012 January 2012, Social Science Research Network electronic library at: 
< http://ssrn.com/abstract=1995780> accessed 2 June 2013 
244 McTear v Imperial Tobacco Ltd No1 31 May 2005 [2005] CSOH 69 
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The principle is important as any tendency towards overdeterrence could be 
considered to be socially undesirable. In the US, where PL plainly does have a 
deterrent effect, Frank comments on the impact of ‘rollover’ litigation (that is litigation 
arising from road traffic accidents involving four wheel drive ‘Sports Utility Vehicles’ 
overturning.) 
 
To date, politicians and regulators have elected to permit consumers to 
choose whether they wish to have an SUV’s off-road features, even though 
doing so means poorer highway performance and gas mileage. The 
plaintiffs’ bar, however, has turned to the courts and has sought for years 
to punish automakers for providing what consumers want.245 
 
3.5.1 Overdeterrence may lead to a ‘pay-off culture’ 
 
Overdeterrence may lead to a ‘pay-off culture’. Instead of regulating the safety of 
products, it simply leads manufacturers to build in the cost of buying off unwarranted 
claims, ‘to ensure that the class counsel will ‘go away,’ . . . dilut[ing] the deterrent effect 
of class action litigation.” 246 Gilles and Friedman dismiss this argument as ‘overblown’ 
and suggest that that in fact Class actions are frequently met by summary judgment 
applications. They argue that there is a risk of underdeterrence that prompts ‘plaintiffs’ 
lawyers to settle for too little, so that defendants are not forced to internalize the full 
costs of their wrongdoing. This is not a realistic notion in the UK. In the Kudo Case 
Study, notwithstanding the lack of merit in Martin’s case, as accepted by the judge at 
trial, several ‘nuisance value’ offers were made to try to dispose of the case. These 
offers had nothing to do with PL. They were simply based on the nuisance value of 
incurring costs and the risk of a rogue judgment. Had the case been lost, the overall 
cost to Kudo would have been in the region of £60,000 when both parties’ costs are 
added to the agreed damages of £2,000. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
245 Ted Frank, ‘Rollover Economics: Arbitrary and Capricious PL Regimes’, (n. 150) p. 5  
246 Myriam Gilles and Gary B. Friedman, ‘Exploding the class action agency costs myth: The social 
utility of entrepreneurial lawyers’ (n. 177) p. 158 
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3.5.2 The risk of overdeterrence is taken into account in negligence but not strict PL 
 
The risk of overdeterrence was noted in Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council,247 
where Tomlinson dived into shallow water at the edge of a lake in the defendant’s 
country park and suffered a catastrophic head injury. Lord Hoffman stated 
  
it is not, and should never be, the policy of the law to require the protection 
of the foolhardy or reckless few to deprive, or interfere with, the enjoyment 
by the remainder of society of the liberties and amenities to which they are 
rightly entitled.248 
 
The Compensation Act 2006249 was specifically amended to take cognisance of this 
principle in relation to common law duties of care. Hansard records that the motivation 
for amendment of the Bill was that after a heavy period of snow it was reported that 
members of the public avoided helping to clear pavements for fear that they might be 
sued if someone were then to slip over. As Jeremy Wright MP put it, ‘…legal 
advertising budgets are spent on persuading us that "Where there's blame, there's a 
claim", and that there almost always is blame.’250 
 
Whilst this concession applies to actions in negligence it will not apply to PL claims 
made under the Consumer Protection Act 1987 because such claims do not require a 
determination of whether the defendant met ‘a standard of care’. 
 
 
 
                                                          
247 Tomlinson v. Congleton Borough Council & Ors [2003] UKHL 47 (31 July 2003) 
248Tomlinson v. Congleton Borough Council & Ors (n. 247) Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough 
249 Compensation Act 2006  
1 Deterrent effect of potential liability 
A court considering a claim in negligence or breach of statutory duty may, in determining 
whether the defendant should have taken particular steps to meet a standard of care 
(whether by taking precautions against a risk or otherwise), have regard to whether a 
requirement to take those steps might– 
 
(a) prevent a desirable activity from being undertaken at all, to a particular extent or in a 
particular way, or 
 
(b) discourage persons from undertaking functions in connection with a desirable activity. 
250Hansard 2 February 2010 
 <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmhansrd/cm100202/debtext/100202-
0004.htm> accessed 10 June 2013 
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Conclusions 
 
The theory that PL claims act a deterrent against accidents may work in the US, where 
the combined threats of jury-made awards of punitive damages and class actions hang 
over producers as a sword of Damocles. In the UK, however, damages awards are so 
much more modest that they have no deterrent effect on any but the smallest 
manufacturers.251 At present PL’s only real potential deterrent quality is its nuisance 
value but this cannot target the control of product quality. Collective redress and the 
potential for awards to multiple claimants has been unsuccessful and unpopular in the 
UK but the advent of damages based agreements and Qualified One-Way Costs 
Shifting may make Group Litigation more attractive. This might herald an increase in 
such litigation and a heightening of the deterrent effect of PL. The EU Commission 
has recommended a ban on contingency fees for collective redress but the Civil 
Justice Council sees contingency fees as a means of achieving access to justice in 
multi-claimant actions in the UK. There may be a price for this in that producers may 
face an increase in spurious claims. The Law Commission was misguided in doubting 
that the introduction of strict liability for defective products would lead to an increase 
in litigation.  
 
The policy of the law should be to discourage unnecessary litigation: it is 
not our function in this report to examine this problem in detail but we are 
persuaded that the competency of a direct action by the injured person 
against the person ultimately responsible for causing the injury can only 
serve to keep litigation to a minimum.252 
 
It is doubtful that even fault based liability has a deterrent effect in the UK. 
 
There may be some areas of activity where the law of negligence has a 
minor deterrent effect, but in general, it seems unlikely that much of value 
would be lost if it were got rid of.253 
 
                                                          
251 Notwithstanding the Commission’s position on page 14 of its Green Paper that ‘The Directive helps 
to increase the level of protection against defective products for two reasons: it is a “sword of 
Damocles” which encourages producers to do their best to produce without unnecessary risks to 
health (it thus complements the regulatory measures and checks to prevent the marketing of defective 
products)…’, the reality is that the PL Directive adds nothing in terms of product safety. 
252 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission (Law Com No 82, Scots Law Com No. 45) 
Liability for Defective Products HMSO Cmnd. 6831 p. 12 
253 P.S. Atiyah, The Damages Lottery (n. 13) 
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There is no sensible reason why strict liability should act as a better deterrent than 
fault based liability. In fact in the US where PL is recognised to have a deterrent effect, 
PL is mainly based on fault. In the UK the PL Directive imposes liability that is strict in 
the sense that the conduct of the producer is not taken into account in determining 
whether the product is defective. Moreover, the avoidability of the defect is irrelevant 
in assessing whether the producer is liable. This removes the incentive for the 
producer to take special care and militates against the deterrence of accidents. PL 
fails to target the decision makers who can affect product quality where the ‘cheapest 
cost avoider’ is fixed by the PL Directive as the importer into the EU who may be 
unable in a global business to influence quality. 
 
The volume of PL litigation in the UK is insufficient to regulate conduct. The imprecise 
shadow of potential litigation hanging over a manufacturer is far too vague to create 
any useful structure of regulation by which the conduct of producers can be directed 
towards making safe products. The suggestion that tort acts as an economic deterrent, 
forcing manufacturers to make safe products or stop manufacturing, has no basis in 
practice where legal liabilities are insured.  
 
In the real world, routine PL claims such as the Kudo Case Study, have little to do with 
deterrence of defective products. They simply form the basis of an easy gamble with 
no risk to the claimant. It has been shown that the deterrent qualities of PL are limited 
because strict liability is less apt to deter than fault based liability.  
 
In any event PL offers no subtlety of control. It either fails to deter or it may overdeter 
to the extent that a producer will cease making a product thereby denying the 
consumer his choice. This haphazard regulation of safety is in any event unnecessary 
because there are far better ways of deterring the circulation of dangerous products. 
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CHAPTER FOUR - THERE ARE BETTER WAYS OF DETERRING 
 
‘Many Americans consider Europe to have a weak products liability 
litigation culture, but I gain the impression that there is sometimes a failure 
to appreciate the depth of the product safety regulatory regimes, which 
may explain why there is less need for products liability litigation as a 
means of regulatory control.’ 
  Geraint Howells 2000254 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A key aspect of product safety in the UK is the strength of the regulatory culture. 
Regulation is far more effective than PL as a deterrent against the supply of dangerous 
products. Regulation also works alongside market forces which act as a natural filter 
to remove production of dangerous products. 
REGULATION WORKS AS A DETERRENT 
4.1 Effective regulation removes the need for PL as a deterrent 
 
Goldberg and Zipursky make the point when considering the effect of PL on safety 
that:  
 
Uneasy next places too much weight on studies of atypical products. Two 
of its central examples concern airplane and vaccine safety. Neither of 
these products resembles a standard consumer product, such as an 
article of clothing, a food item, a home appliance, a power tool, a toy, or a 
passenger vehicle. Airplane manufacturing is heavily regulated, and — as 
Polinsky and Shavell seem to recognize — planes are unusual in that 
there is a complete overlap between the technology that is required for 
them to perform at all and the technology that is needed to prevent the 
occurrence of the most significant hazard that they pose. Simply put, it 
would not be surprising to discover that, even without tort law, plane 
manufacturers would devote significant efforts to rid planes of the sorts of 
defects that tend to cause them to crash. Developing new vaccines 
requires massive up-front development costs, and the number of 
alternative design options available to manufacturers is limited by human 
biology, scientific knowledge, and FDA regulations.255  
 
                                                          
254 Geraint G. Howells, ‘The Relationship Between PL and Product Safety—Understanding a Necessary 
Element in European PL Through a Comparison with the U.S. Position’ 2000 Washburn Law Journal 
Vol 39  305-346 p. 307 
255 Easy Case (n. 11) p. 1932 
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Ironically, these ‘atypical’ products were the very ones which prompted the evolution 
of PL law in Europe.256 Moreover, each of the items listed by Goldberg and Zipursky 
is heavily regulated in Europe.257 If regulation is successful then there should be no 
need for PL to fulfil a quasi-regulatory function. It is suggested here that regulation is 
effective in promoting safety.  
 
 
4.1.1 Regulation can be seen to improve safety 
 
There is empirical evidence to support the obvious proposition that regulation 
improves safety. Two notable areas of regulation in the motor industry are the 
introduction of seat belts and the compulsory wearing of motorcycle crash helmets. In 
both cases regulation has led to use of these devices becoming the norm and as would 
be expected both have materially improved safety and survivability from accidents. 
 
The Road Safety Observatory (RSO),258 whose aim is to promulgate independent 
information and research reviews on road safety matters, has measured the 
effectiveness of seatbelts by ‘the percentage reduction in fatalities or injuries for 
restrained occupants as compared to those suffered by unrestrained occupants.’ RSO 
concluded on the basis of reviewing several studies in Sweden, the US and the UK 
from the 1960s to 2012 that 
 
Seat belts are highly effective in protecting vehicle occupants and 
significantly reducing their risk of being fatally or seriously injuries in a 
crash…Seat belt laws increase seat belt use, and so reduce death and 
injury. 25 years after the first law requiring seat belts to be used, it was 
estimated that front seat belts had saved over 60,000 lives in Great 
Britain.259 
 
                                                          
256 EEC Draft PL Directive Memorandum (n. 24) p. 153 
257By way of a non-exhaustive list of examples –  
Clothing:  from the Textile Products (Indication of Fibre Content) Regulations 1986 to the Nightwear 
(Safety) Regulations 1985;   
Food: Food Safety (Fishery Products and Live Shellfish) (Hygiene) Regulations 1998;   
A Home Appliance:  Waste Electronic and Electrical Equipment Regulations 2006;   
A Power Tool: The Supply of Machinery (Safety) Regulations 2008;  
A Toy:  The Toys (Safety) Regulations 2011; or  
A Passenger Vehicle: The Road Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations 1986 
258 Comprising a number of bodies including the Department of Transport, Road Safety GB, RoSPA, 
the RAC Foundation and Roadsafe 
259< http://www.roadsafetyobservatory.com/HowEffective/vehicles/seat-belts > accessed 15 May 2013  
95 | P a g e  
 
As for crash helmets the Motorcycle Accidents In Depth Study (MAIDS) study was 
undertaken by the Association of European Motorcycle Manufacturers (ACEM) with 
the support of the European Commission and other partners to collect data from 
accidents involving Powered Two Wheelers (motorcycles and mopeds) in Europe. 921 
accidents were investigated in detail, with approximately 2000 variables being 
recorded. Helmets were compulsorily worn in over 90% of cases. The study assessed 
the effectiveness of the helmet in preventing injury ‘based upon a detailed analysis of 
the rider kinematics as well as a review of any head injuries reported.’ According to 
the study: 
 
The data indicates that in 68.7% of all cases, the helmet was capable of 
preventing or reducing the head injury sustained by the rider...260 
 
 
4.1.2. In contrast with PL, regulations are focused, and set standards  
 
It is unsurprising that these regulations have been successful, as the regulations are 
entirely focused on a specific safety goal rather than reacting to accidents, whereas 
PL deals, on an ad hoc basis, only with the failures. PL fails to set standards to be 
adhered to. At best it merely punishes the failure to adhere to unspecified standards. 
Regulations impose safety standards that must be designed in from the outset. Thus 
it was possible to plead with such specificity in the Kudo Case Study: 
 
It is averred that the handbrake design complies with the requirements of 
COUNCIL DIRECTIVE of 26 July 1971 on the approximation of the laws 
of the Member States relating to the braking devices of certain categories 
of motor vehicles and of their trailers (71/320/EEC) 261 which provides:.  
“ANNEX II  
Braking Tests and performance of braking systems...  
2. PERFORMACE OF BRAKING SYSTEMS...  
2.1. Vehicles of categories M and N...  
2.1.3. Parking braking systems  
2.1.3.3. If the control is a manual control, the force applied to it shall not 
exceed 400 N in the case of category M1 vehicles...” 
The Directive therefore permits a design which requires up to 400N of input 
force (equivalent to approximately 40.8 Kgf). 
 
                                                          
260 ACEM 1040 Brussels <  http://www.maids-study.eu/downloads.php > accessed 23 April 2015 
261 COUNCIL DIRECTIVE of 26 July 1971 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to the braking devices of certain categories of motor vehicles and of their trailers (71/320/EEC) 
(OJ L 202, 6.9.1971, p. 37) 
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Once the brake was measured to be within this requirement, there was really no case 
to meet. The claimant’s expert’s attempt to introduce the Manual Handling Operations 
Regulations 1992, as amended, was hopeless and inappropriate. It does not apply to 
the design of parking brake systems. In any event the basis on which forces are 
handled, lifted and held under the Manual Handling Regulations is entirely different to 
pulling a brake lever. 
 
4.1.3 The General Product Safety Directive fills any gaps in regulations 
 
The PL Directive runs in parallel with a successful European Product Safety regime. 
It is notable that in every case in the PL Claims Survey at Appendix 4, the product 
concerned was subject to safety regulations. Where there are no product specific 
regulations for consumer products, the General Product Safety Directive 
2001/95/EC262 steps in to fill the gap.263 Initially its predecessor, the General Product 
Safety Directive 1992264 acknowledged the difficulty in legislating for every product 
and stressed the need for a horizontal framework to cover lacunae.265 The purpose of 
the provisions of this Directive is to ensure that products placed on the market are 
safe.266 
 
Producers shall be obliged to place only safe products on the market.267 
 
The definition of a safe product was any product which, under normal or reasonably 
foreseeable conditions of use ‘does not present any risk or only the minimum risks 
compatible with the product's use, considered as acceptable and consistent with a 
high level of protection for the safety and health of persons’. The characteristics of the 
product, including its composition, packaging, instructions for assembly and 
maintenance, presentation, labelling, any instructions for its use and disposal were all 
                                                          
262 DIRECTIVE 2001/95/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 3 
December   2001 on general product safety L 11/4 Official Journal of the European Communities 
15.1.2002 (GPSD)  
263 For a helpful summary of the provisions of the GPSD see Duncan Fairgrieve and Geraint Howells 
‘General Product Safety: A Revolution through Reform?’ The Modern Law Review, Vol. 69, No. 1 (Jan., 
2006), pp. 59-69 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3877210> .Accessed: 14 June 2013  
264 COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 92/59/EEC of 29 June 1992 on general product safety No L 228/24 Official 
Journal of the European Communities 11.8.92 (GPSD 1992) 
265 GPSD 1992 Recital 3 (n. 264) 
266 GPSD 1992 Article 1 (n. 264) 
267 GPSD 1992 Article 3 (n. 264) 
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to be taken into account as were the characteristics of the consumers at serious risk 
when using the product, in particular children.  
 
The Directive applied to manufacturers and their representative or the importer into 
the EU and, ‘other professionals in the supply chain, insofar as their activities may 
affect the safety properties of a product placed on the market’.268 The net was cast 
wide to catch anyone who might affect the safety properties of the product. It is 
observed in the 1999 Green Paper that liability under the PL Directive ceases ten 
years after the date on which the product was put into circulation whereas the  GPSD 
1992 (current at the time) requires that a product is safe for the reasonably foreseeable 
period of a product’s use.269 Member States were empowered to give Authorities 
power to adopt measures to organise appropriate safety checks, take samples and 
prohibit supply.270  
 
In 2001, the GPSD 1992 was revamped. It was recognised in the Explanatory 
Memorandum accompanying the new General Product Safety Regulations 2005271 
which transposed the GPSD: 
 
The prevailing view among enforcement authorities, consumer groups and 
business is that subjectively the UK does not have a product safety 
problem and the Commission is thought to regard the UK as one of the 
safest countries in the EU.272  
 
The new GPSD introduced, inter alia, most significantly ‘new last-resort provisions for 
the mandatory recall of unsafe products where the voluntary action taken by producers 
and distributors has not been satisfactory or sufficient and where no other measure 
can remove the risk to consumers’.273  This was a major step. Previously the GPSD 
1992 had fallen short of recall with a power to force the ‘withdrawal’274 of a product. 
                                                          
268 GPSD 1992 Article 2(d) (n. 264) 
269 Green Paper (n. 45) p. 27 
270 GPSD 1992 Article 6 (n. 264) 
271 General Product Safety Regulations 2005, 2005 No. 1803 
272 Explanatory Memorandum to the General Product Safety Regulations 2005 [7.7] 
2005 No. 1803 < http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2005/1803/pdfs/uksiem_20051803_en.pdf > 
accessed 23 April 2015  
273 The General Product Safety Regulations 2005 Final Regulatory Impact Assessment 1.3 attached to  
Explanatory Memorandum to the General Product Safety Regulations (n. 272)  
274 GPSD 1992 Article 3 (n. 264) 
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Recall involves calling back a ‘product that has already been supplied or made 
available to consumers by the producer or distributor’.275  
 
The new GPSD provided that ‘Producers shall be obliged to place only safe products 
on the market’ taking into account voluntary national standards, Commission 
recommendations, product safety codes of good practice, the state of the art and 
technology and reasonable consumer expectations concerning safety.276 The 
obligations of Producers extend to providing consumers ‘with the relevant information 
to enable them to assess the risks inherent in a product throughout the normal or 
reasonably foreseeable period of its use, where such risks are not immediately 
obvious without adequate warnings, and to take precautions against those risks’, 
which as a last resort would include product recall.277 
 
The powers given to member States are precisely targeted towards ensuring the 
safety of the product, rather than being incidental to duties. These include a power to 
take samples of products and subject them to safety checks; to require the marking of 
products with warnings; to impose conditions on marketing; to ban products from sale; 
to force the withdrawal of products; and to ‘order or coordinate or, if appropriate, to 
organise together with producers and distributors its recall from consumers and its 
destruction in suitable conditions.’278 
 
It was acknowledged in the Impact Assessment by the DTI: 
 
The Department fully recognises that where recall is appropriate 
producers are generally swift to remove the product from consumers. 
Nevertheless, the introduction of this power has been the most 
controversial part of the transposition process, with business concerned 
that enforcement authorities lack experience in recall and that there could 
be over or misuse of the power.279 
 
The intention however, is clear that the Member States should have a strong 
regulatory enforcement regime to ‘ensure the effective enforcement of the obligations 
incumbent on producers and distributors’ by ensuring monitoring authorities ‘have 
                                                          
275 GPSD Article 2(g) (n. 262) 
276 GPSD Article 3 (n. 262) 
277 GPSD Article 5 (n. 262) 
278 GPSD Article 8 (n. 262) 
279 The General Product Safety Regulations 2005 Final Regulatory Impact Assessment 7.2 (n. 272) 
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powers to take appropriate measures, including the power to impose effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive penalties’.280  
 
The GPSD provides for producers to put in place surveillance programmes, with 
consumer complaints procedures.281 In conjunction with this, the Commission is to 
promote the RAPEX system for Europe-wide reporting of unsafe products by national 
authorities to the Commission and the co-ordination of remedial action.282 
 
This could only serve to intensify the deterrent effect of the Directive because the costs 
of a recall can be out of all proportion to the costs of litigation.283 It is difficult to see 
that the PL Directive could have added much if anything to this provision in terms of 
deterring the supply of unsafe products. 
 
The Product Safety Directive is now going through its third iteration.284 The European 
approach to product safety is seen as a ‘good news story’ in contrast with the PL 
Directive, in the sense that ‘its objectives are valuable’285 and the latest set of 
refinements (including enhanced market surveillance) successfully advance the 
protection of human health and safety for the benefit of society. Key revisions include 
extending the reach of the Regulations to products ‘to which consumers are exposed 
in the context of a service provided to them’.286 The revision is supplemented by the 
proposed Market Surveillance Regulation which would produce a ‘one tier system in 
which all market surveillance rules are brought together in a single instrument and in 
which RAPEX will be the single alert system regarding products presenting a risk’.287  
 
                                                          
280 GPSD Recital 22 (n. 262) 
281 GPSD Article 9 (n. 262) 
282 GPSD Articles 10 & 11 (n. 262) 
283 See for example ‘Toyota takes $2bn hit from global safety recall’  
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/feb/04/toyota-safety-recall-profits> accessed 16 June 2013 
284 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Consumer Product 
Safety and repealing Council Directive 87/357/EEC and Directive 2001/95/EC Brussels, 13.2.2013 
COM(2013) 78 final 2013/0049 (COD) (“Product Safety and Market Surveillance Package”)  
< http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/archive/safety/psmsp/docs/psmsp-act_en.pdf > accessed 5 
February 2015 
285 Geraint Howells, Product safety – A Model for EU Legislation and Reform. Ch. 25 varieties of 
European Economic law and Regulation 2014 ISBN 978-3-319-04903-8 pp. 525-538 
286 Product Safety and Market Surveillance Package Article 2 1(c) (n. 284) 
287 Product Safety and Market Surveillance Package, Explanatory Memorandum (n. 284) p. 5 
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4.1.4 Regulations are backed by Criminal Law sanctions making them normatively 
more effective than PL  
 
Those who fail voluntarily to comply with regulatory requirements face criminal 
sanctions. 
 
Sanctions are an important part of any regulatory system. They provide a 
deterrent and can act as a catalyst to ensure that regulations are complied 
with and indicate that non-compliance will not be tolerated.288 
 
Following on from the Hampton Report289 which recommended inter alia more 
effective deterrence in regulatory powers, Macrory recommended a wide range of 
sanctioning options in addition to criminal prosecution, enabling regulators to respond 
to individual needs. This led to the enactment of the Regulatory Enforcement and 
Sanctions Act 2008 which gave the Local Better Regulation Office powers to 
coordinate regulatory enforcement by local Authorities and provided under Part 3 a 
range of enforcement tools including fixed and variable monetary penalties; 
compliance notices; restoration notices; stop notices and enforcement undertakings.  
 
4.1.5 Regulation backed by criminal sanctions but also cultural norms 
 
The criminal law is better placed than tort to influence norms of behaviour. Indeed the 
roles of criminal sentencing include punishment, reduction of crime (including by its 
deterrence), reform of offenders and protection of the public.290 
 
It is not necessarily the fines and other enforcement means that make regulation work. 
The Association of Personal Injury Lawyers (APIL) wrote in their briefing note against 
                                                          
288 Richard B Macrory, Regulatory Justice: Making Sanctions effective. Final report November 2006  
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070305103615/http://cabinetoffice.gov.uk/regulation/doc
uments/pdf/macrory_penalties.pdf > accessed 5 February 2015 
289 Philip Hampton, Reducing administrative burdens: effective inspection and enforcement March 
2005, ISBN: 1 84532 088 3, p. 6 [16] 
 <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070701131038/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/media/7/F/bud05hamptonv1.pdf  > accessed 5 February 2015 
290 Criminal Justice Act 2003 s 142 
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the proposed repeal of strict liability for breaches of health and safety duties291 in 
response to the Löfstedt Report on Health and Safety:292 
 
Finally, some commentators have said that employers will still face the 
consequences of criminal breaches of statutory duty in the courts. This 
completely misses the point that, according to the Health and Safety 
Executive, in 2011/2012 there were 156,000 accidents at work which led 
to more than seven days’ absence yet in the last year, the HSE, which is 
the main prosecuting authority, prosecuted just 584 cases.293 
 
It is submitted that this is irrelevant to whether criminal sanctions work. The potential 
for criminal prosecution will have deterred many more breaches. It does not always 
require a prosecution to improve safety. Regulation does not necessarily have to be 
heavy handed to achieve its goal.  
 
The possibility of fines, sanctions, and inspections acts less as a deterrent 
threat than as a way to focus management attention on institutionalised 
expectations that may affect the legitimacy and operation of their 
enterprises.294  
 
Compliance with regulations is a cultural and behavioural norm. Successful 
manufacturers want to instil a perception of compliance, safety and legitimacy. The 
LSE’s review of the determinants of compliance with Health and Safety Laws and 
Regulations for the Health and Safety Executive in 2008 found that compliance is 
‘more common than might be expected’. Sanctions may not even feature in the minds 
of the relevant persons and regulators may not need to focus on enforcement. They 
concluded: 
 
Compliance practices may be better understood by reference to the broad 
environment and the regulatory context within which those subject to 
regulation carry out their enterprises. These factors include but are not 
limited to: 
 
- The design and source of the regulations 
 
                                                          
291 Subsequently enacted as s 69 Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 – from 1 October 2013 
(Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 (Commencement No 3, Transitional Provisions and 
Savings) Order 2013) 
292 Löfstedt Report (n. 62) 
293 A parliamentary briefing from the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers (APIL) for members of the 
House of Lords ahead of second reading November 2012: < APIL briefing   > accessed 5 June 2013  
294 (OECD(2000) Reducing the risk of policy failure: Challenges for regulatory compliance) 
< http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/46466287.pdf  > accessed 9 April 2015  
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- The structure of the regulatory agency and its regulatory mandate; 
 
- The enforcement activities of its staff; 
 
- Business motivations for compliance (including the sanctions imposed 
and firms’ perception of the legitimacy of the regulations) and the structure 
of the firms being regulated; 
 
- The regulatory environment (including the economic climate, industry 
size and structure, whether the interests of business converge with those 
of the regulatory agency, and the role of third party actors). 
 
Variation exists among firms in their response to similar regulatory 
standards, and some will, contrary to simple economic models, institute 
compliance measures that go well beyond those required by legal rules.295  
 
What is more important is to promote a culture of compliance. Voluntary Codes of 
Practice exemplify how this can work. In the field of vehicle safety there is a Code of 
Practice on Vehicle Safety Defects and Recalls. It has been developed by the 
Department of Transport in conjunction with the society of Motor Manufacturers and 
Traders amongst others.296 
 
The Code states: 
 
In the United Kingdom legislation covers the manufacturers, suppliers, 
distributors responsibilities regarding consumer protection in the form of 
the General Product Safety Regulations 2005 (GPSR 2005). This 
legislation was brought about by the introduction of European legislation 
(The General Product Safety Directive 2001 (Directive 2001/95/EC) and 
                                                          
295 Dr Tola Amodu, ‘The determinants of compliance with laws and regulations with special reference 
to health and safety A literature review’ RR638 page vii Department of Law, The London School of 
Economics and Political Science < http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/rrpdf/rr638.pdf  > accessed 15 May 
2013 
296 The full list is: 
- Vehicle and Operator Services Agency (VOSA) representing the Secretary of State 
for Transport 
- The Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders Limited (SMMT) 
- The Motor Cycle Industry Association Limited (MCIA) 
- The National Caravan Council (NCC) 
- Independent Automotive Aftermarket Federation (IAAF) 
- Retail Motor Industry Federation (RMIF) 
- British Tyre Manufacturers’ Association Ltd (BTMA) 
- National Tyre Distributors Association (NTDA) 
- Imported Tyre Manufacturers’ Association (ITMA) 
- Retread Manufacturers Association (RMA) 
- Agricultural Engineers Association (AEA) 
- National Trailer and Towing Association (NTTA) 
- British Vehicle Rental and Leasing Association (BVRLA) 
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subsequent additions (2004/905/EC). These documents encourage 
Codes of Good Practice.297   
 
The Code ‘concerns cases where manufacturers, concessionaires or 
official/independent importers become aware of the existence of potential safety 
defects in units that are available for supply in the UK in respect of; passenger cars…’. 
Significantly, there have been 6,540 motor recall campaigns since January 2000.298 
During the same period there has only been one motor manufacture PL group 
action.299 This suggests that there is a culture of compliance. This is not surprising as 
generally manufacturers want the ‘seal of approval’ that compliance gives them.  
 
Compliance is not universal. A search of the European Commission’s RAPEX site300 
shows that of the 6,046 European product recalls registered from 2010 to June 2013, 
3,444 are for products originating in China. If this signifies a trend of importing cheap 
unregulated goods, the question will reasonably be asked whether punishments are 
sufficient to act as a deterrent. Goldberg and Zipursky make the argument in relation 
to the US regulations that, even when enforced, they tend to generate penalties ‘that 
are not correlated with the losses actually caused by the violations’.301 It is true that 
prosecutions under the Consumer Protection Act 1987 tend to attract small fines. A 
visit to the Trading Standards Institute website302 is illuminating in this regard. A recent 
prosecution is illustrative:303 
 
The director of Star One International Limited, Mr Guldip Singh Dang, 
pleaded guilty to six offences relating to the supply of toys that failed to 
meet the essential requirements of The Toys (Safety) Regulations 1995 
and one offence of supplying a toy that contained a banned substance, 
contrary to The REACH Enforcement Regulations 2008. Mr Dang, of 
                                                          
297 Code of Practice on Vehicle Safety Defects and Recalls  Document Reference: VSBCOP001 
Issue: 1 (03/07) Origin: VSB1 , < https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/code-of-practice-on-
vehicle-safety-defects-and-recalls/code-of-practice-on-vehicle-safety-defects-and-recalls > accessed 
9 April 2015 
298 < http://www.dft.gov.uk/vosa/apps/recalls/searches/search.asp > 23 April 2015 
299 See < http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/rcj-rolls-building/queens-bench/group-litigation-orders > 
accessed 23 April 2015 
300 The Rapid Alert System for Non-food Dangerous Products (RAPEX) is a searchable database 
maintained by the European Commission.  
< http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/rapex/alerts/main/index.cfm?event=main.listNotifications > 
accessed 23 April 2015 
301 Easy Case (n. 11) p.1930 
302 < http://www.tradingstandards.gov.uk/  > accessed 23 April 2015 
303 < http://www.tradingstandards.gov.uk/extra/news-item.cfm/newsid/1111 > 27 April 2013 
104 | P a g e  
 
Grange Farm Close, Harrow, was fined a total of £1,000 and ordered to 
pay £3,000 costs  
…  
The safety failures of the toys included: 
• scooters with sharp edges, points, and entrapment/crushing hazards 
• toy buggies that collapsed and whose packaging presented a hazard 
• toy planes with no importer details applied for traceability 
• dolls with sharp points and small parts that were a choking hazard 
• rattles that were poorly constructed and could pose a choking hazard 
• dolls with ten times the permitted level of a harmful chemical 
 
It may be argued with some force that fines of such a small scale fail to deter. However, 
the simple response is that fines can be made larger if necessary. There is a huge 
variation in criminal sanctions across the EU. This is another area for harmonisation. 
In a recent product recall handled by the Practice, advice was received on the potential 
sanctions for failing to notify the recall in Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and 
Poland. Potential penalties ranged from €332 per product type in Slovakia to up to 
€24,000 in Poland; to a possible fine up to as much as €6.6m for failure to comply with 
a recall order in Hungary and up to €2m for failure to notify in Czech Republic.304 
 
4.1.6 Health and Safety Fines lead the way 
 
If, in principle, regulation improves the safety of products, then legislation can 
empower the judiciary to set the fines accordingly. This has happened noticeably in 
the field of Health and Safety. For example, after the Hatfield train crash on 17 October 
2000, Balfour Beatty was prosecuted under section 3(1) of the Health and Safety at 
Work Act 1974 for failing to discharge its duty, as an employer, to persons not in its 
employment. The crash happened when a broken rail caused the derailment of an 
express train travelling at 117mph. The faulty rail had been spotted 21 months earlier 
but left unrepaired. A replacement rail had been delivered and left alongside it for six 
months. The breach of duty in question was a cause of the accident in which 102 
passengers were injured and 4 lost their lives. At trial Balfour Beatty pleaded guilty 
and Mackay J sentenced it to a fine of £10m plus costs. The fine was reduced on 
appeal to £7.5m, still a substantial fine, carrying a clear deterrent message.305 
                                                          
304 The helpful advice of CMS Cameron McKenna is gratefully acknowledged in this regard. It is not 
within the scope of this thesis to investigate the range of punishments in other EU states or how 
frequently and at what level such statutory fines are actually ordered – but it would make an interesting 
project for the future. 
305  R. v Balfour Beatty Rail Infrastructure Services Ltd [2006] EWCA Crim 1586; see also 
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MARKET FORCES ACT AS A DETERRENT 
4.2 Market forces act as a natural deterrent 
Polinsky and Shavell make the point that firms are often motivated by market forces 
to enhance product safety because their sales may fall if their products harm 
consumers.306 Market forces act as a natural deterrent against supplying unsafe 
products. It was acknowledged in the Impact Assessment for the introduction of the 
General Product Safety Regulations 2005 (implementing the GPSD 2001) 
 
13.3 In the main we believe observance to be high in the UK because of 
the potential damaging brand impact that leaving an unsafe product on the 
market can have, though we accept that there may be a small number of 
less scrupulous traders for which this ‘brand image effect’ is not a sufficient 
deterrent. 307 
 
Polinsky and Shavell concede ‘For products that are not widely sold, however, market 
forces and regulation will usually be less effective and, as a consequence, PL is more 
likely to be socially advantageous.’308 They cite drugs and automobiles as examples 
of widely sold products. 
 
4.2.1 Market forces affect contracting parties and third parties, and all products 
whether widely or narrowly sold 
 
Polinsky and Shavell make two illogical concessions. First, they accept that market 
forces do not operate to penalise firms for harm they do to third parties (strangers) 
because the victims of harm are not their customers. This is incorrect.  The negative 
publicity does not only affect the owner of a product made by the particular 
manufacturer. In fact potential buyers are more affected than existing owners as they 
may be put off making a purchase. Uneasy provides examples: Tylenol contaminated 
with cyanide in 1982 led to a fall in market share from 37% to 7%. Audi’s ‘sudden 
acceleration’ crisis in the US led to a drop in sales of 69%.  In recent experience, 
Toyota has gone through a wave of such bad publicity arising from a worldwide recall 
                                                          
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/5149732.stm > accessed 16 January 2013  
306 Uneasy Case (n. 1) p. 6 
307 The General Product Safety Regulations 2005 Final Regulatory Impact Assessment 13.3 (n. 273) 
308 Uneasy Case (n. 1) p. 5 
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arising from an alleged uncontrollable acceleration incident.309 It is not the recall itself 
(although that is not to say that a series of recalls would not of itself become so 
newsworthy as to damage a brand) but the alarming accident reported that does 
reputational damage. In the Kudo Case Study, Kudo had already carried out a recall 
campaign before the incident. It attracted no adverse publicity. In fact recalls may be 
presented to the public in a positive light. Polinsky and Shavell point out that Volvo 
has made a safety a selling point.310 In the UK, the car manufacturer MG’s slogan as 
long ago as the 1930s, was ‘Safety Fast’.311  
 
However, put succinctly by Mr Justice Willis in Walton v British Leyland, bad publicity 
is ‘bad for sales’.312 The degree to which consumers punish manufacturers for unsafe 
products is dependent on the information they have.313 That information may come 
from the media or the internet as the most prevalent sources. It may be ‘mis-
information’. Good news is often not newsworthy and so one may expect that if there 
is news about a product it is most likely to be bad – a recall or a horrific accident. 
Uneasy points out the cognitive bias factor.314 Audi’s sudden acceleration experience 
in the 1980s demonstrates how great the effect of public perception can be, whether 
soundly based or not.315 According to the Department of Transportation Report: 
 
…we cannot identify any single malfunction in the Audi 5000 which could 
simultaneously produce sudden acceleration and brake failure and which 
would leave no readily observable evidence of its occurrence.316 
 
The consumer may not properly understand or evaluate the information about the 
product risks. The Practice sees this regularly with airbag cases. In almost all airbag 
cases handled by the Practice (in excess of 20) the airbag has functioned normally. 
                                                          
309 Daily Mail 20/02/2010 << http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1248177/Toyota-recall-Last-
words-father-family-died-Lexus-crash.html >>   last accessed 23/10/12  
310 < http://www.wired.com/2008/05/volvo-promises  > accessed 23 April 2015 
311 See Pathé advertising film for MG called ‘Safety Fast’ < http://www.britishpathe.com/video/safety-
fast > accessed15 May 2013 
312 Walton v British Leyland (n. 194) 
313 Uneasy Case (n. 1) p. 8 
314 Uneasy Case (n. 1) p. 11 
315<http://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/24/business/a-hard-sell-for-
audi.html?scp=14&sq=audi%20sudden%20acceleration&st=cse > accessed 27 April 2013 
316 Gary Carr John Pollard Don Sussman Robert Walter Herbert Weinstock, (U.S. Department of 
Transportation Research and Special Programs Administration Transportation Systems Center 
Cambridge, MA), Study of Mechanical and Driver – Related Systems of the Audi 5000 Capable of 
Producing Uncontrolled Sudden Acceleration Incidents Final Report DOT-TSC-NHTSA-88-4 
September, 1988 
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However the claimant has misunderstood or been misinformed about the function and 
purpose of the airbag. In some of these cases the airbag very probably saved the 
claimant’s life (see for example cases 13 and 130 in the PL Claims Survey at Appendix 
4.) 
 
The second concession is that market forces are most influential for widely sold 
products because large volume companies have more to lose if their products are 
dangerous and more to gain if they are safe.317 They therefore have a ‘greater 
incentive to invest in product safety because they often offer multiple product lines and 
have long time horizons.’318 But smaller companies and companies with limited 
product ranges and limited market places have proportionately as much to lose. A 
steel fabricator in a small town will suffer hugely if it gains a reputation (justly or 
otherwise) for having had a major building collapse due to defective parts that it 
manufactured. So market forces are critically important to a manufacturer regardless 
of whether his market place is large or small. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The UK has an extensive regulatory regime for product safety and the GPSD, parallel 
to the PL directive, to fill any gaps, backed by criminal sanctions. It works well in 
fostering a culture of compliance through voluntary codes, such as the VOSA Code 
of Conduct on Vehicle Safety Defects and Recalls which had already prompted recall 
action before misguided litigation was commenced against Kudo. Where sanctions 
are thought inadequate to enforce the regulatory regime, the lead of Health and Safety 
legislation should be followed in increasing fines. Targeted fines are far more effective 
in regulating safety than arbitrary awards of damages. By way of contrast, in the US, 
over-reliance on PL law has arguably led to under-regulation.  
 
Above all, I conclude, thalidomide teaches that toxic risks call for stringent 
regulation and an expansion of social insurance.319  
 
                                                          
317 Uneasy Case (n. 1) p. 12 
318 Uneasy Case (n. 1) p. 12 
319 Anita Bernstein, ‘Formed by Thalidomide: Mass Torts as a False Cure for Toxic Exposure’ Columbia 
Law Review, Vol. 97, No. 7, (Nov., 1997), 2153-2176 p. 2156 
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Irrespective of regulation and PL, market forces act as a filter to deter the supply of 
defective products. Information channels are so wide and so instantaneous that any 
bad news about a product translates rapidly into depressed sales whether, the product 
is sold globally or parochially. 
 
The economic theory of tort based on targeting the source of accidents and 
internalising the costs of accident avoidance was explained in Chapter Two as a way 
of ‘persuading [manufacturers] to spend the appropriate levels of money on 
safety…’320 According to this theory, the greater the number of ‘Martins’ making claims 
against Kudo, the more it can be said that PL is working as an indirect deterrent. This 
leads to a moral conundrum. If there is no correlation between the merits of PL claims 
and the deterrent effect of PL claims, then it is difficult to justify PL as a deterrent. 
Kudo is a classic ‘have a go’321 case as identified by the Better Regulation Task Force. 
The injuries were overstated and insignificant. At worst they amounted to minor aches 
and pains and it was pure opportunism that led to them generating a PL claim. Had 
the same injuries or discomfort been suffered in a village football match, the claimant 
might have been expected to ‘grin and bear it’.322 Whilst the burden of proof was 
squarely on the claimant to show that there was a defect in the product and that this 
caused his injury, Kudo could not simply sit back and do nothing in reply, in the hope 
that Martin’s expert would disintegrate on cross-examination (which he did). Thus it 
can be said that on the facts and findings, Kudo were put to expense even though they 
were not liable. There was no defect. The cost to Kudo centred not on the merits of 
the claim but the inconvenience of litigation, the wasted cost of defending a bad claim 
and most significantly the cost of the potential bad publicity which might arise from the 
claim: the nuisance value of litigation. The easier it is for claimants to bring nuisance 
claims, the more claims of this nature Kudo can expect to face. Only then does the 
scale of the overall cost begin to become significant. But this does not constitute a 
satisfactory normative basis for deterrence. It has been suggested that ‘Members of 
the public’ may be excused for ‘having a go’ as they are merely following the moral 
                                                          
320 P.S. Atiyah, The Damages Lottery (n. 13) pp. 165 & 167 
321 See David Arculus and Teresa Graham, Better Routes to Redress (n. 240) p. 5 
322 Richard Mullender, ‘Negligence law and blame culture: a critical response to a possible problem’ 
Professional Negligence 2006, 22(1), 2-31 p. 4 citing J.A Weir, ‘Governmental Liability’ [1989] Public 
Law 40, p. 55 
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code laid down for them by the legal profession.323 It ill behoves the legal profession 
to inculcate a perverse moral code in the public. 
 
 
                                                          
323 Richard Mullender, ‘Negligence law and blame culture: a critical response to a possible problem’ 
(n. 322) 
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Case Study 2 : Corrective Justice 
Vaughan v Cranwell324  
 
Summary 
 
Mr Vaughan was a successful company director. His hobby was flying and he owned 
a light aircraft and was a member of a flying club. Cranwell was a member of small 
syndicate of likeminded enthusiasts which owned and flew a Russian ex-military 
training aircraft from a rural airfield close to the airport from which Vaughan flew his 
own aircraft. 
 
A surprise party was arranged at Vaughan’s flying club for his birthday. As part of the 
celebrations, his friends arranged for Cranwell to take Vaughan for a pleasure flight in 
the syndicate’s aircraft. Vaughan and Cranwell were acquainted through the local 
flying community but had not flown together. 
 
The aircraft was built in the 1970s in the Eastern Bloc and was used as a military 
training aircraft. To an enthusiast it looked and sounded awesome, looking more like 
an aircraft from the 1950s, which in reality was the age of the technology, with a 
powerful radial engine on the front. It was a simple rugged design: open control wires 
ran along the floor of the cockpit between the pilots’ feet from the joystick to the wings 
and tail. It is an aircraft type used for breath-taking aerobatic displays in the hands of 
expert pilots325. 
 
It has two cockpits in line and can be flown from either. 
 
Cranwell was an experienced pilot with some aerobatic experience but was known to 
be conservative with his aerobatic flying. He was not an expert. Cranwell flew to the 
airfield where the party was in full swing. He offered to take Vaughan for a flight. 
                                                          
324 See Appendix 2 for verbatim extracts from the key documents in the case. The only alteration is to 
the parties’ names for anonymity 
325 For an example see the following video made by the expert used by the Practice in the case: 
< https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UyG5RvMz3xE&feature=player_embedded#t=13 > accessed 23 
April 2015 
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Vaughan happily accepted and they discussed flying around the area without any 
aerobatics. The parachutes normally kept on the seats in case of emergency during 
aerobatics had been taken out and cushions put on the seats. 
 
Vaughan’s family were gathered at the club house which looks out onto the runway. 
Vaughan climbed into the rear cockpit and Cranwell briefed him. The seven point 
safety harness was complicated. Two straps came around the waist from each side of 
the seat. One more came over each shoulder and finally an anti-gravity strap came up 
from the floor to hold the occupant in his seat if the aircraft flew inverted. All the straps 
met in the middle on two locking buckles. 
 
The original safety harness had been replaced, as is common practice, with a modern 
equivalent from the USA. Original harnesses would be perished and unsafe and new 
ones of the original type are no longer available. 
 
Cranwell was seen leaning into the cockpit and presumably assisting Vaughan with 
the harness. They spoke for a few minutes. Vaughan was photographed in the cockpit. 
He was happy and relaxed. His harness was fitted securely over his shoulders. 
 
Cranwell climbed into the front cockpit and, once settled, he attempted to start the 
engine. It would not start. The particular design of starter requires it to be charged with 
compressed air from a special cylinder. The cylinder had to be collected from the 
aircraft’s home base. Cranwell flew back there in another aircraft and returned with the 
cylinder. 
 
The two then re-boarded. A friend of Vaughan noticed that he had not secured his 
shoulder straps and offered to assist. Vaughan declined. The aircraft then took off 
successfully, flew low for a short accelerating run and then made a steep roaring climb 
out before banking to the right and disappearing off into the distance. It returned a 
short time later and Cranwell asked Air Traffic Control for permission to make a low 
approach and go round before turning to the right to join the circuit to land. 
 
The aircraft approached at speed and flew past the club house. It then climbed rapidly 
and turned to the right as it had done on take-off. This time, however, when the aircraft 
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banked to the right it continued to roll until it was inverted. Air Traffic Control heard a 
short transmission from the pilot from which he clearly appreciated the imminent 
danger. The aircraft continued to roll and crashed nose first into the ground at high 
speed, erupting in a fireball. Both occupants were killed instantly in the full gaze of 
Vaughan’s family. 
 
The accident was investigated by the Air Accident Investigation Branch of the 
Department of Transport in accordance with the Chicago Convention.326  
 
AAIB Draft Bulletin 
 
The AAIB submits its draft report (Bulletin) to interested parties to enable them to make 
any representations in accordance with the Investigation of Accidents Regulations.327 
 
The draft AAIB bulletin concluded that in the absence of a pre-existing technical defect 
being found, the following causal factors could not be dismissed: 
 
 Inadvertent interference with the controls by the passenger as a result his 
shoulder and crotch straps being unsecured; 
 
 Incapacitation of the pilot or passenger due to g-force; 
 
 Mis-handling of a low level aerobatic manoeuvre. 
 
The Practice had the benefit of expert advice from an experienced aerobatic ex-
military pilot who ran a display team using this aircraft type. He had also flown with 
Cranwell to check him out in some aerobatic manoeuvres.  
 
The expert experimented with one of his own identical aircraft to see what would 
happen if the harnesses were not fastened. He found that the buckle of the rear cockpit 
                                                          
326 Convention on International Civil Aviation as amended July 1994 Annex 13  
327 Civil Aviation (Investigation of Air Accidents and Incidents) Regulations 1996, S I No 2798 of 1996 
Regulation 12  
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anti-gravity (crotch) strap could fall into a gap created when the joystick was pushed 
hard to the right and prevent the stick from returning from that position. This would 
cause the aircraft to continue to roll and behave exactly as the subject aircraft had 
done. 
 
He was certain that it was not in the pilot’s nature to carry out aerobatics at low level: 
so certain that he asked the AAIB for permission to inspect the wreckage of the aircraft. 
This had completely disintegrated forward of the rear cockpit. However, from the wings 
back, the strongest structural part, the fuselage floor was intact although badly 
deformed. 
Figure 3 Extract from original AAIB Report 
On examining the wreckage he found clear evidence that the buckle had indeed fallen 
into the hole with scrape marks in the paint (highlighted by the red circle) where the 
pilot had wrestled in vain with the jammed control. 
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AAIB Revised Bulletin 
 
After representations were made to the AAIB, the conclusion was amended to state 
that the most likely cause of a restriction of the controls was that a buckle on the 
passenger’s unsecured crotch strap had become jammed in the flight controls. 
 
Inquest 
 
A jury at a Coroner’s Inquest into the deaths found 
 
Mr Cranwell was the pilot of a [ … ] aircraft with dual controls.  The 
passenger in the rear seat had not secured his shoulder or crotch straps.  
It is not known whether the pilot was aware of this.  Mr Cranwell requested 
permission for a low approach and go around.  Permission was given.  The 
aircraft was seen to come in at high speed, following which it climbed to 
about 200 feet and started to loop round, at which point the aircraft went 
inverted and struck the ground. It caught fire and the pilot and passenger 
were both killed.  Subsequent investigations show that the rear seat strap 
could become trapped in the controls so as to prevent the pilot from 
controlling the aircraft. 
 
Further Investigations 
 
Further research showed that the original Russian harness design could not fall into 
the hole as it was too large. The modern harness, however, was by pure chance a 
perfect fit. 
 
Pleaded case 
The case against Cranwell was based in negligence. Allegations included  
 
- Ignoring Vaughan’s request for a flight without aerobatics and performing 
aerobatics or abrupt flight manoeuvres at low altitude 
- Failing to give a proper briefing  
- Failing to carry out a suitable pre-flight check and the ensure loose seatbelt 
straps were secured 
- Ignoring CAA safety advice in playing to an audience 
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Mediation 
After expert evidence was exchanged the parties agreed to mediate. The principal 
problem for the defendant was that the Air Navigation Order in force at that time 
imposes heavy obligations on the commander of an aircraft. This includes ensuring 
passengers understand how to use the harnesses and checking the cockpit for loose 
objects. A substantial settlement was agreed to reflect the dependency claim. 
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CHAPTER FIVE - CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 
 
Strict liability is difficult to harmonise with the moral theory, even though in 
some circumstances a man might feel himself under a moral obligation to 
make reparation for harm that was not his fault 
 
  Glanville Williams 1951328 
   
  
INTRODUCTION 
 
5.1 Corrective justice is at the centre of tort 
 
Corrective justice is considered by many (most notably in recent times Coleman,329 
Weinrib330 – and not least Goldberg and Zipursky331) to form the basis of tort law. 
There are varied and conflicting interpretations as to the detail of the conditions of 
responsibility; whether there must be wrong or wrongful loss; and what makes conduct 
wrongful.332 
 
Corrective Justice is not merely one of many theories upon which tort is based: in 
Cane’s search for a ‘general law’ of tort (by analogy with the general laws of crime or 
contract), corrective justice emerges as the most promising candidate.333 It is not 
universally accepted as such. Sheinman argues that primary tort duties have nothing 
to do with corrective justice because they exist before the breach that leads to the 
need for correction.334  Whether it is a primary or secondary duty that gives rise to 
corrective justice it will be assumed that corrective justice is a recognised aim of tort. 
It does seem, however, that much of the academic debate revolves around the 
dangers of trying to fit all of tort into a single theory.335 Out of these debates a common 
                                                          
328 Glanville Williams, ‘The Aims of the Law of Tort’ 4 Current Legal Probs. 137 (1951) pp.156/157 
329 J Coleman, Risks and Wrongs Cambridge University press 1992 ISBN 0-521-42861-0 
330 Ernest  J Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (n. 115) 
331 John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, ‘Torts as Wrongs’ April, 2010 88 Tex. L. Rev. 917 
332 Jules L. Coleman,  ‘The Practice of Corrective Justice’   37 Ariz. L. Rev. 15 1995 p.19 
333 Peter Cane, ‘The General/Special Distinction in Criminal Law, Tort Law and Legal Theory’ Law and 
Philosophy, Vol. 26, No. 5 (Sep., 2007), 465-500, p. 484 
334 Hanoch Sheinman, ‘Tort Law and Corrective Justice’ Law and Philosophy Vol. 22, No. 1 (2003), 21-
73 
335 See Richard A. Epstein, ‘A Theory of Strict Liability’ 2 J. Legal Stud. 151 (1973); John Borgo, ‘Causal 
Paradigms in Tort Law’ The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Jun., 1979), pp. 419-455; also 
Richard A Epstein, ‘Causation and Corrective Justice: a Reply to Two Critics’  8 J legal studies 477 
1979 
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theme of corrective justice must first be extracted: namely that tort corrects the 
damage caused by wrongs. Once a workable model of corrective justice is decided 
on, the next step is to consider whether strict liability for defective products is 
compatible with it. 
 
This chapter considers whether PL, based on strict liability, is consistent with 
corrective justice and thereby furthers a key socially desirable aspect of tort. 
 
5.2 There has to be a ‘Wrong’ to be corrected 
 
A civil-recourse theory that predicates rights of action on wrongs, not losses, 
comfortably shows how tort law hangs together.336 Corrective justice may be 
understood as redressing the balance where one party has bettered his position, 
whether by accident, negligence, intent or fraud, at the expense of another.337  It is a 
matter of rectifying ‘an injustice that the defendant has inflicted on the plaintiff’.338  
 
Coleman agrees that there is a need to annul wrongful gains and losses339  but the 
focus must be on the wrongful loss,340 although his theory later broadened to 
encompass a correlativity dimension,341 then agency, rectification and correlativity.342 
He dismisses as ‘local distributive justice’343 Perry’s theory of outcome 
responsibility,344 a term coined by Tony Honoré,345 explaining that those who causally 
contribute to a harmful interaction in a sufficiently proximate way have, simply for that 
reason, a special responsibility with respect to the outcome that other people do not 
have. It is not just a question of wrongs but of rectifying wrongful losses. ‘Corrective 
justice imposes a duty to repair the wrongful losses for which one is responsible’.346 
                                                          
336 John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, ‘Torts as Wrongs’ (n.331) 986 
337 Aristotle, The Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle (n. 89) p. 152 
338 Ernest Weinrib, ‘Tort Law as Corrective Justice’(n. 85) 
339 Jules Coleman, ‘Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain’ (n. 84) p. 442 footnote 5 
340 Jules L. Coleman, ‘Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice’ 67 Ind. L.J. 349 1991-1992 
p. 358 
341 Jules L. Coleman,  ‘The Practice of Corrective Justice’   37 Ariz. L. Rev. 15 1995 p. 27 
342 Jules L. Coleman  ‘The Practice of Corrective Justice’   (n.341) p. 30 
343 Jules L. Coleman,  ‘The Practice of Corrective Justice’   (n.341) p. 27 
344 Stephen R. Perry, ‘Comment on Coleman: Corrective Justice’ 67 Ind. L.J. 381 1991-1992  p. 399 
note 71  
345  Tony Honoré, ‘Responsibility and Luck’ (n. 134) 
346 Jules L Coleman, ‘Risks and Wrongs’ 15 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 637 1992 p. 645 
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It is widely accepted that morally culpable behaviour is a sufficient (if not necessary) 
basis for corrective justice.347 It is argued strongly that ‘fault is central both to the 
institution of tort law and … to its ultimate moral defensibility’.348 It is intuitive (at least 
to a deontologist if not to a consequentialist)349 that if Kudo had fitted a defective brake 
to Martin’s car and this had caused the vehicle to run over his child, Kudo would be 
responsible for the accident and liable to compensate Martin’s child. But moral 
responsibility alone is not sufficient to ground liability. A Doctor may feel ‘responsible’ 
if his patient dies, or a lawyer ‘responsible’ if his client loses a case but neither will 
necessarily be legally liable. Moral responsibility has to be translated into moral wrong 
before society requires a correction to take place, by making it a legal wrong. 
 
5.2.1 The Wrong must give rise to gain and loss 
 
A moral wrong in itself may not lead to any loss requiring compensation. According to 
Aristotle’s conception of corrective justice there must be a loss on the part of the 
plaintiff and a concomitant gain on the part of the defendant.350 Where material 
property is concerned, the concept of gain and loss may be straightforward. An 
example given by Epstein351 (in the context of strict liability and absence of 
blameworthy conduct, which will be discussed shortly) illustrates the point. In Vincent 
v Lake Erie Transportation352 the defendant saved his ship in a storm by tying it to the 
plaintiff’s dock and causing damage to the dock. The gain and loss are clear and there 
is no obvious reason why, as between the plaintiff and defendant, the plaintiff should 
bear the loss. 
 
A loss of property per se, however, does not explain the concept of loss and gain. In 
Case Study 2, Vaughan v Cranwell, if the aircraft had struck and destroyed a building 
when it crashed, there would be a loss to the owner of the building but what gain would 
                                                          
347 Dewees, Duff and Trebilcock, Exploring the Domain of Accident Law: Taking the Facts Seriously 
Oxford University Press (1996) ISBN 0-19-508797-6, p. 8 
348 Jules L Coleman, ‘Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice’ (n.340) p. 351 
349 Richard A. Epstein, ‘Toward a General Theory of Tort Law: Strict Liability in Context’ Journal of Tort 
Law, Vol. 3 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 6 p.4 
350 Aristotle, The Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle (n. 89) p. 149 
351 Richard A. Epstein, ‘A Theory of Strict Liability’ (n.335) 
352 Vincent v Lake Erie Transportation  109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910) 
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there be to the manufacturer of the passenger’s harness – or to the pilot, the aircraft 
certification authority, the air traffic controllers who permitted the fly past, the 
passenger himself, who failed to secure his straps or any other party who could 
become involved in the chain of causation in tort? 
 
In the context of a PL claim, the question is whether there has been an unjust gain on 
the part of the manufacturer correlative to the loss of the injured plaintiff.353 The only 
material gain the manufacturer has made is the purchase price. This is not necessarily 
an unjust gain. Gain is to be understood, however, in terms of violation of another’s 
rights: a ‘normative’ gain - a gain in rights at the expense of the plaintiff.354  
 
Aristotle makes clear that when he refers to gain and loss he is not speaking literally:  
 
For in such cases, though the terms are not always quite appropriate, we 
generally talk of the doer’s "gain'' (e.g. the striker’s) and the sufferer's 
"loss;" but when the suffering has been assessed by the court, what the 
doer gets is called "loss” or penalty, and what the sufferer gets is called 
"gain."355 
 
According to Weinrib, ‘Aristotle’s notion of correlativity must be understood as referring 
to the Kantian rights and correlative duties that govern the interactions of free 
agents.’356  
 
In other words, the nexus between the plaintiff and defendant is the correlative nature 
of right and duty ‘because the content of the right is the object of the duty’.357 These 
are initially in balance. Immediately before the accident, the parties each have what is 
‘rightfully theirs’. The status quo is one of ‘equality’ and ‘a defendant who breaches 
that equality realizes a gain solely in the sense of having more than he or she ought 
to have as a matter of corrective justice, and similarly, mutatis mutandis, with the 
plaintiff’s loss.’358  
                                                          
353 See Ernest Weinrib, ‘The Gains and Losses of Corrective Justice’ Duke Law Journal, Vol. 44, No. 2 
(Nov., 1994), 277-297 
354 Ernest J. Weinrib, ‘Corrective Justice in a Nutshell’ The University of Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 52, 
No. 4 (Autumn, 2002), 349-356 p. 354; see also Peter Cane, ‘Corrective Justice and Correlativity in 
Private Law: The Idea of Private Law by Ernest J Weinrib, Review’ (n. 116) p. 474 
355 See Aristotle, The Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle (n. 89) p. 152 
356 Ernest J. Weinrib, ‘The Gains and Losses of Corrective Justice’ (n. 353) p. 280 
357 Ernest J. Weinrib, ‘The Gains and Losses of Corrective Justice’ (n. 353353) p. 291 
358 Ernest J. Weinrib, ‘Corrective Justice in a Nutshell’ (n.354) pp. 354/355 
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Society becomes concerned when the balance of individual’s rights is interfered with 
and corrective justice steps in to restore equilibrium. Where a person is injured and 
thereby suffers a wrongful loss, but the injurer does not thereby gain, ‘he has secured 
no gain which would be the concern of corrective justice to rectify’.359  
 
5.3 It is difficult to define what conduct constitutes a wrong 
 
Coleman separates the questions of liability and recovery.360 He sees wrongfulness 
as a ‘rights invasion’.361 There has to be an underlying theory of rights as an 
antecedent to determining when causation of harm is a wrong.362 Goldberg and 
Zipursky would argue in PL cases that that this normative element (that which makes 
the defendant’s conduct wrong) is satisfied by connecting liability with the consumer 
expectations test.363 
  
However, it is argued above364 that the consumer expectations test, as applied under 
the PL Directive, is not a true barometer of right and wrong because an objectively 
assessed expectation may be different from actual expectations, which could be 
greater, lesser or non-existent. Schwartz argues that it is used as a substitute for 
contributory negligence where that defence is unavailable, or as a mechanism to allow 
juries to hold a defendant liable ‘when all other bases are absent’ and calls for the test 
to be abolished.365 Those objectively assessed expectations may be more than the 
public at large actually expect.366 Theories upon which the disposition of rights can be 
founded include basic Kantian morality;367 correlativity based on fairness between the 
                                                          
359 Jules Coleman, ‘Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain’ (n. 84) p. 426 
360 Jules Coleman, ‘Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain’(n. 84) p. 422 et seq 
361 Jules L. Coleman, ‘Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice’ (n.340) 
362 Jane Stapleton, Product Liability (n. 9) p. 171 
363 John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, ‘Torts as Wrongs’ (n.331) p. 983 
364  3.3.5 page 77  
365 Alan Schwartz, ‘Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis’ The Yale Law 
Journal, Vol. 97, No. 3 (Feb., 1988), 353-419 p. 384 
366 PL Directive Article 6 (n. 2): Sam B and Others v McDonald's Restaurants Limited (n. 212) per The 
Honourable Mr Justice Field [74] 
367 Allan Beever,  ‘Corrective Justice and Personal Responsibility in Tort Law’ Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies, Vol. 28, No. 3 (2008), 475–500 p. 492 citing A Burrows (ed.), ‘In Defence of Tort’ in 
Understanding the Law of Obligations (Hart Publishing, Oxford 1998) 10 
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parties;368 justice and propriety;369 mathematical imbalance;370 reciprocity;371 simple 
causation.372 A leading theory in the context of PL is that of ‘enterprise liability’.373  
 
5.3.1 Enterprise liability 
 
 Stapleton’s version of causation based liability is ‘enterprise liability’. She bases 
liability on morality, citing the moral outrage sparked by the Thalidomide 
disaster.   
 
There does seem to be strong anecdotal evidence that when a bad 
outcome is seen as due to commercial operations, the resultant 
resentment and social discredit is often greater than it might otherwise be.’ 
374   
  
There are problems with this theory. Linking moral grounds for product liability with 
profit motive is as random as linking it with bare causation. Every manufacturer is 
trying to make a profit, as is every service provider and every artisan. The law does 
not require everyone to work on a charitable or not-for-profit basis. As Stapleton 
acknowledges, profit-making is approved of in Western economies. Everyone who 
works seeks profit. Pensions are dependent on the profits of commerce. Employees’ 
own financial security depends on the financial security of their employers. If 
manufacturers are making losses, they will sooner or later go out of business. Along 
the way employees will lose their jobs and the scarcity of money may impact on safety. 
Of course, outright greed at the expense of safety would be an egregious wrong – but 
while this may be a factor in fault based liability, it would be completely irrelevant to 
investigate the nature of profits in strict liability.  
There is nothing intrinsically wrong with making profits. As Fleming says, commenting 
on Stapleton:  
 
                                                          
368 Ernest J. Weinrib, ‘Correlativity, Personality, and the Emerging Consensus on Corrective Justice’, 2 
Theoretical Inq. L. 107, 120 (2001); Ernest Weinrib, ‘Tort Law as Corrective Justice’ (n. 85); Ernest J. 
Weinrib, ‘The Gains and Losses of Corrective Justice’ (n.353) p.280 
369 Richard A. Epstein, ‘Toward a General Theory of Tort Law: Strict Liability in Context’ (n. 349)  
370 Aristotle, The Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle Book V (n. 89)  
371 George P. Fletcher, ‘Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory’ (n. 67) pp. 537-573 
372 Richard A. Epstein, ‘A Theory of Strict Liability’ (n.335) p. 152 
373 Jane Stapleton, Product Liability (n. 9), Chapter 8 page 184 ‘A new theory of strict moral enterprise 
liability’ 
374 Jane Stapleton, Product Liability  (n. 9), Chapter 8 page 187 
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What is it about the profit motive that would justify such discrimination? 
And moral at that? Are we not all, consumers no less than producers, 
pursuing self-interest, another name for profit? What is so special about 
financial profit? 375 
  
Furthermore the enterprise liability theory does not explain why it should be preferable 
to fault. The danger is that those who have sought to define a monistic theory of 
corrective justice may end up like Saxe’s six wise men, all of them being partly in the 
right but all of them being in the wrong. Epstein does concede, understandably, that 
‘No one theory of “wrong” can therefore cover all cases’.376 For all these theories, 
intuition does provide a reasonable basis for determining whether a wrong has been 
committed. 
 
Goldberg and Zipursky, defenders of PL, maintain that ‘torts is a law of wrongs and 
recourse’.377 First order duties are based on legal rather than moral wrongs.378 
Because the legal norms that set out wrongs are always wrongs as to a particular 
person or classes of persons, those legal norms go hand in hand with a set of potential 
victims who will be entitled, in principle, to recourse against their wrongdoers.379 
 
Goldberg and Zipursky say that the lack of independent content to the concept of 
wrongfulness380 leads to a random catalogue or ‘hodgepodge’ of acts which, if they 
cause loss, will form the basis of liability. This is not necessarily the problem it is made 
out to be. Tort is, historically, an area of common law that has grown iteratively over 
hundreds of years. Duties have developed by extension and analogy through judicial 
refinement. In this way, it is part of the national conscience to understand what 
constitutes a wrong – difficult to define but easier to recognise.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
375 John G. Fleming, ‘Product Liability De-Constructed: Review of Product Liability by Jane Stapleton’ 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Spring, 1996), pp. 185-190 p. 186 
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377 John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, ‘Torts as Wrongs’ (n. 331) p. 918 
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Most individuals do not have lawyers for their daily lives, and most 
decisions of businesspersons and professionals are made without the 
advice of lawyers, of course. Yet individuals and businesses know a great 
deal about what they may and may not do and what they can and cannot 
reasonably expect others to refrain from doing to them … Companies 
know that if there is a latent defect in a product that injures someone and 
that their sale of the product caused the injury, they can be held 
responsible for the injuring.381 
 
Notwithstanding the lack of definition, it might be concluded that corrective justice 
redresses a wrong when the pre-existing balance of rights between Claimant and 
Defendant is disrupted to the unfair loss of the Claimant (and correlative theoretical 
unjust gain by the Defendant), as a result of morally culpable or non-reciprocal risky 
conduct by the Defendant. 
 
There is a heavy emphasis on moral right as a precursor to legal right. Morality, whilst 
being an underlying basis of law, is constantly in a state of flux and is defined by hazy 
boundaries. In determining what constitutes a legal wrong, society is attempting to 
corral the morality of the day and sharpen up the boundaries. However hazy these 
boundaries may be, liability for defective products based upon moral wrong is capable 
of satisfying the requirements of corrective justice. The question this raises is whether 
PL, based as it is on strict liability, is compatible with corrective justice. 
 
5.4 Strict liability is incompatible with corrective justice 
 
5.4.1 Strict liability is retrograde 
 
Epstein acknowledges in his theory of strict liability that resorting to strict liability is 
retrograde.382 It is true that the earliest written legal codes were based predominantly 
on strict liability.383 This is not in itself a reason to reject strict liability. However, the 
flexibility built into negligence reflects the maturity of a legal system. 
 
 
                                                          
381 John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, ‘Torts as Wrongs’ (n. 331) pp. 975/976 
382 Richard A. Epstein, ‘A Theory of Strict Liability’ (n.335) p. 153 
383 Ur-Nammu (ca. 2050 BC and Lipit-Ishtar (ca. 1870 BC) 
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There has never been a completely satisfactory monistic comprehensive theory of 
right whether as a constituent of corrective justice or as a separate gateway into 
corrective justice. That is because there are too many variables in play. Whatever 
rights are given to one person must be subject to the rights of everyone else in 
accordance with their Hobbesian social contract. Since the rights of different persons 
compete with one another, the theoretical models become tangled. Aristotle knew this.  
 
… every law is laid down in general terms, while there are matters about 
which it is impossible to speak correctly in general terms. Where, then, it 
is necessary to speak in general terms, but impossible to do so correctly, 
the legislator lays down that which holds good for the majority of cases, 
being quite aware that it does not hold good for all. The law, indeed, is 
none the less correctly laid down because of this defect; for the defect lies 
not in the law, nor in the lawgiver, but in the nature of the subject-matter, 
being necessarily involved in the very conditions of human action.384 
 
The law of negligence has built in flexibility. Strict liability, ex hypothesi, has none. 
 
5.4.2 Bare ‘but for’ causation is unable to take context into account.  
 
Epstein holds that there is a presumption that a person may act without having to 
account for his actions subject to not causing harm to another person. The invasion of 
that second person’s rights by the first person is, prima facie, sufficient to found a right 
to compensation.385 Borgo explains Epstein’s theory as starting with the concept that 
where one man harms another, the victim has a prima facie moral right to 
compensation as a matter of corrective justice subject to a number of excuses and 
justifications which he may plead in answer.386 Epstein’s theory puts strict liability at 
the ground floor387 but equally he acknowledges ‘the impossibility of strict liability’388 
as a complete theory of tort. Liability is founded on any ‘physical invasion triggered by 
the defendant’.389 He sums up his case for strict liability, as against negligence, thus: 
 
                                                          
384 Aristotle, The Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle (n. 89) p. 175 
385 Richard Epstein, ‘Causation and Corrective Justice: a Reply to Two Critics 8 J. Legal Stud. 477 1979 
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387 Richard A. Epstein, ‘Toward a General Theory of Tort Law: Strict Liability in Context’ (n. 349) 
388 Stephen R. Perry, ‘The Impossibility of General Strict Liability’ 1 Can. J. L. & Jurisprudence 147 
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To say that simply killing another person does not create liability is, in 
effect, to say that the defendant is no worse for having killed the plaintiff 
than if he had not done anything at all. The “innocent” killing is treated for 
legal purposes as though it were an Act of God. At this point, the supposed 
moral superiority of the negligence theory becomes suspect. The line 
between killing and not killing seems a lot more durable and powerful than 
the line between killing and killing negligently, where the former is not 
actionable even though the latter is. The reason why the usual notions of 
“corrective” justice resonate so well under strict liability is that it puts the 
line between culpable and non-culpable in the right place.390 
 
The principal objection to this argument is that it elevates bare ‘but for’ causation to 
legal causation. The difference can be illustrated by considering the harness in the 
aircraft in Case Study 2. Imagine that the aircraft had accidentally burst a tyre and run 
off the runway colliding with a wall, and that the pilot had been retained in his seat by 
the harness exactly as it was intended – but that as a result of the collision the harness 
straps broke his collar bones. There is no doubt that as a matter of ‘but for’ causation 
the harness was one of the operative causes of his injury. But it was not the legal 
cause because it functioned as it was intended, probably saving the pilot from worse 
injuries. The answer to this simple conundrum is context.391 There is causation but no 
‘wrong’. Compare this with a situation in which the design or manufacture of the 
harness makes it likely to become lodged in the controls thus causing the pilot to lose 
control in flight. Here it is not difficult to find a wrong (even if there were other 
contributory causes). Even in these latter circumstances the full context will determine 
whether there has been a wrong requiring correction. If the harness had come with 
instructions that it was unsuitable for a particular type of aircraft, or the installer had 
modified it in some way so that it became prone to entrapment in the controls, or simply 
fitted it incorrectly, there would be no wrong (on the part of the manufacturer). 
 
In other words for strict liability under the PL Directive to achieve corrective justice in 
the way Epstein envisages, the wrong must have been clearly established ex ante, 
and the Directive introduced to provide the cure. 
 
 
 
                                                          
390 Richard A. Epstein, ‘Toward a General Theory of Tort Law: Strict Liability in Context’ (n. 349) 
391 See generally Jane Stapleton, Product Liability (n. 9) pp. 167/168 
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5.5 Fault must be presumed ex ante 
 
If the goal of tort is ‘obliging a person whose morally culpable behaviour has violated 
another’s autonomy to restore the latter as nearly as possible to his or her pre-injury 
status’,392 then imposition of strict PL implies morally culpable behaviour on the part 
of the manufacturer. It is argued that Epstein’s conception of strict liability ‘incorporates 
… a distinctive conception of fault’.393  
 
In other words it is based on presumed fault. Strict liability fails to allow room for 
context to override the presumption of fault. If A pushes B out of the way of a car which 
he has seen mount the pavement, unnoticed by B, common sense would suggest that 
A should not be liable for B’s resultant injuries. A saved B’s life. A’s conduct is 
reasonable and justified. A preordained truly strict liability regime would not permit the 
defendant’s noble conduct to override the presumption of fault. 
 
5.5.1 Fault is inherent in in personam cases 
 
Epstein’s position is that there is a relatively scalable pre-existing duty of forbearance 
against interference with another’s person or property.394 In such ‘entitlement’ cases, 
that a person should pay for loss he has caused, as a matter of corrective justice, is a 
‘moral primitive’.395 However, ‘in personam cases’ have a different character: 
 
The kind of care and concern involved here is no pale insistence that 
people take care to avoid running down others. Rather, it is that they take 
care of patients, customers, pupils, wards, or visitors by tending to their 
needs with a wide range of actions, often at great personal expense … 
This high range of variation explains why no single strict liability formula 
could hope to succeed in all these cases, even if a strict liability standard 
might turn out to be appropriate…396 
 
 
 
                                                          
392 Dewees, Duff and Trebilcock, Exploring the Domain of Accident Law: Taking the Facts Seriously (n. 
347) p. 8 
393 Stephen R. Perry, ‘The Impossibility of General Strict Liability’ (n. 388) p. 169 
394 Richard A. Epstein, ‘Toward a General Theory of Tort Law: Strict Liability in Context’ (n. 349)  
395 Larry Alexander, ‘Causation and Corrective Justice: Does Tort Law Make Sense?’ Law and 
Philosophy, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Apr., 1987), 1-23 
396 Richard A. Epstein, ‘Toward a General Theory of Tort Law: Strict Liability in Context’ (n. 349)  
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5.5.2 There is no logical reason to treat products specially 
 
It is difficult to see how there is a difference between Epstein’s examples and PL given 
the wide range of objects encompassed by the term ‘product’. In reply to the general 
critique of PL, that it lacks defining criteria or doctrinal content extrinsic to contract and 
tort, it has been argued that products have a special place in social culture: they define 
civilisations such as the Stone Age or the Bronze Age. Notwithstanding doctrinal 
confusion, the defining common essence of PL is that the product holds a special role 
in society and this is its basis for a special code of liability transcending traditional 
concepts of tort and contract:  
 
Products help to form ourselves; products order the lives of human beings 
long before human beings order the law of products liability.397  
 
Alluring as this romantic notion may be, there is no rational basis for it. The contrary 
argument is that there are so many ways in which a given product can harm – and 
many have no bearing on the producer. Imbuing products with anthropomorphic 
qualities fails to take into account the fact that in order to harm, products have to 
interact in some way with humans. For the producer to be liable there must be a defect 
in design, manufacture or instructions. However, a product related accident might in 
practice arise out of any of the following causes: error in the specification of the product 
required; error in integration of the product in another product; accident involving 
impact with the product but not arising from any defect; misuse or abuse of the product; 
accidental mis-operation of the product; using the wrong instructions; wear and tear of 
the product; time expiry of a perishable product; incorrect assembly of the product; 
mistake in installation; intervening error of supplier/dealer; or inherent danger in the 
product. 
 
If the mere exposure of the plaintiff to risk justifies imposition of strict liability, there is 
no obvious reason why this theory should apply to products only. If corrective justice 
is the overriding goal, it makes no sense for an aircraft or pharmaceutical manufacturer 
to be strictly liable but a pilot flying the aircraft or doctor prescribing or administering 
the drug to be liable only if he is negligent.  
                                                          
397 Anita Bernstein, ‘How Can a Product Be Liable?’ Duke Law Journal, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Oct., 1995), 1-
83. p. 82 
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5.5.3 Other areas of strict liability predetermine criteria which define the wrong 
 
Coleman posits three bases upon which compensation may be payable. First, simple 
fault (justified conduct precludes recovery and fault is a necessary condition for 
compensation to be recoverable); second, where justifiable conduct causes loss but 
the justifiability is no bar to either liability or recovery; and third where conduct causing 
loss is justifiable only if the injurer pays compensation. Coleman sees the first two 
situations as fitting the corrective justice model but the third, strict liability, as being a 
special case.398 Coleman cites blasting as an example of the third. An option is to 
permit blasting provided that the person blasting compensates anyone injured, 
whether as a result of fault or not. Compensation ex post might be considered to be 
justificatory in the same way as consent ex ante. Whilst voluntary allocation of risk ex 
ante would have been preferable, compensation ex post is second best. 
 
Abnormally dangerous activities 
 
Weinrib says that in relation to abnormally dangerous activities (such as Coleman’s 
blasting example), the lack of a need to prove fault is an extension of negligence: the 
degree of care required is proportionate to the magnitude of the risk and in such cases 
‘fault can be imputed’.399 The issue for Weinrib is whether the activity is ‘sufficiently 
risky that the lack of care can be imputed from the very materialization of the risk. Strict 
liability for abnormally dangerous activities represents the law’s judgment that such 
activities are at that point.’400  
 
The manufacture of products per se cannot be categorised as abnormally dangerous. 
There may of course be types of product that could be so described. The Practice 
handles numerous cases arising out of the supply of fireworks for example. Equally, 
the majority of products might be considered neutral in this context (clothing, furniture 
or toys for example). There are also products which are designed specifically to 
enhance safety – such as fire extinguishers, airbags, pharmaceuticals or safety 
harnesses. That is not to say that they may not be inherently dangerous. A fire 
                                                          
398 Jules L. Coleman, ‘Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice’ (n. 340) pp. 356/7 
399 Ernest  J Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (n. 330) p. 189 
400 Ernest  J Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (n. 330) pp. 188/189 
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extinguisher is a pressure vessel – if it contains a metallurgical flaw it might explode; 
airbags and seat belts have a built in pyrotechnic device; many therapeutic drugs will 
kill if not handled and administered under closely controlled conditions. This merely 
serves to emphasise the inappropriateness of grouping such diverse products and 
subjecting them to a liability regime lacking in flexibility or based on uninformed 
consumer expectation. 
 
Rylands v Fletcher 
 
Ryland v Fletcher is often cited as a paradigm of strict liability. Lord Cranworth 
summed up the principle: 
 
If a person brings, or accumulates, on his land anything which, if it should 
escape, may cause damage to his neighbour, he does so at his peril. If it 
does escape, and cause damage, he is responsible, however careful he 
may have been, and whatever precautions he may have taken to prevent 
the damage.401 
 
Bringing the dangerous item onto one’s land satisfies the moral element. It is 
prejudged that this is a wrong. There is no need to look at the precise circumstances 
of each case to see whether there is some justification or partial excuse. The Ryland 
v Fletcher principle reflects the self-serving non-reciprocal risk taking of the defendant. 
The risk entails no potential benefit to any third party. This is in strict contra-distinction 
with typical products. The basis of PL is that (defective) products are supplied. If not 
the claimant then someone else, other than the defendant manufacturer, is supposed 
to benefit from the supply of the product. The risk is not simply for the defendant’s 
benefit at the third party’s expense. The intended benefit extends beyond the 
manufacturer. In Case Study 1, the Kudo vehicle was sold, in this instance to the 
claimant. The claimant was intended to benefit from the use of the vehicle. It would 
have to be insured and so insurers and brokers would benefit. The distributor would 
have benefited. It would need regular maintenance and so the garage which 
maintained the vehicle would have benefited. It would also be to the advantage of the 
whole Kudo family. In all of the cases within the PL Claims Survey at Appendix 4 it 
could be said that the product had some social benefit beyond simply benefiting the 
manufacturer. 
                                                          
401 John Rylands and Jehu Horrocks v Thomas Fletcher  (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330 p. 340 
130 | P a g e  
 
 
International conventions 
 
Typically, strict liability is used to protect a particular class needful of protection. It is 
used for example in international conventions such as the Warsaw or Athens 
Conventions402 where the nature of the ‘wrong’ has been established ex ante and the 
legislation imposing strict liability is brought in to deal pragmatically with a specific 
problem: in these cases the difficulties inherent in bringing claims arising from 
international carriage, in foreign jurisdictions with different laws and procedures. Each 
strict liability situation has been pre-designated. 
 
Defining a wrong in a specific statute has the advantage of establishing a reference 
point but the disadvantage of re-inventing the wheel, in the sense that whatever words 
are used, they may be open to new interpretation. Thus regardless of any statutory 
rules or regulations dealing with the design of aircraft harnesses, most bystanders 
would consider it wrong of the manufacturer, in Case Study 2, if it had failed to provide 
fitting instructions (considering the risks of interference with controls) or provided the 
harness for a specific aircraft without testing the fitment. Similarly, if Kudo had 
designed a brake which was incapable of holding the vehicle on a gentle incline, 
intuition would suggest that it was guilty of a wrong. Having a statute that required the 
product to be safe or reasonably safe would add very little to the definition of a wrong 
in either of these cases.  
 
Protection 
 
Imposition of strict liability to situations in which the act or omission causing the harm 
is not intuitively a wrong, would mean defining a specific set of circumstance as a 
wrong. This might be done where a societal group needed particular protection. Take 
for example the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1998. Here it has 
been decided legislatively that it is wrong to put certain terms in contracts with 
consumers and so to protect them, certain types of clause will be unenforceable 
                                                          
402 Eg the original Warsaw Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to International 
Carriage by Air, 1929; or the Athens Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their 
Luggage by Sea, 1974 
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against a consumer. The principle is straightforward enough and makes eminent 
sense.  
 
How, then, does it work in relation to defective products? According to the PL Directive 
‘protection of the consumer requires that the injured person should be able to claim 
full compensation for the damage…’403 If a manufacturer places a defective product 
into circulation, this is automatically a wrong. So supplying a harness which is 
vulnerable to falling into the controls would be a wrong (subject to the specific defence 
at Art 7(f) ‘… in the case of a manufacturer of a component, that the defect is 
attributable to the design of the product in which the component has been fitted or to 
the instructions given by the manufacturer of the product’.) But similarly producing a 
shoe on which the heel broke off, injuring the consumer, due (unbeknownst to the 
manufacturer) to defective glue ,404 would also be a wrong. Do consumers need the 
same protection from defective shoes as they do from defective aircraft or vehicles? 
The PL Directive says: 
 
Whereas liability without fault on the part of the producer is the sole means 
of adequately solving the problem, peculiar to our age of increasing 
technicality, of a fair apportionment of the risks inherent in modern 
technological production.405 
 
From the perspective of ‘technicality’ it would be churlish to suggest that a process of 
fixing heels on shoes is analogous to the manufacture of aircraft. It is also more likely 
that a person injured by a defective shoe will have a contractual right of action. Shoes 
are less likely to injure bystanders than defective vehicles. This illustrates again the 
danger of treating all products the same. 
 
Goldberg and Zipursky cite the ‘familiar refrain from consumer-protection advocates’ 
that the ordinary individual needs protection against the ‘predations’ of large 
organisations.406 The original context of the predatory manufacturer sentiment407 is 
with respect to the asbestos and tobacco industries and in relation to punitive damages 
                                                          
403 PL Directive Recital 5 (n. 2) 
404 Such were the facts of another routine case of the Practice. 
405 PL Directive Recital 2 (n. 2) 
406 Easy Case (n. 11) p. 1947 
407 The citation is by Goldberg and Zipursky is of Thomas H. Koenig & Michael L. Rustad, In Defense 
of Tort Law 2 (2001) New York University Press ISBN 0-8147-4757-4. 
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– essentially in the sense of covering up past mistakes. Whether it is a justified 
comment or not, it cannot be levelled as a criticism of manufacturers generally so as 
to justify the imposition of strict liability, based on presumed moral culpability. Insofar 
as it may be considered, by these ‘advocates’, that this is an embodiment of the implied 
fault or wrong upon which strict liability should be founded, the argument is weak. It 
would be difficult to imagine that international car, aircraft or pharmaceutical 
manufacturers are all institutionally ‘predatory’. Logic would suggest that if an aircraft 
manufacturer deliberately sold unsafe aircraft and tried to conceal this, it would not be 
long before someone noticed a stream of similar aircraft dropping out of the sky. None 
of the 132 cases in the PL Claims Survey in Appendix 4 contained allegations of 
manufacturers preying on vulnerable consumers. As Coleman says: ‘The impact of 
the current system for compensating consumers for harm done by manufactured 
goods extends far beyond such celebrated cases as those facing cigarette 
manufacturers or asbestos suppliers.’408 
 
Whilst strict liability may have a place in the protection of classes within society, this 
has nothing to do with corrective justice and is more obviously aligned with allocative 
justice. 
 
5.6 Correction (no more nor less) 
 
Rectifying an injured person’s loss may impose a cost on the injurer greater than the 
injurer’s wrongful gain. 
 
If justice requires that no more nor less than the injurer's wrongful gain and 
the victim's wrongful loss be annulled, then tort law, which more often than 
not imposes costs on injurers in excess of the gain they secure by their 
mischief, is indefensible as a matter of justice.409 
 
There will always be transactional costs in making a recovery under a legal system. 
These potentially include court costs, legal fees, medical expenses, and expert 
witness fees. The smaller the claim, the more these transactional costs threaten to be 
disproportionate. If Coleman’s argument were taken to its logical conclusion, it must 
mean that no damages claim satisfies the requirements of corrective justice because 
                                                          
408 J Coleman, Risks and Wrongs (n. 329) p. 407 
409 Jules L Coleman, ‘Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice’ (n. 340) p. 353 
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the cost to the injurer will always be greater than the injured person’s loss. In Case 
Study 1, if the handbrake had been defective, payment by Kudo of damages of £2,000 
and costs of about £30,000 to the Practice plus assessed costs of the claimant at 
£20,000, would not reflect the correction of equal gain and loss. In 90% of the cases 
within the PL Claims Survey at Appendix 4 the overall legal costs exceeded the 
eventual value of the claim itself. 
 
5.7 The better conclusion is that PL falls outside corrective justice 
 
It is significant that both Weinrib and Coleman consider strict liability to fall outside 
their respective general theses of tort as corrective justice.410 In The Idea of Private 
Law, Weinrib’s chapter on strict liability makes clear that ‘to view negligence liability 
as corrective justice, … implies the rejection of strict liability.’411 Weinrib holds that 
strict liability is incompatible with corrective justice on two bases. First, he says that 
strict liability is theoretically inadequate: Epstein’s attempt to equate strict liability with 
corrective justice is in Weinrib’s view flawed as it is inconsistent with corrective 
justice’s equality, agency and correlativity of right and duty.412 Second, he explains 
away established strict liability doctrines such as respondeat superior, liability for 
dangerous activities and nuisance, as extensions of fault liability or common law 
regulation of property in accordance with corrective justice. He rejects Epstein’s 
justification of strict liability as corrective justice, based on the thesis that a person 
should bear the cost of injuries he causes to another as though they were injuries he 
suffered himself, on the ground that this is equally a justification for saying that the 
loss should lie where it falls.413 
 
Coleman, on the other hand in Risks and Wrongs says that he separates the law of 
PL from the general discussion of accident law.  
 
corrective justice may explain those strict liability cases that can 
adequately be modeled on the idea of a taking. Corrective justice might 
                                                          
410 Ernest  J Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (n. 115) and J Coleman, Risks and Wrongs (n. 329); 
Jules Coleman, ‘Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain’ (n. 84) pp. 421-440  
411 Ernest  J Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (n. 115) p. 171 
412 Ernest  J Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (n. 115) p. 172 
413 Ernest  J Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (n. 115) p. 174; see also Stephen R. Perry, ‘The 
Impossibility of General Strict Liability’ (n. 388) p. 153 
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therefore explain Vincent v. Lake Erie, but probably not strict liability for 
either ultrahazardous activities or defective products.414 
 
First, it is difficult to extract PL’s underlying normative commitments from the unsettled 
doctrine which underpins it; second the American Law Institute had ‘recommended 
separating products liability from the body of tort law’.415 Coleman’s preferred 
approach is to treat PL law as if liability were based on a theoretical rational contract 
between injurer and injured.416 
 
Fletcher also excludes PL from his theory of fairness and utility in tort: 
 
It is important to distinguish the cases of strict liability discussed here from 
strict products liability, a necessary element of which is an unreasonably 
dangerous defect in the product.  … Because of the market relationship 
between the manufacturer and the consumer, loss-shifting in products-
liability cases becomes a mechanism of insurance, changing the question 
of fairness posed by imposing liability.417 
 
Goldberg and Zipursky in postulating a theory of torts as wrongs give scant treatment 
to strict liability, explaining Rylands v Fletcher as sui generis and not counting ‘as 
evidence against our general interpretive account’ and sitting ‘at the margin of tort 
law’418 
 
Conclusion 
 
A simple conclusion may be drawn from the discussion above. It is the conclusion 
Glanville Williams reached over 60 years ago, before the resurgence of academic work 
on corrective justice, in response to the economic theory of tort. Strict liability is not 
compatible with corrective justice. 
  
If it is said that a person who has been damaged by another ought to be 
compensated, we readily assent, moved as we are by sympathy for the 
victim's loss. But what has to be shown is not merely that the sufferer ought 
to be compensated, but that he ought to be compensated by the 
defendant. In the absence of any moral blame of the defendant, how is this 
                                                          
414 Jules Coleman, ‘Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain’ (n. 84) p. 427 
415 J Coleman, Risks and Wrongs (n. 329) p. 407 
416 J Coleman, Risks and Wrongs (n. 329) pp. 418/419 
417 George P. Fletcher ,‘Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory’ (n. 67) p. 544 footnote 24 
418 John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, ‘Torts as Wrongs’ (n. 336) pp. 952/953 
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demonstration possible? It is fashionable to say that the question is simply 
one of who ought to bear the risk. This, however, is a restatement of the 
problem rather than a solution of it… 
… However, the actual rules of strict liability are so haphazard that they 
can hardly be fitted into any rational pattern.419 
 
PL based on strict liability fails to achieve social desirability through the delivery of 
corrective justice. The elements of corrective justice are the redressing of a wrong; the 
disruption of the equilibrium of rights between claimant and defendant; unfair loss and 
correlative unjust gain; and morally culpable or unfair or non-reciprocal risky conduct. 
These elements point intuitively to fault based liability.  
 
Strict liability is more appropriately allied to allocative justice, where it is inserted to 
remedy a specific problem such as the protection of a class. It is highly questionable 
whether such protection is needed across the wide spectrum of products to which the 
PL Directive applies. Strict liability fails to allow the flexibility that is required where 
products are concerned. 
 
Products do not harm. People do. People design, manufacture, instruct, warn, install, 
modify, incorporate, maintain, sell, operate, or otherwise interact with products. There 
are too many permutations and combinations for a single simple principle such as 
corrective justice based on the strict liability of the manufacturer to apply. Strict liability 
fails to take account of context. The social value of the injurer’s conduct may be a 
factor in deciding whether the causation of injury is a wrong.420 Thus in determining 
the social desirability of PL by reference to corrective justice, the social value or 
‘sozialadäquat’421 of the product itself should be taken into account. For example, if as 
in case 13 in the PL Claims Survey at Appendix 4, a manufacturer installs an airbag 
which causes relatively minor burns in the course of saving the driver’s life in a serious 
head on collision, that minor injury may be excusable. 
 
In Case Study 2 it was seen that there is no doubt that this was an accident. Indeed 
this was the verdict of a jury at the Coroner’s Inquest. It is submitted that it would be 
                                                          
419 Glanville Williams, ‘The Aims of the Law of Tort’ (n. 328) pp. 151/152 
420 Jane Stapleton, Product Liability (n. 9) p. 171 
421 A v National Blood Authority (n. 204) p. 339 
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incorrect to label this as an injustice ‘inflicted’422 on the deceased by the manufacturer 
of the harness. The term ‘inflict’ has a scent of dealing out some form of punishment 
and is inapposite to the context. 
 
In determining whether there was morally culpable behaviour on the part of the 
manufacturer, questions arise instinctively as to what the manufacturer knew or ought 
to have known about the purpose to which the harness was to be put; what testing 
they ought reasonably to have done; what instructions or warnings were given with the 
harness as to safe fitting; what regulations should have been complied with in the 
design or supply of the harness. All of these questions go to the root of whether the 
manufacturer should be held responsible. These questions are fundamental to 
determining whether there was fault on the part of the manufacturer. 
 
A fault based system of PL, with an innate conception of moral wrong at the heart of 
it, is more predictable, fairer and a clearer guide as to what conduct is expected of the 
manufacturer. Case Study 2 exemplifies how fault based liability found a result for the 
claimants, (and arguably thereby satisfied the requirements of corrective justice), 
where strict PL would have failed (or been inappropriate) as a foundation for a claim. 
 
Regardless of the inappropriateness of strict liability, there remains a procedural 
problem with PL as a vehicle for corrective justice. The cost of litigation is so 
disproportionate that claims rarely conform to the principle that the claimant’s loss 
must not impose a cost on the injurer greater than the injurer’s wrongful gain. 
                                                          
422 See note 338 above 
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CHAPTER SIX - VINDICATION AND RETRIBUTION 
 
This is a vindication for us and all those wonderful people who have 
supported us when they had nothing to gain by doing so 
       
      Captain John Cook423 2000  
 
6.1 Defining vindication 
 
The first part of this chapter discusses the vindicatory role of PL. As foreshadowed in 
Chapter 2, there are two related strands of vindication. The first is in having a right 
affirmed424 and the second in obtaining public recognition of a breach of one’s rights:425 
there is a benefit in not only having justice done but in justice being seen to be done.  
 
It is explained that whilst recognition of rights may have a minor role to play in PL it is 
more likely to be on the part of the manufacturer intent on protecting its reputation. It 
is suggested that private law remedies are inappropriate for public recognition of 
rights. Society has developed other means of achieving such recognition, from 
Inquests to Public Inquiries. 
 
6.1.1 Affirmation 
 
The first strand of vindication, affirmation, is of importance in the sense of establishing 
legal precedents. Had McTear426 succeeded, the right to compensation of a smoker 
who had not been adequately warned would have been ‘vindicated’. This is of less 
interest than the latter for the purposes of this thesis. It is accepted that legal 
judgments vindicate rights as a matter of general law, and set precedents. This 
function is not doubted. The social value of those precedents is a separate issue. It 
does not automatically follow that a right vindicated by the court is of social benefit. It 
                                                          
423 Father of one of the pilots of the Chinook Helicopter which crashed on the Mull of Kintyre in 1994 , 
after a Review eventually clear his son, Flt Lt Richard Cook, and Flt Lt Jonathan Tapper of any 
responsibility for the accident which killed 29. 
424 Chester v Afshar (n. 96) [87] (Lord Hope of Craighead): ‘The function of the law is to enable rights 
to be vindicated’ 
425 Rackham v Sandy [2005] EWHC 482 (QB) Gray J at paragraphs 124 and 125 ‘To the extent that Mr 
Rackham seeks and is entitled to vindicate his reputation, that will be largely achieved by a reasoned 
judgment...’ 
426 McTear v Imperial Tobacco Ltd (n. 244) 
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depends on the subject matter of the right concerned. Insofar as PL rights are in 
question, this is the wider subject matter of this thesis. It is hoped that the answer is 
found in reading the thesis in the round.  
 
It should be added here that the very fact of a judgment being given (in open court) 
provides the finality which potentiates vindication. However, in practice, Claimants are 
almost always happy to settle out of court and agree to a confidentiality clause (for 
what it is worth). Not a single claimant within the PL Claims Survey at Appendix 4 
refused to sign a confidentiality clause. This tends to suggest that vindication of rights 
by a judgment is not typically the driver in PL claims. 
 
6.1.2 Recognition 
 
The second sense of vindication is of greater interest as it poses the question as to 
whether claimants injured by defective products sue merely for compensation or to 
obtain public recognition that they have been so injured and that they have suffered a 
wrong. 
 
Personal vindication may be important but the experience of the Practice has been 
that claimants are usually in search of damages. In only 21 cases (16%) from within 
the PL Claims Survey at Appendix 4 did the initial notification letter to the manufacturer 
not mention damages (or a synonym for it). It might be argued that the award of 
damages itself constitutes or contains an element of vindication for the claimant. For 
example it has been argued in relation to defamation that damages ‘actually "repair" 
the reputation by reversing the harm done to it, and thus restore the status quo in a 
real sense rather than providing the "next best" position as damages in tort generally 
do.’427 If vindication were a serious motivating factor in the bringing of PL claims, one 
might expect some claimants to seek a declaration instead of or in conjunction with 
damages. The Practice has never experienced a claimant seeking a declaration rather 
than damages in a PL claim.  
 
                                                          
427 Jenny Steele, ‘Damages in Tort and under the Human Rights Act: Remedial or Functional 
Separation?’ The Cambridge Law Journal, Vol. 67, No. 3 (Nov., 2008), 606-634 at  p. 607 
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Even if vindication is a legitimate goal of PL, deliberate or negligent harmful acts and 
omissions would seem more likely to give rise to a need for vindication than an act or 
omission which carries no fault but gives rise to strict liability. Technically, if liability is 
strict, there is no need to sanction the behaviour of any individual.  
 
6.1.3 Vindication of the defendant 
 
In PL claims, it is often the defendant (though not invariably) who has a greater need 
for vindication by dismissal of the claim. Large companies and their Insurers do of 
course buy off small claims after taking into account the economic realities. Now that 
Qualified One-Way Costs Shifting428 prevents the defendant from recovering costs in 
most injury cases, defendants are under even greater economic pressure to settle 
cases regardless of the merits. If a defendant does decide to defend a case, bearing 
in mind that it is unlikely to recover the costs of doing do even if it wins, it follows that 
vindication must be a significant factor in the decision. However, this only arises if a 
claimant brings the action in the first place. It would be as difficult to imagine 
circumstances in which a defendant might seek a declaration that it was not liable for 
an accident, as to contemplate an injured claimant seeking only a declaration. 
However, in Loveday v Renton and Wellcome Foundation429  the High Court 
considered as a preliminary issue ‘Can or could pertussis vaccine used in the United 
Kingdom and administered intramuscularly in normal dosage cause permanent brain 
damage or death in young children?’ It was alleged that the claimant’s injuries were 
caused by the vaccine and that the person who administered the vaccine was 
negligent in administering it despite certain contra-indications. Wellcome Foundation 
was not known to be the manufacturer of the vaccine in this case. However, as it was 
the only manufacturer still making pertussis vaccine in the UK, it applied to be joined 
as a defendant. Stuart-Smith LJ found that it could not be shown on a balance of 
probabilities that pertussis vaccine could cause permanent brain damage in young 
children. Thus it could be said that Wellcome Foundation intervened in these 
proceedings to obtain vindication. 
 
                                                          
428 CPR 44.13 
429 Loveday v Renton and Wellcome Foundation Ltd [1990] 1 Med LR 117 
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Fraud 
 
In case number 99 in the PL Claims Survey at Appendix 4, a claimant alleged that the 
seat in his vehicle had collapsed while he was driving, causing him to injure his back. 
The claimant made various demands for damages. The manufacturer examined the 
vehicle and found that a nut had fallen off the end of the seat back adjuster. However, 
this could not cause the seat to collapse because the adjuster was geared rather than 
‘direct drive’. Thus in the event of a complete failure of the adjustment mechanism the 
seat would simply stay locked in the position to which it was last adjusted. The 
manufacturer became concerned that the claim might be fraudulent. This concern was 
enhanced by a letter submitted in support of the claim purportedly from the claimant’s 
GP. Investigations showed that that GP did not exist, the address of the surgery was 
not a surgery but a house on a run-down estate, and the letterhead of the GP had 
been fabricated – by cutting and pasting an NHS logo from the internet. The claimant 
subsequently died of causes unrelated to the alleged accident but his parents 
assiduously pursued the case even in the days immediately following his death. When 
the fraud was revealed to the claimant’s parents’ solicitors, the claim was swiftly 
dropped. The manufacturer could have settled the case for £3,000 but took the 
position that it should be defended to trial if necessary. Whilst fraudulent claims are 
relatively frequently mentioned by the media, because they are newsworthy,430 this 
was one of only a handful of overtly provable fraudulent PL claims with which the 
Practice has dealt. Within the PL Claims Survey at Appendix 4 there was only one 
provable fraud (case 99) and there were two cases in which an element of fraud was 
suspected (cases 16 and 62). 
 
Reputation 
 
The Practice has more frequently been instructed to defend claims that threaten the 
reputation of a ‘flagship’ product. In case Study 1, Martin v Kudo, the defendant would 
have paid a nuisance value settlement to dispose of what was clearly an unmeritorious 
claim but not one that was likely to lead to repeat claims. The claimant could not accept 
                                                          
430 E.g. Sheffield ‘crash-for-cash ringleaders jailed’  
 < http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-south-yorkshire-25886347 > accessed 6 March 2014 
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the nuisance value settlement offer (if he wanted to) because of his liability for his 
solicitor’s fees under a Conditional Fee Agreement. 
 
The importance of defendant vindication in PL claims was highlighted in Eli Lilly v 
James,431 an appeal against an interlocutory cost capping order. The claimant sued 
Eli Lilly, the manufacturer of the drug Zyprexa, which she was taking for her bi-polar 
disorder, claiming that it had caused her to suffer from Type 1 diabetes. The claimant 
sought an order capping the defendant’s recoverable costs at £100,000 on the basis 
that  
 
there is a real and substantial risk that the Defendant has incurred and 
intends to incur costs which are disproportionate to the claim and which 
may be deliberately pitched at such an extortionate level to prevent the 
Claimant having access to justice. The figures are clearly designed to 
ensure that this litigation is not conducted on a level playing field. 432 
 
Eli Lilly had submitted that the case would have far reaching ramifications if the 
claimant succeeded. It would be sued by ‘a significant number of people’. Therefore 
Eli Lilly should not be fettered in its defence. The Master ordered the costs cap on the 
basis that this was a ‘David and Goliath’ situation and it would be unjust for the 
claimant to be liable for the costs occasioned by the defendants fully defending the 
claim. The High Court set aside the order. One of the requirements for cost capping 
was that it was ‘just to make such an order’.433 The Master had found, inter alia, that 
‘it would be quite unjust, were Mrs James to lose, for her to be liable for all the costs 
expended by Eli Lilly Limited in attempting to and in these circumstances successfully 
attempting to vindicate their reputation.’ The High Court found ultimately that the 
claimant would not necessarily be responsible for those costs as the court would 
control costs in the usual way. However, it recognised the potential importance of 
vindication to the defendant in PL cases. 
 
Theorists recognise as a goal of tort ‘vindicating a plaintiff for a wrong when 
compensation is not entirely satisfactory in situations where irreparable injury has 
                                                          
431 Eli Lilly & Company Limited v James [2009] EWHC 198 (QB) 
432 Eli Lilly & Company Limited v James (n. 431) [6] 
433 Smart v. East Cheshire National Health Service Trust [2003] EWHC 2063 
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occurred’.434 In PL cases the injuries are not likely to be irreparable in the sense that 
damages are the usual remedy. However, there is an argument that vindication may 
be an important factor in ‘big issue’ or political PL actions such as Group Actions 
against whole industrial sectors – e.g. the tobacco or alcoholic drinks industries. 
Sometimes the individual claims are too small on their own to justify the cost of 
litigation and it requires aggregation of claims with others to enable a route to satisfying 
a class or group of affected claimants. Montague comments:  
 
‘It is to Mrs McTear's credit that she did not give up under these pressures 
long before the end of the case - in the circumstances, Cameron Fyfe, her 
solicitor, could be excused the hyperbole in his comment that the case 
“pitted a lonely woman against a multi-national giant.”435 
 
She comments that there were another 120 potential pursuers waiting in the 
background. While there is a real possibility in group litigation that a critical mass will 
be generated, the court may still find the claim to be ill-founded. This was the position 
in the Scania Group Action. Hundreds of claimants all complaining of aches and pains 
added weight credibility and momentum to the claim but as discussed in Chapter 9 on 
Compensation, each claimant still had to satisfy the criterion of having an actionable 
injury. It was always the defendant’s suspicion that the real motivation for the claim 
was not vindication but money and that the case was promoted by lawyers and the 
claimants’ Trades Union, which funded the litigation. Had there been no canvassing 
of potential claimants, it seems highly unlikely that most of the claimants would ever 
have contemplated the need for a personal injury claim to be made. 
 
It was also the case in McTear that the judge suspected strongly that McTear was 
simply motivated by money. He was according to Lord Nimmo Smith ‘a profoundly 
dishonest man who readily lied in order to obtain advantage for himself’.436 
 
 
 
                                                          
434 Blomquist, ‘Goals, Means, and Problems for Modern Tort Law: A Reply to Professor Priest’ 22 VAL. 
U.L. REV. 621 (1988) pp. 629/630 citing G. White, Tort Law In America: An Intellectual History 223 
(1980) [now Oxford University Press, USA; Expanded Edition (26 Feb 2003) ISBN-10: 0195139658 
ISBN-13: 978-0195139655] 
435 Janice Elliott Montague, ‘Cigarette, but?...The failure of tobacco litigation in the United Kingdom’ 
Cov. L.J. 2005, 10(2), 24-28 
436 McTear v Imperial Tobacco Ltd (n. 244)  Lord Nimmo Smith p. 133 [4.222] 
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6.1.4 Private law revenge is not in society’s interest 
 
It is questionable whether a private law remedy between two parties should have such 
potentially major consequences for society as a whole. The UK has democratically 
developed ways of delegating authority to regulate and control product safety. It is 
submitted that the winning and losing of individual PL claims should not be permitted 
to subvert the rational legislative process. If McTear had succeeded against Imperial 
Tobacco, the consequences would have been far reaching not merely for Imperial 
Tobacco but for all tobacco manufacturers. Regardless of one’s views on smoking, the 
legal effect of such a judgment is undesirable in principle. Other manufacturers would 
effectively be bound by a judgment in a case in which they had no standing or 
opportunity to participate; from the perspective of the anti-smoking lobby it might 
equally be argued that McTear losing the case has set back the opportunity for other 
smokers to make claims against the tobacco industry. These are matters better dealt 
with by legislation, rather than leaving industry to the arbitrary fate of private claims. 
The danger of allowing private litigation to shape society’s rights is illustrated by 
experience in the US. During the US insurance crisis of the 1980s it was found that 
whilst accident rates had declined, PL claims had numerous consequences including: 
increases in product prices; withdrawal of large numbers of products from sale; and 
the withdrawal of municipalities, doctors, manufacturers and others from the 
commercial insurance market and their retreat into mutual insurance pools, leaving 
the commercial insurance market fragile due to insufficient volume.437 
 
An interesting comparison may be made between UK tobacco litigation and tobacco 
litigation in the US. Private revenge may legitimately be satisfied by an award of 
punitive damages in some states. However the US Supreme Court has ruled438 that 
punitive damages may not be awarded to punish a defendant for injuries to persons 
not party to the litigation. This is a matter for public law not private litigation. The 
importance of the distinction is that punishment in respect of public wrongs is for the 
criminal law which has inbuilt procedural safeguards.439 
                                                          
437 George L Priest, ‘Satisfying the Multiple Goals of Tort’ 22 (3) Val. U. L. Rev. 643 (1988) 
438 Philip Morris USA v Williams 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007) 
439 Colby, ‘Clearing the Smoke from Philip Morris v Williams: The Past, Present, and Future of Punitive 
Damages’ Yale Law Journal, Vol. 118, 392-479, 2009 
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6.1.5 There are better ways to achieve vindication 
 
More importantly, there are better ways to achieve vindication than by pursuing PL 
claims. These include Coroners’ Inquests, Public Inquiries, and Reports of 
Government Agencies (such as the Air Accident Investigation Branch or the Marine 
Accident Investigation Branch of the Department of Transport).  
 
Public Inquiries 
 
In AB v Wyeth440 some 5000 claimants sued the manufacturers of Benzodiazepine 
tranquilisers. The vast majority of plaintiffs were legally aided. In a small number of 
cases they also joined the prescribers of the drugs on the basis that they would only 
be pursued if the claims against the manufacturer failed, in which case the damages 
would be consumed by the legal aid charges for the costs of the failed claims against 
the manufacturers. The prescribers sought to strike the claim out as vexatious and an 
abuse of process. At first instance the order sought was granted on the basis that the 
prescribers’ costs were out of proportion to the potential benefit to the plaintiffs. The 
Court of Appeal agreed and dismissed the appeal. The plaintiffs’ case was that the 
court should not strike the case out as disclosing no cause of action where there was 
indeed a valid cause, merely because the benefit to the plaintiff would be small 
compared with the costs of pursuing the claim. To do so would interfere with ‘the 
citizens’ constitutional right of access to the courts’. They submitted that it was really 
a matter for the Legal Aid Board to decide whether it would fund the litigation. The 
Board would take in to account how the costs compared with the amount at stake. 
Stuart-Smith LJ disagreed. The court’s power is to ‘prevent misuse of its procedure in 
a way which, although not inconsistent with the literal application of its procedural 
rules, would nevertheless be manifestly unfair to a party to litigation’. Stuart-Smith LJ 
stated: 
 
One can see at a glance that the prescriber defendants will be put to 
astronomical expense in defending these contingent claims. And to what 
end? If the plaintiffs stood to obtain a substantial benefit, the position might 
well be different. But here the benefit is at best extremely modest, and in 
                                                          
440 A.B. & Others v John Wyeth & Brother Ltd. & Others [1994] P.I.Q.R 109 
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all probability nothing. That involves great injustice to the defendants. It is 
no answer that there are public authorities or insurance associations that 
are footing the bill. The National Health Service has better things to spend 
its money on than lawyers' fees, and the cost of medical insurance is a 
matter of public concern. Group actions involve great advantage to 
plaintiffs, who are able to join together to bring actions which, on their own, 
would never be possible. But they must be conducted in such a way that 
they do not involve injustice to other parties.441  
 
The Scottish Law Commission in its 1996 report on Multi-Party Actions put it thus 
(referring to Stuart-Smith LJ’s judgment): 
 
… it may be argued that … there is a public element in the litigation which 
requires, or permits, the court to adopt the aim of "behaviour modification" 
or punishment. We reject this view of a public element in multi-party 
actions. It has been said by the English Court of Appeal that a claim for 
damages should not be used as a pretext for what essentially amounts to 
a public inquiry; the sole proper object of such claims is to obtain 
compensation…442 
 
The Public Inquiry443 is the appropriate vehicle for investigating an issue of wide public 
importance. Inquiries may be held under the Inquiries Act 2005.444 Non-statutory 
Inquiries may also be ordered outside the Act. In addition ‘private’ Public Inquiries may 
be ordered – funded privately.445 There have been 40 major inquiries since 1990 
typically covering widespread loss of life, threats to public health or safety, failure by 
the state in its duty to protect, failure in regulation or shocking events.446 
 
On 2 June 1994 an RAF Chinook Helicopter ZD576 crashed on the Mull of Kintyre 
killing all 29 occupants. A military Board of Inquiry Report (itself a potential vehicle for 
vindication) concluded that the most probable cause was the selection by the crew of 
                                                          
441 A.B. & Others v John Wyeth & Brother Ltd. & Others (n. 440) per Stuart-Smith LJ p. 116 
442 Scottish Law Commission Multi-Party Actions Report on a reference under section 3(1)(e) of the 
Law Commissions Act 1965 Presented to Parliament by the Lord Advocate by Command of Her Majesty 
July, 1996  
Edinburgh: HMSO  (Scot Law Com No 154) p. 12 [2.23] 
443 See < http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/webarchive/public-inquiries-inquests.htm  > accessed 23 
April 2015 
444 Under the section 1 Inquiries Act 2005 
(1) A Minister may cause an inquiry to be held under this Act in relation to a case where 
it appears to him that – 
(a) particular events have caused, or are capable of causing, public concern, or 
(b) there is public concern that particular events may have occurred. 
445 E.g. Independent Public Inquiry into Contaminated Blood and Blood Products by Lord Archer of 
Sandwell QC <  http://www.archercbbp.com/  > accessed 23 April 2015 
446 < http://www.publicinquiries.org/determining_the_need_for_an_inquiry >  accessed 5 March 2014 
00.20  
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an inappropriate rate of climb, insufficient to overfly the high ground of the Mull. It found 
that both pilots were ‘negligent to a gross degree’.447 
 
The parents of the pilots sought to clear their names. They could have pursued a PL 
claim against the manufacturers of the aircraft or any component they could prove was 
defective. This would face major obstacles of proof and funding would have been an 
issue. If they did in fact pursue a claim, there is no public information on whether they 
succeeded but more importantly no public vindication of the pilots as a result. 
 
However, a Public Inquiry448 was ordered by the Secretary of State for Defence to 
examine the evidence relating to the Board of Inquiry Report. The published Review 
states: 
 
The continuing debate is naturally distressing for the families involved. The 
relatives of the pilots feel that the finding of negligence is a stain on the 
characters of their loved ones, and the families of the passengers wish 
that the controversy surrounding the accident be brought to an end.449 
 
It was ultimately found 
 
1.4.32 Having completed our review we are led to make the following 
recommendations: 
(i) We recommend that the finding that Flt Lt Tapper and Flt Lt Cook were 
negligent to a gross degree should be set aside. 
(ii) We recommend that the Ministry of Defence should consider offering 
an apology to the families of Flt Lt Tapper and Flt Lt Cook.450 
 
On 13 July 2011, the Secretary of State for Defence publicly apologised to the families 
of the deceased pilots.451  
 
 
                                                          
447 See The Mull of Kintyre Review: An Independent Review to examine all available evidence relating 
to the findings of the Board of Inquiry into the fatal accident at the Mull of Kintyre on 2 June 1994, 
Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 13th July 2011, HC 1348 Edinburgh: The Stationery 
Office ISBN: 9780102952377 [available for download at http://www.mullofkintyrereview.org.uk/review-
report ] p. 2 [1.1.4] - Since 1997, Boards of Inquiry are not permitted to attribute blame or negligence in 
cases of unnatural death or serious injury. Similarly verdicts of Coroners’ Inquests and Findings of Air 
Accident Investigation Reports must not apportion blame. 
448 The Mull of Kintyre Review (n. 447) 
449 The Mull of Kintyre Review (n. 447) p. 3 [1.1.6] 
450 The Mull of Kintyre Review (n. 447) p. 10 [1.4.32] 
451 < http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/after-17year-fight-for-justice-families-of-
chinook-pilots-win-mod-apology-2313163.html > accessed 10 February 2015 
147 | P a g e  
 
Coroners’ Inquests 
 
Whilst verdicts at Coroners’ Inquests must not be framed in such a way as to appear 
to determine any question of criminal or civil liability, this is an important forum for 
vindication in fatal accidents.452 The Coroner has the duty where an Inquest has 
revealed a risk of future deaths, to make a report to any person with power to eliminate 
or reduce that risk.453 Coroners’ Inquests are held before a Jury where the accident 
involves a death in Police Custody454 or a death reportable to a government 
department.455 
 
Accident Investigation Reports 
 
Accident Investigation Reports are produced by the relevant branches of the 
Department of Transport. There is an inbuilt safety valve by which representations 
may be made by a person whose reputation may be adversely affected.456 In Case 
Study 2 – Vaughan v Cranwell, this procedure was used to overturn the AAIB’s draft 
finding that suggested that a reckless aerobatic manoeuvre by Cranwell might have 
been the cause of the accident. Cranwell’s reputation was vindicated both in the AAIB 
Report and at the Inquest. 
 
Conclusion 
 
There is a balance between the individual’s need for vindication and the public benefit. 
Litigation in the post Legal Aid Board era is essentially a private affair. Thus there 
should be no real concern about misuse of public funds. However, that is to ignore the 
reality of the provenance of funding for litigation. Indirectly, private litigation is publicly 
funded as it is paid for by insurance costs passed on to the public at large. It is 
submitted that there has to be a system of control over individuals’ rights to vindication. 
Human rights are already protected by the European Convention on Human Rights.457 
Thus any other rights requiring vindication should be on a lower tier. The costs must 
be taken objectively into consideration before claimants are allowed to call upon the 
                                                          
452 Coroners and Justice Act 2009 s 10(2) 
453 Coroners and Justice Act 2009 Schedule 5 paragraph 7 
454 Coroners and Justice Act 2009 s 7(2)(a) 
455 Coroners and Justice Act 2009 s 7(2)(c) 
456 The Civil Aviation (Investigation of Air Accidents and Incidents) Regulations 1996 Regulation 12 
457 As embodied in the Human Rights Act 1998 
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full armoury of litigation to seek vindication in cases where the issues, viewed 
impartially, are minor. The majority of PL claims handled by the Practice are minor in 
nature, about 80% of the claims within the PL Claims Survey at Appendix 4 being 
valued at less than £10,000. It is submitted that not every bump, bruise and scrape 
should entitle claimants to indulge themselves with PL litigation, at Society’s expense, 
simply because they feel subjectively that they require vindication. 
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6.2 Retribution 
 
You will achieve more in this world through acts of mercy than you will 
through acts of retribution. 
        Nelson Mandela 2000 
 
6.2.1 Introduction 
 
The second part of this chapter argues that there are both doctrinal and practical 
reasons to dismiss retribution as a desirable benefit of PL.  
 
Retribution is an element of punishment. The key role of punishment in relation to 
defective products is deterrence as discussed in Chapter 3. Retribution has nothing to 
do with deterrence or prevention of the defendant’s wrongful conduct. It is little more 
than ex post facto private satisfaction for the wronged claimant satisfying a base need. 
It is argued below that such a need is outmoded, out of kilter with the mores of civilised 
society and of no tangible benefit to society. It is, in any event, redundant in a binary 
system of civil law and criminal law in which the criminal law satisfies any vestigial 
need for private and public retribution with built-in systemic protection against abuse. 
Even if retribution is considered an acceptable basis for punishing morally culpable 
torts, wrongful behaviour is not always morally culpable. Therefore not every tort is 
deserving of punishment. 
 
Punishment is particularly unsuited to strict liability because liability may be incurred 
without the defendant’s fault. Where damages are expressly awarded to punish, these 
are separate from compensatory tortious damages. This is an acknowledgement that 
punishment can only be a very limited factor in awarding general damages. Private 
punishments are not encouraged by society because they are inconsistent and more 
likely to lead to an escalation of private hostilities than to an effective resolution. 
 
It is argued here that the idea of a claimant wanting his day in court to punish the 
defendant is, in practice, a myth, unsupported by empirical evidence. Cases reaching 
court are exceptional. It will be demonstrated that even if a claimant has retribution in 
mind, the practical reality is that compensation falls short of punishing for a number of 
reasons. These include that the measure of damages is intended to equate to actual 
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loss; the cost of compensation is not necessarily borne by the tortfeasor direct; and the 
punishment does not fit the crime in the sense that the relationship between the wrong 
and the loss is stochastic. Compared to the position in the US, it is concluded that tort 
based punishment plays no role in UK life. 
 
6.3 Doctrinal shortcomings 
 
Retribution is not a synonym for punishment. Punishment is ‘not a purpose but a 
mechanism … it may have various purposes, such as retribution, deterrence 
appeasement of the victim, incapacitation of the wrongdoer, and education.’458 Before 
considering whether the ‘mechanism’ of punishment is effective or necessary within 
tort, it is helpful to focus first on the role of retribution specifically. 
 
6.3.1 Retribution satisfies a base need no longer relevant to modern society. 
 
It has been argued that the primary reaction to harm, caused by carelessness, is a 
desire for compensation. Where intentional harm is concerned, the desire is for 
retribution. Where recklessness is involved, reactions provoked involve elements of 
both careless and intentional harm. These reactions contain both cognitive 
interpretations of the event and emotional reactions to it.459 
 
Research suggests that the primary determinant lies in judgments about 
the perpetrator's state of mind. If perpetrators are judged to have 
committed the harm unintentionally, naive psychological thinking focuses 
on compensating the victim for the damage done to his or her property or 
person, presuming that restoration is judged to be appropriate. However, 
when harm is thought to have been committed intentionally, people see 
punishment as necessary.460 
 
If it is correct that retribution is thus reserved for cases involving intentional harm, then 
it is out of place in cases of mere negligence, and, a fortiori, in cases of strict liability 
without fault.  
  
                                                          
458 Ronen Perry, ‘The Role of Retributive Justice’ (n. 102) pp. 226-227 
459 John M. Darley and Thane S. Pittman, ‘The Psychology of Compensatory and Retributive Justice’ 
Pers Soc Psychol Rev’ 2003; 7; 324 
460John M. Darley and Thane S. Pittman, ‘The Psychology of Compensatory and Retributive Justice’ (n. 
459) p. 326  
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As explained in Chapter 2.6, compensation is rooted in Talionic punishment, which 
itself contains a significant element of retribution. However, Talionic punishment is no 
longer acceptable in the Western World because the ‘use of punishment for retribution 
is no longer representative of a civilised society’.461 Laws must keep pace with shifting 
boundaries of mores. Two hundred years ago there were in excess of two hundred 
statutes in force imposing the death penalty for crimes ranging from the most serious 
down to petty theft.462 Criminal sentencing has moved on to reflect the changing views 
of society with the emphasis less on retribution and more on restoration. For example 
the Criminal Justice Act 2003 introduced the Community Order which contains a range 
of more sophisticated punishments that are tailored to the offender.463 
 
This reflects the more enlightened views of society towards crime and punishment. 
The Howard League for Penal reform commented in its response to the Green Paper 
‘Breaking the Cycle’464  
 
                                                          
461 See Jon Yorke, ‘The right to life and abolition of the death penalty in the Council of Europe’ 2009 
European Law Review 205 recording the ‘renunciation of retribution and the lex talionis’. 
462 P. R Glazebrook, Criminal Law Reform: England Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice | 2002 < 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3403000073.html > Accessed 21 December 2011 
463 Civil Justice Act 2003 s 177  
Community orders 
(1)Where a person aged 18 or over is convicted of an offence, the court by or before 
which he is convicted may make an order (in this Part referred to as a “community order”) 
imposing on him any one or more of the following requirements—  
(a)an unpaid work requirement (as defined by section 199),  
(b)an activity requirement (as defined by section 201),  
(c) a programme requirement (as defined by section 202),  
(d)a prohibited activity requirement (as defined by section 203),  
(e)a curfew requirement (as defined by section 204),  
(f)an exclusion requirement (as defined by section 205),  
(g)a residence requirement (as defined by section 206),  
(h) a mental health treatment requirement (as defined by section 207),  
(i) a drug rehabilitation requirement (as defined by section 209),  
(j) an alcohol treatment requirement (as defined by section 212),  
(k) a supervision requirement (as defined by section 213), and  
(l) in a case where the offender is aged under 25, an attendance centre requirement (as defined 
by section 214). 
464 Ministry of Justice (2010d), Breaking the Cycle: Effective Punishment, Rehabilitation and Sentencing 
of Offenders, London: The Stationery Office December 2010 Cm 7972 ISBN 978-0-10-179722-1 
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Community payback and community intervention have a vital role to play 
in reducing crime, however it is important that such programmes focus not 
on retribution but on community outcomes.465 
 
6.3.2 Punishment is the domain of the criminal law 
 
Irrespective of retribution’s quondam role within punishment, there is no necessity for 
tort to perform a punitive role. It is superfluous in a system with a clear division between 
criminal and civil laws in which the criminal law satisfies any need for punishment (and 
any private and public retribution), whilst preserving the systemic protections of the 
criminal law: not least jury trial for serious offences and the higher standard of proof.  
 
Primitive law knew no distinction between crime and tort. Mueller has reviewed 
primitive laws of the Babylonians, Jews, Romans, Hindus, Germanic Peoples, Incas, 
North American Indians, Inner African Peoples and Pacific Insular Peoples and with 
the benefit of retrospection considered whether the ‘community reaction’ to various 
wrongs was ‘...in the form of or for the purpose of retaliation, deterrence, 
resocialisation or neutralisation’ – in which case the wrong could be categorised as a 
crime; whereas, if the reaction to the wrong was merely to exact compensation, then 
it was a tort.466 For example under the Germanic Leges Barbarorum, murder gives rise 
to capital punishment (clearly a crime), whereas, accidentally causing injury is merely 
a tort.467 The Anglo Saxons distinguished between wite (a fine: clearly criminal) and 
wergild and bot (purely compensatory: tortious).468  
 
Mueller cites Mommsen’s conclusion that penal law started with the reaction to wrongs 
against the security of society, with the private law of compensation growing in parallel. 
So, for example, under Babylonian and Mosaic Laws the gravest crimes involved 
witchcraft, offences against the administration of justice itself and religion, as well as 
sexual offences. Offences against the person or property could either be a ‘tort-crime 
hybrid’ or a mere tort.469 
                                                          
465 Howard League for Penal Reform Response to Breaking the Cycle p 8,  2011 ISBN 978-1-905994-
31-1 
466 Gerhard Mueller, ‘Tort Crime and the Primitive’ the Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police 
Science Vol 46 No 3 (Sep-Oct 1955, 303-332) 
467 Sec 49 Lex Thuringorum: ‘Who not wilfully but by some accident kills a human being or wounds him, 
shall pay lawful compensation’ 
468 Gerhard Mueller, ‘Tort Crime and the Primitive’ (n. 466) p. 311 
469 Mommsen’s Romisches Strafrecht, Leipzig 1899 
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Duff argues that in modern times there are two factors that identify conduct as falling 
into the criminal domain rather than being merely tortious. First, tort concentrates on 
the loss and fault is relevant to determining who pays for it. Second, criminal law 
focuses on the nature of the wrong, which explains why inchoate offences are 
nevertheless offences.470  
 
6.3.3 Exemplary and aggravated damages are distinguishable from PL compensation 
 
Notwithstanding the separation of tort and crime, the existing law does allow for 
retributive damages in limited circumstances. The question is whether such damages 
may be awarded in PL cases.   
 
The primary object of an award of damages is to compensate the claimant 
for the harm done to him; a possible secondary object is to punish the 
defendant for his conduct in inflicting that harm. Such a secondary object 
can be achieved by awarding, in addition to the normal compensatory 
damages, damages which are variously called exemplary damages, 
punitive damages, vindictive damages or even retributory damages, and 
comes into play whenever the defendant’s conduct is sufficiently 
outrageous to merit punishment, as where it discloses malice, fraud, 
cruelty, insolence or the like.471 
 
The leading judgment on exemplary damages is that of Lord Devlin in Rookes v 
Barnard in which he held that 
 
… that there are certain categories of cases in which an award of 
exemplary damages can serve a useful purpose in vindicating the strength 
of the law and thus affording a practical justification for admitting into the 
civil law a principle which ought logically to belong to the criminal.472  
 
The categories were ‘oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by the servants 
of the government’ and cases in which the ‘defendant's conduct has been calculated 
by him to make a profit for himself which may well exceed the compensation payable 
to the plaintiff.’  
 
                                                          
470 RA Duff, Restoration and Retribution (in von Hirsch et al., Restorative Justice and Criminal Justice 
(Hart Publishing 2003), 43-59) 
471 Harvey McGregor, McGregor on Damages (n. 132) [13-001] 
472 Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129 
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Aggravated Damages are perhaps an even rarer species than exemplary damages. 
They are awarded for ‘an injury to the victim's moral dignity that results from the 
defendant's denial that the victim is entitled to respect as a moral person’.473 
 
‘On the one hand there are those who believe that “aggravated damages 
are effectively indistinguishable from punitive damages”; while on the other 
there are those who side with the Law Commission's view that aggravated 
damages are no more than a particular species of compensatory damages 
which are sometimes awarded to claimants in respect of mental distress. 
The difference in function -- punishment versus compensation -- could 
hardly be more pronounced.’474 
 
Murphy concludes ‘insofar as it is possible to commit both the tort of negligence and 
a breach of contract in high-handed and malicious ways, there seems no good reason 
to exclude aggravated damages from those contexts.’ 475  
 
On this basis it is theoretically possible to award both exemplary and aggravated 
damages in a PL claim. Any such claim would be a rarity (and has never been 
experienced by the Practice). However, insofar as either or both of exemplary or 
aggravated damages are punitive in nature, it tends to indicate that ordinary general 
damages do not perform this function. 
 
The Law Commission reviewed exemplary and aggravated damages as part of its 
‘Sixth Programme of Law Reform: Damages Aggravated, Exemplary and 
Restitutionary Damages’. It reported to the then Lord Chancellor, Lord Irvine of Lairg476 
that whilst they are an ‘anomalous’ civil remedy, and must be limited as far as 
precedents permit, they should continue to be part of UK law.477 The Law Commission 
prepared a draft Bill to enact its recommendations which included: 
 
(1) Aggravated damages should be retained to compensate for mental 
distress but not to punish;478 
(2) Restitutionary damages should be available for torts and civil wrongs 
where the defendant’s conduct ‘showed a deliberate and outrageous 
disregard of the plaintiff’s rights’;479 
                                                          
473 A Beever, ‘The Structure of Aggravated and Exemplary Damages’ (2003) 23 O.J.L.S. 87 
474 Murphy, ‘The nature and domain of aggravated damages’ C.L.J. 2010, 69(2), 353-377 
475 Murphy, ‘The nature and domain of aggravated damages’ (n. 474) p. 376 
476 Law Commission 247 (n. 161) 
477 Law Commission 247 (n. 161) p. 183-188 
478 Law Commission 247 (n. 161) Draft Bill, clause 13 
479 Law Commission 247 (n. 161) Draft Bill, clause 12(1) – 12(3) 
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(3) Exemplary damages should be retained but renamed ‘punitive 
damages’.480 They must only be awarded by a judge (not a jury) where the 
defendant ‘deliberately and outrageously disregarded the plaintiff’s rights’. 
 
The Law Commission’s proposals on exemplary damages were rejected: 
 
In November 1999, the Government accepted other recommendations 
from the report but rejected the proposals on exemplary damages on the 
grounds that: "The purpose of the civil law on damages is to provide 
compensation for loss, and not to punish. The function of exemplary 
damages is more appropriate to the criminal law, and their availability in 
civil proceedings blurs the distinctions between the civil and criminal law. 
The Government does not intend any further statutory extension of their 
availability.”481 
  
6.3.4 Not all wrongful behaviour is morally culpable 
 
Coleman explains, descriptively:  
 
To say that a harm is an actor's fault is to say that he is to blame for it. If 
an actor is to blame for a harm then he is blameworthy in some sense of 
that term. The fault system, then, by exacting reparation from those at fault 
guarantees that blameworthy conduct receives its due. This suggests that 
the fault system is required by the traditional retributivist principle.482 
 
Kotler argues that tort is based on punishing ‘conduct which violates certain core 
values that comprise the underlying basis of moral intuition’ as a ‘means of exacting 
revenge or retribution’.483 He claims support from the fact that US courts balk at 
excessive jury awards of punitive damages, arguing that the retributivist insists on 
proportionality of punishment.484 In other words tort punishes fairly and so punitive 
damages are unnecessary. The argument is a non sequitur. Abhorrence of excessive 
awards of punitive damages seems an equally reasonable response for one who 
considers damages to contain no punitive element. Kotler extends his argument to 
claim that ‘the culpability factor is critical to an understanding of the fierce popular 
                                                          
480 Law Commission 247 (n. 161) Draft Bill, clause 1 (2) 
481 Draft Civil Law Reform Bill: pre-legislative scrutiny - Justice Committee 
< http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmjust/300/30006.htm#note162 > 
accessed 23 March 2014 
482 Jules L. Coleman, ‘On the Moral Argument for the Fault System’  The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 
71, No. 14, Some Problems in Ethics (Aug. 15, 1974), 473-490 p. 474 
483 Martin A. Kotler ‘Utility, Autonomy and Motive: a Descriptive Model of the Development of Tort 
Doctrine’ Cincinnati Law Review Vol. 58 1990 1231 p. 1232 
484 Martin A. Kotler ‘Utility, Autonomy and Motive: a Descriptive Model of the Development of Tort 
Doctrine’ (n. 483) p. 1235 
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resistance to the adoption of strict liability principles’.485 Again, whilst that is in itself 
correct, Kotler is guilty of assuming the proposition that he seeks to prove, namely that 
culpability deserves punishment. Coleman, on the other hand, argues that tort does 
not have to be based on moral culpability which puts a ‘dent’ the argument that fault 
is based on retributivism.486  
 
There is some historical support for the retributivist view from Lord Atkin who, when 
enunciating his famous neighbour principle, began: 
 
The liability for negligence, whether you style it such or treat it as in other 
systems as a species of "culpa," is no doubt based upon a general public 
sentiment of moral wrongdoing for which the offender must pay.487 
 
 
However, it is submitted that this does not reflect the true position. Coleman observes 
that ‘we cannot presume that all individuals who are at fault in causing automobile 
accidents are morally culpable’.488 The same applies in PL. One of the factors 
considered in the PL Claims survey at Appendix 4 was whether there was a ‘wrong’. 
However it is difficult to define what exactly constitutes a wrong for the purposes of a 
PL claim. The criterion used when reviewing the files was whether there was evidence 
of moral culpability. Given that the claim may have involved allegations of fault which 
were never tested, answering the question categorically would involve a high degree 
of subjectivity. It can be said objectively that the manufacturers in the settled cases 
cannot be presumed to have been morally culpable. For example, there were four 
cases (44, 64, 74 and 111) in which the claimant was injured by the unintended 
deployment of an airbag. Liability was indisputable in these cases yet there was 
nothing the defendant importer of the vehicle did or failed to do that contributed to the 
accident to which moral culpability can be attached. 
 
 
 
                                                          
485 Martin A. Kotler ‘Utility, Autonomy and Motive: a Descriptive Model of the Development of Tort 
Doctrine’ (n. 483) p. 1235 
486 Jules L. Coleman ‘On the Moral Argument for the Fault System’  (n. 482) p. 477 
487 Donoghue v. Stevenson, 1932 App. Cas. 562, p. 580  
488 Jules L. Coleman ‘On the Moral Argument for the Fault System’ (n. 482) p. 477; see also Ronen 
Perry, ‘The Role of Retributive Justice’ (n. 102) p. 189 ‘… tort law often imposes liability for conduct that 
cannot be deemed morally wrong. This is done especially under rules of faultless liability, such as strict 
and vicarious liability. Strict liability is imposed for begetting harm. It is independent of moral 
wrongfulness unless one considers causation of harm to be wrongful per se.’ 
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Darley and Pittman say: 
 
Intuitively, the following example will clarify the difference between 
punishment and compensation. If a thief, eventually caught, were to 
compensate the victim immediately for the full monetary costs of the theft, 
people would not consider that this was a sufficient infliction on the 
perpetrator to close the matter.489 
 
This is an example of moral culpability equating to the commission of a criminal 
offence, deserving punishment, together with a tortious wrong, for which repayment or 
compensation is the appropriate remedy. The same would apply if for example a 
disgruntled employee in a car factory had been a deliberately sabotaging car braking 
systems. To contrast Darley and Pittman’s example, if A accidentally opens a door 
into B causing B to spill a tray of drinks and A immediately offers to pay for the drinks, 
most would intuitively feel that justice has been done without the need for further 
recrimination.  
 
6.3.5 Tort only intervenes where there is a loss  
 
Whilst the criminal law responds to inchoate offences, tort has no role in attempts or 
acts and omissions that lead to no loss or damage. 
 
The notion of retribution may play a significant role in the laymen’s 
understanding of tort law; perhaps this understanding has even been 
endorsed by one or two judicial opinions. But it is a total misconception of 
tort law from a theoretical standpoint. First, the law of negligence, which is 
currently the most significant division of tort law, does not penalize 
wrongful conduct unless damage ensues; whereas, from a retributive 
perspective, wrongful conduct must yield the same sanction regardless of 
the fortuitous occurrence of harm. Whether harm occurs or not is a fortuity 
that does not alter the gravity of the conduct; hence it should have no effect 
on the severity of the sanction…490 
 
Coleman observes that ‘retributivism requires that all wrongdoers get their come-
uppance, and not only those wrongdoers who may be to blame for particular 
accidents.’491 
 
 
                                                          
489 John M. Darley and Thane S. Pittman ‘The Psychology of Compensatory and Retributive Justice’ (n. 
459) p. 326 
490 Ronen Perry, ‘The Role of Retributive Justice’ (n. 102) p. 189 
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6.3.6 Punishment is not suited to strict liability – but may be suited to fault 
 
It is submitted here that strict liability lies uneasily with retributive justice. Punishment 
makes more sense where liability is based on fault. However, on closer inspection it is 
seen that the nexus between civil fault and punishment is illusory. 
 
Kotler equates the movement away from the strict liability basis of §402A of the 
Restatement (Second) Torts towards a fault based regime, with punishment forming 
the normative foundation of tort. In other words the need to punish for a wrong explains 
a general discomfort with strict liability, imposed regardless of fault.492 Kotler inducts 
Weinrib into the retributivist fold because Weinrib’s philosophy of tort is plainly based 
on fault. However, Weinrib does not mention punishment or retribution in his theory. 
He distances himself from those who ascribe to tort ‘independently desirable goals 
(such as … punishment)’.493 Indeed there is nothing of this nature to be found 
anywhere in Weinrib’s writings.494 Kotler is equating retribution with correction. The two 
are quite different concepts, the latter focusing on the wrong and the former on the 
wrongdoer. As Kotler acknowledges,495 Weinrib considers strict PL to be anomalous: 
falling outside his corrective justice model.  
 
The prevailing view is that the perception that retribution underlies tort is wrong.496 
First, negligence requires damage. A near miss does not give rise to damages – 
although this is a common misperception amongst cases dealt with by the Practice. It 
is not unusual for a claim to be made where there is simply no loss or damage. And 
where there is loss or damage, it is not uncommon for the claimant to try to explain 
how much worse the situation could have been but for chance – as if this in some way 
                                                          
492 Martin A. Kotler, ‘Utility, Autonomy and Motive: a Descriptive Model of the Development of Tort 
Doctrine’ (n. 483) p. 1239 
493 Ernest Weinrib, Tort Law as Corrective Justice (n. 85) 
494 Weinrib, Ernest J. (1987), ‘Causation and Wrongdoing,’ Chicago-Kent Law Review: Vol. 63: Iss. 3, 
Article 3; Ernest J. Weinrib, ‘Correlativity, Personality, and the Emerging Consensus on Corrective 
Justice’ (n.368); Ernest J. Weinrib, ‘The Gains and Losses of Corrective Justice’ (n. 353) pp. 277-297; 
Ernest J. Weinrib, ‘Right and Advantage in Private Law’ Cardozo Law Review vol. 10 1283; Ernest J. 
Weinrib, ‘The Insurance Justification and Private Law’ The Journal of Legal Studies Vol. 14, No. 3, 
Critical Issues in Tort Law Reform: A Search for Principles (Dec., 1985), 681-687; Ernest J. Weinrib, 
‘The Monsanto Lectures: Understanding Tort Law’, 23 Val. U. L. Rev. 485 (1989); Ernest J. Weinrib, 
‘Corrective Justice in a Nutshell’ (n. 354) 
495 Martin A. Kotler ‘Utility, Autonomy and Motive: a Descriptive Model of the Development of Tort 
Doctrine’ (n. 483) p. 1231 
496 Ronen Perry, ‘The Role of Retributive Justice’ (n. 102)  
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enhances or intensifies the wrong and the entitlement to damages. See for example 
Case 90 in the PL Claim Survey at Appendix 4 in which the claimant sought 
compensation for 'trauma, stress and distress caused to my three young children who 
all witnessed the fire and who only through luck were not seriously injured.' 
 
Second, tort sometimes imposes liability where there is no moral wrong – e.g. strict or 
absolute liability (although this could be in places where there is a presumption of 
moral wrong).  
 
Third, the severity of sanction depends not on the culpability of the defendant but on 
the fortuity of loss, which may be a poor measure of the defendant’s wrongdoing.497 
As Perry points out, a minor lack of attention could cause an accident with huge 
financial consequences and a serious departure from the standard of care can result 
in mere minor consequences. This outcome violates the retributive principles of 
cardinal and ordinal proportionality.498 The principle of cardinal proportionality requires 
that ‘the sanction should not be too harsh or lenient with respect to the absolute gravity 
of the wrong’.499 Ordinal proportionality on the other hand requires that ‘the sanction 
must reflect the relative gravity of the wrong’.500 
 
6.3.7 Where damages are expressly awarded to punish, these are separate from 
compensatory tortious damages 
 
In the US, where punitive damages are expressly designed to punish a defendant’s 
tort, it is helpful to examine more closely the basis on which such awards are made. 
PL claims in the US are typically based on wider causes of action than UK PL, such 
as: ‘deceptive trade practices, unjust enrichment, negligence, public nuisance and 
fraudulent concealment’.501   
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once the plaintiff has established the right to compensatory damages, she 
also can receive punitive damages by proving that the defendant acted 
with fraud, malice or in wanton disregard of the plaintiff’s tort rights.502 
 
It has been suggested that a significant difference between the US and the UK is that 
American juries can only criticise the defendant’s conduct by awarding punitive 
damages503 as, unlike a judge, they do not have an opportunity to write an excoriating 
judgment.504 
 
Geistfeld cites a striking example of an award of $28 billion (this is not a misprint) by 
a California jury to a single smoker who contracted lung cancer. 
 
no rational justice system could possibly mete out that kind of penalty for 
harming a single person, no matter how severe the suffering and how 
reprehensible the wrongdoing. But it was not necessarily unreasonable as 
punishment for the harm done to the literally millions of smokers who were 
injured or killed by the defendant’s fraud (if one concludes, as did the jury, 
that the tobacco company was guilty of maliciousness in knowingly 
causing those countless deaths and injuries).505 
 
The implication is that this is a matter of public law rather than mere private justice. 
Darley and Pittman suggest that whilst such punitive damages are conceived as 
fulfilling deterrent purposes, ‘ordinary people’ display their moral outrage by punishing 
‘for reasons of just deserts’.506 Whether or not the award in that case can be justified, 
it can be seen that the award is not punishing the tort. It is punishing accompanying 
criminal conduct. Contrast this with the Scottish case of McTear in which the material 
allegations were of lack of care rather than fraudulent concealment: 
 
(6) it was the duty of the defenders before and after 1964 to warn smokers 
of the facts that smoking was addictive and could cause fatal diseases and 
the defenders were in breach of that duty; 
(7) it was the duty of the defenders to take reasonable care not to 
manufacture tobacco products for sale to members of the public or sell to 
them; and 
                                                          
502 Mark A. Geistfeld, Principles of Products Liability, Foundation Press New York 2006 ISBN-13 978-
1-58778-974-8, ISBN-10: 1-58778-974-4 p. 217 
503 See generally on the role of the jury: Mark P. Gergen, ‘The Jury's Role in Deciding Normative Issues 
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505 Mark A. Geistfeld, Principles of Products Liability (n. 502) p. 217 
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(8) M’s lung cancer was caused by the fault and negligence of the 
defenders.507 
 
Geistfeld points out that early common law awards of punitive damages involved 
intentional torts508 - thus punitive damages are ill-suited to PL cases of defective 
product design. Punitive damages could become relevant in PL if there were a 
risk/utility test for defectiveness. Geistfeld offers the well-known Ford Pinto case509  as 
an example, in which it was held that Ford had deliberately decided not to introduce a 
modification to improve the Pinto’s poor resistance to bursting into flames when struck 
from the rear, on the basis that the cost of modification would exceed the cost of 
claims. However, the test for defect in the UK is not based on risk/utility. It is based on 
consumer expectation. Liability arises regardless of fault or risk/utility decisions, 
however deliberate they might be found to have been. Ironically, the notable PL 
decision in the UK on risk/utility pre-dates the PL Directive. In Walton v BL,510 Mrs 
Walton was catastrophically injured when a rear wheel of the Austin Allegro in which 
she was a passenger came off while the car was travelling at 50-60 mph along the M1 
motorway. British Leyland was aware of a problem involving bearing failures on Austin 
Allegro cars which could lead to the loss of a wheel. It introduced a modification which 
prevented the wheel coming adrift but decided not to instigate a recall campaign at a 
cost of £300,000. Willis J held: 
 
the duty of care owed by Leyland to the public was to make a clean breast 
of the problem and recall all cars which they could, in order that the safety 
washers could be fitted … The duty seems to me to be the higher when 
they can palliate the worst effects of a failure which, if Leyland's view is 
right, they could never decisively guard against. They knew the full facts; 
they saw to it that no one else did. They seriously considered recall and 
made an estimate of the cost at a figure which seems to me to have been 
in no way out of proportion to the risks involved. It was decided not to follow 
this course for commercial reasons …511 
 
The limited report on the case does not deal with damages. It is, therefore, not known 
whether damages were agreed or tried or whether any form of exemplary or 
aggravated damages were sought. 
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6.3.8 Private punishment is anti-societal 
 
Punishment falls squarely within the domain of criminal law in the UK. Society does 
not condone individuals punishing individuals. Retribution is by its nature private 
punishment: ‘…retribution focuses on the moral desert of a single person, and does 
not distribute a benefit or a burden among two or more persons.’512 Individuals should 
not ‘take the law into their own hands’, as children are instructed at an early age. The 
reason for this is that judgement as to whether there has been a wrong (and if so how 
serious it is) will be subjective and there will be no control over the level of punishment. 
Whereas compensation seeks an end to a disruption of the fortuitous relationship 
between injurer and injured, retribution may lead to an escalation of hostilities.  Crimes 
offend not merely against the individual victim but against society and its values. 
Therefore it is society that should punish. The system has its own checks and 
balances, which, whilst not infallible, require a wrong to be proved beyond reasonable 
doubt, to the satisfaction of a jury (in any serious case) and subject to standardised 
penalties. An individual cannot manipulate the system for his own gain at the expense 
of another. 
 
Parisi explains how, in ancient legal systems, punishment evolved into compensation. 
At that point in the evolutionary process the state took control of punishment and 
private retaliation was no longer permissible.513 
 
Once the punitive role of the law is monopolistically absorbed by the state, 
retaliation or self-administered punishment is regarded as illicit, and the 
unpunished injurer who suffers retaliation perceives such punishment as 
a wrongful act and is consequently regarded as a victim himself.514 
 
Colby distinguishes punitive damages awarded against the tobacco industry from 
punishment of public wrongs, and argues that if they became a substitute for the 
criminal law, then they would make an ‘intolerable end run around the Bill of Rights’.515 
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6.4 Empirical evidence of the practical role of a retributivist’s conception of tort 
 
6.4.1 The day in court myth 
 
An element of retribution may be present in the tort system. People who 
have been harmed are sometimes anxious to have day on court in order 
to see the perpetrator of their suffering squirming under cross-
examination.516 
 
Any suggestion that PL claimants want their day in court is entirely unsupported by 
empirical evidence within the PL Claims Survey at Appendix 4. Cases reaching court 
are the exception rather than the rule. Out of the 132 sample cases only three reached 
court. The first, case 57, which was used as Case Study 1, Martin v Kudo, went to trial 
because the claimant’s solicitor would not permit the claimant to accept an offer which 
left them with less than their full costs and success fee. If the claimant had accepted 
the offer, he would have had to make up the shortfall in his solicitors’ costs himself. 
Thus he had no choice but to go to trial. The decision was taken out of his hands. In 
case 45 the claimant believed he would win and had supporting expert evidence. 
Ultimately the defendant’s expert evidence was preferred. There was no suggestion of 
retribution. In case 50 the claimants’ solicitors’ and counsel’s costs hindered successful 
mediation and so the case went to trial. In the event they won, although the Court of 
Appeal gave unconditional leave to appeal, which then paved the way for a mediated 
settlement. It is a certainty, from seeing the claimants in and around the court room 
that they had no desire to be in court. Such anomalous cases generally fail to settle for 
reasons ranging from bad legal advice, intransigence and costs issues to (rarely) 
vindictiveness. But such cases are such an insignificant proportion of all claims that 
they should be discounted in the search for consistent theories. 
 
6.4.2 Civil liability may fail to reach the person who is culpable 
 
Tort law—as a bipolar rectificatory mechanism—cannot attain retributive 
justice, nor can it be expected to. It frequently imposes sanctions on non-
culpable parties; it does not impose sanctions on all wrongdoers; the 
extent of a sanction is usually determined by the magnitude of actual loss 
and cannot be adjusted to fit the gravity of the respective wrong, and in 
the end, the burden is not necessarily borne by the actual wrongdoer.517 
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Damages are rarely paid by the tortfeasor. The majority of injury claims arise from road 
traffic accidents (approximately 75% in 2013-14).518 Road traffic accidents are subject 
to compulsory insurance,519 as is Employers Liability.520 In cases of vicarious liability 
it is unheard of in the experience of the Practice for a claimant to pursue the liable 
employee as the prospects of recovery against the employer are usually likely to be 
so much better (even if there is no insurance). 
 
6.4.3 Tort based ‘punishment’ fails to fit the crime 
 
One moral position traditionally referred to as "retributivist" requires that a 
measure of pain, suffering, or deprivation befit the morally blameworthy 
actor to an extent proportionate to the nature and magnitude of the evil he 
has done: penalties which, so to speak, fit the crime.521 
 
Punishments that are proportionate to the scale of the crime are ‘fairer than 
punishments that are not’.522 Punishments should meet the principles of both 
cardinal and ordinal proportionality.523 Fines should be commensurate with the 
defendant’s wealth, because of the principle of the diminishing marginal utility of 
income for optimal deterrence.524 However, damages have no relationship with 
the degree of moral turpitude, the conduct of the tortfeasor (although this may be 
taken into account in determining the responsibility of the defendant as against a 
joint tortfeasor)525 or the wealth or ability of the defendant to pay.  
 
Conclusions 
 
It is evident that tort and criminal law share some elements and exhibit some common 
factors. Damages are capable of punishing an uninsured defendant in the same way 
                                                          
518 Compensation Recovery Unit data on cases registered, settlements recorded and recoveries made 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/306064/cases-
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519 Road Traffic Act 1988 s 143 
520 Employers’ Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969 
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of that person’s responsibility for the damage in question’.   
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as a fine. Take the example of a manufacturer of roller skates which have inadequate 
warnings526 leading to a consumer breaking a leg. A prosecution under the Consumer 
Protection Act 1987 for breach of the Toys (Safety) Regulations 2011/1881 could lead 
to a maximum fine of £5,000.527 An action for damages could result in an award of 
damages and costs in the tens of thousands of pounds – depending not on the 
tortfeasor’s circumstances but entirely on the fortuity of the circumstances of the 
injured person. Criminal law punishments are measured. Punishments do not merely 
fit the crime but take into account the circumstances of the criminal.528 A claimant could 
theoretically exact retribution by pursuing a civil claim. But this does not mean that tort, 
still less strict liability PL, satisfies a ‘need’ for retributive justice. To argue otherwise, 
as Kotler does, is a classical syllogistic fallacy.  
 
As Coleman argues,529 retributivism fails to provide a satisfactory foundation for fault 
based liability. The random repercussions of civil liability are inconsistent with an 
underlying intention to punish fairly and proportionately. Civil liability is instrumental 
and functional, whereas retribution has the non-utilitarian purpose of giving culprits 
their just deserts.530 
 
 
                                                          
526 In contravention of Directive 2009/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: SUBSTANTIVE LAW - FLAWS IN ADOPTING STRICT 
LIABILITY UNDER THE PL DIRECTIVE 
 
strict liability is one area of tort law in which a page of history can be at 
least as relevant as a page of logic531 
 
                 American Law Institute, 2005 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter asks whether PL claims fulfil the needs of distributive justice. Whether or 
not tort is intended as an engine of distributive Justice, tort has distributive effects.  
Both the substantive law of tort and the procedural law implementing it distribute rights 
because rulemaking is by its very nature distributive of rights. Rulemaking reflects 
political choices that are ostensibly socially desirable. The focus in this chapter is on 
whether the distributive role of PL law is socially desirable in the sense that it meets a 
criterion of fairness. Fairness is inevitably highly subjective and does not easily lend 
itself to an objective formulation. However, this chapter identifies a number of incorrect 
assumptions and generalisations which militate against the fair distribution of 
substantive rights under the PL Directive. 
 
7.1 The PL Directive’s distributive intent 
 
Notwithstanding Goldberg’s and Zipursky’s assertion that they are ‘not arguing for 
recognition of liability for defective products on the ground that it will serve distributive 
justice’532 there is no doubt that the PL Directive had a distributive intent in that it was 
designed to protect a class of society: injured consumers. It does this by approximating 
PL law so as to prevent the ‘divergences that may distort competition’ and the ‘differing 
degree of protection of the consumer against damage caused by a defective 
product’.533 It seeks to achieve these goals by imposing a form of strict liability.  
 
                                                          
531 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM Ch. 4 scope note (Proposed 
Final Draft No. 1, 2005). American Law Institute ISBN: 978-0-314-23194-3 
< http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publications.ppage&node_id=61 > accessed 17 June 2015 
532 Easy Case (n. 11) p. 1944 note 96 
533 PL Directive Recital 1 
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This chapter argues that strict liability was selected as the standard for PL for the 
wrong reasons. It was not soundly based on doctrine with a view to achieving a specific 
goal – but arose through following a perceived trend started in the US. It was based 
on emotive reasons rather than practical needs – the difficulties of proof in complex 
cases. However, concerns in the US about the social desirability of strict liability were 
ignored. More significantly this explains why liability under the PL Directive is 
inappropriate for the types of cases which led to its introduction (the Thalidomide 
tragedy and the 1974 Paris Air disaster). However well-intentioned the introduction of 
strict liability for defective products may have been, it is submitted that the concept is 
flawed substantively, leading to unfairness. 
 
7.2 The inappropriate factors making strict liability an illogical choice  
 
Strict liability was an illogical choice resulting from inappropriate influences. 
Furthermore the very principle of strict liability for defective products relies on 
generalisations and assumptions that do not stand up to close scrutiny: 
 
Part I:  Inappropriate influences for Strict Liability 
 
1. The authors followed a perceived international ‘trend’ leaning towards strict liability, 
lacking in normative clarity; 
2. Strict liability was seen as a simple convenient way to avoid lengthy complex 
multinational litigation but most PL litigation bears no resemblance to this model.  
3. The choice of strict liability was inspired by (and sought to emulate) the development 
of strict liability for defective products in the US. Although in 1978 it was one of the 
stated objectives of the Economic and Social Committee of the EU, in its opinion on 
the Draft PL Directive, to follow developments in international PL law,534 the empirical 
evidence suggests that a paradigm shift in the US went unnoticed in Europe. By the 
time of the introduction of strict PL in Europe, the US had rejected strict liability and 
turned back to fault based liability for defective products. 
 
 
                                                          
534 Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee (161st plenary session, Brussels 12 and 13 July 
1978) Official Journal of the European Communities No C 114/16 7.5.79 
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Part II:  Why Strict Liability is an illogical choice 
 
4. The need for legislation was predicated more upon emotional reasons than practical 
needs following two disasters of unprecedented proportions involving highly technical 
products – in relation to which ‘victims’ needed compensation.  
 
5. It is a leap from these accidents to treat all ‘products’ as warranting a distinct legal 
classification justifying the imposition of a sui generis form of liability because: 
 
a) the types of product fomenting the debate were unrepresentative of the majority of 
products; and  
 
b) the arguments used to justify the imposition of strict liability for defective products 
could equally be applied to other forms of liability. 
 
6. Strict liability was perceived to overcome difficulties of proof of negligence and 
causation. It is a fallacy that taking fault out of the equation overcomes the problem of 
causation. 
 
Part III:  The arguments lead more naturally to ‘No-fault’ 
 
7. The factors directing legislators towards strict liability point more accurately towards 
no-fault liability. 
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PART I:  INAPPROPRIATE INFLUENCES FOR STRICT LIABILITY 
7.3 The authors followed a perceived international trend lacking in normative 
clarity 
 
The authors of the PL Directive followed a perceived international trend towards strict 
liability but this trend lacks any real normative substance and fails to explain the need 
for strict liability. The Strasbourg Draft Convention Draft Explanatory Report stated: 
 
… the growth of inter-State commercial trade has resulted in the problem 
of producers' liability acquiring in certain cases, an international aspect.535 
 
The context suggests that the underlying concern was about differential treatment of 
PL depending on the particular jurisdiction and the lack of PL specific rules in any of 
the jurisdictions investigated. This led to the conclusion that special rules were 
required at European level ‘since the question of products liability could no longer be 
confined within national frontiers.’536 It would therefore be convenient for Member 
States to share a basis of legal liability through international convention.  The Hague 
Convention537 already dealt with choice of law in international PL claims.538 What was 
needed was a convention that dealt with liability.  
 
Internationality per se does not explain or justify strict liability. A strict liability based 
international convention only makes sense if the products envisaged are multinational 
in nature and liable to cause large scale injury or death of individuals spread 
throughout different jurisdictions – such as aircraft and pharmaceuticals. According to 
the Draft EU PL Directive Memorandum  
 
                                                          
535 Strasbourg Draft Convention Article 3 (n. 23) p. 134 
536 Strasbourg Draft Convention, Draft Explanatory Report (n. 23) p. 135 
537 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to PL of 2 October 1973, applicable in 6 Member States 
since 1977 
< http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=84 > accessed 17 December 2013; 
now REGULATION (EC) No 864/2007 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
of 11 July 2007on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II)  
<  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:199:0040:0040:en:PDF   > 
accessed 17 December 2013  
538 See generally Thomas Kadner Graziano, ‘The Rome II Regulation and the Hague Conventions on 
Traffic Accidents and PL – Interaction, conflicts and future perspectives.’ Nederlands Internationaal 
Privaatrecht (NIPR) 2008, 425-429 < http://www.biicl.org/files/5200_graziano_27-09-10_biicl_1.pdf > 
accessed 27 January 2014 
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… special problems of these cases again lie, as distinct from those of 
previous eras, in the possible extent of the damages which such defects 
can cause to the health or financial position of the user. For example, 50 
million US-dollars in the case of the above mentioned [Paris] aircraft 
disaster, 110 million DM compensation in the Contergan [Thalidomide] 
case. These losses bear no relation to the value of the article used or the 
benefits sought by the user.539 
 
7.4 Avoidance of complex multinational litigation  
 
The conclusion that special rules were required at European level, because PL could 
no longer be confined within national frontiers, follows the logic of international 
transport conventions such as the Warsaw Convention of 1929.540  
 
it would be worth considering a provision that the manufacturer of a 
defective product should be deemed to be liable for failing to exercise 
reasonable care unless he were to prove that the defect arose after it had 
left his control or that it arose whilst within his control but without lack of 
reasonable care on his part. This would treat the liability of the 
manufacturer for defects in his products in much the same way as … the 
liability of the carrier to passengers involved in an air crash… [and] … go 
some distance to meet one of the principal arguments for the imposition of 
strict liability …541 
 
However, international air travel cannot be considered on even terms with products 
generally or even dangerous products. In 1929 commercial air travel was in its infancy. 
It was a considerably higher risk enterprise than today. International air crashes 
involve wide scale injury and death. Passengers might find themselves injured in 
foreign countries or in the air above unascertained territory. There were concerns 
about difficult questions of applicable law542 and the need to develop a consistent and 
uniform body of world-wide law.543 
 
 
 
                                                          
539 Draft PL Directive Explanatory Memorandum (n. 24) p. 81 
540 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, Signed at 
Warsaw on 12 October 1929 (enacted in the UK by the Carriage by Air Act 1961 and cited by the Law 
Commission as an example of ‘channelling’ – see Law Commission Working Paper No 64; The Scottish 
Law Commission Memorandum No 20 Liability for Defective Products Printed in England for Her 
Majesty's Stationery Office by Oyez Press Limited Dd 506997 K24 6/75 page 49) 
541 Law Commission Working Paper No 64 (n. 23)  pp. 41/42 
542 Grein v Imperial Airways, Limited [1937] 1 K.B. 50  Greene LJ  pp. 74-76 
543 Alona E. Evans, Reed v. Wiser 555 F.2d 1079 The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 72, 
No. 1 (Jan., 1978), pp. 147-149 
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7.4.1 Strict liability was intended to avoid forum shopping 
 
There is an obvious attraction in a simple system of strict liability to avoid forum 
shopping and the air carrier being exposed to concurrent litigation in multiple 
jurisdictions. The quid pro quo, in the case of the Warsaw Convention, was a system 
of limitation of liability. Lord Steyn explained in re Deep Vein Thrombosis and Air Travel 
Group Litigation: 
 
… The purpose of the Warsaw Convention, following the precedent of the 
earlier Hague Rules governing carriage by sea, was to bring some order 
to a fragmented international aviation system by a partial harmonisation of 
the applicable law. The Warsaw Convention is an exclusive code of limited 
liability of carriers to passengers. On the other hand, it enables passengers 
to recover damages even though, in the absence of the Convention and 
the Act, they might have no cause of action which would entitle them to 
succeed.544 
 
Whilst many products are imported, many others are produced and sold domestically. 
If the need for a simplified form of liability is based on the difficulties of access to 
foreign producers, then then it might be argued that claims against domestic producers 
should be exempt. By analogy, the Warsaw Convention only applied to carefully 
defined ‘international carriage’.545 
 
Moreover, even though a product may be imported, this does not automatically 
increase the likelihood of consumers being injured abroad. Consumers are most likely 
to be injured where they use products: in their own domicile. Whilst a consumer may 
be injured by a product abroad, he is in no worse position in this respect than anyone 
who has an accident abroad. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
544 In re Deep Vein Thrombosis and Air Travel Group Litigation [2006] 1 A.C. 495 per Lord Steyn p. 507 
545 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, Signed at 
Warsaw on 12 October 1929: ‘Article 1 (2). For the purposes of this Convention the expression 
"international carriage" means any carriage in which, according to the contract made by the parties, the 
place of departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be a break in the carriage or a 
transhipment, are situated either within the territories of two High Contracting Parties, or within the 
territory of a single High Contracting Party, if there is an agreed stopping place within a territory subject 
to the sovereignty … of another Power…’. 
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7.4.2 The PL Directive does not prevent forum shopping 
 
One of the principal concerns for a lawyer advising a claimant, who has a choice of 
jurisdictions, is to bring the claim where the damages will be highest. Geddes noted 
as an example (in 1992 figures) 
 
A 40 year old male doctor who is married with two children and who suffers 
serious brain injury, if he brings his proceedings in Ireland he would be 
likely to receive something in the region of $2 million. If he brings his 
proceedings in Spain on the other hand he would be lucky to receive 
$250,000.546 
 
The PL Directive will not prevent forum shopping as it is a substantive law and is not 
concerned with damages. It was acknowledged in the commentary on the Draft 
Strasbourg Convention: 
 
Article 3 does not define damage, leaving it to national law to stipulate the 
heads of damage (for example pain and suffering etc.) which can be 
claimed under the Convention and the measure of damages. The 
Committee was aware that this solution might give rise to undesirable 
"forum shopping", but it believed that this disadvantage was acceptable in 
view of the fact that any attempt to harmonise national law on this subject 
would raise considerable difficulty which might jeopardise the success of 
the Convention.547 
 
The same applies to the PL Directive: 
 
We note in this connection that neither the Strasbourg Convention nor the 
EEC Directive contains any provision which would significantly reduce the 
divergences in levels of awards of damages which at present exist in the 
member States.548 
 
The harmonisation of liability regimes is an ineffective tool in preventing forum 
shopping so long as damages awards remain a ‘lottery’ across Europe. 
 
While harmonisation of almost every area of the law in Europe continues 
apace, personal injury legislation remains stubbornly national, strictly tied 
to national social values and the country-specific administration of justice. 
The enormous disparity between compensation systems and awards 
                                                          
546 Andrew C Geddes, ‘Difficulties relating to the recoverability of damages for personal injury’ 1992 
European Law Review 408 (referencing David McIntosh, and Marjorie Holmes, Personal Injury Awards 
in E.C. Countries, 1991, Lloyd’s of London Press) 
547 Strasbourg Draft Convention, Commentary on Article 3, (n. 23) p. 146  
548 Law Com. No. 82 Liability for Defective Products (n. 252) p. 46 
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across the member states leads to confusion, artificial forum shopping, 
unfair competitive advantages and unpredictable insurance risk.549 
 
If there were concerns about having to sue a foreign manufacturer, application of 
foreign law, or difficulties of discharging the burden of proof against a manufacturer 
based abroad, these were not paramount at the time of initial drafting of the PL 
Directive. The draft PL Directive defined a producer as ‘any person by whom the 
defective article is manufactured and put into circulation in the form in which it is 
intended to be used’.550 There was no reference to importers or those who put their 
name, trademark or brand on the product, as in the Strasbourg Draft Convention.551  
 
7.4.3 Pursuit of a foreign producer fails to explain strict liability 
 
Notwithstanding the lack of importance given to this in the Preliminary Draft PL 
Directive, the real question is whether an injured third party will have difficulty pursuing 
a foreign manufacturer. In Case Study 1, Martin v Kudo, assuming that Mr Martin was 
not the purchaser of the vehicle, and that the vehicle was manufactured in Japan, he 
would have had to obtain leave to serve outside the jurisdiction. Circumventing 
horizontal or even vertical privity of contract and allowing Martin to sue the importer 
has an obvious convenience.  
 
Imported goods present a problem. The producer, being resident abroad, 
is sometimes hard to find; even then, it may not be possible to obtain 
jurisdiction against him. It is likely to be inconvenient and expensive to 
litigate in the producer’s own country and the outcome of litigation depends 
to a large extent on the law of that country. It would be entirely 
unsatisfactory, however, if the remedies of a person injured by a defective 
product should depend on whether or not the product is an imported one. 
However, in our view, the importer of goods should answer for the quality 
of these goods not only to persons with whom he is in a contractual 
relationship, but to any person who may be injured by them. He creates 
the risk by importing the product into the jurisdiction for commercial 
purposes. This was the preponderant view of a great number of 
commentators.552 
 
                                                          
549 Kelly Parsons, ‘The European personal injury lottery’ 2003 Euro Law 42 
550 Draft EU PL Directive Article 3 (n. 24) 
551  Strasbourg Draft Convention Article 3 (n. 23) p. 128 
552 Law Com. No. 82 Liability for Defective Products (n. 252) p. 30 
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However, making the importer answerable for defects does not explain the need for 
strict liability. Privity of contract could be circumvented or leapfrogged by statutory 
intervention regardless of whether the basis of liability is strict or fault based. 
 
It may be argued that there is sense in basing the law on strict liability as this avoids 
difficulty of proof (causation aside) and puts the burden on the importer to seek 
indemnity from its foreign contractual partner. But the other side of this argument is 
that it might discourage international trade or place a disproportionately onerous 
burden on the importer and drive up the cost to the consumer. Moreover, even if it 
could be concluded that internationality is the justification for strict liability, then it would 
only justify strict liability in respect of imported products - not all products. 
 
7.4.4 PL was mistakenly treated as synonymous with collective redress 
 
The focus on disaster litigation can be better understood by considering Epstein’s 
analysis of mass tort litigation. Epstein explains that the emphasis on strict liability in 
the US reflects a change in legal thinking from the two party issues to ‘cases with large 
numbers of individual plaintiffs and multiple institutional defendants’.  
 
The distinctive problem in the law of mass torts is how to control the 
transaction costs, which on any view increase exponentially as the number 
of parties increases.553 
 
He explains that there is a mistaken assumption that the more parties that can be 
drawn into a dispute, the more likely it is that substantive justice will be reached. The 
transactional costs of litigation rise exponentially with multiple parties. He concludes 
that the number of parties to litigation should be reduced and the rules of liability should 
be made simple and easy to determine: hence the trend toward strict liability – in 
multiparty actions. Therefore, subliminally, the real subject matter of the PL Directive 
was not defective products but ‘collective redress’. The focus should not have been on 
substantive liability law but on the procedure of collective redress and it is only latterly 
that legal thinking has developed in Europe to give this topic separate status.554 Only 
recently has the European Commission issued its policy on Collective Redress. Rather 
                                                          
553 Richard A. Epstein, ‘The Legal and Insurance Dynamics of Mass Tort Litigation’ The Journal of Legal 
Studies, Vol. 13, No. 3, Catastrophic Personal Injuries (Aug. 1984), 475-506 
554 See 3.2.5 and 3.2.6 above.  
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than propose any legislation, it has simply issued a ‘Recommendation’. The tenor of 
the Commission’s comments suggests strongly that it is now beginning to see the 
potential for systemic abuse, against which it puts the onus on national legislations to 
introduce procedural safeguards. More significantly it warns against aspects of the US 
procedural systems which it sees as a catalyst for such abuse. 
 
The collective redress mechanisms established at national level should be 
accompanied by important procedural safeguards aimed at protecting the 
procedural rights of the parties and avoiding incentives to abuse the 
collective redress systems. For instance it should be verified at the earliest 
possible stage of litigation that manifestly unfounded cases are not 
continued. Member States should also avoid lawyers' fees calculated as a 
percentage of the compensation awarded (contingency fees) and punitive 
damages (awarded in excess of actual damage or loss suffered by the 
claimants). As such, the European approach to collective redress clearly 
rejects the US style system of "class actions".555 
 
Hodges has closely monitored the development of policy in this area and concludes: 
 
The current empirical evidence suggests that the package will not deliver 
much increase in redress for consumers or businesses. …  While 
respecting the rights of all parties involved, it provides some robust 
safeguards against abusive litigation and limits (but does not avoid) 
economic incentives to bring speculative claims …556 
 
7.5 Europe followed the US, ignorant of its subsequent transformation 
 
The choice of strict liability in Europe was inspired by, and sought to emulate, the 
development of strict liability for defective products in the US. Strict Liability had 
developed as an extension to consumers (including extra-contractual consumers) of 
the contractual warranty.  
 
Strict Liability in the US, under the Second Restatement,557 was limited. Most 
significantly, it did not apply to drugs nor was it designed to confer rights on mere 
bystanders. When Europe came to adopt strict liability, the US had amassed almost 
                                                          
555 Frequently Asked Questions: European Commission recommends collective redress principles to 
Member States MEMO/13/530 Strasbourg 11/06/2013 <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-
13-530_en.htm?locale=en > accessed 12 June 2013 
556 See Christopher Hodges, ‘Collective Redress in Europe: The New Model’ 2010 29 CJQ Issue 3; 
Christopher Hodges, ‘Collective Redress: A Breakthrough or a Damp Sqibb?’ J Consum Policy DOI 
10.1007/s10603-013-9242-0; see also 3.2.6 above. 
557 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965):  
http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publications.ppage&node_id=120  
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30 years of practical experience and had radically changed its approach. By the mid-
1960s an element of reasonableness had already been injected into the test of safety. 
By the end of the 1980s the US had rejected strict liability and turned back to fault 
based liability for defective products.  Nevertheless, the European Commission and 
the Law Commission disregarded warning signs about how strict liability had 
developed and problems it had caused in the US.  
  
7.5.1 Europe followed the US lead on strict liability for defective products 
 
Weinrib observed in 1985 that ‘in the common-law world, only the United States has 
witnessed the judicial creation of a regime of strict products liability. Unlike so many 
American ideas, this one has not inspired imitation.’558 On the contrary, this was the 
year in which Europe was to embark on the sincerest form of flattery by introducing 
the PL Directive. PL as a concept originated in the US and became the inspiration for 
European scholars and courts.559 As Howells and Mildred commented ‘European tort 
lawyers historically have looked to the United States for inspiration and direction in the 
field of products liability’.560   
 
It cannot be said that US law was uniform, as it varies from State to State, but the 
Second Restatement, Torts561 is an attempt to extract the common essence of the law 
in the US. The PL Directive goes a stage further in formally codifying the law in Europe. 
Reimann explains that the European and US models are alike in many respects: 
supply by the manufacturer of defective products; causation of harm other than to the 
product itself; strict liability for manufacturing defects; and similar defences. The 
European ‘quasi-statutory’ model then formed a template for a global spread of PL 
law: not merely throughout Europe but to the future members of the expanded EU and 
beyond to the Asia Pacific region, Latin America and Australia.562 
 
                                                          
558 Ernest J. Weinrib, ‘The Insurance Justification and Private Law’ (n. 494) p. 681 
559 Mathias Reimann, ‘Product Liability in a Global Context: the Hollow Victory of the European Model’ 
11 Eur. Rev. Private L. 128 2003 p. 129 
560 Geraint G. Howells & Mark Mildred, ‘Is European Products Liability More Protective than the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?’ 65 Tenn. L. Rev. 985 1997-1998 p. 988 
561 Restatement Second of Torts 1965 (n. 557) 
562 Mathias Reimann, ‘Product Liability in a Global Context: the Hollow Victory of the European Model’ 
(n. 559) p. 134 
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As explained in Chapter 1, European lawyers had been observing PL in the US since 
the 1970s, leading to the Strasbourg Convention in 1977. In the UK, the Law 
Commission, in its 1975 Working Paper on Liability for Defective Products, referred 
extensively to the law on PL in the US.563  P N Legh-Jones, one of the members of the 
Law Commission’s working party, had studied the workings of the US system of PL 
and published a paper on the subject564 identifying the numerous legal bases of PL 
used in the US. These included actions for breach of express or implied warranty (by 
retailer or manufacturer); and tort liability under §402A Second Restatement (Special 
Liability of Seller of Products for Physical Harm to User or Consumer). He commented 
that the latter is strict in the sense of not depending upon proof of fault rather than 
making the manufacturer an insurer, obliging the manufacturer ‘to satisfy the 
reasonable expectations of the buying public’.565 
 
Legh-Jones concluded that under PL law in the US there were several distinct and 
overlapping legal doctrines and that countries wishing to impose strict liability for 
defective products should create a liability in tort rather than straining contract law. He 
noted, however, that he had not explored the underlying arguments used to justify 
strict liability and there are ‘as many arguments as legal doctrines’566 including 
improved quality, prevention of accidents and that the manufacturer has a ‘moral 
obligation to compensate any consumer injured by his product’.567 
 
7.5.2 The PL Directive followed the US model of  tortious strict liability 
 
In the US, the leading case of Greenman v Yuba Power568 had introduced the concept 
of the tortious warranty under which a manufacturer could be held strictly liable in tort 
for a defect in his product which injured a consumer. Here the plaintiff was given a 
‘Shopsmith’ tool (a combined saw, drill and lathe) for Christmas by his wife and so he 
had no contractual relationship with the seller. A piece of wood flew out of the machine 
and injured him while he was using it. He was therefore a consumer qua user of the 
                                                          
563 Law Commission Working Paper No 64 (n. 23)  
564 See P. N. Legh-Jones, ‘Products Liability: Consumer Protection in America’ The Cambridge Law 
Journal, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Apr., 1969), pp. 54-80 
565 P. N. Legh-Jones, ‘Products Liability: Consumer Protection in America’ (n. 564) 
566 P. N. Legh-Jones, ‘Products Liability: Consumer Protection in America’ (n. 564) p. 80 
567 P. N. Legh-Jones, ‘Products Liability: Consumer Protection in America’ (n. 564) p. 80 
568 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. , 59 Cal.2d 57 
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machine, using it for the purpose for which it was designed. The manufacturer was 
held liable to the plaintiff in negligence. The manufacturer appealed. Traynor J held: 
 
A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the 
market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves 
to have a defect that causes injury to a human being. Recognized first in 
the case of unwholesome food products, such liability has now been 
extended to a variety of other products that create as great or greater 
hazards if defective.569 
 
Traynor J held, without rehearsing the reasons for imposing strict liability, that the 
authorities570 make clear that the liability is not one governed by the law of contractual 
warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort.571 It is evident that Traynor J’s words 
flowed through into the PL Directive: 
Table 5 Comparison between US and European bases of PL 
1963 1965 1977 1985 
Greenman v 
Yuba   
Restatement 
Second of Tort  
Draft Strasbourg 
Convention  
PL Directive  
    
‘A manufacturer 
is strictly liable 
in tort when an 
article he places 
on the market … 
proved to have a 
defect that 
causes injury to 
a human being.’ 
(Traynor J) 
§402A.  
(1) One who sells 
any product in a 
defective 
condition 
unreasonably 
dangerous to the 
user or consumer 
or to his property 
is subject to 
liability for 
physical harm … 
Article 3 
1. The producer 
shall be liable to 
pay compensation 
for death or 
personal injuries 
caused by a 
defect in his 
product. 
[Article 2 … 
c. a product has a 
"defect" when it 
does not provide 
the safety which a 
person is entitled 
to expect…] 
Article 1 
The producer shall 
be liable for 
damage caused 
by a defect in his 
product 
[Article 6  
1. A product is 
defective when it 
does not provide 
the safety which a 
person is entitled 
to expect …] 
    
 
                                                          
569 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (n. 568) Traynor J [6] 
570 Cited by Traynor J as: ‘Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 176 Kan. 68 [269 P.2d 413, 418]; Rogers v. 
Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244 [147 N.E. 2d 612, 614, 75 A.L.R. 2d 103]; Decker & Sons 
v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 617 [164 S.W. 2d 828, 142 A.L.R. 1479]), and the refusal to permit the 
manufacturer to define the scope of its own responsibility for defective products (Henningsen v. 
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358 [161 A. 2d 69, 84-96, 75 A.L.R. 2d 1]; General Motors Corp. v. 
Dodson, 47 Tenn. App. 438 [338 S.W. 2d 655, 658-661]; State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Anderson- 
Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289 [110 N.W. 2d 449, 455-456]; Pabon v. Hackensack Auto Sales, Inc., 63 
N.J. Super. 476 [164 A. 2d 773, 778]; Linn v. Radio Center Delicatessen, 169 Misc. 879 [6 N.Y.S. 2d 
110, 112]’ 
571 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (n. 568) 
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It is a simple evolutionary step to extend the contractual warranty by finding the 
manufacturer liable in a case where it sold the product for the use to which it was being 
put by the person for whom it was purchased. It makes as little difference that the 
plaintiff’s wife had purchased the tool as the question of who purchased air-tickets for 
a family carried by an aircraft that crashes. 
 
Stapleton argues that US lawyers ‘promoted an overambitious and ultimately 
unworkable rule that caught all product flaws, not merely those due to manufacturing 
errors.’572 She points out the naivety of those who assume that the US legal system 
was more mature than the European system and should therefore be followed.573 In 
response, Howells and Mildred say that even if the implications of strict liability for 
design defects and failure to warn claims were not fully appreciated, ‘it does not 
necessarily mean that the United States adopted an inappropriate solution.’574 
 
7.5.3 Europe adopted the ‘channelling’ solution 
 
The Law Commission noted the transition in the US from a contractual basis of liability 
to liability in tort,575 as illustrated by Greenman and concluded, following the logic of 
Traynor J, that the appropriate way forward in Europe was that loss should be 
‘channelled’ to the risk creators; those best able to exercise control over the quality 
and safety of the product; those best placed to insure; those who advertised and 
promoted their products; those with knowledge of the production process; and those 
who could be identified and sued most efficiently.576 
 
The emulation of channelling has two undesirable effects more relevant to Europe 
than to the US. First, this purely doctrinal approach offers a more limited protection to 
consumers than the wider pragmatic approach of European safety legislation, the 
GPSD, which imposes the primary obligation upon the producer to place ‘only safe 
                                                          
572 Jane Stapleton, ‘Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, an Anglo-Australian Perspective’ 
Washburn Law Journal Vol. 39 [2000] 363-403 p. 367  
573 Jane Stapleton, ‘Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, an Anglo-Australian Perspective’ 
(n. 572) p. 367 
574 Geraint G. Howells & Mark Mildred, ‘Is European Products Liability More Protective than the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?’ (n. 560) p. 989 
575 Law Commission 82 (n. 548) p. 10 
576 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc. (n. 568) 
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products on the market’.577 The producer is defined more widely under the GPSD than 
under the PL Directive to include: 
 
(i) the manufacturer of the product, when he is established in the 
Community, and any other person presenting himself as the manufacturer 
by affixing to the product his name, trade mark or other distinctive mark, 
or the person who reconditions the product; 
(ii) the manufacturer's representative, when the manufacturer is not 
established in the Community or, if there is no representative established 
in the Community, the importer of the product; 
(iii) other professionals in the supply chain, insofar as their activities may 
affect the safety properties of a product;578 
 
The GPSD recognises that persons other than the manufacturer may affect the safety 
properties of the product. There are lesser obligations on distributors whose activities 
do not affect the safety of the product. In practical terms, unless a distributor is nothing 
more than a ‘paper’ middleman it may be difficult to argue that his activities would not 
affect the product’s safety. For example, a car importer who takes temporary 
possession of the vehicle will typically carry out a pre-delivery inspection which 
arguably affects the safety properties of the vehicle not least because it extends to the 
steering and brakes. In Relph v Yamaha and Burtonwood,579 an English company 
imported a bulk consignment of three wheeled All-Terrain Vehicles from the US. They 
arrived in crates, part assembled with an owner’s manual in the crate. Yamaha Japan 
manufactured the ATVs. Yamaha USA was a distributor in the USA. After a number 
of accidents these ATVs were effectively banned in the USA. Yamaha USA sold its 
excess stock to a dealer on condition that they would not be sold in countries where 
Yamaha had a distributor. Some found their way to the UK in May and June 1988. The 
supply by Yamaha Japan pre-dated the coming into force of the Consumer Protection 
Act 1987. One of the questions for the court was whether the supply by Yamaha USA 
which post-dated the coming into force of the Consumer Protection Act 1987 was a 
supply by a ‘producer’. Pearl explains: 
 
this turned on [Yamaha US’s] role in testing the machine for the American 
market place, its ownership of the owner’s manual and the provision of a 
warranty to US customers.580 
                                                          
577 GPSD Article 3 (n. 262)  
578 GPSD Article 2 (n. 262)  
579 Relph v Yamaha Motor Company, Yamaha Motor Corporation USA and Burtonwood Developments, 
QB Division July 1996 Douglas Brown J (unreported) 
580 Simon Pearl, ‘As The Law Develops’ 18 PL International 121 (1996) 
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It was argued that the overall manufacturing process was spread out between different 
subsidiaries in different countries, with the result that there could be more than one 
producer. The judge impliedly accepted the principle that there could be co-producers 
but on the facts all design decisions were taken by Yamaha Japan. Yamaha US’s 
involvement was minimal. It is submitted, by way of contrast, that if the test applied by 
the GPSD had to be applied, Yamaha US might well have been found to be a 
professional in the supply chain whose ‘activities may affect the safety properties of a 
product’.581 
 
Even a person who imports in bulk and merely re-boxes a product could affect its 
safety. For example a bulk importer of fireworks who then breaks down the load into 
smaller boxes has to handle the product – which in itself could arguably affect its safety 
(see case 45 of the PL Claims Survey at Appendix 4). The net effect is that the GPSD 
has a wide reach in its goal of improving safety. By comparison, the PL Directive has 
a much narrower compass in imposing strict liability for defects. Given that the stated 
objective of the PL Directive is protection of the consumer,582 a pragmatic approach 
would be to extend liability to the widest range of potential defendants. That would 
mean not merely channelling liability towards producers but also, following the GPSD 
model, fixing liability upon other professionals whose activities affect the safety 
properties of the product. 
 
Second, enforceability is dependent upon on where the product is made, for the 
following reason. Many products are supplied through a distributor or even a chain of 
distributors.  
 
any person who imports into the Community a product for sale, hire, 
leasing or any form of distribution in the course of his business shall be 
deemed to be a producer within the meaning of this Directive and shall be 
responsible as a producer.583 
 
If the distributor is the first importer into the EU, he may be treated as the producer. 
However, if the product was made in Europe, the distributor who imports from one 
                                                          
581 GPSD Article 2 (n. 262)  
582 PL Directive Recital 4 (n. 2) 
583 PL Directive Article 3 (n. 2) 
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Member State to another is not considered a producer. In the latter case, the injured 
person’s remedy is against the actual manufacturer, wherever in Europe he may be. 
Under the recast Judgments Regulation he must sue a producer from another Member 
State in that Member State or where the accident occurred.584 This means that the 
simplification of action, which strict liability is supposed to introduce, is not uniform 
throughout Europe. Injured persons will face different challenges in seeking a remedy 
depending whether the product was made in their own country, another EU Member 
State or outside the EU.  
 
7.5.4 The Law Commission disregarded concerns about adopting the US model 
 
The Law Commission was cautious about US PL experience: 
 
We are not overlooking the recent escalation in insurance premiums for 
products liability cover in the United States of America. This was much 
discussed at the First World Congress on PL, which was held in London 
between 19 and 21, January 1977.585 
 
However, this did not deter them from recommending a strict liability regime as they 
felt that contingency fees, higher medical expenses and jury awards of damages in the 
US all combined to construct a very different landscape from that existing in the UK. 
They conceded: 
 
It should not however be left out of account that the introduction of strict 
liability in a context of increasing awards of damages could in due course 
have a significant effect on insurance costs.586 
 
The Government of the day also considered whether there were warning signs to be 
heeded. 
 
I return also to the burden of costs and who shall bear them. No one knows 
precisely what the costs will be … However, international companies 
exporting to or operating in the United States already know what premiums 
they pay… the premiums occasioned by the directive will be much less 
than those paid in relation to the American market, first, because the draft 
directive, even as it stands, does not propose a regime like the disastrous 
American experience—I hope that we have all learnt lessons from that 
experience—and, secondly, because our courts are very different from the 
                                                          
584 REGULATION (EU) No 1215/2012 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 
12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters,  OJ 20 December 2012, L 351/1.  
585 Law Commission 82 (n. 252) p. 14 
586 Law Commission 82 (n. 252) p. 15 
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American courts in the absence of punitive damages and the scale of 
damages awarded, and our legal profession is very different from the 
American legal profession, where lawyers sometimes share in the benefits 
of the damages won. 
… these increased costs are bound to be passed on to consumers in 
increased prices to a greater or lesser extent … Therefore, all consumers 
will be contributing through the prices that they pay for the compensation 
to a few unfortunate injured victims. I do not think that anyone would 
quarrel with that concept.587 
 
This seems naïve when viewed in the current climate of injury litigation. The thought 
may have been, at that time, of a few unfortunate victims but the reality in the 21st 
century within the Practice has been that claims are not confined to a small number of 
seriously injured and suffering claimants. The majority of claims are minor in nature. 
Two thirds of all the cases in the PL Claims Survey at Appendix 4 were valued at under 
£5,000. As discussed in Chapters 9 and 10 on Compensation, if society’s expectation 
was that the cost of claims would be passed by the few injured claimants to the many 
consumers, then in the light of the ‘have a go’ culture that developed in the early years 
of the 21st century, it is axiomatic that the cost to consumers must have been greater 
than expected. 
 
Whilst the UK has not followed the US by awarding punitive damages in PL cases, the 
UK has nevertheless edged closer to the US regime distinguished by Sally Oppenheim 
MP. As a consequence of the Jackson Reforms, two important procedural changes 
have been instigated: a 10% increase in general damages588 and Damages Based 
Agreements589 (Contingency Fee Agreements) where the lawyer takes a percentage 
of the claimant’s ‘winnings’.  
 
The Scottish law Commission also observed that the insurance crisis in the US could 
not be attributed solely to developments in PL law because there had been an equally 
remarkable rise in professional negligence and medical malpractice premiums where 
liability was fault based.590 This may have been an over-simplification as professional 
                                                          
587 Mrs Sally Oppenheim, Minister for Consumer Affairs (n. 117) [1111/2] 
588  See Simmons v Castle [2012] EWCA Civ 1288: 10% increase in ‘the proper level of general 
damages in all civil claims’ for (i) pain and suffering, (ii) loss of amenity, (iii) physical 
inconvenience and discomfort, (iv) social discredit, (v) mental distress, (unless the claimant had 
entered into a CFA before that date). 
589 The Damages-Based Agreements Regulations 2013 No: 609 
590 Law Commission 82 (n. 252) p. 15 
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negligence and medical malpractice suits in the US might equally be based on 
contract, which could incorporate elements of strict liability. However, it is a valid point 
that must be borne in mind when reviewing the current position in the UK. The boom 
in litigation over the past 15 years since the Woolf Reforms were implemented by the 
Access to Justice Act 1999 cannot be attributed to strict liability under the PL Directive. 
It has been apparent in all areas of litigation and, therefore, is more likely to be 
attributable to procedural reforms that apply across the board. The influence of the PL 
Directive is likely to be more subtle. 
 
7.5.5 The PL Directive took the strict liability concept much further than the US model. 
  
a. the restatement was limited in application and excluded drugs 
 
In Legh-Jones review of the bases of PL in the US he commented on the inapplicability 
of §402A to unavoidably dangerous drugs, referring to ‘comment k’.591 Over the next 
30 years in the US, §402A and comment k fuelled a debate over the applicability of 
strict liability to ‘drugs, cosmetics, food, cigarettes, and alcoholic beverages’ in addition 
to blood products, and led to the conclusion that ‘drugs were a special product, not to 
be subjected to the usual rule of strict liability’.592 This represents a retreat from the all-
embracing concept of strict liability for defective products which shaped the PL 
Directive. 
 
                                                          
591 Comment k reads: 
‘Unavoidably unsafe products 
There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being 
made safe for their intended and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs. An 
outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads 
to very serious and damaging consequences when it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads 
to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding 
the unavoidable high degree of risk which they involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and 
accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The 
same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very reason cannot 
legally be sold except to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician. It is also true in particular 
of many new or experimental drugs as to which, because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient 
medical experience, there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but 
such experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically 
recognizable risk. The seller of such products, again with the qualification that they are properly 
prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to 
strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to 
supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently 
reasonable risk.’ 
592 George W. Conk, ‘Is There a Design Defect in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?’ 
The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 109, No. 5 (Mar., 2000), 1087-1133 p. 1093 
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b. PL in tort under the Second Restatement did not apply to bystanders 
 
A further limitation in the US model of strict liability was its inapplicability to bystanders, 
at the time of the Law Commission’s review.593 The American Law Institute’s position 
on bystanders was that they did not require the same protection as consumers but the 
Institute expressed ‘neither approval nor disapproval of expansion of the rule to permit 
recovery by such persons’.594  By contrast, the PL Directive applied to bystanders from 
the start. Art 1 provides simply that the ‘producer shall be liable for damage’ without 
limiting the class of claimant, notwithstanding the conceptual difficulties with the 
application of a consumer expectation test to a bystander.595 Ironically, again, although 
the recitals in the PL Directive suggest that the intention is to protect the ‘consumer’, 
that is the person using, consuming or in some way benefiting from the product, the 
victims of Thalidomide were not in any sense consumers: they were the paradigmatic 
bystander. 
 
7.5.6 Europe failed to heed the changes occurring in US PL 
 
PL law in the US did not stand still. The Law Commission was well aware of §402A 
and reproduced the section in its Report. 
 
§402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or 
Consumer 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably 
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability 
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to 
his property…596 
 
It can be seen that by 1965 the principle of strict liability based on a defect had already 
been diluted to ‘in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous’. The notion of 
reasonableness is the antithesis of strict liability. ‘Thus, the section's strict-liability rule 
                                                          
593  Law Commission Working Paper No 64 (n. 23) p. 69. See ‘Strict Products Liability to the Bystander: 
A Study in Common Law Determinism’ The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Spring, 
1971), pp. 625-646 (author unspecified) on the subsequent extension of the tortious warranty doctrine 
to bystanders. 
594 Restatement (Second) of Torts §402A, caveat (n. 557) 
595 Alistair Clark, ‘The Conceptual Basis of PL’ The Modern Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 3 (May, 1985), 
325-339, p. 335 
596 Law Commission Working Paper No 64 (n. 23) p. 45 
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was tempered by a negligence-based concept of defect.'597 Legh-Jones recognised 
the potential for fault to ‘creep back into a strict liability action through a side door’.598 
 
In the 25 years following the introduction of the Restatement (approximately up to the 
time of the PL Directive being given effect nationally across the EU Member States) 
there were ‘literally thousands upon thousands of products liability decisions’ in the US 
courts developing and refining the law.599 One of the goals of the PL Directive, 
expounded by the Economic and Social Committee in July 1978, was to follow 
‘developments in the field of liability for defective products in both international law and 
national law...’ 600 However, there was a rush to adopt a basis of liability that was even 
stricter than that prevailing in the US.601 There is no evidence that any developments 
in the law in the US were noted: still less that they were taken into account in shaping 
European Law.  
 
Coleman wrote in 1992 that ‘strict liability in conjunction with the design defect tests 
have wreaked havoc within the manufacturing sector of the economy’.602 He set out a 
list of ‘striking’ figures to prove his contention, including the decimation of the aviation 
industry603  and, most significantly: 
 
In 1985–6, nearly half (47 percent) of all product manufacturers in the 
United States removed product lines from the market place, 25 percent 
discontinued product research and 39 percent decided against introducing 
new products, all as the result of increased exposure to liability.604 
 
In 1986 the US Department of Justice Tort Policy Working Group reported on the 
insurance crisis faced at the time. The Report identified and discussed four problem 
areas:  
                                                          
597 George W. Conk, ‘Is There a Design Defect in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?’ 
(n. 592) p. 1092 
598 P. N. Legh-Jones, ‘Products Liability: Consumer Protection in America’ (n. 564) p. 75 
599 James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, ‘A Proposed Revision of Section 402A of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts’ 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 1545 (1992) 
600 Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee (161st plenary session, Brussels 12 and 13 July 
1978) Official Journal of the European Communities No C 114/16 7.5.79 
601 Mathias Reimann, ‘Product Liability in a Global Context: the Hollow Victory of the European Model’ 
(n. 559) p. 142; see also Geraint G. Howells & Mark Mildred, ‘Is European Products Liability More 
Protective than the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?’ (n. 574) p. 987; and William Boger, 
‘The Harmonization of European Products’ Liability Law Fordham International Law Journal Volume 7, 
Issue 1 1983 Article 1 
602 J Coleman, Risks and Wrongs (n. 329) p. 414 
603 J Coleman, Risks and Wrongs (n. 329) p. 408 
604 J Coleman, Risks and Wrongs (n. 329) p. 407: citing the Report of the United States Conference 
Board, 1987 
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- the movement towards no-fault liability increasingly resulting in 
companies and individuals being found liable even in the absence of any 
wrongdoing on their part; 
- causation being undermined by ‘questionable practices’ shifting liability 
to deep pocket defendants who did not cause the injury; 
- the explosive growth in damages awards; and  
- excessive transaction costs leading to two thirds of money paid out going 
to lawyers and litigation expenses.605 
 
The Report noted that ‘between 1974 and 1985 there has been a 758% increase in 
the number of PL lawsuits filed in federal district court’.606 Notably, the Report 
recommended a return to a fault-based standard for liability.607 The Working Group 
considered the move towards no-fault liability disturbing, having replaced deterrence 
and compensation with economic theory, leading to a devastating challenge to fault or 
wrongdoing ‘as a moral and doctrinal justification for and limitation on tort liability’.608 
The removal of this limitation has resulted in ‘compensation often awarded merely for 
the sake of compensation’.609 Fault had not been entirely rejected and courts would 
often go to ‘amazing distortions’ to find fault because ‘fault remains the only vehicle in 
tort law capable of distinguishing wrongful (or undesirable) from beneficial (or 
desirable) conduct’610  
 
The Report also rejected the consumer expectation test as ‘undesirable because it is 
not really a defect test at all’. It provokes a debate about what safety expectations are 
reasonable – which requires the application of ‘other tests’. For example, in 
determining whether a vehicle meets the consumer expectation test of 
crashworthiness, it is necessary to apply a cost/benefit test or a risk/utility test. The 
consumer expectation test is also used in practice, it is said, as a substitute for 
contributory negligence where it does not exist or as a ground for juries ‘to hold 
manufacturers liable when other bases for liability are absent and the jury wants to 
                                                          
605 U.S. Department of Justice, Report of the Tort Policy Working Group on the Causes, Extent and 
Policy Implications of the Current Crisis in Insurance Availability and Affordability (1986) p. 2 
< http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED274437.pdf > accessed 28 September 2012 
606 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Report of the Tort Policy Working Group (n. 605) p. 2 
607 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Report of the Tort Policy Working Group (n. 605) p. 4  
608 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Report of the Tort Policy Working Group (n. 605) p. 31  
609 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Report of the Tort Policy Working Group (n. 605) p. 31  
610 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Report of the Tort Policy Working Group (n. 605) p. 32  
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compensate the plaintiff’. Concerns were also expressed about the value of the 
consumer expectation test, founded as it was in contract rather than tort, because it 
replaces objective risk/utility considerations with ‘emotion and culture as the 
foundation for determining liability’.611 The Working Party recommended abolition of 
the Consumer Expectation test – the test forming the basis of the definition of safety 
in the PL Directive.612  
 
The consumer expectation test in Europe is curtailed by the requirement that the 
expectation should be ‘legitimate’ or ‘entitled’.613 Whilst this may limit the number of 
cases that reach court, there are still many claims in which a purely subjective test of 
consumer expectation is applied by the claimant or his lawyer so that consumer 
expectations are not tempered by any requirement of reasonableness – see page 107 
above in relation to airbag cases.  
 
It has been argued, based on empirical evidence, that the mid 1980s saw a quiet pro-
defendant revolution in judicial attitudes to PL in the US which, perhaps goes some 
way towards explaining why in Europe (let alone in the US) this trend had ‘gone all but 
unnoticed’.614  
 
In the early 1990s it was argued that strict liability should be abandoned on the grounds 
that the justification for strict liability was weak and that ‘few worthy cases today could 
not be brought successfully under negligence’.615 1998 heralded the Third 
Restatement with a specific section for PL. When the Third Restatement was to be 
drafted, Henderson and Twerski were appointed as the reporters. They were opposed 
                                                          
611 Geraint G. Howells & Mark Mildred, ‘Is European Products Liability More Protective than the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?’ (n. 560) p. 995 
612 Alan Schwartz, ‘Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis’ The Yale Law 
Journal, Vol. 97, No. 3 (Feb., 1988), 353-419 p. 384/5 
613 A v National Blood Authority (n. 204) p. 311  
614 Henderson, James A. Jr. and Eisenberg, Theodore, ‘The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An 
Empirical Study of Legal Change’ (1990). Cornell Law Faculty Publications. Paper 338. 
< http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/338 > accessed 17 June 2015 and Eisenberg, Theodore 
and Henderson, James A. Jr.,  ‘Inside the Quiet Revolution in Products Liability’ (1992). Cornell Law 
Faculty Publications. Paper 396.< http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/396 > accessed 17 June 
2015   
615 William Powers, Jr. ‘A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products Liability’ 1991 U. Ill. L. Rev. 639  
p. 6482 
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to liability without fault and ‘enthusiastically embraced what they viewed as a judicial 
trend towards reshaping strict products liability into negligence-based liability.’616 
 
Whilst the Third Restatement retained strict liability for manufacturing defects, liability 
for design defects or inadequate instructions or warnings is subject to a foreseeability 
test, which constitutes a reversion to a fault based theory of liability.617  Mildred and 
Howells lamented that the tide was turning in favour of defendants since the high water 
mark for plaintiffs in the early 1980s.618 
 
As for prescription drugs, the Third Restatement treats them as a ‘very special genre 
of cases’, the unintelligible case law being incapable of intelligent restatement and in 
need of reformulation.619 
 
A prescription drug . . . is not reasonably safe due to defective design if 
the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug . . . are sufficiently great 
in relation to its foreseeable therapeutic benefits that reasonable health-
care providers, knowing of such foreseeable risks and therapeutic 
benefits, would not prescribe the drug . . . for any class of patients.620  
 
The rule applies a sozialadäquat test and ‘the manufacturer need persuade the fact 
finder only that, on balance, the product does more good than harm for at least one 
                                                          
616 Ellen  Wertheimer, ‘The Biter Bit: Unknowable Dangers, The Third Restatement, and the 
Reinstatement of Liability without Fault’ 70 Brooklyn L. Rev. 889 (2005)  p. 915 
617 The Restatement (Third) of Torts §2 (1998) now provides 
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it contains a manufacturing 
defect, is defective in design, or is defective because of inadequate instruction or 
warnings. A product: 
...  
(b) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of the harm posed by the product 
could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design 
by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, 
and the omission of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe; 
(c) is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when the foreseeable 
risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the provision 
of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor 
in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the instructions or warnings 
renders the product not reasonably safe... 
618 Geraint G. Howells & Mark Mildred, ‘Is European Products Liability More Protective than the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?’ (n. 560)  
619 James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, ‘A Proposed Revision of Section 402A of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts’  (n. 599) p. 1512 
620 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6(c) (1998)  
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class of users’.621  Thalidomide would pass this test as it is now licensed by the MHRA 
for multiple myeloma in over 65 year old males.622 
 
Conk, in complaining that the Third Restatement excludes blood products entirely and 
exempts makers of prescription drugs,  vaccines and mechanical devices such as 
cardiac pacemakers from the ‘alternative-safer-design standard’, argues that it 
‘reverses thirty-five years of safety-advancing products-liability law’.623 The justification 
put forward by the Third Restatement for its position on drugs is partly that they are 
provided via a ‘learned intermediary’. It is argued that prescription pharmaceuticals 
are unlike other consumer products as physicians may have to try different doses, or 
combinations. Also, patients may be refractory to the drug of choice and other 
secondary or tertiary choices are required, possibly reverting to more dangerous 
options.624 A further justification tendered by the Third Restatement is the development 
risks argument, that strict liability would inhibit innovative research and development. 
It also states that strict liability for these products is unnecessary because of the 
stringent regulatory regime imposed by the FDA. This argument underscores Chapter 
3 on Deterrence, above, and extends to many other products in more heavily regulated 
Europe. 
 
The Third Restatement probably marks a shift from grand theory to pragmatism 
whereas the PL ‘Directive does seem to be more influenced by grand theory.’625 It 
must not be forgotten that this grand theory was born in the USA against the backdrop 
of ‘jury trials, widely available punitive damages, the need for awards to cover the 
whole cost of injury (including health costs), and inflation of awards to compensate for 
the known deduction of contingency fees’,626 in addition to ‘lack of liability for the 
                                                          
621 George W. Conk, ‘Is There a Design Defect in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?’ 
(n. 592) pp. 1087-1133 at pages 1088 and 1089, who argues that ‘drugs, vaccines, biological products, 
and medical devices can and should be tested for defect by the same measures as all other products’. 
622 http://www.mhra.gov.uk/Safetyinformation/DrugSafetyUpdate/CON085195  
623 George W. Conk, ‘Is There a Design Defect in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?’ 
(n. 592) pp. 1088 and 1089.  
624 Lars Noah, ‘This is your products liability Restatement on Drugs’ Brooklyn Law Review 2009 Vol 
74:3 p. 18 
625 Geraint G. Howells & Mark Mildred, ‘Is European Products Liability More Protective than the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?’ (n. 560) p. 1026 
626 Geraint G. Howells & Mark Mildred, ‘Is European Products Liability More Protective than the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?’ (n. 560) p. 993 
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prevailing party’s costs’.627 It was concluded that whilst the PL Directive provides a 
more protective environment than the Third Restatement, the lower levels of damages 
in Europe and poorer access to justice prevent PL having a major impact.628  
 
It has been suggested that US law may have turned yet again towards strict liability. 
Wertheimer argues that the introduction of the Third Restatement forced courts to 
confront the erosion of strict liability or ‘provided courts with a view of strict products 
liability in contrast to the current one in place.’629 This interpretation is sternly rebutted 
by Henderson and Twerski who describe the claimed judicial backlash against the 
erosion of strict liability as ‘fiction … rejected by the overwhelming majority of courts 
and scholars.’630 It matters not whether US law was against strict liability or for it – or 
whether in fact the approach of the courts has been sinusoidal. In fairness to both 
protagonists, being asked to define a uniform version of US case law is an invidious 
task because ‘it is not possible to speak of a single criterion for PL in operation in the 
United States’.631 The volume of decisions in different states is out of all proportion to 
the number of PL cases in Europe. The point for present purposes is not to try to 
determine who is right but to demonstrate that insofar as the choice of strict liability for 
the PL Directive was based on the US model, then this was a flawed strategy because 
it relies on questionable assumptions: 
 
- That Strict liability applied uniformly to PL in the US; 
- That the US law would work effectively with UK procedure; 
- That excesses and abuses prevalent in the US would not be replicated in the 
UK because of procedural differences. 
                                                          
627 Geraint G. Howells & Mark Mildred, ‘Is European Products Liability More Protective than the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?’ (n. 560) p. 1030 
628 Geraint G. Howells & Mark Mildred, ‘Is European Products Liability More Protective than the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?’ (n. 560) p. 1029 
629 Ellen  Wertheimer, ‘The Biter Bit: Unknowable Dangers, The Third Restatement, and the 
Reinstatement of Liability without Fault’ (n. 616) pp. 934/935 
630 James A Henderson, Jr and Aaron D Twerski, ‘A Fictional tale of Unintended Consequences: A 
response to Professor Wertheimer’ 70 Brooklyn L. Rev. 939 (2005)   
631 Jane Stapleton, ‘Products Liability Reform Real or Illusory?’ (n. 230)  pp. 414/415 
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The underlying tort theory in the US in which PL litigation fulfils a regulatory function 
to protect consumers is absent in the UK.632 When the PL Directive was transposed 
into UK law under the Consumer Protection Act 1987, it contained an entirely separate 
regulatory section, Part II of the Act on Consumer Safety, which imposed the General 
Safety Requirement and contained criminal sanctions for breach.633  This has now 
been replaced by the General Product Safety Regulations.634 
Howells and Mildred consider it unfortunate that substantive law was used to modify 
aspects of the American legal system ‘such as damages and contingency fees’, which 
ought properly to be dealt with by procedural reform rather than undermining the 
‘grand theory of products liability’. They consider strict liability to be ‘a more moral and 
efficient basis of liability than assignment of fault’.635 This is not a universally accepted 
                                                          
632 The Lovells Report (n. 51) p. 62 - It would have been difficult at the time of the PL Directive to impose 
regulation through liability law throughout separate states with separate economies, separate 
currencies, different tax regimes, different healthcare systems and different national insurance 
schemes. 
633 Consumer Protection Act 1987: ‘PART II CONSUMER SAFETY The general safety requirement.  
10 (I) A person shall be guilty of an offence if he—  (a) supplies any consumer goods which fail to 
comply with the general safety requirement;…  
(2)For the purposes of this section consumer goods fail to comply with the general safety requirement 
if they are not reasonably safe having regard to all the circumstances, including— 
(a)the manner in which, and purposes for which, the goods are being or would be marketed, the get-up 
of the goods, the use of any mark in relation to the goods and any instructions or warnings which are 
given or would be given with respect to the keeping, use or consumption of the goods; 
(b)any standards of safety published by any person either for goods of a description which applies to 
the goods in question or for matters relating to goods of that description; and 
(c) the existence of any means by which it would have been reasonable (taking into account the cost, 
likelihood and extent of any improvement) for the goods to have been made safer.’ 
634 General Product Safety Regulations 2005: ‘General safety requirement 5.—(1) No producer shall 
place a product on the market unless the product is a safe product.’ And this is defined as follows: 
‘“safe product” means a product which, under normal or reasonably foreseeable conditions of 
use including duration and, where applicable, putting into service, installation and maintenance 
requirements, does not present any risk or only the minimum risks compatible with the product’s use, 
considered to be acceptable and consistent with a high level of protection for the safety and health of 
persons. In determining the foregoing, the following shall be taken into account in particular— 
(a) the characteristics of the product, including its composition, packaging, instructions for assembly 
and, where applicable, instructions for installation and maintenance, 
(b) the effect of the product on other products, where it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used 
with other products, 
(c) the presentation of the product, the labelling, any warnings and instructions for its use and disposal 
and any other indication or information regarding the product, and 
(d) the categories of consumers at risk when using the product, in particular children and the 
elderly. 
The feasibility of obtaining higher levels of safety or the availability of other products presenting a lesser 
degree of risk shall not constitute grounds for considering a product to be a dangerous product;’ 
635 Geraint G. Howells & Mark Mildred, ‘Is European Products Liability More Protective than the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?’ (n. 560) p. 987 
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view. It is argued to the contrary that the utility approach ‘best serves fairness and 
efficiency, and adopting and clarifying the majority position best serves 
consistency’.636 
 
It is ironic that, in the UK, LASPO637 has introduced significant changes to procedural 
law, including a 10% increase in general damages and contingency fees (Damages 
Based Agreements) as a strategy to  contain the explosion of personal injury litigation 
(facilitated in the case of PL by substantive protective legislation such as the PL 
Directive). 
                                                          
636 Chun, ‘The New Citadel: A Reasonably Designed Products Liability Restatement’ Cornell Law 
Review 1994 vol 79 1654 p. 1679 
637 The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 
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PART II:  WHY STRICT LIABILITY IS AN ILLOGICAL CHOICE 
 
7.6 Following a trend for emotive reasons lacks normative authority 
 
The Strasbourg Convention Committee of Experts had observed how liability for 
defective products was being treated internationally. Ultimately, they had adopted 
strict liability not on the basis of any ideological rationale but because this is what had 
become ‘manifest in many States.’638 As the Strasbourg Draft Convention, Draft 
Explanatory Report had explained:  
 
there was an almost general trend towards stricter liability of producers 
apparently caused by a desire to protect consumers from the effects of 
new techniques and marketing and sales methods639 
 
That led to the resolution that: 
 
Concerning … the legal basis of the system of liability … the majority of 
the Committee agreed that the notion of "fault" - whether the burden of 
proof lay with the person suffering damage or with the producer - no longer 
constituted a satisfactory basis for the system of products liability in an era 
of mass-production, where technical developments, advertising and sales 
methods had created special risks…640 
 
Similarly the Memorandum to the Draft EU Directive states: 
 
In all Member States, the courts and academic opinion generally have 
tended towards establishing stricter criteria of liability, towards holding the 
producer responsible.641 
 
In the UK, the Law Commissioners opined: 
 
that the trend in Europe is towards imposing strict liability on 
manufacturers, at least where defects in their products lead to personal 
injuries, and thereby providing the injured person with rights of redress that 
are, in theory at least, an improvement on the rights provided by our 
present laws.642 
 
                                                          
638 Strasbourg Draft Convention, Draft Explanatory Report (n. 23) p. 136  
639 Strasbourg Draft Convention, Draft Explanatory Report page (n. 23) p. 135 
640 Law Commission Working Paper No 64 (n. 23) p. 136 
641 Law Commission Working Paper No 64 (n. 23) p. 154 
642 Law Commission Working Paper No 64 (n. 23) p. 33 
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It is, no doubt, the case that a trend towards strict liability could be observed but a 
trend lacks any normative authority. It is merely an observation of the basis of liability 
in other countries without explaining why strict liability was chosen, the context in 
which it operates or why it is perceived to be advantageous to society.  Insofar as it is 
possible to discern any normative basis from the above, it is that consumers needed 
protection from modern technical products. 
 
7.6.1 The normative basis was the need for protection from ‘modern industrial 
products’ 
 
The Law Commission quoted consumer organisations as ‘pressing for an 
improvement in the legal position of the consumer to protect him from the risks of 
modern industrial products.’643 The question of whether imposition of strict liability 
‘protects’ has been addressed in Chapter 3 on Deterrence. Putting this to one side, 
the question for consideration in this Chapter is what is meant by the risks of modern 
industrial products. It is suggested that what was envisaged is essentially aircraft and 
pharmaceuticals. However, on a proper analysis, a number of the influences which 
shaped the trend towards strict liability are inappropriate to a Directive governing 
products in general because they treat all persons injured by products as ‘victims’ 
without considering the impact on claims relating to minor injuries or injuries caused 
by less complex products. 
 
7.6.2 Injured persons are perceived as victims 
 
The thought processes underlying the original Strasbourg Convention are revealed by 
the language of the Explanatory Memorandum. This contains ten references to the 
injured person as ‘the victim’, which term even appears once in the Convention 
itself.644 It appears 20 times in the Law Commission’s Report on Liability for Defective 
Products.645 Whilst the range of meanings is broad, the usual context would envisage 
someone who has been seriously injured or killed.646 
                                                          
643 Law Commission Working Paper No 64 (n. 23) Appendix C p. 155 
644 Draft Strasbourg Convention Article 10 (n. 23) – ‘Contracting States shall not adopt rules derogating 
from this Convention, even if these rules are more favourable to the victim’ 
645 Law Commission Working Paper No 64 (n. 23) 
646 The term comes from victima the Latin for a sacrificial offering: Collins English Dictionary – Complete 
and Unabridged © HarperCollins Publishers 1991, 1994, 1998, 2000 
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A survivor of a major air disaster or a pharmaceutical tragedy such as Thalidomide 
might be considered an accident victim but it hardly applies to a person suffering from 
blisters from a badly made shoe or a person who suffers whiplash due to a low speed 
collision arising from defective brakes. Whilst it is a subjective matter, it is suggested 
that most of the claimants in the PL Claims Survey at Appendix 4 should not readily 
be described in common parlance as victims. The Strasbourg Convention Committee 
of Experts plainly had products such as pharmaceuticals and aircraft in mind rather 
than everyday products not inherently dangerous but which could nevertheless injure.  
 
There is clear evidence that this thinking has continued to colour the PL Directive. The 
EU 1999 Green Paper on Defective Products647 also refers to victims, even though this 
term is used nowhere in the PL Directive or even in the Consumer Protection Act 
1987,648 when it proposes a number of elements of the PL Directive for possible reform. 
The first of these is the burden of proof.649  
 
It has perhaps become conventionally acceptable to refer to accident sufferers as 
victims. The term is used consistently by most of the leading academic commentators 
on PL cited in this thesis.650 By contrast, McKenna & Co’s 1994 report651 to the 
Commission on the application of the PL Directive (under Article 21) uses the word 
‘victim’ only once, as does the Lovells’ Report.652  
 
7.6.3 Thalidomide victims were at the forefront in Parliamentary debate 
  
The proposed PL Directive was debated in Parliament in 1980. The Conservative 
Government and Labour Opposition were both broadly in favour of the legislation. 
Sally Oppenheim MP was the Conservative Minister for Consumer Affairs of the 
Conservative Government of the time, striving to achieve ‘a proper balance between 
                                                          
647 Green Paper (n. 45)  
648 Cf s3 Compensation Act 2006 which describes mesothelioma sufferers as victims  
649 Green Paper (n. 45) p. 20   
650 Including Stapleton, Cane, Atiyah, Mildred, Howells, Jolowicz, Powers, Birnbaum, Faure, Bernstein, 
Shavell and Polinsky, Goldberg and Zipursky, Geistfeld, inter alios 
651 McKenna Report (n. 44) p. 22 [57]  
652 The Lovells Report (n. 51) p. 48 – McKenna and Lovells might reasonably be described as 
‘defendant’ firms, which may go some way to explaining the difference in terminology. 
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the interests of injured victims and the interests of producers’.653 John Smith MP, later 
Leader of the Labour Party, in opposition, stated: 
 
If injury arises from a defect in a product, on whom should the loss fall? 
Who should bear the loss? Should it be the person who manufactured the 
product, who put it into circulation and who presumably gained some profit 
by so doing? Should he bear the loss and share the loss, as it were, by 
taking out insurance, the cost of which would no doubt be reflected in the 
price that consumers would pay for the product, or should the person who 
suffered the injury alone bear the loss? 
  
I find little difficulty in answering that social and political question. It seems 
manifestly unfair that the Thalidomide children should bear uniquely the 
loss that they sustained and not those who manufactured the product that 
gave rise to their injuries.654 
 
This is ultimately an issue of distributive justice, and therefore a political issue, but it 
would be difficult to imagine anyone arguing that the Thalidomide children should ‘bear 
uniquely the loss they sustained.’ However, this does not explain who should bear the 
loss. The possibilities for bearing loss could include first party insurance; liability 
insurance; or social welfare; or a combination of these. All that Smith does is rule out 
first party insurance by unborn children as an option. That much is uncontroversial, if 
only from the practical point of view. Smith merely contemplates the single alternative 
of the manufacturer internalising the cost (rather than society as a whole). Even if it is 
accepted that internalisation is the correct approach for Thalidomide, it does not justify 
imposition of strict liability on producers of all products – because there had been no 
consideration of whether different products and different accident circumstances 
should require the same treatment as a Thalidomide disaster.  
 
Consideration of the development risks (state of the art) defence, too, focused on 
Thalidomide: 
 
John Smith MP: … it is difficult for people to establish a liability based upon 
fault. In this situation, we ought to consider whether we ought to reform the 
law. In my opinion, we ought to do so. … It is a strong argument for 
introducing strict liability in the manufacture of defective products. That 
example also illustrates problems about having a state of the art defence. 
                                                          
653 Mrs Sally Oppenheim, Minister for Consumer Affairs (n. 117) [1115] 
654 Mr John Smith MP, HC Deb 04 November 1980 vol 991 cc 1106-200,  
 http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1980/nov/04/european-community-product-liability 
[1118] 
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If the company had said in an action based on strict liability that it was a 
defect that it could not reasonably have known about at the time—it is 
highly likely that that is what it would have pleaded in its defence … In that 
situation, and at first sight, strict liability would seem to offer a remedy to 
the Thalidomide children, but that remedy would be snatched from them 
by the application of the state of the art defence.655 
 
The debate did not touch on the consumer who burns her leg with a heat pad (case 
53 of the PL Claims Survey at Appendix 4), as she might equally have done using a 
hot water bottle, or a person who catches their shin on the door of a car (case 73), as 
he might on the edge of a coffee table. This may be unsurprising but more importantly 
there was no consideration of how a strict liability regime might impact on cases other 
than mass disasters. Similarly there was no assessment of the statistical frequency of 
disasters that would require strict liability to provide a remedy. This is fundamentally 
important in considering a change of law for distributive purposes. Only then could 
alternatives be considered.  
 
7.7 Products as a special class 
   
7.7.1 Pharmaceutical products are unrepresentative 
 
The types of product fomenting the PL debate were high technology items which do 
not represent the majority of products. Pharmaceutical products are unique in that they 
interact by design with the body. Different patients react in different ways and require 
different doses. Many are administered by highly trained specialists. Some are used 
even at an experimental stage. Others cause harm that would not be tolerated but for 
the desperate circumstances of their users. ‘Pharmaceutical products are to a certain 
and limited extent “unavoidably unsafe” in that they cause adverse drug reactions.’656 
 
To the PL lawyer, pharmaceutical products stand out from other products for a number 
of reasons: 
 
(1) Healthcare in the UK is predominantly public. This means that patients do not 
typically have contractual rights against the doctor prescribing drugs for them (as they 
                                                          
655 Mr John Smith MP (n. 654) [1117] 
656 Johannes Klose, ‘A Snapshot of the Pharmaceutical Industry and Future Trends’, 
< http://www.imc-seminars.com/uploads/papers/Johannes_Klose.pdf > accessed 29 September 2012  
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usually do in the US). Therefore there is a particular need either to provide a vertical 
right of action against the manufacturer or a means of circumventing horizontal privity 
by introducing a quasi-contractual basis of liability on prescribers. This was the most 
significant complaint referred to in the Parliamentary debate: 
 
For years, consumers in this country have had the benefit of strict liability 
against the supplier under the Sale of Goods Act, recently strengthened 
by the Unfair Contract Terms Act, under which there is no state of the art 
defence. This right, however, does not extend to third parties—those who 
are injured by goods but who did not purchase them in the first place.657 
 
(2) The typical injured party is the patient. This is the person for whom the product was 
intended but through a quirk of the UK system they have no contractual relationship 
with the prescriber. It is less likely that a bystander would suffer injury as they might 
with, for example, a vehicle. However, pharmaceuticals can give rise to the unique 
subset of birth defect sufferers, who are bystanders, as in the Thalidomide case. 
 
(3) Causation is possibly the most complicated and difficult to prove in pharmaceutical 
cases not least because the link may be a matter of epidemiological evidence. 
 
The Law Commission in its 1977 review of the law of ‘Liability for Defective Products’658 
acknowledged that highly technical products such as pharmaceuticals and aircraft 
needed special consideration as the cost of insuring against the consequences of a 
catastrophe might be prohibitive.659 It anticipated that special schemes might have to 
deal with such anomalous losses and there might even have to be an exclusion from 
strict liability. Such products included:  
 
...pharmaceuticals, natural products (including human blood), nuclear 
materials and so on, due to a defect in the product for which the producer 
might be held strictly liable, while large multiple claims could arise from 
aircraft, shipping, oil-rig, road and rail accidents caused by a defect in a 
finished product or in one of its components.660 
 
                                                          
657 Mrs Sally Oppenheim, Minister for Consumer Affairs (n. 117) [1109] 
658 Law Commission Working Paper No 64 (n. 23) p. 60 
659 The correctness of this proposition is seriously doubted. The insurance market has coped with ‘9/11’ 
a loss of close to $40bn according to a report of the Insurance Information Institute ‘Terrorism Risk: A 
Reemergent Threat, Impacts for Property/Casualty Insurers April 2010: 
 < http://insurancemarketreport.com/Portals/131/TerrorismThreat_042010.pdf > (accessed 30 January 
2014) and many other disasters of enormous proportions. 
660 Law Commission Working Paper No 64 (n. 23) p. 60 
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The Pearson Commission661 took the contrary view when considering prescription 
medicines. It acknowledged that proof of causation would be a real issue for claimants 
and that responsibility for safety of drugs rests not only on manufacturers but also on 
the Committee on Safety of Medicines662 and on prescribing doctors. Nevertheless ‘no 
special treatment could be justified’.663 
 
The demand for fuller and surer compensation for injuries caused by drugs 
is now an international phenomenon.664 
 
The position taken in the House of Lords when debating the development risks 
defence was similarly limited to the application of strict liability to pharmaceuticals: 
 
Lord Lucas of Chilworth: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Allen of 
Abbeydale, is quite correct in reminding the House that the Germans do, 
in fact, treat drugs separately. While I recognise that they may be seen as 
perhaps different to other manufactured products, I believe that the system 
of strict liability which is in the current proposals more than adequately 
deals with this type of product.665 
 
In Germany where the Contergan/Thalidomide tragedy began, a specific PL law for 
pharmaceuticals, das Arzneimittelgesetz (Medicinal Products Act), was introduced in 
1978.666 This treats pharmaceuticals differently from other products. In fact liability is 
even stricter. In its current form the Medicinal Products Act provides for absolute 
liability.667 
                                                          
661  Pearson Commission (n. 191) pp. 1272-1275 
662 Since 30 October 2005: the Commission on Human Medicines 
663 Pearson Commission (n. 191) p. 273 [1275] 
664 Pearson Commission (n. 191) p. 273 [1275] 
665 Lord Lucas of Chilworth, HL Deb 04 July 1985 vol 465 cc1303-5, 
<  http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1985/jul/04/ec-consumer-affairs > [1304] accessed 17 
June 2015 
666 Richard Best, ‘A Comparison of Civil Liability for Defective Products in the United Kingdom and 
Germany’, 3 German Law Journal (2002), available at 
<  http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=144 > accessed 17 June 2015 
667 Arzneimittelgesetz s 84 Absolute liability 
(1) If, as a result of the administration of a medicinal product intended for human use, which was 
distributed to the consumer within the purview of the present Act and which is subject to 
compulsory marketing authorisation or is exempted by ordinance from the need for a marketing 
authorisation, a person is killed, or the body or the health of a person is substantially damaged, 
the pharmaceutical entrepreneur who placed the medicinal product on the market within the 
purview of the present Act shall be obliged to compensate the injured party for the damage 
caused. The liability to compensate shall only exist if: 
1.  when used in accordance with its intended purpose, the medicinal product has harmful effects 
which exceed the limits considered tolerable in the light of current medical knowledge, or  
2.  the damage has occurred as a result of labelling, expert information or instructions for use which do 
not comply with current medical knowledge. 
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Some tragedies transcend blame or doctrinal attribution of strict liability. The 
Thalidomide tragedy was probably the best known and most public pharmaceutical 
disaster. There are many victims: those who suffered directly from disability; their 
families; their carers. Few would deny that they need some form of compensation to 
assist in normalising their lives by meeting extraordinary needs in so far as that is at 
all possible. To rely on the finances of the manufacturer of the product could leave 
these genuine victims in a precarious position. It might not have sufficient funds. It 
might have no insurance or there might be a breach of the terms of its insurance or an 
operative exclusion preventing it from claiming an indemnity.668  In case 72 in the PL 
Claims Survey at Appendix 4, two claimants were struck by defective rocket fireworks. 
They obtained an uncontested judgment against the defendant importer of the 
fireworks but it was unenforceable as the defendant carried a substantial insurance 
deductible and was in insolvent Liquidation.  
 
There is an argument that a tragedy on the scale of Thalidomide is such a special case 
that the cost should be borne by the broader shoulders of society as a whole in order 
to avoid the financial risk, in the same way that the Government might bear the cost 
of natural disasters. In case 92 in the PL Claims Survey at Appendix 4, a claimant was 
rendered paraplegic in a motorcycle accident but failed to prove that his accident was 
caused by a defect rather than a handling error. This claimant was left with no remedy. 
He had to discontinue his claim in the face of insuperable difficulties with expert 
evidence and his ATE insurer paid the defendant’s considerable costs of an advanced 
case. The claimant had been through two years of unsuccessful litigation. In the post 
Jackson era, the only material difference would be that the claimant would not have to 
pay the defendant’s costs. This might encourage him to take his chance in court with 
the expert evidence, if his lawyers were prepared to risk their time on a conditional fee 
basis. The outcome is likely to be the same other than that the defendant would not 
recover its costs. The claimant would still fail to recover and would face years of 
                                                          
Translation provided by the Language Service of the Federal Ministry of Health (Bundesministerium der 
Justiz) < http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_amg/englisch_amg.html#p1702 > accessed 17 
June 2015 
668 See for example John Wyeth & Brother Ltd v Cigna Insurance Co of Europe SA-NV & Ors. [2001] 
CLC 970, a dispute over whether J Wyeth’s costs of some £17.34 million incurred in successfully 
defending the Benzodiazepine litigation were recoverable from insurers. In this case they were. 
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unsuccessful litigation with his hopes being raised and then crushed. What remains 
clear is that this claimant was genuinely a victim of an accident and he recovered 
nothing. 
 
A regime designed for highly technical products such as pharmaceuticals and aircraft 
components might not be appropriate for other more mundane products whether or 
not mass produced. What is more concerning is that whilst theory is based on the 
pharmaceutical industry or blood products, approximately 75% of injury cases 
registered with the Compensation Recovery Unit in 2013-2014 involved motor 
claims.669 Whilst the percentage attributable to alleged PL rather than collisions or 
other driving related accidents is unknown, common sense suggests that the car is 
probably a product responsible for a significant percentage of PL claims. 
 
7.7.2 Products are not homogeneous 
 
Even if the above arguments justify strict liability for pharmaceutical products, it 
ignores the contrary question as to whether less sophisticated products require strict 
liability. Nothing obviously singles out products as warranting a distinct legal 
classification justifying a sui generis form of liability. The term ‘product liability’ is a 
comparatively recent invention. It does not appear at all in the leading PL negligence 
case of Donoghue v Stevenson.670 As recently as 1980 it was stated 
 
Although the term "product liability" is by now well understood, it is still the 
fact that it is not the subject of special legislation in any Western European 
country.671 
 
Yet in the neologism ‘product liability’ there is an implicit premise that product cases 
are substantially homogeneous. In fact, product cases differ more among themselves 
than they differ from other personal injury cases.672 Differences between ‘products’ 
include their complexity of design, complexity of function, level of skill to operate, 
combination with other products, interaction with people, complexity of manufacturing 
process, perceptibility of potential defect, and most importantly social utility (whether 
                                                          
669 Compensation Recovery Unit data (n. 518) 
670 Donoghue v Stevenson (n. 487) 
671 J. A. Jolowicz, ‘Product Liability. The E.E.C. and the House of Lords’ The Cambridge Law Journal, 
Vol. 39, No. 2 (Nov., 1980), 263-269.  
672 William Powers, Jr  ‘A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products Liability’ (n. 615) 
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a product is socially acceptable – or ‘sozialadäquat’). Burton J held in A v National 
Blood Authority673 that if the public had sufficient knowledge of a risk and it was socially 
accepted, then it may not constitute a defect as it would be sozialadäquat. The infected 
blood failed this test. However, it is a commonly applied test. Examples would include 
at one end of the spectrum ‘chemotherapy drugs which are known to cause harmful 
side effects but whose curative benefits render the drugs socially accepted’,674 and 
airbags which might cause friction burns or hearing problems in their normal life-saving 
operation. At the other end of the spectrum, products such as cigarettes have been 
held to be sozialadäquat notwithstanding their recognised potential to cause harm to 
health (see page 88 above). There is no justification for imposing the same liability 
regime to different products exhibiting such varied characteristics.  
` 
It is not merely the concept of the product that is difficult to circumscribe. Howells 
points out that PL itself overlaps with other areas of law, such as sale of Goods Law, 
which vary from state to state and may not specifically be subject to European 
harmonisation, so that trying to create a uniform European regime is impracticable.675 
Reimann takes the view that the PL Directive has been ineffectual in practice as it fails 
to engage properly with ‘existing regimes, and of the overall environment in which they 
will be employed, i.e., of the incentives, mechanisms, and chances to enforce’.676 
 
 
7.7.3 There is nothing special about products 
 
Stapleton notes: 
 
it is worth remembering how accidental it was that injuries caused by 
products supplied in the course of business should have been separated 
out for separate doctrinal treatment. Looked at afresh, there does not 
seem to be any particular moral, economic, or social reason why the 
victims of such injuries should have been accorded any more special 
treatment than, say the victims, of medical misadventures or 
                                                          
673 A v National Blood Authority (n. 204) 
674 Christopher Johnston QC, ‘A personal (and selective) introduction to PL law’ 2012 J.P.I. Law 1 pp. 
8/9 
675 Geraint Howells, ‘PL – A History of Harmonisation’ Chapter 35 Electronic copy available at: <  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1537180 > accessed 17 June 2015 
676 Mathias Reimann, ‘Product Liability in a Global Context: the Hollow Victory of the European Model’ 
(n. 559) pp. 153/154 
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environmental pollution— both areas in which plaintiffs find it difficult to 
establish liability under traditional causes of action.677 
 
Powers argues that most of the general arguments favouring strict liability fail to 
explain why product cases are special.678 Product cases are not significantly different 
from other types of personal injury cases.679 Rationales used to support strict liability 
for defective products do not distinguish PL from any other kind of liability. Powers 
identifies the following reasons typically cited for imposing strict PL:  
 
(1) it promotes product safety by requiring manufacturers to bear accident 
costs. 
(2) it helps internalize accident costs into the, price of products, thereby 
spreading a victim's loss among an entire group of consumers. 
(3) defective products frustrate consumer expectations.  
(4) it places the burden of injuries on manufacturers who are in a better 
position to prevent injury. 
(5) plaintiffs face an unduly difficult burden of proving specific acts of 
negligence in product cases. 
 
Case Study 2 provides a useful example to test Powers’ proposition as it involves a 
potential product defect, allegedly defective installation and potential pilot negligence: 
 
(1) Promotion of safety.  
 
Notwithstanding the doubts expressed in Chapter 3 as to the ability of strict liability to 
promote safety or its need in the face of heavy regulation, the argument is that strict 
liability forces the manufacturer to spend money on safety. If that is correct then by the 
same argument an aero-engineer who installs a modified part ought to spend more on 
training and testing if he faces strict liability. Similarly the pilot would spend more 
money on training. In fact all three are heavily regulated. They all have to be highly 
trained, tested and audited on a regular basis.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
677 Jane Stapleton, ‘Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, an Anglo-Australian Perspective’ 
(n. 572) p. 366 
678 William Powers, Jr  ‘A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products Liability’ (n. 615) p. 640 
679 William Powers, Jr  ‘A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products Liability’ (n. 615) p. 639 
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(2) Internalisation leads to spreading the loss across a group of consumers. 
 
Again disregarding whether such spreading is efficient and beneficial, internalising risk 
to the installer or pilot would spread risk (both through prices paid680 and insurance). 
 
(3) Frustration of consumer expectations.  
 
The passenger’s expectations are frustrated not only in relation to the possible failure 
of the product but equally the failure of the pilot or installation engineer. 
 
(4) Transferring burden of injuries to the producer who is better placed to prevent injury 
 
If it is accepted that the producer is better placed than the injured person to prevent 
injury, then the same applies to the pilot and the installation engineer. 
 
(5) Unduly difficult burden of proving specific acts of negligence in product cases. 
 
In an English court it would be as difficult to prove negligence against the pilot or 
installer as the manufacturer. If proof of negligence were required against the 
manufacturer, the claimant would need evidence as to the propensity of the buckle to 
fall into the gap - straightforward factual evidence obtained by photographing an 
identical aircraft; the failure to test or inadequate testing - disclosure of design 
documents would be sought and those documents submitted to an expert aviation 
engineer. Disclosure would also need to be obtained as to any warnings and 
instructions provided both in relation to installation and use. 
 
Next, considering the position of the installer, similar evidence would need to be 
obtained as to the likelihood of the buckle fouling the controls. Disclosure would also 
be needed as to the fitting instructions and evidence from an expert aviation engineer 
as to what testing and investigation would be carried out by a competent engineer. 
 
As for the pilot, a flying expert with experience of this aircraft type and understanding 
of the particular handling characteristics would be required to consider the effect of the 
control jam on the controllability of the aircraft, the pre-flight preparations required to 
                                                          
680 In fact the pilot was not acting as a professional in this instance although he was a qualified 
commercial pilot. 
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be taken by the pilot, and the extent to which the pilot could be expected to foresee a 
control problem. 
 
In practice the burden of proof in negligence is equally onerous against all three 
potential defendants. The onus is not great, however. Disclosure is a routine 
procedural step. There are aviation engineering and flying experts available. Cases 
involving specialised areas such as aviation and pharmaceuticals or clinical 
negligence would tend to be run by lawyers with specialised skill and experience in 
these areas, just as the defendants will be represented by specialists in the field. Both 
sides will have ready access to experts. The same would apply to other technical 
fields. 
 
Proof of negligence in the design of a product might typically be the most difficult area. 
However, this is no different from any complex professional indemnity case. By 
comparison, in L v B the Practice acted in the defence of a naval architect who 
provided plans for the self-build of a trawler. The plans were executed carefully and 
the workmanship was excellent except in one respect. The design was for a stern 
trawler but the builder decided to modify it to a beam trawler. A trawler with nets slung 
over each side is inherently less stable than one trailing its nets. It capsized on its 
maiden voyage drowning a crew member. Expert evidence in the case was highly 
complicated (and disputed) as to stability calculations, test procedures, sea trials, and 
what advice should have accompanied the plans. Certainly this was no less 
complicated than a PL claim. By contrast one of the earliest cases dealt with by the 
author involved an air crash caused by a baggage door of an aircraft coming adrift in 
flight and breaking off the vertical stabiliser (the tail). On reviewing potential discovery 
it was found that there had been over 40 known incidents of the door on this aircraft 
type coming unlatched, some leading to loss of the door. The case was settled. 
  
7.7.4 Fallacy that modern products are more defect prone than hand made products 
 
According to the Explanatory Memorandum to the Draft Directive, modern products 
were considered to be ‘technically complicated and specialised’ and ‘therefore involve 
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the risk of defects more than the simple hand-made products of past eras’.681  It is not 
explained why technical products are more prone to defects than hand made products. 
At the high technology end of the spectrum it would be reasonable to think that it is 
not only the production methods that have improved but also the quality control. 
Indeed quality control is audited in any high technology manufacturing process and 
manufacturers in many fields require accreditation, such as ISO 9000.682 
 
There is no obvious reason to assume that a mass produced item of furniture is more 
likely to be defective than for example a hand-made item of furniture. In Piper v JRI,683 
a claim arising out of the failure of an implanted hip replacement, the Court of Appeal 
supported the trial judge’s finding that no defect existed when the product was supplied 
by the manufacturer. The trial judge had held: 
 
I have absolutely no doubt that this product was subject to vigorous and 
meticulous process of work and inspection of the highest quality. I 
appreciate that with human error or even pure negligence nobody can 
pretend that a mistake could not be made, but if a defect of such 
significance had slipped through the net it would have required, in my view, 
mistakes or negligence by a number of individuals. On this evidence I am 
simply not prepared to accept that such a mistake was made with the 
product. An ultimate failure rate of 5 in some 80,000 supports this point.684 
 
The technically complex process may be less vulnerable to criticism than human 
intervention. In two PL cases involving the manufacture of tyres (which involved a 
significant human input) even though the Consumer Protection Act was not applicable 
on the facts, the court readily inferred negligence from the existence of a defect.685 In 
Divya v Toy o Tire686 Mackay J found ‘this is a labour intensive process controlled by 
people’ and was able to conclude ‘what can be said as a matter of probability is that 
                                                          
681 to the Draft EU PL Directive, Explanatory Memorandum (n. 24) p. 153 
682 The International Organization for Standardization claims: The ISO 9000 family addresses various 
aspects of quality management and contains some of ISO’s best known standards. The standards 
provide guidance and tools for companies and organizations who want to ensure that their products 
and services consistently meet customer’s requirements, and that quality is consistently improved. See 
International Organization for Standardization < http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_9000 > accessed 2 January 
2014 
683 Piper v JRI (Manufacturing) Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1344 
684 Piper v JRI (Manufacturing) Limited (n. 683) [22] 
685Carroll & Others v Fearon & Others & Dunlop, High Court QB Sitting at Oxford ref 950001/1 4th/5th 
March 1996, Wilson-Mellor J upheld on this point on appeal in Alan Carroll and Others v Lundy Fearon 
and Others; Astrid Barclay and Another v Dunlop Limited and Another [1999] E.C.C. 73 
686Divya & Others v Toyo Tire and Rubber Co Ltd (t/a Toyo Tires of Japan) [2011] EWHC 1993 (QB), 
MacKay J (unconditional leave to appeal was granted by Court of Appeal and the matter subsequently 
settled before hearing). 
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at some stage of the manufacturing process ... the human side of the process has 
failed to detect such failure or failures’. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, hand-made products have not been completely 
replaced by machine-made products. If the rationale for the regime anticipated by the 
PL Directive is that mass produced goods are more prone to defect, then it would 
make no sense to apply the same regime to goods with a significant human 
manufacturing element. Yet no such distinction was ever anticipated. It might be 
argued that by defining a defect by reference to the safety that persons generally are 
entitled to expect, the Directive provides for a different level of expectation in relation 
to goods with a significant man-made element. In practice however, there have been 
no reported cases where such an argument has been used and it is submitted that it 
would receive short shrift from the courts in the light of the Dunlop and Toyo cases. 
 
Equally, natural products may by their nature be susceptible to failure for reasons that 
might not be detected. The Practice handled an EL claim, C v K, (not falling within the 
PL Claims Survey) in which a scaffolder put his foot through a wooden scaffolding 
board which suddenly split under his weight. As a consequence he suffered such a 
serious injury that his leg had to be amputated. Following Stark v Post Office687 liability 
was accepted on behalf of the employer for breaches of PUWER,688 notwithstanding 
evidence that the boards were checked thoroughly for damage before stowing, to see 
whether they would be re-usable. PUWER imposed strict liability.689 
 
Even if the proposition were correct that highly technical products are more prone to 
defects, it is obvious that the cases which so strongly influenced the proponents of the 
PL Directive were exceptions rather than the norm. Tailoring the law to these products 
ignores the fact that most products are not so complicated.  
 
                                                          
687 Stark v Post Office (n. 65) p. 105 
688 The Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998, breach of which, prior to s 69 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, imposed a strict liability on the employer: Suitability 
of work equipment ‘4.  (1)  Every employer shall ensure that work equipment is so constructed or 
adapted as to be suitable for the purpose for which it is used or provided.’ 
689 The Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998, Regulation 4. (Before s 69 Enterprise 
and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 which has abolished strict civil liability for a breach of the Regulations) 
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Highly technical products such as aircraft and pharmaceuticals are of course tightly 
regulated. The effect of such regulation is that errors are less likely to occur. Aircraft 
parts will be subject to type approval and the designers and manufacturers themselves 
must be certified.690 Additionally, if a manufacturer or overhaul facility is in breach of 
regulations, it is considerably easier to demonstrate this. For example in N v D the 
Practice acted in the defence of a case  based in negligence arising from the failure of 
an aircraft tyre on take-off in South Africa. The tyre had been retreaded (as is normal 
practice in the aviation industry). The carcase was certified for a number of ‘retread 
lives’. After the accident it was possible to trace the paperwork that accompanied the 
tyre as it arrived at the retreading plant and followed it through the factory until 
shipment to the airline. The records included shearographic records of the tyre at the 
stage at which it was assessed for damage or excessive wear that might take it outside 
the parameters certified for ‘retreadability’. The raw materials were audited; the 
process was certified; each stage was signed off by the individual identifying stamp of 
a specially trained engineer. That is not to say that accidents cannot happen but it 
certainly makes proof more straightforward if a process has accidentally been left out. 
Ultimately, in that particular case, the documentary record provided sufficient proof to 
a court that there was no negligence in the process and the most likely cause of the 
accident was impact with a metal object on the runway. 
 
Similarly the homologation process provided a clear basis to prove in Case Study 1, 
Martin v Kudo, that the braking system was not defective. It is a defence under Article 
7(d) of the PL Directive ‘that the defect is due to compliance of the product with 
mandatory regulations …’ (author’s emphasis). Whilst, this falls short of a defence of 
compliance with regulations, it would have more easily enabled proof of defect if the 
braking system had not complied with the regulatory requirements. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
690 European Aviation Safety Agency EASA Part 21J Design Organisations; part 21G Production 
Organisations 
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7.8 Strict Liability was introduced to overcome proof of fault 
 
Strict liability was presumed to be the sole means of solving the problem of fair 
apportionment of the risks inherent in modern technological production.691 The 
Explanatory Memorandum of the Strasbourg Convention explains 
 
…the majority of the Committee' agreed that the notion of “fault" - whether 
the burden of proof lay with the person suffering damage or with the 
producer - no longer constituted a satisfactory basis for the system of 
products’ liability in an era of mass-production, where technical 
developments, advertising and sales methods had created special risks, 
which the consumer could not be expected to accept.692 
 
7.8.1 Fallacy that fault is always difficult to prove  
 
The recitals to the PL Directive explain that ‘liability without fault … is the sole means 
of solving the problem peculiar to our age of increasing technicality, of a fair 
apportionment of the risks inherent in modern technological production.’693   
 
This led to the conclusion that 
 
If it is impossible for [the producer] to avoid a manufacturing defect despite 
careful checks, it does not seem unfair that he should also bear the burden 
of the consequences of unavoidable defects in order to protect the 
consumer.694  
 
The Law Commission noted a concern that proving fault against a manufacturer could 
be problematic.  
 
This burden of proof can be particularly difficult to discharge in products 
liability cases where the injured person is extraneous to the process of 
production and may have difficulty in establishing by technical and other 
evidence that there was a design defect or negligence on the part of an 
employee.695 
 
Greville Janner MP interjected in the Parliamentary debate on the Draft Directive: 
 
… the trouble with suing in tort or in negligence is that one has to prove 
fault. That is almost impossible for the ordinary person who cannot 
                                                          
691 PL Directive 1985 Recital 3 
692 Strasbourg Draft Convention Article 3.  (n. 23) p.  136 
693 PL Directive 1985 Recital 3 
694 Draft European Directive Explanatory Memorandum (n. 24) p. 157 
695 Law Commission Working Paper No 64 (n. 23) p. 31 
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command either legal aid or a vast amount of money and who, therefore, 
cannot get justice without strict liability.696 
 
The context is that of Thalidomide and mass disasters. As John Smith MP had put it, 
focusing on Thalidomide: 
 
If it were open for people to take an action on the basis of tort, that would 
be fine, but in this area we are talking of cases in which it is difficult for 
people to establish a liability based upon fault.697 
 
7.8.2 Difficulty of proof of fault is overstated  
 
The simple proposition is that to equalise competition, the burden of proof the claimant 
faces must be equal in all Member States.698 Since fault based liability requires more 
complex proof, the lowest common denominator across the Member States is 
achieved by imposing strict liability. Therefore it is necessary to examine the premises 
that proof is difficult and that it is made easier by strict liability. 
 
It is as much a generalisation to say that difficulty of proof is overstated as it is to say 
that proof of negligence is almost impossible. There will be difficult cases and easy 
cases. There will also be the cause célèbre that demands media attention with less 
rigorous attention to the precise legal reasons for its success or failure. Lannetti lists 
‘oft cited’ judicial explanations for strict PL, including that the burden of proof is ‘almost 
insurmountable’:699 
 
… (6) That because of the complexity of present day manufacturing 
processes and their secretiveness, the ability to prove negligent conduct 
by the injured plaintiff is almost impossible. (7) That the consumer does 
not have the ability to investigate for himself the soundness of the product 
…700 
 
                                                          
696 Greville Janner MP, HC Deb 04 November 1980 vol 991 cc1106-200 
<http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1980/nov/04/european-community-product-liability> 
[1116] accessed 17 June 2015 
697 Mr John Smith MP (n. 654) [1118] 
698 Law Commission 82 (n. 252) p. 81 
699 David W. Lannetti, ‘Toward a Revised Definition of "Product" Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability’ The Business Lawyer, Vol. 55, No. 2 (February 2000), 799-844  
700 David W. Lannetti, ‘Toward a Revised Definition of "Product" Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability’ (n. 699) citing Arizona appellate court in Lechuga, Inc. v. Montgomery, 467 P.2d 256, 
261-62 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970) (Jacobson, J., concurring) 
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A claimant would have to show negligence in manufacture, information or design. The 
first two are less likely to be a problem. It is not ‘almost impossible’ to prove negligence 
in manufacturing cases. Negligence is often presumed in manufacturing cases 
regardless of strict liability.701 The Law Commission acknowledged: 
 
Certainly there are few reported cases since Daniels v. White, which was 
decided in 1938, in which an injured person has proved the existence of a 
manufacturing defect but has failed to prove a lack of reasonable care on 
the part of the manufacturer.702 
 
In a recent case handled by the Practice R v M, not yet in the archives forming the 
basis of the PL Claims Survey, a vehicle was delivered to a dealer on a transporter 
truck. When the truck driver removed the stays, it slipped its handbrake and rolled off 
the transporter knocking the driver off the side of the top deck and causing serious 
injury. The brake was inspected and it was found that the handbrake cable had not 
been seated correctly in its detent. The brake had operated normally at first until the 
cable worked its way out of the detent and released the brake. Any competent 
engineer inspecting the brake after the accident would have identified the defect. As 
the cable had not been seated properly there would have been no defence to a claim 
in negligence. Plainly the factory operative fell below the standard of care expected. 
In that case liability was promptly admitted. In a more complex technical product such 
as pharmaceuticals and medical or aerospace products, proof of negligent production 
would be assisted by regulatory requirements to retain production and batch records 
and samples.  
 
The appropriateness of warnings, or whether warnings should have been given, may 
be straightforward matters for a judge to determine. In Walton v British Leyland,703 
after numerous wheel bearing failures, British Leyland introduced a modification to 
prevent the risk of a wheel coming off the axle which is precisely what happened to 
the Waltons, with catastrophic consequences for Mrs Walton who was left 
quadriplegic. Instructions to dealers on when to fit a safety washer were unclear. Willis 
                                                          
701 See Carroll & Others v Fearon & Others & Dunlop, (n. 685), Wilson-Mellor J upheld on this point on 
appeal in Alan Carroll and Others v Lundy Fearon and Others; Astrid Barclay and Another v Dunlop 
Limited and Another [1999] E.C.C. 73 and Divya & Others v Toyo Tire and Rubber Co Ltd (n. 686), 
MacKay J (unconditional leave to appeal granted by Court of Appeal and matter subsequently settled 
before hearing). 
702 Law Commission Working Paper No 64 (n. 23) p. 35 
703 Walton v British Leyland (n. 194) p. 131 
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J held that it would have been ‘simplicity itself’ for the manufacturer of a car to warn 
dealers to replace the wheel bearings on both hubs and that they should have recalled 
the affected cars.704 
 
McTear v Imperial Tobacco705 was a cause célèbre. It was the first and only major UK 
case against the cigarette industry in the UK to reach trial. This was a claim by the 
widow of Alfred McTear, who died aged 48 in 1993 from lung cancer. It was claimed 
that the deceased started smoking in 1964 and was at that time unaware that smoking 
could cause fatal diseases. Health warnings started appearing on packets of cigarettes 
in 1971, by which time he was ‘addicted’ and could not stop smoking.  
 
It is a Scottish case but the principles are identical for present purposes to English law. 
The supply pre-dated the Consumer Protection Act 1987 and so, although this is a 
relatively recent case, it deals with proof of negligence. Mrs McTear lost on all counts. 
She failed to prove either negligence or causation. Montague writes that  
 
… the Scottish Court of Session held that Imperial Tobacco (IT) was not 
legally responsible for the death of Mr McTear at the age of 48 from lung 
cancer, despite Mr McTear having smoked up to 60 cigarettes a day since 
the age of 17 in 1964, two years after the Royal College of Physicians 
gave its first warning to the government about the link between tobacco 
and lung cancer… Perhaps the most surprising (and from the anti-tobacco 
lobby's viewpoint, probably the most damaging) part of the judgment was 
that IT was absolved of its duty of care to customers because his Lordship 
found that even as early as 1964, consumers were aware of the risks 
associated with smoking, even though this was seven years before 
warnings began to appear on packets.706 
 
Proof of fault in complex cases will be complicated but it is easy to fall into the trap of 
assuming such causes célèbres were lost because of some technical difficulty in the 
proof of negligence.  
 
The totally uneven playing field this produced when the case came to trial 
was perhaps at the heart of why the learned judge, Lord Nimmo Smith, 
came to such a poor decision. He found against Mrs McTear on almost 
every point before him.707  
                                                          
704 Walton v British Leyland (n. 194) p. 136 
705 McTear v Imperial Tobacco Ltd (n. 244) 
706 Janice Elliott Montague, ‘Cigarette, but?...The failure of tobacco litigation in the United Kingdom’ (n. 
435) 
707 Martyn Day,  ‘Tobacco litigation’ 2006 Journal of Personal Injury Law  1, 3 
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Martyn Day notes  
 
In 1999, at the end of the group action here in London, I was forced, along 
with John Pickering and other colleagues at Irwin Mitchell and Leigh Day 
and Co to agree not to take on further claims against the tobacco 
companies. This came about because the premium offered by insurers to 
protect the 50 claimants against the defendants' costs orders was some 
£4 million. They, unsurprisingly, did not have that sort of money--so the 
claimants went into the case without any cover. When the case was lost 
and the tobacco companies obtained the normal costs order, the only way 
of ensuring that the claimants were not bankrupted, was for our two firms, 
as the lawyers representing the claimants, to give undertakings not to act 
in such cases for a number of years.708 
 
This might have a tendency to colour his view of the case. One must not neglect the 
simple fact that there may have been no fault. Mr McTear’s evidence had been taken 
on Commission shortly before he died, several years before trial. The judge assessed 
from evidence as to his credibility, that the deceased was a ‘profoundly dishonest man 
who readily lied in order to obtain advantage for himself’.709 He knew the risks and 
made an informed choice. 
 
Mildred acknowledges 
 
Mr McTear, in common with the general public, was held to have been 
aware of the association between cigarette smoking and lung cancer 
before he started to smoke Imperial Tobacco's products in 1971. He was 
accordingly in a position to make an informed choice about whether to 
smoke. 
The conclusion was that there had been no lack of reasonable care by 
Imperial Tobacco Ltd.710 
  
On this basis the negligence claim was bound to fail regardless of causation 
difficulties. If the public is aware of the harm of tobacco or alcohol yet still chooses to 
buy it (and by comparison with, for example, cocaine, it has not been made illegal) 
then no liability will attach to the producer. It passes the consumer expectation test. 
The same considerations would apply under the PL Directive. In A v National Blood 
Authority Burton J noted  
                                                          
708 Martyn Day,  ‘Tobacco litigation’ (n. 707) 4 
709 McTear v Imperial Tobacco Ltd (n. 244) p. 132 [4.222] 
710 Mark Mildred, ‘Case Comment Personal Injury – death – liability’ 2005 Journal of Personal Injury 
Law 141 p. 142 
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The Commission agreed with the Honourable Member that nobody can 
expect from a product a degree of safety from risks which are, because of 
its particular nature, inherent in that product and generally known, e.g., the 
risk of damage to health caused by alcoholic beverages. Such a product 
is not defective within the meaning of ... the ... Directive.711  
 
Social policy should not be governed by the uncertainties and variables inherent in a 
single piece of private law litigation: including competence of the parties’ legal teams, 
experts and of a judge; the finances available to the parties; and access to evidence. 
Whether smoking tobacco or drinking alcohol should be permissible are matters for 
the legislative process. A sustained legislative and regulatory presence is required to 
ensure meaningful policy changes.712 
 
To this extent strict liability under the PL Directive has not added much. However in 
design cases proof certainly relies on accessibility of evidence to the claimant. The 
assumption is that claimants have a difficult burden because there is usually a lack of 
balance regarding access to information. This may be correct but as discussed above 
the position is not necessarily different from professional negligence litigation. Indeed 
it is difficult to justify a dividing line between pharmaceutical PL and clinical negligence. 
 
7.8.3 Causation remains the real issue 
 
The problem of proof in PL cases is not one of negligence but of causation. The 
causation issues are often insurmountable. But even if these issues are put to one 
side, if the definition of defect entails a cost/benefit analysis at the time of circulation 
of the product, involving consideration of warnings and instructions, risk assessment 
and the state of the art, it is likely that establishing liability against the producer of a 
highly technical product such as Thalidomide would be difficult under the regime of the 
PL Directive.713 That is because  
                                                          
711 A v National Blood Authority (n. 204) p. 14 
712 Peter D Jacobson and Kenneth E Warner, ‘Litigation and Public Health Policy Making: The Case of 
Tobacco Control’ Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 24.4 (1999) 769-804 
713 Jane Stapleton, ‘Products Liability Reform Real or Illusory?’ (n. 230) see also Mr John Smith MP  ‘at 
first sight, strict liability would seem to offer a remedy to the Thalidomide children, but that remedy would 
be snatched from them by the application of the state of the art defence.’ 
(n. 654)  [1117] 
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a) causation is often so complex in cases involving bioactive products, that it is difficult 
to discharge the burden of proof: ‘Where the product is a drug or medical device the 
problem is exacerbated since it is trite that all bioactive substances can produce 
undesirable just as desirable effects and that none can produce a unique effect’;714  
and 
b) where products are subject to a sophisticated regulatory regime, there is the 
possibility of relying on the development risks defence715 if a completely unforeseen 
complication arises. 
 
Causation is ultimately a matter of evidence. In McTear v Imperial Tobacco716 Mrs 
McTear, the Pursuer, had to prove that ‘smoking can cause lung cancer’ (not a matter 
of judicial knowledge) and that it caused the deceased’s lung cancer. Lord Nimmo 
Smith’s judgment is 567 pages long and the bibliography of texts referred to stretches 
to over 10 pages.  He concluded: 
 
no scientist with appropriate expertise who studied the relevant literature 
would conclude that it had been established that cigarette smoking could 
cause lung cancer, let alone that it caused Mr McTear’s lung cancer.717  
 
Mildred says Lord Nimmo Smith took a ‘highly literal approach to the standard and 
method of proof.’718 Broadbent argues  
 
When no other evidence is available to a fact finder, it is legitimate to be 
guided by the epidemiological evidence (assuming it is of a sufficiently high 
quality to warrant a causal inference at the general level...)719 
 
His Lordship explained that he had not been sufficiently instructed by the expert 
evidence to form his own judgment on the epidemiological evidence. As Goldberg 
explains, ‘a failure to take the court to the primary literature showing causation and to 
teach it how to do the epidemiology to a sufficient extent is likely to be fatal to the 
                                                          
714 Mildred, ‘Pitfalls in Product Liability’ (n. 211) p. 142  
715 PL Directive Article 7(e) ‘that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when he put 
the product into circulation was not such as to enable the existence of the defect to be discovered’ 
716 McTear v Imperial Tobacco Ltd (n. 244) 
717 McTear v Imperial Tobacco Ltd (n. 244) p. 473 [6.153] 
718 Mark Mildred, ‘Case Comment Personal Injury – death – liability’ (n. 710) p. 143 
719 Alex Broadbent, ‘Epidemiological evidence in proof of specific causation’  2011 Legal Theory 237 
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prospects of success.’720 Montague admits: ‘With hindsight, therefore, maybe McTear 
was not the ideal ‘test case’ which the anti-tobacco lobby required.’721 
 
Causation remains a major issue in complex pharmaceutical litigation. It has been the 
stumbling block in numerous Group Litigation attempts.722 Two cases typify the 
problems: Loveday v Renton723 and XYZ v Schering.724 
 
In Loveday v Renton725 the plaintiff was one of about 200 children who made claims 
that they suffered brain damage following pertussis vaccination. The court heard the 
preliminary issue: ‘Can or could pertussis vaccine used in the United Kingdom and 
administered intramuscularly in normal dosage cause permanent brain damage or 
death in young children?’ Lord Justice Stuart-Smith found that it could not be shown 
on a balance of probabilities that pertussis vaccine could cause permanent brain 
damage in young children. 
  
The plaintiff’s counsel argued that what he had to prove was what the preponderance 
or confluence of medical opinion was, but not whether that medical opinion was right 
or wrong. The judge held that this confused negligence with causation. The question 
of whether a doctor acted in accordance with a respectable body of medical opinion 
was relevant to determining whether he was negligent (the Bolam test).726 The factual 
issue of causation had to be determined by weighing all the medical evidence. 
Opinions of experts not called to give evidence were only admissible if adopted by an 
expert in the case as supporting or reinforcing his own opinion. In this case the 
evidence merely raised a hypothesis whether pertussis vaccine could cause brain 
damage where the onset of serious neurological illness occurred within 72 hours (or 
more commonly 24 hours) of vaccination.  
                                                          
720 Richard Goldberg, ‘Causation, idiopathic conditions and the limits of epidemiology’ Edin. L.R. 2009, 
13(2), 282-286 
721 Janice Elliott Montague, ‘Cigarette, but?...The failure of tobacco litigation in the United Kingdom’ (n. 
435) p. 26 
722 See Mildred, ‘Pitfalls in Product Liability’ (n. 211) p.142  for a summary of failures and rare successes.  
723 Loveday v Renton and Wellcome Foundation Ltd (n. 429) 
724 XYZ & Others v Schering Health Care Limited, Organon Laboratories Limited, John Wyeth & Brother 
Limited [2002] EWHC 1420(QB); 70 BMLR 88 
725 Loveday v Renton and Wellcome Foundation Ltd (n. 429) 
726 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 2 All ER 118 p. 121 per McNair J ‘I myself 
would prefer to put it this way, that he is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with a 
practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular art’ 
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Whilst the requirement to prove fault was replaced under the PL Directive with the 
requirement to prove defect, the need for proof of causation has not changed.  
 
In XYZ v Schering727 claims were brought under the Consumer Protection Act/PL 
Directive by 7 lead claimants against Combined Oral Contraceptive pill manufacturers. 
The issues included whether the subject pill carries an increased risk of venous-
thromboembolism of twice that of the previous generation of pill; if so was the product 
defective taking into account warnings and instructions, and does the development 
risks defence apply?  
 
The case turned entirely on the expert evidence which included three transnational 
studies. The third of these was commissioned by one of the defendants Organon. It 
comprised data from 502 cases and 1864 controls with full or lifetime exposure to the 
third generation combined oral contraceptive for over 90% of the subjects – ‘based on 
the pill calendars whose form and content were specified at the outset’. The quality of 
the data was particularly good as subjects were identified as taking this pill exclusively 
from the beginning of contraception. The study found no association between third 
generation combined oral contraceptives and any increased risk of venous 
thromboembolism compared with predecessor pills – ‘if anything the reverse’.728  
 
The judge perceived his role not as ‘super-scientist’ but to evaluate the witnesses and 
decide what evidence is sound and reliable, following Stuart Smith J in Loveday v 
Renton,729 examining the reasons for the expert opinion and the extent they are 
supported by the evidence; weight and internal consistency of logic; care with which 
the expert has considered the subject; precision and accuracy of thought; handling of 
cross-examination and concessions in the light of further evidence and demeanour. It 
is apparent that the judge had been taken through the evidence of the various studies 
and the epidemiological techniques in great detail. In Lord Nimmo Smith’s terms, in 
McTear730 he had been ‘taught how to do epidemiology to a sufficient extent’. 
                                                          
727  XYZ & Others v Schering (n. 724) 
728 XYZ & Others v Schering (n. 724) MacKay J  [123] 
729 Loveday v. Renton and another (n. 429) p. 125 
730 McTear v Imperial Tobacco Ltd (n. 244) [6.155] 
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MacKay J found that as a matter of probability there is no relative risk of venous 
thromboembolism attaching to the third generation combined oral contraceptive as 
against the second generation. 
 
Whilst these complicated cases are of jurisprudential interest they do not necessarily 
reflect a problem with PL law. Dissatisfaction experienced by particular claimants in 
failed PL litigation in relation to tobacco, or contraceptive pills or vaccines does not 
mean that there is something wrong with the law. The law may have come to the right 
decision in those cases.  In the PL Claims Survey at Appendix 4 causation was in 
issue in 95 cases (72%). The intention of the PL Directive was, at its simplest, to 
provide remedies to consumers where they were injured by a defective product. If a 
court holds in a given case that a product was not defective or that there was no causal 
link, is this a problem? If the purpose of the PL Directive was to provide an automatic 
right to recovery in a Thalidomide situation then it would be naïve to assume that 
imposition of strict liability would achieve this. It would still be necessary that the drug 
in question caused the birth defect in question. Causation is at the essence of any 
liability based system of compensation. If causation is taken out of the equation the 
logical conclusion is to turn to no-fault compensation, in which case there is no basis 
upon which to find a particular manufacturer responsible for the claimant’s injury.  
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PART III: NO-FAULT 
 
7.9 No-fault would be a fairer system of distribution 
 
Calabresi’s internalisation of risk justification for strict liability was that the costs of 
injury should be borne by the activity that created the risks.731 This connects cost with 
risky activity. It has been observed732 that this is a strikingly similar approach to the 
justification for no-fault schemes cited in the Woodhouse Report733 which led to the 
pioneering New Zealand no-fault scheme – the socialisation of risk. The point being 
made by Woodhouse was, put simply, that communities encourage activities that 
create risk of injury and so the community should carry the risk and bear the cost of 
injury.  
 
The later refinement of economic theory based on enterprise liability similarly relies on 
arguments that tend to justify absolute liability.734 If making manufacturers strictly liable 
encourages them to embark on safety programmes thus reducing risk, then imposing 
State funded absolute liability would, a fortiori, encourage even better funded, State 
initiated, safety schemes. 
 
Thus rather than making Kudo strictly liable to Martin, Martin’s injuries would be 
compensated by the State. Whilst Kudo might be encouraged to improve safety, State 
sponsored initiatives are likely to have more chance of success because the State is 
not trammelled by commercial considerations such as competition on prices. 
 
Strict liability, like no-fault liability, fails to discriminate between the type of product or 
types of victim. A Thalidomide victim is treated same as Mr Martin, in the sense that 
drugs and cars are both products and so trigger the PL Directive. Manufacturers will 
be strictly liable for defects whether the products generally benefit society, 
                                                          
731 Guido Calabresi, ‘Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts’, 70 Yale LJ. 499, 533 
(1961)  
732 Stephen R Perry, ‘The Moral Foundations of Tort Law’ 77 Iowa L. Rev. 449 (1991-1992) 471 p. 467 
note 70 
733 Woodhouse Report, Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry December 1967 By Authority: R. E. 
Owen. Government Printer, Wellington. New Zealand—1967 pp. 164/165 [441] 
 <http://www.library.auckland.ac.nz/data/woodhouse/ > accessed 18 April 2014  
734 George L. Priest, ‘The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual 
Foundations of Modern Tort Law’, 14 J. Legal Stud. 461, 462-64 (1985) 
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(pharmaceuticals), or whether ultimately they lead to costs for society with limited 
communal benefits (for example a drink that turns out to have carcinogenic properties). 
The justification for this is that compensation should concentrate on the injured 
person’s needs and PL is simply a mechanism for providing, and allocating the cost. 
In no sense is the Thalidomide victim treated as more deserving. The only difference 
is in the measure of damages. If this is so, the best option is to spread the risk as 
widely as possible to ensure there are funds available and that efforts are not wasted 
trying to identify a suitable defendant: this leads logically to no-fault liability rather than 
strict liability. The question for consideration therefore is whether a no-fault scheme 
would distribute rights of those injured by products more fairly than under the PL 
Directive.  
 
There is some evidence that no-fault is already having to fill the gaps left by the 
inadequacies of tort. In the field of clinical trials of Investigational Medical Products the 
Clinical Trials Directive735 Article 3 sets out provisions for the protection of clinical trial 
subjects and requires that 
 
(f) provision has been made for insurance or indemnity to cover the liability 
of the investigator and sponsor. 
 
This is given force of law in the UK by the Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) 
Regulations 2004.736 But what is the basis of liability to a clinical trial subject? As has 
been explained by Pharmaceutical Industry Guidelines737  
 
                                                          
735 DIRECTIVE 2001/20/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 4 April 
2001 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States 
relating to the implementation of good clinical practice in the conduct of clinical trials on medicinal 
products for human use 
736 The Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004. PART 2 CONDITIONS AND 
PRINCIPLES WHICH APPLY TO ALL CLINICAL TRIALS  
Conditions based on Article 3 of the Directive 
…. 
16. Provision has been made for insurance or indemnity to cover the liability of the investigator and 
sponsor which may arise in relation to the clinical trial.’ 
737 Insurance and compensation in the event of injury in Phase I clinical trials Guidance developed by 
the Association for the British Pharmaceutical Industry, the Bio Industry Association and the Clinical 
Contract Research Association in consultation with the Department of Health and the National Research 
Ethics Service, 
<http://www.abpi.org.uk/our-
work/library/guidelines/Documents/Phase%20I%20Clinical%20Trials%20Insurance%20Guidance.pdf  
> accessed 13 October 2014 
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2.1 Clinical Research takes place on the boundaries of scientific 
knowledge and, therefore, if a healthy volunteer suffers injury as a result 
of participation in the study of a new medicine, the volunteer will not find it 
easy to establish an entitlement to compensation under general principles 
of the law. A claim for damages based upon negligence or (for producers) 
based upon strict liability under the Consumer Protection Act 1987 are the 
likely bases for asserting a right to compensation. 
 
However, injury can arise in research studies without evidence of fault by 
either Sponsor or Investigator. Moreover, a volunteer will find it hard to 
establish strict liability against the producer of the medicine because the 
safety that the volunteer is entitled to expect (the focus in strict liability) will 
ordinarily have been heavily qualified by the informed consent process and 
the producer may also be able to rely upon the development risks defence. 
  
Thus it is acknowledged that the PL Directive is unlikely to protect an injured clinical 
trial subject738 and therefore the compulsory insurance would seem to be redundant.  
Hence the industry has created its own special no-fault scheme to fill the need for 
compensation. 
 
7.9.1 No-fault spreads the risk efficiently 
 
No-fault compensation is ‘fairer’ than strict liability in terms of risk spreading,739 
efficiency,740 ensuring compensation is paid to the widest cross section of deserving 
people compared with the privileged few favoured by tort741 with the flexibility to treat 
different types of accident or disability differently742 without wasting money 
overcompensating minor injuries743 and failing to compensate those who need it.744 
 
Ison lists the criticisms of tort: 
 
… (1) that the fault principle is irrelevant to social needs, (2) that problems 
of evidence and causation frequently make the result of a claim dependent 
on fortuitous circumstances, (3) that the assessment of damages is largely 
                                                          
738 The guidelines oversimplify the law and may well be inaccurate in that the test is not what the subject 
consented to or expected but what ‘persons generally are entitled to expect’. Nevertheless an injured 
subject may face significant difficulty in proving causation. 
739 G Calabresi and J Hirschoff, ‘Toward a Test for Strict Liability In Torts’ (n. 80) p. 1056 
740 P. S. Atiyah, ‘No-Fault Compensation: A Question That Will Not Go Away’ 1980 Ins. L.J. 625 p. 639 
741 John Gardner, ‘What Is Tort Law For? Part 2. The Place of Distributive Justice’  (n. 109) p. 10  
742 P. S. Atiyah, ‘No-Fault Compensation: A Question That Will Not Go Away’ (n. 740) p. 640 
743 Lewis, ‘Insurers and Personal Injury Litigation: Acknowledging the Elephant in the Living Room’ 
[2005] J.P.I.L. ISSUE 1/05 p. 6 
744 Geoffrey Palmer, ‘New Zealand's Accident Compensation Scheme: Twenty Years on’ The University 
of Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 44, No. 3 (Summer, 1994), 223-273 p. 272 
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intuitive, (4) that minor injuries tend to be over-compensated and serious 
injuries under-compensated, (5) that compensation depends less on the 
conduct of the parties than on the availability of liability insurance or a 
prosperous defendant, (6) that the processing of claims involves inordinate 
delay, (7) that the system compensates only a minority of injury victims 
and rarely compensates at all those who are disabled by disease, and (8) 
that only about half of the income of the system is actually devoted to 
compensation, the remainder being absorbed by the costs of 
administration… The aim, it is submitted, should be a system of personal 
injury compensation that is quick, comprehensive, adequate in amount, 
automatic, and with a reasonably low cost of administration. By automatic, 
it is meant that neither the entitlement to compensation nor the 
determination of quantum should depend on a purely intuitive judgment in 
each case. To achieve these goals, a switch is required from liability 
insurance to some type of accident insurance cover.745  
 
To this list there may be added the criticism that deterrence is blunted by the incidence 
of insurance and that insurance costs stifle social activity.746   
 
The requirement to find an identifiable tortfeasor, or the cause of a disability, militate 
against just distribution of resources according to equality of treatment based on 
need.747 
 
Luck and luck alone separates the negligent who cause injury from the 
negligent who do not. It is fairer to neutralize the arbitrary effects of luck 
than to let it wreak havoc with people’s lives.748 
 
The Woodhouse Report, in New Zealand, recommended no fault compensation as a 
fair distribution of risk: 
 
compensation for all injuries, irrespective of fault and regardless of 
cause… level of compensation must be entirely adequate and it must be 
assessed fairly as between groups and as between individuals within 
those groups.749 
 
The intention was to replace individual responsibility with collective ‘national 
responsibility’750 a vision of State paternalism, in which there was no place for 
                                                          
745  Terence G. Ison, ‘Tort Liability and Social Insurance’  The University of Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 
19, No. 4 (Autumn, 1969), 614-622 pp. 614-615 
746 Alan Clayton, ‘Some Reflections on the Woodhouse and ACC Legacy’ (2003) 34 VUWLR 449 – 464 
p. 461 
747 Jane Stapleton, Disease and the Compensation Debate Clarendon press Oxford 1986 ISBN 0-19-
825552-7 p. 115 
748 Gregory C. Keating, ‘Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law of Accidents’ (n. 112) p. 225 
749 Woodhouse Report (n. 733) p. 179 [488]  
750 Woodhouse Report (n. 733) p.180 [489 (5) & 490 (2)] 
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commercial insurers.751 Woodhouse felt that insurers could offer no impetus in the 
areas of accident prevention or rehabilitation,752 the State being in a better position to 
foster these ideals, with the power to regulate.753 
 
Woodhouse concluded that the adversarial system of tort hinders rehabilitation; fault 
is ‘erratic and capricious in operation’; it favours the fortunate few and leaves many 
uncompensated; and it is ‘cumbersome and inefficient’ with administrative costs 
absorbing up to $40 of every $60 paid out.754 
 
Woodhouse set out five goals for the scheme:  
- national responsibility for those who are injured;  
- compensation for all injured persons, irrespective of causation, uniformly 
assessed; 
- rehabilitation in addition to financial compensation;    
- income related whole period benefits; and  
- no delays or administrative wastage.755 
 
The scheme is governed by the Accident Compensation Act 2001 which carries (in 
Rawlsian terms), to a ‘higher order of abstraction the traditional theory of the social 
contract as represented by Locke, Rousseau, and Kant … that is Kantian in nature.’756 
In other words a contract theory underpinned by a moral imperative (rather than a 
purely utilitarian system) regulating the ‘distribution of social and economic 
advantages.’757 
 
The purpose of this Act is to enhance the public good and reinforce the 
social contract represented by the first accident compensation scheme by 
providing for a fair and sustainable scheme for managing personal injury 
that has, as its overriding goals, minimising both the overall incidence of 
injury in the community, and the impact of injury on the community 
(including economic, social, and personal costs).758 
                                                          
751 Woodhouse Report (n. 733) p.180[491 (1)] 
752 Woodhouse Report  (n.733) p. 180 [491 (3)] 
753 Woodhouse Report (n. 733) p.140 [353] 
754 Woodhouse Report (n. 733) p.77 [171]  
755 Woodhouse Report (n. 733) p. 177 [484] 
756 Rawls, A Theory of Justice  Revised Ed, The Belknapp Press of Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts 1999 ISBN 0-674-00077-3 p. xviii 
757 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (n. 756) p. 53 
758 Accident Compensation Act 2001 s 3 see 
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7.9.2 Success of the NZ Scheme 
 
The New Zealand scheme has served as a working trial and has generally been judged 
successful. It optimises the ‘social goal of equal and comprehensive benefit to New 
Zealand residents (and visitors) and the goal of economic efficiency, particularly 
compared to the transaction costs and other fiscal inefficiencies of the tort system…’759 
Its blame neutrality encourages transparency in situations where potential tortfeasors 
would tend to be defensive,760 ‘offering accountability mechanisms focused on 
ensuring safer care rather than assigning individual blame’.761 The three principal 
achievements of the scheme have been identified thus: 
- Compensation is extended beyond those injured by fault to those injured by 
accident and it thereby constitutes less of a lottery than tort; 
- The scheme is more economically efficient than tort with costs running at 12% 
as opposed to 85% of damages in the UK in tort; 
- The ACC scheme reflects community responsibility for accidents and 
redress.762 
 
Commentators typically praise the economic efficiency of the scheme compared with 
tort: ‘5 per cent to 10 per cent of the net amount distributed’ compared to estimates of 
the cost of tort ranging from ‘60 per cent to 140 per cent of the net amount 
distributed’.763 A review of the scheme by PriceWaterhouseCoopers reportedly found 
that it ‘adds considerable value to New Zealand society and economy, and performs 
very well in comparison to alternative schemes in operation internationally.’764 The 
New Zealand no-fault compensation scheme is said to be a success on the basis that  
                                                          
<http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2001/0049/latest/whole.html#DLM100100 > accessed 15 
September 2014 
759 Alan Clayton, ‘Some Reflections on the Woodhouse and ACC Legacy’ (n. 746) pp. 456/7 
760 Bronwyn Croxson, ‘Fundamental similarities between tort and administrative systems for managing 
health care accidents’ J Health Serv Res Policy 2008 13: 193 p. 194 
761 Marie Bismark and Ron Paterson, ‘No-Fault Compensation In New Zealand: Harmonizing Injury 
Compensation, Provider Accountability, And Patient Safety’ Health Affairs, 25, no.1 (2006):278-283 at 
p. 278 
762 Ken Oliphant, ‘Accident Compensation in New Zealand’ pp. 16 & 17 [34-36] 
< http://www.courdecassation.fr/IMG/File/pdf_2006/05-12-2006_assurance/05-12-06_ken_oliphant-
en.pdf > accessed 12 October 2014  
763  Terence G. Ison, ‘Tort Liability and Social Insurance’  (n. 745) p. 621 
764 Hazel Armstrong Blood on the Coal The origins and future of New Zealand’s Accident Compensation 
Scheme Trade Union History Project 2008 ISBN 978-0-473-13461-7 p. 6 
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- compensation is reasonably generous;765  
- claims are processed with a minimum of formality;  
- it is efficient;  
- there is little evidence that barring tort claims has compromised safety 
standards; 
- the requirement for accountability of wrongdoers can be dealt with by 
alternative means;  and 
- costs can compare favourably with a tort based system.766 
 
Physical and vocational rehabilitation is a cornerstone of Woodhouse.767 Recognition 
of the importance of rehabilitation is not confined to no-fault. In the UK there is a 
Rehabilitation Code that should be followed as part of pre-action conduct ‘to promote 
the use of rehabilitation and early intervention in the compensation process so that the 
injured person makes the best and quickest possible medical, social and psychological 
recovery.’768  
 
Nowadays it is common to see the code mentioned in letters before action.769 
However, in practice, pre-action letters often simply pay lip service to the requirement 
to invite the potential defendant to cooperate with rehabilitation, in order to avoid 
criticism by the court for failure to do so. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
765 This is endorsed by a two year study of injured people conducted by the Department of Preventive 
and Social Medicine, University of Ortago, Dunedin: ‘Most of the reported financial costs associated 
with injury in New Zealand are paid for by ACC rather than by the injured individuals themselves, and 
this result is consistent across injury types, injury severities and whether or not people were 
hospitalised. This suggests that ACC is performing well with respect to supporting injured people 
financially.’ Wilson R, Derrett S, Hansen P, et al. ‘Costs of injury in New Zealand: Accident 
Compensation Corporation spending, personal spending and quality-adjusted life years lost’ Injury 
Prevention (2012). Downloaded from < injuryprevention.bmj.com > on April 25, 2014 
766  Stephen Todd, Treatment Injury in New Zealand, 86 Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. (2011). 
Available at: < http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol86/iss3/8  > accessed 12 October 2014  
p. 1216 
767 Woodhouse Report (n. 733) p. 26 [18] 
768 The 2007 Rehabilitation Code:  
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/contents/form_section_images/pre-
action_protocol/injury_claims_pdf_-eps/prot_injury_anx_d.pdf> accessed 12 July 2014 
769 It was not referred to in the letter of claim in Martin v Kudo. 
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7.9.3 No-fault is not without problems 
 
Notwithstanding the general praise, no-fault is not without problems, the most striking 
of which is financial. Even though the scheme might be more efficient in delivering 
compensation, its huge breadth means that the overall cost is substantial. The latest 
claims summary of the ACC states that there were 1,742,223 new claims in 12 
months770 as against the total New Zealand population of 4.471 million in 2013771 
(around 7% of the population of the UK).772 This figure needs to be looked at in context. 
‘85% of accepted claims are for treatment only, without any payment of compensation 
or rehabilitation assistance’.773 Oliphant goes on to say that only 150,000 claims each 
year (fewer than 9%) are classified as entitlement claims i.e. giving rise to entitlement 
to compensation or rehabilitation. 
 
In the UK, the Pearson Commission in its heterogeneous collection of 
recommendations774  considered, as possible options in relation to PL, a no-fault 
scheme, alteration to the law of contract, reversal of the burden of proof and strict 
liability for defective products.775 No-fault was discounted, on the grounds of difficulty 
in financing and the disproportionality of introducing compulsory insurance, in favour 
of strict liability.776 This was in contrast with: 
- no-fault schemes recommended for work related injury and disease 
combined with  tort;   
- no-fault for motor vehicles injuries; and  
- negligence liability for medical injuries and ante-natal injuries.777 
                                                          
770 ACC Annual report 2013 
<http://www.acc.co.nz/PRD_EXT_CSMP/groups/external_communications/documents/reports_results
/annual_report_2013.pdf > accessed 12 October 2104 
771 < http://data.worldbank.org/country/new-zealand > accessed 12 October 2014 
772 64.10 million 2013 <  http://data.worldbank.org/country/united-kingdom > accessed 12 October 2014 
773 Ken Oliphant, ‘Accident Compensation in New Zealand’ (n. 762) p. 13 [29] 
774 Described by Stapleton as a ‘(notorious?) collection of ad hoc justifications’ (Jane Stapleton Disease 
and the Compensation Debate (n. 747) p. 109). 
775 Pearson Commission (n. 191) p. 260 et seq [1221] et seq 
776 Pearson Commission (n. 191) p. 263 [1236]; p. 288 [1347]; and p. 307 [1464] 
777 Quaere whether motor, medical and ante-natal PL were intended to fall within or without PL. Certainly 
the inference in the conclusions on the PL section of the Report is that it is intended to apply to future 
disasters of the dimensions of the Thalidomide tragedy (p. 274 [1278]) but this does not square with the 
recommendation that ‘a child born alive suffering from the effects of ante-natal injury caused by the fault 
of another person should continue to have a right of action for damages against that person’ (p. 307 
[1464]). 
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Long term cost was a concern for the Scottish Government’s No Fault Compensation 
Review Group.778 The Chief Medical Officer for England also rejected no-fault on costs 
grounds when considering establishment of a scheme for clinical negligence.779 The 
UK Government’s response to the Health Select Committee Report on patient safety 
states:  
 
“No fault” compensation was considered as part of the Making Amends 
(2003) consultation and more recently during the passage of the NHS 
Redress Act 2006. The Department rejected the introduction of a “no fault” 
scheme for a number of reasons, including: overall costs are expected to 
be higher than the current tort system because more claims would fall 
within the scheme; there is no clear definition of “no fault”, and we would 
argue that none of the schemes we examined are genuinely “no fault”;  a 
high minimum level of injury or hospitalisation that a patient has to meet to 
qualify may be necessary to make a scheme cost-effective; there is still a 
need to establish causation, leading to arguments about “fault” being 
replaced by ones about “cause”; explanations and apologies are not 
necessarily provided in a system which focuses on financial recompense 
alone; a “no fault” scheme, in itself, does not improve accountability or 
ensure learning from adverse events. Ministers in Scotland have already 
announced that they are going to consider the benefits to patients of 
introducing a “no fault” compensation scheme in Scotland. We maintain 
an interest in the review and, rather than duplicating, we will await its 
outcome in order to inform further thinking.780 
 
The Woodhouse recommendations were based on extensive financial planning and 
sickness and disease were specifically left out of the scheme due to the ‘virtual 
absence of the statistical signposting which alone can demonstrate the feasibility of 
the further move’781  
 
However, no-fault does not automatically lead to excessive costs. It depends on the 
compensation criteria. Woodhouse expressed the sentiment that ‘New Zealanders are 
not so dependent that they must have maximum outside assistance for every minor 
                                                          
778 No Fault Compensation Review Group Report and Recommendations Volume I Commissioned by 
the Scottish Government St Andrews House Regent Road Edinburgh EH1 3DG <www.scotland.gov.uk 
>  accessed 12 October 2014 
779 Sir Liam Donaldson, CMO Making amends: a consultation paper setting out proposals for reforming 
the approach to clinical negligence in the NHS:, Department of Health Publications < 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/www.dh.gov.uk/en/PublicationsandStatistics/Publications/
PublicationsPolicyandGuidance/DH_4010641 > accessed 12 October 2014 
780 Government response to the Health Select Committee Report 'Patient Safety' 13 October 2009 
ISBN: 978-0-10-1770927 
781 Woodhouse Report (n. 733) p.2 [10] & p. 26 [17] 
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setback.782 Such remarks might appear as naïve and outmoded in today’s 
compensation climate as Sally Oppenheim MP’s comment that ‘all consumers will be 
contributing through the prices that they pay for the compensation to a few unfortunate 
injured victims. I do not think that anyone would quarrel with that concept.’ 783 The cost 
issue is not restricted to no-fault. Richard Mullender784 asks, in relation to tort, whether 
society wants to compensate everyone for every injury citing Weir785 and Atiyah786 as 
critical of the judicial expansion of the boundaries of negligence for setting society on 
the ‘slippery slope’ towards ‘blame culture’.  
 
It is reported that the New Zealand scheme was never fully 'funded' in a pure actuarial 
sense,787 meaning that funds collected in a given year were insufficient to meet 
outgoings without the benefit of accumulated reserves from early years before claims 
started to build up. There was a costs crisis in 1986 due to ‘compensation expenditures 
rising more rapidly than levy incomes’.788 This was met by an increase in the levy on 
average of 192% (265% for self-employed and over 500% in some cases.)789 The 
scheme was partially privatised in 1999790 but then this was reversed the following 
year.791 
 
Four factors make the NZ ACC scheme affordable: 
 
- a strong social security system – free hospital care and subsidized 
pharmaceuticals; 
 
- awards are generally lower and more consistent than under a malpractice 
equivalent; 
 
- It has been estimated that the ratio of potentially compensable events to 
successful claims is around thirty to one; 
 
                                                          
782 Woodhouse Report (n. 733) p. 23 [11]  
783 Mrs Sally Oppenheim, Minister for Consumer Affairs (n. 117) [1111/2] 
784 Richard Mullender, ‘Negligence law and blame culture: a critical response to a possible problem’ 
(n. 322) 
785 Weir, J A, ‘Governmental Liability’ [1989] Public Law 40 
786 Atiyah, P S, The Damages Lottery (n. 13) Chs. 2, 3. 
787 Geoffrey Palmer, ‘New Zealand's Accident Compensation Scheme: Twenty Years on’ (n. 744) p. 231 
788 Ken Oliphant, ‘Accident Compensation in New Zealand’ (n. 762) p. 8 
789 Ken Oliphant, ‘Accident Compensation in New Zealand’ Ken Oliphant ‘Accident Compensation in 
New Zealand’ (n. 762) p. 8 [18] 
790 Accident Insurance Act 1998 [NZ] 
791 Injury Prevention Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2001 [NZ] 
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- The system has been very cost-effective, with administrative costs absorbing 
only 10 percent of the ACC’s expenditures compared with 50–60 percent 
among malpractice systems in other countries.792 
 
In addition many believe compensation is inadequate particularly for those unable to 
claim earnings related compensation and there is a tension between payments from 
health and welfare systems for disease and payments by ACC for injury – the latter 
typically being more generous.793 
 
Dewees Duff and Trebilcock, reviewing the arguments for no-fault in relation to PL, 
find that any such scheme would be ill conceived. Attempting to define a causation 
trigger is ‘impractical, if not impossible’ and the scheme would by default amount to 
absolute liability for every injury ‘in which a product was involved’.794 That would 
impliedly be too costly. Whilst they ultimately recommend no-fault schemes for 
automobile and medical misadventure accidents they prefer tort for PL on the grounds 
of deterrence capability.795 
 
The economics of such a scheme require limitations on cover. Treatment injury 
presents some difficulty. There is still a requirement in New Zealand to prove causation 
in this field. Whilst there is no formal need to show any kind of mishap or error, the 
difficulties of causation and medical injury have not entirely been overcome by an 
‘outcomes-focused’ no-fault compensation scheme.796 An example is Atkinson v 
ACC797 in which a child who suffered brain damage failed in his claim against the ACC 
on the basis that hypoxia could not be causatively linked to the brain damage.798 The 
                                                          
792 Marie Bismark and Ron Paterson, ‘No-Fault Compensation In New Zealand: Harmonizing Injury 
Compensation, Provider Accountability, And Patient Safety’ (n. 761)  p. 281 
793 Marie Bismark and Ron Paterson, ‘No-Fault Compensation In New Zealand: Harmonizing Injury 
Compensation, Provider Accountability, And Patient Safety’ (n. 761) p. 282; see also Jane Stapleton 
‘Compensating Victims of Diseases’ Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Summer, 1985), 
248-268 p. 268 complaining that no fault schemes are biased towards accident sufferers rather than 
disease sufferers (who are in the majority). 
794 Dewees, Duff and Trebilcock, Exploring the Domain of Accident Law: Taking the Facts Seriously (n. 
347) p. 245 
795 Dewees, Duff and Trebilcock, Exploring the Domain of Accident Law: Taking the Facts Seriously (n. 
347) pp. 436/437 
796 Stephen Todd, ‘Treatment Injury in New Zealand’ (n. 766) p. 1186  et seq  
797 Atkinson v Accident Rehabilitation Compensation and Insurance Corporation [2002] I NZLR 374 
(CA) [19]-[26] 
798 Stephen Todd, ‘Treatment Injury in New Zealand’ (n. 766) p. 1190  
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New Zealand courts have not applied the modifications and manipulations of causation 
rules introduced in the UK, which Todd lists.799 He suggests that the difficulties in 
establishing causation arguably lead to the conclusion that ‘while negligence is not 
formally required, all of these points suggest that it necessarily reappears in deciding 
whether treatment injury can be shown to exist.’800 
 
In expanding her arguments in Disease and the Compensation Debate,801  Stapleton 
notes that there has been a proliferation of special non-tort compensation schemes 
for specific diseases but that ‘whilst these provide better compensation for certain 
victims there are still both practical demarcation problems and policy objections to 
these ad hoc schemes.’802 Criticisms include medical causation and remoteness, lump 
sum benefits, loss of individualisation, lack of coverage of non-pecuniary loss, lack of 
public scrutiny of adequacy of benefits, failure to cater for particular needs or 
susceptibilities and ‘a growing tendency to treat compensation issues separately and 
preferentially according to the medical cause of disability, an apparent illogicality not 
present in the tort system.’803 Stapleton concedes that some schemes work well – 
such as the Thalidomide Trust. However, this is the exemplar case in which a special 
scheme should be merited whatever the underlying general scheme for compensation 
of those suffering accidents or injuries.  This is merely articulating the truism that 
Thalidomide is a special case.  
 
Woodhouse anticipated the need to impose some kind of franchise, excess or 
threshold, observing that ‘those absent from work for less than a fortnight are about 
30 times as numerous as those absent for three months or longer’.804 The goal is “real” 
rather than “full” compensation, including: 
- Weekly compensation 80% pre-accident earnings capped at 2.5 x 
average weekly income for paid employee from second week of absence 
(also paid to those losing financial support) 
                                                          
799 Stephen Todd, ‘Treatment Injury in New Zealand’ (n. 766) p. 1190  
800 Stephen Todd, ‘Treatment Injury in New Zealand’ (n. 766) p. 1199 
801 Jane Stapleton Disease and the Compensation Debate (n. 747)  
802 Jane Stapleton Disease and the Compensation Debate (n. 747) p. 88 
803 Jane Stapleton Disease and the Compensation Debate (n. 747) p. 108 
804 Woodhouse Report (n. 733) p. 163 [435]  
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- A lump sum for economic loss  NZ$2,500 to NZ$100,000 if permanent 
impairment over 10% 
- Medical and rehabilitation expenses such as care in home or 
adjustments to vehicle/home and mobility aids.805 
 
Notwithstanding these issues, the overall picture above is that no-fault is successful. 
The question is whether it could be introduced in the UK as an efficient replacement 
for tort. 
 
7.9.4 No fault in UK 
 
Atiyah writing in 1980 found tort archaic and predicted its demise within 50 years. He 
considered no-fault schemes to be the way forward. But no-fault schemes have 
already been in contemplation for a considerable time in the UK. William Beveridge, 
architect of the welfare state, wrote in 1942 
 
If a workman loses his leg in an accident, his needs are the same whether 
the accident occurred in a factory or in the street; if he is killed the needs 
of the widow and other dependents are the same, however the death 
occurred. Acceptance of this argument and adoption of a flat rate of 
compensation for disability, however caused, would avoid the anomaly of 
treating equal needs differently and the administrative and legal difficulties 
of defining just what injuries were to be treated as arising out of and in the 
course of employment …. A complete solution is to be found only in a 
completely unified scheme for disability without demarcation by the cause 
of disability.806 
 
In the UK there have been numerous legislative proposals since 1932 which are 
summarised by Bartrip.807 None of these is comprehensive. The principal area for 
proposers of such schemes is road traffic, presumably because these accidents cause 
the greatest proportion of injuries. However, Bartrip explains that opposition has 
focused on the question of why motorists should be singled out for preferential 
treatment. Of course they already are as they are subject to compulsory third party 
                                                          
805 Ken Oliphant ‘Accident Compensation in New Zealand’ (n. 762) p. 7 & 8  
806 Sir William Beveridge Social Insurance and Allied Services 1942 Cmnd 6404 
< http://www.sochealth.co.uk/resources/public-health-and-wellbeing/beveridge-report/beveridge-
workmens-compensation-change-4/> paragraph 80 accessed 29 June 2014  
807 Peter Bartrip ‘No-fault compensation on the roads in twentieth century Britain’ C.L.J. 2010, 69(2), 
263-286 
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insurance. It might be argued that the special nature of road traffic accidents is that 
most of the population use motor vehicles or roads or benefit from them in one-way or 
another. Taxation by way of a targeted levy can practically be charged through fuel 
prices. However, as Bartrip mentions, a case can be made out for preferential 
treatment of other groups such as those in the armed forces. By extension a case for 
special treatment might be made for most people in public service: firemen, police, 
health workers and teachers. 
 
Moreover, there are already special no-fault schemes808 in place covering: 
- criminal injuries;809 
- severe disablement resulting from vaccination against one of a list of 
diseases;810 
- those injured or made ill as a result of service in the armed force;811 and 
- individuals suffering from asbestos related disease.812 
 
These schemes reflect society taking responsibility for compensation in circumstances 
where blame is simply irrelevant. The schemes benefit society as a whole and are best 
paid for by taxes. This reasoning is, however, reminiscent of the thought processes 
discussed earlier in this Chapter, which led to strict liability. 
 
A relatively recent attempt at a scheme is the NHS Redress Act 2006, which was 
enacted to enable regulations to be made for a no fault scheme with compensation 
mirroring tort damages (limited to £20,000) in addition to the giving of an explanation 
or the making of an apology.813 However, this was merely enabling legislation, which 
has apparently been abandoned without any regulations ever having been made. 
 
                                                          
808 For a helpful summary see No Fault Compensation Review Group Report and Recommendations 
(n. 778) p. 23 
809 Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 2008 
810 Vaccine Damage Payments Act 1979 as amended 
811 Armed Forces Compensation Scheme, The Armed Forces and Reserve Forces (Compensation 
Scheme) Order 2011 (SI 2011/517) see < http://www.infolaw.co.uk/mod/afcsandspo.htm > accessed 
1  September 2014 
812 Diffuse Mesothelioma Payments Scheme Regulations 2014 and Pneumoconiosis etc. (Workers’ 
Compensation) Act 1979 
813 NHS Redress Act 2006 s 3 (2)(a), (b), and (c). 
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The No Fault Compensation Review Group Report814 identified the following 
advantages of no-fault schemes: 
- A community response to injury; 
- Greater access to justice than tort affords; 
- A less defensive attitude to accidents in the medical profession; 
- Rehabilitation; 
- Easing of financial pressure on health professionals due to insurance 
premiums; 
- Greater efficiency in compensation administration. 
 
Against these the Group identified: 
- cost;  
- lesser compensatory sums;  
- potential promotion of compensation culture; and  
- causation issues. 
 
The problem with previous proposals in the UK is that they have been piecemeal. As 
explained above, Pearson’s recommendations were multi-stranded and lacked 
uniformity or coherence. The real challenge now would be to make a system universal 
so that it catered for any injuries, worked in tandem with the National Health Service 
and benefits in respect of illness, paid for itself, and was capable of being 
administered. If these obstacles could be overcome to achieve a fairer embodiment of 
distributive justice than under tort litigation, the next problem would be EU legislation 
such as the PL Directive. The detail of such a scheme would have to provide a remedy 
that is no narrower than that provided by the PL Directive. No-fault might otherwise 
have to be adopted at EU level in place of existing legislation. 
 
No-fault satisfies tests of fairness and distributive justice in a way that Tort does not. 
However, the real question is whether it could be achieved practically. That is largely 
a matter of economics. No economic study has been published on a proposed 
comprehensive system. The study would have to take into account how such a 
scheme would dovetail with the NHS and it would evidently be that case that there 
                                                          
814 No Fault Compensation Review Group Report and Recommendations (n. 778) pp. 25-27  
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would have to be thresholds and limits applied procedurally to make the scheme 
viable. 
 
Conclusions 
 
It is unsurprising that the PL Directive might be unsatisfactory from the points of view 
of claimants and defendants alike. The underlying hypotheses upon which the PL 
Directive was based were flawed in several respects. The promoters of the PL 
Directive were confused about the problem society faced and the reasons for 
introducing strict liability as a solution to that problem. The problem was a unique set 
of circumstances under which third parties, foetuses in utero, were seriously injured 
by a complex pharmaceutical product, Thalidomide. The special circumstances of 
these genuine victims of a tragedy confounded the legal remedies available at the time 
and led to the adoption of a completely new ill-fitting set of legal rights that neither 
aided the victims of Thalidomide nor would they aid the victims of a future tragedy of 
a similar nature. 
 
This chapter has explored the underlying misperceptions that led to this illogical 
choice: wrong assumptions about the difficulties of proof of fault and how strict liability 
would resolve this; categorising society’s need as a problem relating to products 
without understanding how products differed from each other from a legal perspective 
and how the justifications for strict liability in respect of products applied equally to 
many other forms of liability; blindly following a trend towards strict liability without 
understanding the theory as to how strict liability is supposed to work; failing to 
appreciate how compromising the grand theory of strict liability meant that it would not 
work in the very cases that had created the clamour for a strict liability remedy; copying 
strict liability from the US whilst ignorant of the fact that the US had moved on from 
this failed experiment having experienced disastrous economic consequences. As a 
result every claimant is treated as a victim; claimants see themselves as victims; 
consumer expectations of products have lost touch with reality. As such the imposition 
of a strict liability regime for products was destined to fail to serve society’s needs.  
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The arguments which led to strict liability point more logically to no-fault. No-fault is 
fairer than strict liability but the cost has to be controlled. It is time to review the 
possibility of an all embracing no-fault scheme. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE - THE FLAWED PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK  
 
Most economic fallacies derive from the tendency to assume that there is 
a fixed pie, that one party can gain only at the expense of another. 
              Milton Friedman 1980815 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter examines the distributive effect of the most significant Jackson Reforms 
on PL claims. Inevitably much of the commentary applies to injury claims generally. 
The particular relevance to the PL debate is that in the pursuit of harmonisation it is 
pointless agreeing a common basis for liability when the local procedure by which 
claims are brought has the effect of introducing a system of virtual absolute liability for 
small claims. 
 
These reforms816 are an attempt at redistributing rights, as between notional claimants 
and defendants. The Cumulative Jackson Impact Assessment817 confirms that the 
reforms are likely to ‘shift the balance considerably in favour of claimants’ and explains 
that ‘this distributional impact may constitute a cost to society, depending upon 
society’s preferences.’ It is argued here that the procedure introduced to give effect to 
the reforms is ideologically flawed and gives rise to potential unfairness to some 
defendants and particular unfairness to product manufacturers. Moreover the 
concentration on redistributive procedure is at the expense of ignoring whether the 
underlying litigation is beneficial.  
 
It is argued that the Jackson Reforms were precipitated by the failure of the Woolf 
Reforms, the key goal being to make litigation more proportionate. However, this 
ignored the quasi-substantive effect that rigid procedures may have in forcing results 
that have no correlation with the particular merits. This chapter concentrates on 
Qualified One-Way Costs Shifting (QOCS) and considers how the role of insurance 
(essential to QOCS) fails to fit Jackson’s superficial model. It is also shown that the 
                                                          
815 Milton Friedman, Free to Choose Thomson Learning ISBN –10: 0156334607 
816 Which term includes reforms made in his name although not necessarily precisely as recommended 
by him (see p. 250 below).  
817 Impact Assessment Cumulative Jackson Proposals IA No: MoJ 40 29/06/2012 [2.13] 
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rules introduced to implement the Jackson reforms ignored the qualification that 
Jackson intended to ameliorate the potential unfair effects of QOCS.  
 
8.1 The Woolf reforms failed to achieve access to justice and urgently needed 
overhauling 
 
It is widely acknowledged that the Woolf Reforms that led to the Civil Procedure Rules 
1998 misfired.818 What was intended as a vehicle for ‘access to justice’ became a 
litigation bandwagon because of the procedural weighting in favour of claimants and 
the disproportionate costs recoverable by claimants’ lawyers on winning. Case 109 in 
the PL Claims Survey at Appendix 4 is typical of this generation of claims. Here the 
claimant alleged a steering defect causing a minor injury. Liability was admitted early 
on. The claim settled for £7,262. The claimant’s solicitor then served a bill of costs 
claiming £31,245.26. Whilst there was undoubtedly greater access to justice for 
claimants and the litigation process became more streamlined, the cost of litigation 
lacked proportionality.819 Such disproportionate costs rules had a ‘chilling effect’ on 
defendants’ access to justice.820 It has been argued that such a dysfunctional system 
leads to increased costs, typically paid for by insurers and then passed on to 
consumers. To remedy the situation costs must be predictable, proportionate to the 
amount at stake and recoverable.821   
 
8.1.1 The new goal of proportionality introduced 
 
The stated goal of the Jackson reforms was to redistribute the cost of litigation to 
achieve access to justice at proportionate cost.  
 
The terms of reference require me to review the rules and principles 
governing the costs of civil litigation and to make recommendations in 
order to promote access to justice at proportionate cost. They also require 
me to review case management procedures; to have regard to research 
                                                          
818 Winky So, ‘A brief history of the law of costs - lessons for the Jackson reforms and Beyond’ C.J.Q. 
2013, 32(3), 333-348 p. 7 
819 Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, Master of The Rolls Proportionate Costs Fifteenth Lecture in the 
Implementation Programme the Law Society 29 May 2012 
820 Adrian Zuckerman, ‘The Jackson Final Report on Costs: plastering the cracks to shore up a 
dysfunctional system’ C.J.Q. 2010, 29(3), 263-283 p. 264 
821 Adrian Zuckerman, ‘The Jackson Final Report on Costs: plastering the cracks to shore up a 
dysfunctional system’ (n. 820) p. 264 
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into costs and funding; to consult widely; to compare our costs regime with 
those of other jurisdictions ...822 
 
‘Proportionality’ is the litmus test of success of the reforms according to the Impact 
Assessment.823 There is little doubt that there will be a significant benefit to some 
insurers in respect of attritional claims because of the saving in costs over a wide book 
of claims. However, this says nothing about whether the underlying litigation is 
beneficial to society. Cost is merely one factor. It may be that if Martin had won his 
case, the overall cost to Kudo under the old costs regime would have been around 
£30,000 and under the new regime perhaps £15,000. This does not provide a robust 
normative basis for allowing such claims to be made. 
 
8.1.2 Procedural Reforms have quasi-substantive effects 
 
Howells and Mildred were critical of the US for making substantive changes to the law 
of PL when they felt the problems could be addressed procedurally.824 It is respectfully 
submitted that the US approach (irrespective of the rights or wrongs of the particular 
changes) was correct in that the starting point in the distribution of rights is the 
substantive law. Substantive law is the means by which society determines the 
distribution of rights. Procedural law should then enable the exercise of those rights. 
That includes imposing procedural limits on when those rights may be exercised and 
when they may be forfeited, such as limitation periods and time limits.  
 
However, one cannot ignore the consequences of procedural distributive changes. ‘In 
devising and choosing between social arrangements we should have regard for the 
total effect.’825  This chapter shows that procedural changes may have quasi-
substantive effects. 
 
 
 
                                                          
822 The Jackson Report (n. 6) p. xvi 
823 Impact Assessment Cumulative Jackson Proposals (n. 817); and The Parliamentary Under-
Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Jonathan Djanogly) Written Ministerial Statement Tuesday 17 
July 2012 Ministry Of Justice 
824 Geraint G. Howells & Mark Mildred ‘Is European Products Liability More Protective than the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?’ (n. 560) p. 1030 
825 Ronald Coase ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 3 (Oct., 1960), 1-
44 
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8.1.3 The key changes 
 
The key provisions of the Jackson reforms for present purposes include: 
- The abolition of recovery of CFA success fees (other than by way of deduction 
from damages awarded).826 
- The prohibition on recovery of ATE premiums.827 
- The introduction of Qualified One-Way Costs Shifting.828 
- Implementation of a modified Pre-action Protocol for Low Value Road Traffic 
Accident Claims (the RTA Protocol) and a parallel protocol for low value  
‘Employers’ Liability and Public Liability’ Claims829 (the EL/PL Protocol) coupled 
with their associated Ministry of Justice Portal and staged fixed costs.830 
- Modification of the Part 36 rules to award an additional scale based sum up to 
£75,000.831 
- Introduction of Damages Based Agreements.832 
- The requirement for Cost budgeting.833 
- A 10% increase in the level of general damages.834 
 
The most significant of these changes was the introduction of Qualified One-Way Cost 
Shifting, in that it is manifestly intended to redistribute rights. CPR 44.14 now provides: 
 
Effect of qualified one-way costs shifting 
44.14 
(1) Subject to rules 44.15 and 44.16, orders for costs made against a 
claimant may be enforced without the permission of the court but only to 
the extent that the aggregate amount in money terms of such orders does 
not exceed the aggregate amount in money terms of any orders for 
damages and interest made in favour of the claimant. 
                                                          
826 Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 s 44 (4)  
827 Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012  s 46 (1) 
828 CPR 44 (13) – (16) 
829 Pre-Action Protocol for Low Value Personal Injury Claims in Road Traffic Accidents from 31 July 
2013: 
https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/protocol/pre-action-protocol-for-low-value-
personal-injury-claims-in-road-traffic-accidents-31-july-2013 accessed 28 September 2014 
and 
Pre-Action Protocol for Low Value Personal Injury (Employers’ Liability and Public Liability) Claims: 
https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/protocol/pre-action-protocol-for-low-value-
personal-injury-employers-liability-and-public-liability-claims accessed 28 September 2014 
830 CPR 45 (16) et seq 
831 CPR 36.14 (3) (d) 
832 Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 s 45 
833 CPR 3.13 
834 Simmons v Castle (n. 588) 
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However the basis for this redistribution is suspect. 
 
8.2 Underlying foundations of Qualified One-way Costs Shifting 
 
Jackson made two fundamental assumptions that shaped his reforms. First, he 
asserted that ‘Claimants are successful in the majority of personal injury claims’,835 
with the consequence that ‘Defendants seldom recover costs, so they derive little 
benefit from two way costs shifting.’ Second, he claimed that ‘the defendant is almost 
invariably either insured or self insured’. These assumptions are broad generalisations 
requiring closer attention. 
 
8.2.1 Claimants usually succeed 
 
Jackson’s first assumption relies on a circular argument. The reason why claimants 
are so often successful needs examining. Jackson pointed out in his introduction 
 
2.3 …it must be acknowledged that one of the benefits of the current CFA 
regime is that it is geared towards ensuring that claimants receive proper 
compensation. This, however, comes at a heavy price for defendants, who 
often have to bear a disproportionate costs burden.836 
 
The Impact Assessment on Conditional Fee Agreements had summarised the 
problems with CFAs: 
 
Under the existing CFA arrangements, clients with a CFA carry no financial 
risk …This has led to costs that are often disproportionate to the value of 
the claim, and can lead to non-meritorious cases being pursued. CFA 
funding is more commonly used by claimants. High legal costs therefore 
impact disproportionately on defendants, and as a result defendants are 
more likely to settle otherwise weak claims due to the risk of being liable 
for high costs if they lose. 837 
 
The burden on defendants had translated into intense pressure to settle rather than 
face the ‘chilling’ consequences of losing. It is no surprise then that claimants were 
usually successful in making a recovery. This does not necessarily mean that all 
claims should be successful. If it was unfair that claimants were overwhelmingly 
                                                          
835 The Jackson Report (n. 6) pp. 184/185 
836 The Jackson Report (n. 6) pp. xvi-xvii 
837 Impact Assessment IA No: MoJ 43 15/11/2010 
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successful, then a new regime that favours claimants will perpetuate an injustice. As 
Zuckerman says: 
If the present system that shifts the claimant's litigation risk to defendants 
is absurd, there can be no merit in its substitution by a different method 
which also results in shifting the same burden to defendants.838 
 
Furthermore, even if claimants do usually win, exposure to a costs risk would dampen 
the enthusiasm for pursuing weak cases. 
 
The merits had become irrelevant 
 
Case Study 1, Martin v Kudo, is a prime example of the potential for claimants to 
succeed irrespective of the merits. Before the claim eventually went to trial, Kudo 
made various nuisance offers, on the basis that whilst they were reasonably confident 
of winning at trial, and were subsequently proved right, it could not be a foregone 
conclusion. If Martin had succeeded at trial, Kudo would have faced a bill of over 
£60,000 comprising damages, Martin’s costs and its own costs.  Had Martin accepted 
an offer, this would have been a case in which the claimant succeeded – yet as was 
proved at trial, the case was without merit. As it was, the case was incapable of 
settlement because of Martin’s exposure to the costs of his own solicitors, unless Kudo 
was prepared to include these in a settlement. This brings into the spotlight the tension 
between facilitating the enforcement of claimants’ rights and the encouragement of 
gambling on litigation outcomes. The Impact Assessment recognises that nothing has 
changed in this regard: 
  
This proposal might also encourage claimants to make more claims, 
especially lower value claims, which defendants might be inclined to settle 
given that the defendant would still incur legal costs if they win the case.839 
 
8.2.2 Defendants are almost invariably insured 
 
Jackson also assumed that the defendant is ‘almost invariably’ insured. Had there 
remained any doubt that tort and insurance are ineluctably connected, such doubt 
must by now have evaporated completely. Jackson’s thesis gives insurance a 
                                                          
838 Adrian Zuckerman, ‘The Jackson Final Report on Costs: plastering the cracks to shore up a 
dysfunctional system’ (n. 820) p. 267 
839 Impact Assessment Cumulative Jackson Proposals (n. 817) [2.40] 
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normative role in the distribution of rights, notwithstanding the traditional argument that 
insurability is an unsound criterion, for the reason that 
 
because most risks are insurable, at least at some price, the criterion 
would nearly always support liability.’840  
 
Tort’s confused ‘symbiotic relationship with insurance’841  
 
To understand why Jackson’s reliance on insurance is unsound, it is necessary to 
consider the relationship between tort and insurance and the inconsistencies that 
exist. Stapleton explains the historic view that insurance is irrelevant to the issue of 
whether liability should be imposed. The 1960s and 1970s brought about a change of 
focus to the ‘realities of insurance’ argument, leading to the conclusion that ‘it now 
seems almost axiomatic that in real life tort claims are only worth bringing and are 
therefore virtually only ever brought against insured defendants.’842  Whilst this surely 
overstates the position, it rightly recognises the reality that tort and insurance are 
umbilically connected. Insurance is at the very least the mechanism by which tort 
distributes rights to compensation. With this interrelationship comes the paradox that 
by spreading risk, insurance denudes tort of its normative force in promoting risk 
averse behaviour and deterrence, limiting moral hazard and ameliorating adverse 
selection843 although pooling of risks should not ‘threaten the liability criterion so long 
as the pool contains like risk-takers.’844 
 
Insurance is not a normative basis for liability 
 
Stapleton also notes that the urge to expand tort judicially, where the risk could be 
covered by insurance, may have had the attractions of ensuring compensation and 
spreading risk but she questioned whether it was right ‘to promote that effect as an 
appropriate goal of the liability rule such that it should independently influence the 
incidence of that rule’.845 Merkin objects to Stapleton’s assessment that insurance 
‘seeks to convert tort from a mechanism for restorative justice to a system of 
                                                          
840 Jane Stapleton, ‘Tort, Insurance and Ideology’ The Modern Law Review Vol. 58 No. 6 (Nov 1995) 
pp. 820-845, 828 
841 Rob Merkin, ‘Tort, Insurance and Ideology: Further Thoughts’ (n. 133) p308 
842 Jane Stapleton,  ‘Tort, Insurance and Ideology: The Modern Law Review’ (n. 840) p 824 
843 Richard A. Epstein, ‘Products Liability as an Insurance Market’, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 645, 648- 53 
(1985) 
844 Jane Stapleton, ‘Tort, Insurance and Ideology’ (n. 840) p. 843 
845 Jane Stapleton, ‘Tort, Insurance and Ideology’ (n. 840) p. 828 
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distributive justice,’ in cases where the insurance position is known.846 Merkin expands 
the ‘realities of insurance’ argument in the twenty-first century with After the Event 
Insurance shaping which claims are brought, and compulsory insurance following 
employers’ liability and motor liability, suggesting that ‘in personal injury claims the 
true claimant is the victim and the true defendant is the wrongdoer’s liability insurer, 
whereas in property and other claims the true parties are the claimant or the claimant’s 
first party insurer, if any, and (almost certainly) the defendant’s liability insurer.847 
 
Merkin identifies thirteen areas of liability backed by compulsory insurance (to which 
clinical trials can be added) and cases where insurance has overtly been taken into 
account by the courts in attributing liability. For example, in Vowles v Evans, Morland 
J in holding that a rugby referee owed a duty of care to a player (upheld by the Court 
of Appeal)848 stated 
 
23. In my judgment when rugby is funded not only by gate receipts but 
also by lucrative television contracts I can see no reason why the Welsh 
Rugby Union should not insure itself and its referees against claims and 
the risk of a finding of a breach of duty of care by a referee where ‘the 
threshold of liability is a high one which will not easily be crossed’. 
Amateur rugby players will be young men mostly with very limited income. 
Insurance cover for referees would be a cost spread across the whole 
game…849 
 
However, there is still an element of inconsistency: Merkin points out that in Jones V 
Kaney850 on experts’ duties, the various judges had differing views on the role of 
insurance ranging from assuming there would be insurance in place for experts’ 
professional indemnity to disregarding insurance entirely. 
 
Merkin sees insurance as inextricably linked with tort in typical cases.851 Lewis goes 
further in suggesting that tort is driven by the insurance industry when it should be the 
vehicle through which tort meets the needs of society in allocating liability.852 He 
suggests that the system is so dependent on insurance that the results are arbitrary 
                                                          
846 Rob Merkin, ‘Tort, Insurance and Ideology: Further Thoughts’ (n. 133) p. 322 
847 Rob Merkin, ‘Tort, Insurance and Ideology: Further Thoughts’ (n. 133) p. 303 
848 Vowles v Evans [2003] 1 W.L.R. 1607. 
849 Vowles v Evans (n. 848) 
850 Jones v Kaney [2011] UKSC 13; [2011] 2 All ER 671. 
851 Rob Merkin, ‘Tort, Insurance and Ideology: Further Thoughts’ (n. 133) p. 323 
852 Lewis, ‘Insurers and Personal Injury Litigation: Acknowledging the Elephant in the Living 
Room’ (n. 743) p. 6. 
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and bear only a limited relationship with textbook tort. He is to a degree correct in this 
assessment. Certainly during the golden years of ATE insurance, when premiums 
were recoverable by successful claimants and losing claimants’ premiums were 
waived by insurers, cases were effectively run by the ATE insurers and the merits were 
irrelevant. In case 51 in the PL Claims Survey at Appendix 4, the claim became almost 
impossible to settle because the ATE insurer insisted that in any settlement, it was 
entitled to its premium of around £400,000. The claimant was prepared to accept 
£300,000 in damages. 
 
He is only partly correct because the insurance industry is merely a subset of the larger 
litigation industry which also includes lawyers, medico legal service providers, loss 
adjusters, experts, and the court system. Moreover, Insurers can be viewed as a 
middleman. Damages are paid by insurers; Insurers’ funds come from invested 
premiums; premiums are paid by manufacturers; and manufacturers’ funds come from 
consumers, in the purchase price. So indirectly, consumers pay.853  
 
Pooling of risks 
 
The risk of loss is distributed by insurance across a risk pool. Keating observes that 
‘the size of the distributive group and the amount of the benefit or burden to be 
distributed will ordinarily be determined by independent, contingent factors.’854 It is 
instructive first to look at motor claims to see how the system of distribution works as 
motor claims are the paradigm risk pool - because motorists are all exposed to the risk 
of injuring each other and being injured by each other.855 Liability is typically fault 
based (negligence) and insurance to meet such liability is compulsory.  
 
Since the huge majority of personal injury claims are motor claims, this model is 
representative (numerically) of the ‘majority’ of injury claims. Motorists contribute to 
and stand to benefit from the spread of risk across the risk pool. The relationship 
between a particular injurer and injured is irrelevant.856 
 
                                                          
853 Atiyah, P S, The Damages Lottery (n. 13) p. 21 
854 Stephen R Perry, ‘The Moral Foundations of Tort Law’ (n. 732) p. 471 
855 Jane Stapleton, ‘Tort, Insurance and Ideology’ (n. 840) p. 842 
856 Stephen R Perry, ‘The Moral Foundations of Tort Law’ (n. 732) p. 471 
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PL, however, does not fit the motorists’ distributive model, in which risks and benefits 
are shared equitably. Whilst a driver may at the same time be a creator and a victim 
of risk, a consumer is not a manufacturer (or vice versa).  It has been argued that 
fairness demands that strict liability should be spread amongst creators of similar risks 
‘just as much as it favors dispersing the costs of accidents precipitated by wrongdoing 
among lucky and unlucky wrongdoers’.857 Coleman sees strict liability as serving a 
‘private social insurance function’: 
 
in standard strict liability, risk is distributed in two steps. The cost of 
insuring against risk is imposed on the manufacturer. The manufacturer 
then passes those costs to consumers, spreading the costs over persons 
and time.858 
 
In practice this does not happen consistently. The pool, amongst which the risk is 
spread, through premiums paid for in the purchase price, varies from product to 
product. In respect of some products, the risk is spread widely. In the first case study, 
Martin v Kudo, Kudo buys PL insurance, which it pays for out of the price of its 
products. It may build only cars. It may on the other hand also build motorcycles, fork 
lift trucks, power tools or other products unrelated to any of these. Thus the risk is 
spread first among consumers of the brand rather than the product. Second, one must 
consider the insurer’s position. It may specialise in PL insurance or it may write PL as 
an adjunct to Employer’s Liability and Public Liability. So the risk may be spread to 
consumers of other products underwritten by the insurers, or other policy holders of 
the insurer who do not even buy PL insurance. In the second Case Study, Vaughan v 
Cranwell, the harness manufacturer will have purchased specialist aviation PL 
insurance. This is written in the aviation insurance market. Therefore the risk is 
internalised in this sector. Passengers buy tickets from airlines; airlines buy aircraft 
from aviation manufacturers; aviation manufacturers buy specialist aviation insurance. 
Thus the pool is funded by passengers of airlines.  
 
Pharmaceuticals present yet another variation. Medicines consumed in the UK will 
include both over the counter drugs and prescribed drugs. Prescription drugs are 
                                                          
857 Gregory C. Keating, ‘Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law of Accidents’ (n. 112) p. 226 
858 J Coleman, Risks and Wrongs (n. 329) p. 420 
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funded by taxpayers through Primary Care Trusts859 and so there is a large element 
of socialisation of risk in this sector.  
 
In other words, some PL risks are internalised whilst others are externalised. There is 
no single risk pool for PL. It cannot properly be said that there are necessarily 
homogeneous risk pools.860 The consequence of this is that the way PL is paid for by 
society is arbitrary and the distribution of rights does not work uniformly and 
consistently. This potentially causes unfairness.861 Insurance has grown in a 
seemingly dendritic manner at the same time both meeting and creating needs: 
sometimes compulsory sometimes not; sometimes first party; sometimes third party; 
sometimes permitting excesses and other times not.  
 
Insurance works inconsistently across the field of tort 
 
In compulsory insurance fields such as motor and employer’s liability, the legal liability 
will be backed by a compulsory policy of insurance thus guaranteeing payment of the 
injured party. The claimant must identify the tortfeasor and generally prove fault. In 
areas where insurance is not compulsory, the injured party must go further. He must 
find the tortfeasor but he may not be able to establish the insurance position and may 
have to invest considerable funds in pursuing a claim without the security of knowing 
that a judgment will be worth having. 
 
In other cases such as PL where strict liability is imposed under the normative banner 
of consumer protection, there is no compulsory insurance and therefore no guarantee 
that a successful action will lead to real compensation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
859 See generally National Prescribing Centre (NPC) Supporting rational local decision-making about 
medicines (and treatments) 
< http://www.npc.co.uk/local_decision_making/resources/handbook_complete.pdf > accessed 13 
September 2014  
860 Rob Merkin, ‘Tort, Insurance and Ideology: Further Thoughts’ (n. 133) p. 306 
861 Michael J. Trebilcock, ‘The Role of Insurance Considerations in the Choice of Efficient Civil Liability 
Rules’ Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Autumn, 1988), 243-265 p. 262 
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Insurers are not necessarily in control in PL 
 
Lewis suggests that  
 
‘in nine out of ten cases the real defendants are insurance companies, with 
the remainder comprising large self-insured organisations or public bodies 
… policyholders cede control over their case to their insurer and thereafter 
usually play little or no part in the litigation process.862  
 
The experience of the Practice is that whilst liability policies typically cede the power 
to Insurers to control the defence and settlement of claims, there is no consistency in 
how that power is used. Insurers typically run RTA claims. However, PL claims in the 
motor sector are handled differently. The norm is for the manufacturers to have a 
significant element of control and involvement in any litigation. It is their product at risk 
and they have their reputation at stake. The fact that a product may be mass-produced 
means that a single small claim can have repercussions for many other vehicles. In 
Case Study One, Martin v Kudo, even though it was a small claim, Kudo wanted the 
action fought and Kudo’s in-house Counsel attended the trial. Similar principles apply 
to a major air crash or a pharmaceutical disaster. The size and significance of the 
claim would be an important factor. In none of the claims within the PL Claims Survey 
at Appendix 4, could it be said that the insurer took control of the defence without the 
Insured’s input. 
 
Inconsistent treatment where lack of insurance cover 
 
The enforceability of awards is dependent on the defendant’s means or the insurance 
position. It is submitted that the fairness of tort with insurance as a distributive 
mechanism is undermined by inconsistent rules on claimants’ rights against insurers. 
The outcome can be dependent on something as unconnected with the claimant as 
whether the defendant notifies the claim in time. EL Insurers may not rely on late 
notice.863 However, the regulations make no provision for Insurers to make any direct 
payment to the claimant. Thus a claimant would have to obtain a judgment against the 
                                                          
862 Lewis, ‘Insurers and Personal Injury Litigation: Acknowledging the Elephant in the Living Room’ 
(n. 862) p. 6 
863 Employers Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Regulations 1998, Reg 2. (1) (a) 
249 | P a g e  
 
defendant, put the defendant into liquidation and then pursue a claim under the Third 
Party (Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930.864 Similarly motor insurers may not rely on 
late notice.865 The claimant can enforce a judgment, obtained against a driver, direct 
against the driver’s Insurer under s 151 (5) Road Traffic Act 1988. The claimant’s 
position is even more secure by virtue of Regulation 3 of The European Communities 
(Rights against Insurers) Regulations 2002,866 permitting the Claimant to proceed 
direct against the motor insurer. In addition, insurers fund the Motor Insurers Bureau 
which deals with claims against uninsured and untraced drivers.867 Public and PL 
insurers may rely on breach of condition precedent leaving the claimant unable to 
secure damages against a bankrupt defendant.868 
 
Thus broad assumptions about the role of insurance may be misleading in the field of 
PL. There is no sensible reason why motorists and employees enjoy secure 
enforcement but fault based liability, whereas ‘victims’ of defective products, deemed 
worthy of special protection by strict liability, do not have the security of direct rights 
against insurers. 
 
The uninsured defendant 
 
Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the 
welfare of society as a whole cannot override. For this reason justice 
denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good 
shared by others. It does not allow that the sacrifices imposed on a few 
are outweighed by the larger sum of advantages enjoyed by many.869 
 
 
                                                          
864 At the time of writing the Third Party (Rights Against Insurers) Act 2010 has not yet come into force. 
When it does, a significant change would be that the Claimant would not have to obtain a judgment 
against the Insured before pursuing the insurer 
865 Road Traffic Act 1988 s 148 (5) 
866 Enforcing DIRECTIVE 2009/103/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
of 16 September 2009 relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, 
and the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability (codified version) ‘Article 18  Direct 
right of action: Member States shall ensure that any party injured as a result of an accident caused by 
a vehicle covered by insurance as referred to in Article 3 enjoys a direct right of action against the 
insurance undertaking covering the person responsible against civil liability.’ 
867 See MIB website < http://www.mib.org.uk/Home/en/default.htm > accessed 12 October 2014  
868 The Insurance Act 2015 is not in force at the time of writing and the operation of the Financial 
Ombudsman Service is ignored for present purposes, whilst accepting that it will ameliorate the effects 
of breaches of condition by insured consumers and micro-enterprises. 
869 Rawls, A Theory of Justice  (n. 756)  
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Jackson LJ’s statement that the defendant is ‘almost’ invariably insured acknowledges 
by implication that the defendant is not invariably insured. There will be defendants 
who are not insured. Indeed Kudo bore a deductible within which the claim would have 
fallen, had its settlement offer been accepted. Jackson LJ was concerned that if 
claimants were liable for a successful defendant’s costs, they would be exposed to the 
risk of ruinous costs orders. Equally, if uninsured defendants were liable for claimants’ 
costs, they could potentially face ruinous costs orders, (albeit that Kudo would not 
have fallen into this category). 
 
Jackson LJ did, to a degree, take this into account in his proposed formulation: 
 
Costs ordered against the claimant in any claim for personal injuries or 
clinical negligence shall not exceed the amount (if any) which is a 
reasonable one for him to pay having regard to all the circumstances 
including: 
(a) the financial resources of all the parties to the proceedings, and 
(b) their conduct in connection with the dispute to which the proceedings 
relate.870 
 
This is why the system was termed ‘Qualified’.  
  
2.6 The system would be ‘qualified’ so that a costs order could still be 
granted against the claimant in cases where the claimant is judged to have 
acted unreasonably in relation to the claim; is sufficiently wealthy, and/or 
the defendant is an uninsured individual or otherwise of limited means.
871  
 
Jackson LJ saw one-way cost shifting as ‘the only sensible way’ to give effect to social 
policy: the targeting of only those who need costs protection.872  
 
8.2.3 The merits no longer determine the outcome 
 
The one-sidedness of the arrangement was partially justified by referring back to pre-
Woolf Legal Aid funding in which plaintiffs rarely recovered any costs: the legal aid 
shield.873 In fact this worked differently to QOCS. Legal Aid was administered by the 
Legal Aid Board which was an independent body. Applicants were subject to a means 
                                                          
870 The Jackson Report (n. 6) p. 190 [4.8] 
871 Impact Assessment Qualified One-Way Cost Shifting IA no: MoJ 40 15/11/2010 [punctuation as 
original]. 
872 The Jackson Report (n. 6) p. 5.1 p. 88 [5.1] 
873 The Jackson Report (n. 6) p. 184 [1.3] 
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test and a merits test. This was a genuine merits test, in that a plaintiff had to persuade 
the Board that he had a good case. Moreover, the Board could recover a contribution 
to costs from the recipient of Legal Aid, subject to means, and impose a statutory 
charge on a successful plaintiff’s property.874 The difference after the Woolf reforms is 
that the only merits test was with an After The Event (ATE) Insurer. However, if 
claimants usually win, regardless of the true merits, then the threshold for gaining the 
support needed from an ATE Insurer will consequently be very low. Indeed, the fact 
that ATE insurers do not impose excesses or deductibles, or even charge premiums 
if the case is lost, suggests that they have no need to limit moral hazard. There are no 
statutory restrictions on denying cover or avoiding policies. Their investment in 
litigation was secure and profitable.   
 
The motivation for the Woolf reforms had essentially been the spiralling cost to the 
Legal Aid Budget.875 As with the Jackson reforms, subsequently, there was no 
consideration of why litigation was booming. The issue for discussion was the cost, 
not whether all the litigation was beneficial to society. This would have involved 
questioning the substantive law in addition to the procedure. Ultimately, all that was 
done was to change the procedure to redistribute the cost of litigation. The process 
has been repeated by Jackson. 
 
The merits of the claim continue to be as irrelevant, since the substitution of QOCS for 
recoverable ATE insurance, as they were before the Jackson reforms. All that is 
required is to persuade a lawyer to take the case. As there is no costs risk for a 
claimant, the pressure should be so great on defendants to settle, that the risk taken 
on by the claimant’s lawyer should be minimal. The claimant’s lawyer gambles that the 
particular defendant is willing and able to spend over the odds to achieve a nuisance 
settlement rather than risk incurring irrecoverable costs in disputing the claim. The 
commercial choice for Kudo, had QOCS applied, would have been whether to pay 
£30,000 to defend the case successfully to trial or something less than £30,000 to 
                                                          
874 See Legal Aid Act 1988 s 16 
875 Michael E. Stamp, ‘Are the Woolf Reforms an Antidote for the Cost Disease--The Problem of the 
Increasing Cost of Litigation and English Attempts at a Solution’, Journal of International Law, Vol. 22, 
Iss. 2, Art. 4 p. 351 
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settle the case regardless of its merits. There seems to be no difference in the practical 
outcome of a given case to the outcome under the system that Jackson was criticising: 
 
The Jackson Review criticised the recoverability of CFA success fees and 
ATE premiums because the regime produced unfortunate unintended 
consequences, namely (a) litigants with CFAs had little interest in 
controlling the costs which were being incurred on their behalf and (b) 
opposing litigants faced a massively increased costs liability. The same 
was true of legal aid cases where claimants who were not liable to make 
contributions, since all legally aided claimants were effectively insulated 
from adverse costs orders: the result was referred to as ‘legal aid 
blackmail’ by defendants.876 
 
By contrast the ‘loser pays’ system of costs apportionment (favoured by Demolin, 
Brulard, Barthelemy in their report to the European Commission on the transparency 
of costs)877 was introduced as long ago as the 12th Century to ‘put a check on litigation’, 
although by the 16th Century one-way cost shifting operated for most personal 
injury.878 Jackson later appears to have recognised the importance of the claimant 
having a stake in the risks of litigation: 
 
A regime in which both parties have some responsibility for costs is 
necessary to encourage reasonable litigation behaviour and to promote 
control over the costs being incurred on both sides.879 
 
Jackson reported the concern of some respondents to his consultation, that one-way 
cost shifting would encourage bad claims.880 In expressing his own view he simply 
said that there are ‘sound policy reasons’ to continue the costs protection of claimants 
– impliedly access to litigation. Without insulation against costs, claimants could not 
afford to pursue claims.  Yet this is inconsistent with his acknowledgement that: 
 
                                                          
876  Christopher Hodges, John Peysner and Angus Nurse Research Report, Litigation Funding: Status 
and Issues January 2012 < http://www.csls.ox.ac.uk/documents/ReportonLitigationFunding.pdf > 
accessed 12 October 2014  
877 Demolin, Brulard, Barthelemy, Study on the Transparency of Costs of Civil Judicial Proceedings in 
the European Union Final Report to the European Commission: Contract JLS/2006/C4/007-30-CE-
0097604/00-36 pp. 330/331 <Demolin Transparency of Costs>  accessed 21 July 2014  
878 Winky So, ‘A brief history of the law of costs - lessons for the Jackson reforms and Beyond’ (n. 818) 
879 Rupert Jackson: Sir Rupert Jackson’s brief reply to Professor Oliphant’s Report 16th May 2011 
< http://ectil.org/etl/getdoc/774d731d-d399-4f12-9899-fb77f58686bd/responsetooliphant3.aspx > p. 6 
[6.2] accessed 18 July 2014  
880 The Jackson Report (n. 6) p. 188 [3.5] 
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A regime under which one party – win or lose – pays nothing in costs, while 
the other party is exposed to substantially increased costs liability is 
hopelessly lopsided.881 
 
But it is not necessarily correct that the claimant needs insulation from costs exposure. 
Solutions such as ATE insurance in which the claimant pays no premium even if he 
loses, or QOCS, which renders a costs award against the claimant unenforceable if 
he loses, cannot be justified by claiming that they allow those with successful claims 
to risk pursuing them. Those with successful claims will win back their costs. QOCS is 
protecting those who lose: those who do not have a valid claim. Without any stake in 
the outcome, a claimant, who is not responsible for the ATE insurance premium882 and 
has no excess or deductible to meet if a claim has to be paid, has what amounts to 
free bet.  
 
This debases the justice system and mirrors a problem that has plagued the US 
system: 
 
The American rule makes the civil justice system as a whole unnecessarily 
costly by encouraging the filing of such lawsuits, which defendants must 
either settle quickly or defend against at significant cost. Such low-merit 
legal cases clog the American legal system and raise the cost of goods 
and services to consumers by forcing businesses that are sued to cover 
their legal expenses by raising prices.883 
 
Lewis makes the valid point that the niceties of tort law books become irrelevant where 
smaller claims are concerned.884 Defendants substitute rules of thumb for strict rules 
of tort. It is too expensive to instruct experts to analyse accident circumstances and 
cases are dealt with by paperwork alone. This is certainly the experience of the 
Practice with regard to non-PL small claims. The position is different for PL claims 
                                                          
881 Rupert Jackson: Sir Rupert Jackson’s brief reply to Professor Oliphant’s Report (n. 879) p.6 [6.2] 
882 Typically premiums were self-insured so that they only became payable if the Claimant won (and 
were then paid out of the recovery from the defendant). This remains the case, see for example Box 
Legal’s website < http://www.boxlegal.co.uk/paying_the_premium/ > accessed 3 October 2014  
‘How is the ATE Insurance Premium Paid if a Personal Injury Claim is Unsuccessful? 
It is normally part of the After the Event Insurance policy that the ATE Insurance premium does 
not need to be paid if the case is lost or abandoned, and this is true with all ClaimSafe ATE 
Insurance policies.’ 
883 Marie Gryphon, ‘Assessing the Effects of a “Loser Pays” Rule on the American Legal System: an 
Economic Analysis and Proposal for Reform’ Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy Spring 2011 Vol 
8:3 567-612 p. 568 
884  Richard Lewis and Annette Morris, ‘Challenging views of tort: Part 1’ J.P.I. Law 2013, 2, 69-80 p. 
76 
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largely because of reputational concerns. Even small claims are often resisted and 
independent expert evidence is obtained and, if supportive of a defence, used to resist 
claims. 
 
8.2.4 Qualified One-Way Costs Shifting was based on a flawed impact assessment 
 
Financial inequality was initially assumed 
 
Not only does the current incarnation of QOCS fail to reflect the recommendations of 
Jackson but the Impact Assessment for its implementation is wholly misleading. There 
are gaps in the logic that led to the version of the rule now implemented.   The 
underlying premise is that QOCS applies where the parties are financially unequal: 
 
A package of reforms is being considered that aims to reduce costs 
overall. Part of that package includes a proposal that in certain types of 
case where the financial position of the parties is sufficiently unequal 
defendants should always be liable for their own costs, even if they are 
successful …885 
 
The Ministry of Justice, however, published a Written Ministerial Statement of its 
intentions for implementation saying: 
 
 i. QOCS will apply to all claimants whatever their means; there is to be no 
financial test to determine eligibility;  
 
ii. Subject to the provisions below, claimants who lose will not have to 
contribute towards defendants’ costs (there is to be no minimum payment 
by a losing claimant);886 
 
The Civil Justice Council responded to the Ministry of Justice consultation by stating: 
 
It seemed to us that if there is to be no consideration of the claimant’s 
means then there should be no consideration either of the defendant’s 
means. It would follow from this that uninsured defendants facing personal 
injury claims would be precluded from arguing that they should benefit 
from what would amount to QOCS in reverse (where the claimant would 
stand to lose the QOCS shield because the defendant was impecunious) 
as a consequence of their status alone.887 
                                                          
885 Impact Assessment Qualified One-Way Cost Shifting (n. 871) 
886 Djanogly, Ministry of Justice, Written Ministerial Statement Tuesday 17 July 2012 
 <http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Reports/wms-civil-litigation-costs-
17072012.pdf > accessed 3 October 2014 
887 Civil Justice Council ‘Response To Ministry of Justice Commissioning Note entitled “Implementation 
Of Part 2 Of The Legal Aid, Sentencing And Punishment Of Offenders Act 2012: Civil Litigation Funding 
And Costs – Issues For Further Consideration By The Civil Justice Council’   June 2012 p. 8 [16] 
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This is a logical non sequitur. The fact that there is no consideration of the claimant’s 
financial position means that the claimant can litigate with impunity. The defendant, on 
the other hand, if uninsured, will face potential ruin whether he wins or loses. This is a 
curious distribution of rights. It purports to shift the burden from ‘claimants’ to 
‘defendants’. However, there is in reality no class of defendants within society. It is an 
artificial compartmentalisation. Defendants only become defendants when a claimant 
chooses to sue them. Defendants have no choice in the matter: they join this transient 
group at another person’s suit. At this point they become exposed to the risk of 
significant financial loss. What is really meant by ‘defendants’, is liability insurers. 
However, this is an equally imprecise grouping for the reasons discussed above. 
 
It is submitted that such an outcome is unjust. It imposes a burden (or even a 
punishment in the sense of a financial penalty) on a person who has done no wrong 
and caused no harm, simply on the basis that a notional class of defendants as a 
whole generally pay less in costs under the reformed rules than they would have done 
before the reform. This may be of no benefit to an individual defendant, who is not an 
insurer with a book of claims across which the vicissitudes of litigation are able to 
counterbalance each other. 
 
As Jackson pointed out 
 
The most recent Social Trends report shows that 73% of all households 
have savings (made up of securities, shares, currency and deposits) of 
less than £10,000. Defence costs can easily be many times higher than 
£10,000 in fully-contested litigation.888 
 
The right to a fair trial is potentially infringed 
 
This brings into question whether QOCS potentially infringes Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights which provides: 
 
Article 6  
Right to a fair trial 
1 In the determination of his civil rights and obligations … everyone is 
entitled to a fair … hearing …889 
 
                                                          
888The Jackson Report (n. 6) p. 184 [1.2] 
889 European Convention of Human Rights as implemented in the UK by Human Rights Act 1998 
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It is difficult to envisage how an uninsured defendant can possibly have a fair hearing 
in the knowledge that he will have to pay for his defence without any hope of recovery 
from the claimant, who can launch court proceedings with impunity. It is anticipated 
that it may not be long before this issue comes before the courts. In Coventry v 
Lawrence890 Lord Neuberger considered the argument that the pre-Jackson costs 
regime might infringe Article 6 ECHR. Here the claimants succeeded in the Supreme 
Court in reinstating a judgment of the first instance court that had been overturned in 
the Court of Appeal, against a motor-sports stadium, in a nuisance claim in respect of 
noise. The stadium owners argued that the costs order against them infringed Article 
6 ECHR. Lord Neuberger noted the judgment of the European Court in Mirror Group 
v UK891 in which it was held that the requirement for Mirror Group to pay success fees 
was disproportionate against a wealthy claimant, Naomi Campbell, who succeeded in 
a claim against the Mirror based on a breach of confidence in publishing the fact that 
she was receiving drug counselling. The European court held that the costs award 
constituted a breach of article 10, the right to freedom of expression.  
 
The European Court had found in trying to balance the newspaper’s right to freedom 
of expression with Ms Campbell’s right to a fair trial, that the CFA scheme with 
recoverable success fees ‘exceeded even the broad margin of appreciation to be 
accorded to the state in respect of general measures pursuing social and economic 
interests.’892 
 
In Coventry v Lawrence, Lord Neuberger said that the issue of whether the costs 
regime introduced by the Access to Justice Act 1999, and in particular a claimant’s 
right to recover any success fee and ATE premium from an unsuccessful defendant, 
infringes the Convention, is one which it is open to the Court to reconsider. However, 
he felt that the Government should have the right to address the court on the subject 
because:  
 
a determination by a United Kingdom court that the provisions of the 1999 
Act infringed article 6 could have very serious consequences for the 
Government. Although the Strasbourg court would not be bound by the 
                                                          
890 Coventry and Ors v Lawrence and Another (no2) [2014] UKSC 46  On appeal from: [2012] EWCA 
Civ 26 
891 Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd v United Kingdom (2011) 53 E.H.R.R. 5  
892 Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd v United Kingdom (n. 891) [217] 
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determination, it would, I suspect, be likely to agree or accept that 
conclusion, so that those litigants who had been “victims” of those 
provisions could well have a claim for compensation against the 
government for infringement of their article 6 rights.893 
 
It was remarked by Lord Neuberger that ‘the relevant provisions of the 1990 and 1999 
Acts894 have been repealed and replaced by a far less unsatisfactory system’. That 
system is QOCS and there appears to be no recognition of the inequality of arms in 
litigation argument outlined above in this Chapter. The arguments have now been 
heard by the Supreme Court and judgment is awaited at the time of writing. 
 
More recently in Wagenaar895 the Court of Appeal rejected an argument that QOCS 
was Ultra Vires. The court recognised that ‘the QOCS regime is part of a wholesale 
reform of the funding of personal injury litigation … If QOCS were to be struck down, 
there would need to be a complete rethink of the entire Jackson reform programme as 
it affects personal injury litigation.’896 
 
Impossible success criteria 
 
This, however, is not a good reason for failing to strike it down if it is wrong and it is 
argued here that the reform program is as flawed as the system it has replaced.  The 
Ministry of Justice’s Impact Assessment for the ‘Cumulative Jackson Proposals’897 
sets as the key success criterion: ‘… to ensure that parties who need to bring or defend 
a claim are able to do so…’ It has been shown above that the rules as framed cannot 
achieve this goal because the ‘unqualified’ cost shifting regime now in place will 
prevent some defendants from being able to defend a claim. Jackson had asked: 
 
16…And is the approach to proportionality to be the same for defendants’ 
costs as it is for those of claimants? Such issues will have to be worked 
out, but the working out will involve the Judges exercising that quality 
which they are pre-eminently expected to have, namely judgement.898  
 
                                                          
893 Coventry and Ors v Lawrence and Another (no2) (n. 890)   
894 Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 and the Access to Justice Act 1999 
895 Wagenaar v Weekend Travel Limited and Serradj [2014] EWCA Civ 1105 
896 Wagenaar v Weekend Travel Limited and Serradj [2014] (n. 895) 
897 Impact Assessment Cumulative Jackson Proposals Royal Assent (n. 817) 
898 The Jackson Report (n. 6) p. 38 [5.17] 
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As implemented, this is taken out of the Judges’ hands. The rules do not permit a 
defendant to enforce a costs judgment - except in very limited circumstances, 
unrelated to any hardship the defendant may suffer. 
 
Inadequate financial analysis 
  
More worrying still is the lack of financial analysis of the proposed reforms. The 
Cumulative Jackson Proposal Impact Assessment, in considering the costs and 
benefits of the proposals, admitted: 
 
This Impact Assessment identifies impacts on individuals, groups and 
businesses in the UK, with the aim of understanding what the overall 
impact to society might be from implementing the policy package …These 
might include how the proposals impact differently on particular groups of 
society, and the value of any distributional change.  
… distributional impacts are difficult to quantify ... the majority of the 
financial implications on different parties cannot be sensibly monetised. 
This stems from a lack of robust baseline data, which prevents us from 
being able to aggregate the impacts on each group, as well the fact that 
we do not have the necessary data and evidence to quantify how the 
baseline factors would change in the future. 899  
 
If the cost of the reform cannot be predicted, this is tantamount to admitting that the 
reforms are worth implementing regardless of cost. There is no dispute that the 
existing system needed reform but this is not a sound basis for the particular reform 
selected. The generalisation (based on the false premise that QOCS was to be 
qualified) that the reforms ‘are likely to have positive implications for economic 
growth’900 is beside the point. It is not based on any reliable financial data. Nor is the 
suggestion, however accurate, that the reforms are ‘likely to increase competition 
between law firms’.901 As benefits to society, these must rank far below the real 
distributional goals of enabling proportionate litigation to enforce rights. The 
Cumulative Impact Assessment admits: ‘It is possible that a large number of cases 
might be settled less fairly than they are now. A range of wider social and economic 
costs apply when cases are not settled fairly enough’.902  
 
 
                                                          
899 Impact Assessment Cumulative Jackson Proposals Royal Assent (n. 817) [2.1 – 2.3] 
900 Impact Assessment Cumulative Jackson Proposals Royal Assent (n. 817) [2.157] 
901 Impact Assessment Cumulative Jackson Proposals Royal Assent (n. 817) [4.1] 
902 Impact Assessment Cumulative Jackson Proposals Royal Assent (n. 817) [2.14] 
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De facto threshold for litigation 
 
Lord Dyson was concerned that ‘reductions to legal aid will inevitably cause an 
increase in the number of litigants in person, putting increased pressure on courts at 
a time when budgets are being reduced.’903 The same principle applies to the funding 
of civil claims. The Cumulative Impact Assessment acknowledged: 
 
The proposals may lead to some claimants not pursuing cases in future or 
litigating in person, in particular claimants with weaker cases, claimants 
with damages which are low compared to the legal costs involved, or 
claimants seeking a remedy other than damages.904 
 
In effect, the imposition of limited cost recovery on low value claims is designed to 
introduce a threshold for litigation. If defendants cannot recover costs in low value 
claims, it is commercially more attractive to settle than spend thousands of pounds on 
a defence. From the claimant’s point of view, if there is so little profit in pursuing small 
claims, lawyers will not take these cases on. This leaves claimants the choice of 
abandoning the claim or litigating in person. Claims by litigants in person can be 
disadvantageous to the smooth and efficient running of the justice system. Because 
litigants in person are unlikely to be familiar with the law and the rules of procedure, it 
is likely that they will bring a greater number of bad claims and require more procedural 
assistance from the courts. It is too early to evaluate whether this is happening. The 
experience of the Practice is that there is some evidence that this may be the case. 
There is a sense that the County Courts are experiencing delays and backlogs but 
there is insufficient experience to present this as hard evidence. It needs to be 
monitored over the next year or two. An example of this is Case 128 in the PL Claims 
Survey at Appendix 4. This is a claim in which the vehicle in which the alleged defect 
existed was first supplied more than 10 years ago. There is therefore a firm defence 
under s 11A (3) Limitation Act 1980 which has extinguished the Claimant’s right of 
action under the Consumer Protection Act 1987. The Claimant’s lawyers had dropped 
out of the case, presumably because they realised that there is no way around the 
limitation defence (other than trying to base a claim in negligence which would be 
extremely difficult). However, the claimant decided to continue on her own. The 
defendant had the choice of settling the claim for perhaps £5,000 or spending £10,000 
                                                          
903 Catherine Baksi, ‘Brace yourself for unprecedented change, says master of rolls’ Law Society 
Gazette 19 October 2012 
904 Impact Assessment Cumulative Jackson Proposals Royal Assent (n. 817) [2.88] 
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- £15,000 defending the case to trial. In the event, the defendant obtained summary 
judgment with costs – ordered not to be enforceable in accordance with QOCS. 
 
8.2.5 Reducing the level of recoverable costs does not necessarily achieve a fair result 
 
It might be argued that if this case is one of many handled by an insurer, the cost will 
be balanced by the benefits of fixed costs in low value claims and the irrecoverability 
of CFA success fees and ATE premiums.  
 
There are two reasons to doubt this argument in PL cases. First, it is not agreed that 
this compromise should be accepted as a fair distribution of rights. The claimant above 
in case 128 had no claim in law. The substantive and limitation law make this clear. 
However, the procedural changes are in effect overriding the law to provide the 
claimant with a windfall ‘remedy’ if the defendant is forced to make a nuisance 
settlement. It is submitted that procedural changes should not have quasi-substantive 
effects - absolute liability regardless of causation - by holding the defendant to ransom. 
Second, there are a number of procedural anomalies applicable to PL claims which 
mean that producers do not necessarily benefit from the simplified reformed 
procedure. Based on an analysis of 5,041 EL cases, 3,528 public liability cases and 
21,089 RTA cases, the Cumulative Impact Assessment noted that ‘[Public Liability] 
cases would be most affected once the reforms are implemented whilst RTA claims 
would be least affected. EL claims are somewhere in the middle.’905 There is no 
mention of PL cases. PL cases may fall into any of these categories depending on the 
context. However, they do not fall within the definitions of EL, RTA claims or Public 
Liability for the purposes of the low value protocols introduced as part of the Jackson 
reforms. There are two such protocols: the Pre-Action Protocol for Low Value Personal 
Injury Claims in Road Traffic Accidents;906 and the Pre-Action Protocol for Low Value 
Personal Injury (Employers’ Liability and Public Liability) Claims.907 Claims under 
these protocols are commenced in the Ministry of Justice Portal and there are fixed 
                                                          
905 Impact Assessment Cumulative Jackson Proposals Royal Assent (n. 817) [1.32] 
906 < http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/protocol/pre-action-protocol-for-low-value-
personal-injury-claims-in-road-traffic-accidents-31-july-2013#I > accessed 24 April 2015 
907 < http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/protocol/pre-action-protocol-for-low-value-
personal-injury-employers-liability-and-public-liability-claims > accessed 24 April 2015 
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costs applicable at various stages. Cases that settle within the Portal have lower fixed 
costs than those which settle outside the Portal. 
 
In addition there is a fixed recoverable costs provision in road traffic accidents 
occurring on or after 6 October 2003 and before 31 July 2013 settling without issue of 
proceedings for damages not exceeding £10,000.908 This provision predates the Portal 
and does not apply to claims brought under the protocol. It will become redundant 
soon as all low value RTA claims will be commenced under the protocol. 
 
In each case there are reasons why the procedures with their lower costs provisions 
do not apply to PL claims. The fixed costs regime predating the Portal applies to 
accidents ‘resulting in bodily injury to any person or damage to property caused by, or 
arising out of, the use of a motor vehicle on a road or other public place...’ The Practice 
has found itself arguing about whether an accident arising from a defect while the 
vehicle was being used on a road arose from ‘use on a road’ (see for example case 
70 in the PL Claims Survey at Appendix 4 in which a driver’s seat detached while 
driving on a dual carriageway). Another anomaly is where the accident happens on 
the owner’s driveway rather than on a road or public place (see for example case 111 
in the PL Claims Survey at Appendix 4 in which the driver was injured by a defective 
airbag deploying while the car was stationary in the drive). The same accident would 
fall within the fixed costs regime on the road but not on the drive. There is no logic to 
the separation. The explanation for the distinction is that the regime was not designed 
for PL cases. It was designed for collisions between cars on the road. Of course, the 
regime is also inapplicable to products that are not vehicles. 
 
Similarly, the Protocol for low value RTAs applies to accidents after 30 April 2010 
caused by, or arising out of, the use of a motor vehicle on a road or other public place. 
Again, it will not apply to products that are not motor vehicles nor will it affect accidents 
that are not on a road or public place. More importantly, under clause 4.4 of the 
protocol, it does not apply to  
 
                                                          
908 CPR 45.9 
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a claim  (1) in respect of a breach of duty owed to a road user by a person 
who is not a road user.909 
 
This means that the protocol will not apply to a manufacturer even if a breach of duty 
is alleged, as the manufacturer will not be another road user. The justification for this 
is that typical RTAs can be analysed simplistically according to rules of thumb (eg a 
driver who hits another vehicle from behind is at fault)910 – whereas PL is based on 
proving the existence of a causative defect. This may require complex technical 
evidence to demonstrate whether there was a pre-existing defect or simply a failure of 
the product as a result of the accident. For example in case number 21 in the PL 
Claims Survey at Appendix 4 where the claimant’s expert was unable to say whether 
failure of the wheel was a cause or an effect of the collision, there was no provable 
claim and the claimant eventually discontinued. Under CPR 38.6 the claimant was 
liable for the defendant manufacturer’s costs, which were paid by ATE insurers. Under 
the current procedure, no order for costs would have been enforceable in accordance 
with CPR 44.14 – 44.16 as there was no misconduct, dishonesty or abuse of process. 
 
The Employers’/Public Liability Protocol applies to ‘claims by an employee against 
their employer for damages arising from—(a) a bodily injury sustained by the 
employee in the course of employment’. This will not include a typical consumer claim 
for a defective product. Next considering whether a PL claim could fall to be treated 
as Public Liability, the critical defining factor is that there must be a claim arising out 
of ‘a breach of a statutory or common law duty of care’. This means that a PL claim 
will only fall within the Public Liability protocol if the basis of claim is a breach of a duty 
of care rather than strict liability under s2 Consumer Protection Act 1987. This will 
depend on whether there is an allegation of negligence. Taking Case Study 1, Martin 
v Kudo, for example, the initial letter of claim included: 
 
The reason why we are alleging negligence is that there appears to be a 
fault with the handbrake and as such the mechanism was unsafe and not 
fit for purpose. 
 
Thus a similar claim today could fall within the Protocol as a Public Liability Claim 
although it is unclear whether this was ever intended. However, if the allegation had 
                                                          
909 Low Value RTA protocol (n. 906) [4.4] 
910 Lewis, ‘Insurers and Personal Injury Litigation: Acknowledging the Elephant in the Living Room’ 
(n. 743) p. 5 
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simply been under s2 Consumer Protection Act 1987 then the claim would not have 
been for breach of duty of care and would not fit within the protocol.  
 
The recent procedural reforms, culminating in the Jackson reforms, have introduced 
a number of bespoke targeted procedures for particular types of claim – with a view to 
improving the overall efficiency of dealing with them and thus reducing the costs.  
 
Zuckerman has been critical of the change from a trans-substantive procedure 
(broadly one civil procedure for all types of litigation) to a retrograde ‘Balkanisation of 
civil procedure’ (in other words a multiplicity of procedures to suit different categories, 
sizes and forms of litigation).911 The contrary argument is that whilst a multiplicity of 
procedures can be confusing, claims vary in substantive and procedural complexity 
and it is unrealistic to apply a single set of rules to all cases. Jackson pointed out that 
whilst personal injury litigation was most sharply in focus, it only accounts for 5% of all 
proceedings issued in the County Courts and High Court.912 However, the Jackson 
Report does not mention PL at all, even to exclude PL claims from its ambit. PL 
appears to have been overlooked rather than having been deliberately omitted. PL 
falls into the general category of claims for personal injuries under CPR 44.13 so that 
QOCS applies. But PL neither has a special procedure nor fits within the procedures 
for RTA or EL/Public Liability claims designed to provide defendants with costs 
benefits as a quid pro quo for QOCS. 
 
8.3 Unacceptable role of chance in tort claims 
 
PL fails the fairness test for distributive justice on the grounds that chance plays a 
‘normatively unacceptable role’913 in the distribution. It is argued that society should 
protect its citizens from ‘brute luck’ over which they have no control but not ‘option 
luck’ which reflects their own gambles or bad choices.914 
 
                                                          
911 Adrian Zuckerman, ‘The Jackson Final Report on Costs: plastering the cracks to shore up a 
dysfunctional system’ (n. 820) p. 276 
912 Rupert Jackson: Sir Rupert Jackson’s brief reply to Professor Oliphant’s Report (n. 879) p.4 [3.9] 
913 Ronen Avraham, ‘Accident law for egalitarians’ (n. 118) p. 216 
914 Ronen Avraham, ‘Accident law for egalitarians’ (n. 118) p. 192, borrowing the terms from Ronald 
Dworkin, ‘What Is Equality. Part 2: Equality of Resources’ 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283, 293 (1981). 
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Luck plays a part in the causation of accidents and in the amount of compensation 
arising from an accident, but more importantly it plays a major role in the procedure 
for determining claims. If one were to design a complete system of compensation to 
meet the needs of injured people today, one of the key criteria, it is suggested, would 
be certainty. Claimants should not be embarking on litigation on the mere chance that 
they will succeed. If the right to compensation is one that society recognises as 
beneficial to all ‘victims’ then the requirement for one party to win and the other to lose 
a private contest seems counterintuitive because it leads to uncertainty.  
 
This uncertainty is exacerbated by the system of Part 36 offers. These are particularly 
problematic because they require each party’s lawyer to make an assessment of the 
value of the case. The objective is to discourage claimants from over-claiming and 
defendants from undervaluing and to encourage parties to settle rather than proceed 
to trial.915 Where a defendant makes a part 36 offer which the claimant fails to beat, 
                                                          
915 Costs consequences following judgment  
36.17  
(1) Subject to rule 36.21, this rule applies where upon judgment being entered—  
(a) a claimant fails to obtain a judgment more advantageous than a defendant’s Part 36 offer; or  
(b) judgment against the defendant is at least as advantageous to the claimant as the proposals 
contained in a claimant’s Part 36 offer.  
(Rule 36.21 makes provision for the costs consequences following judgment in certain personal injury 
claims where the claim no longer proceeds under the RTA or EL/PL Protocol.)  
(2) For the purposes of paragraph (1), in relation to any money claim or money element of a claim, 
“more advantageous” means better in money terms by any amount, however small, and “at least as 
advantageous” shall be construed accordingly.  
(3) Subject to paragraphs (7) and (8), where paragraph (1)(a) applies, the court must, unless it considers 
it unjust to do so, order that the defendant is entitled to—  
(a) costs (including any recoverable pre-action costs) from the date on which the relevant period 
expired; and  
(b) interest on those costs.  
(4) Subject to paragraph (7), where paragraph (1)(b) applies, the court must, unless it considers it unjust 
to do so, order that the claimant is entitled to—  
(a) interest on the whole or part of any sum of money (excluding interest) awarded, at a rate not 
exceeding 10% above base rate for some or all of the period starting with the date on which the relevant 
period expired;  
(b) costs (including any recoverable pre-action costs) on the indemnity basis from the date on which 
the relevant period expired;  
(c) interest on those costs at a rate not exceeding 10% above base rate; and  
(d) provided that the case has been decided and there has not been a previous order under this 
sub-paragraph, an additional amount, which shall not exceed £75,000, calculated by applying the 
prescribed percentage set out below to an amount which is— 
 
i) the sum awarded to the claimant by the court; or  
(ii) where there is no monetary award, the sum 
awarded to the claimant by the court in respect of 
costs—  
Amount awarded by the court  
 
 
 
Prescribed percentage  
Up to £500,000  10% of the amount awarded  
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the defendant may set off, against the damages awarded, his costs wasted since the 
offer could have been accepted – because QOCS only prevents the defendant from 
recovering costs over and above ‘the aggregate amount in money terms of any orders 
for damages and interest made in favour of the claimant.’916 Similarly a defendant who 
fails to beat a claimant’s offer suffers a range of penalties under part 36.17 (3) including 
penalty interest, part indemnity costs and a pro rata financial penalty of up to £75,000. 
The price for failing to accept a well-pitched Part 36 offer is deliberately punitive and 
may be disastrous for a litigant. 
 
A claimant may potentially lose all of his damages for being too ‘greedy’. Yet how does 
he know what is greedy and what is fair? He has to be guided by his lawyer, for whom 
‘part 36 throws up all manner of problems’;917 and who often cannot give a precise 
figure; and who certainly will not be giving guarantees.  Therefore a slight 
misjudgement, or difference of opinion from the trial judge, could cost a claimant 
dearly. The claimant may have done nothing other than follow professional advice (no 
doubt sufficiently caveated to prevent an E & O claim). 
 
The concept of Part 36 offers was a creation of the Woolf Reforms, extending the 
previous procedure for making a payment into court. Zander observed that the rule of 
payments into court  
 
depends for its effect on the plaintiff's fear that failure to accept the offer 
paid-in will result in his losing much of the damages, in having to pay his 
opponent's costs and his own.918  
 
He noted Lord Denning’s displeasure at the effect of a rule that could override the 
Judge’s award by depriving the plaintiff of her due damages but accepted that it was 
in the ‘public good’ not to allow litigants to go to court and run up costs with impunity.919 
Zander considered possible reforms to the rule, one of which would be to abolish it. In 
                                                          
Above £500,000  10% of the first £500,000 and (subject to the limit 
of £75,000) 5% of any amount above that figure.  
 
916 CPR 44.14 
917 Tony Lawton, ‘The perils and pitfalls of personal injury practice’ J.P.I. Law 2013, 4, 254-260 
918  Michael Zander, ‘Is the English Payment-Into-Court Rule Worth Copying?’ Rabels Zeitschrift für 
Ausländisches und Internationales Privatrecht / The Rabel Journal of Comparative and International 
Private Law, 40. Jahrg., H. 3/4, Der Schutz Desschwächeren im Recht (1976), 750-758 
919 Findlay v Railway Executive [1950] 2 All ER 969 
266 | P a g e  
 
this respect he suggested that it would have the merit of ‘reducing the Russian roulette 
aspects of the system’ although more cases would be fought to conclusion. He posed 
the question: ‘what value is attached to the maximising of the number of settlements 
on the one hand, against on the other to seeing that defendants are not forced by rules 
of procedure to settle on unfavourable terms?’ He acknowledged that research would 
be required into the outcomes of cases to answer this. What is beyond doubt now is 
that whilst Lord Woolf was mindful of the fine line between incentivising litigants to 
settle sensibly and placing them under undue pressure,920 Part 36 does force 
defendants to settle on unfavourable terms and even to settle cases for a ‘nuisance 
value’ where there is no liability.  
 
Higgins seeks to justify QOCS on fairness and efficiency grounds arguing that it 
improves access to justice for prospective claimants with arguable claims, by ending 
the need for ATE insurance in return for caps on damages based agreements and 
success fees, and bans on referral fees. More importantly he seeks to offer the 
machinery of Part 36 as a justification for QOCS on the basis that it acts as a brake 
and therefore ‘promotes proportionate use of the legal process’. This argument fails 
for the fundamental reason that it is premised on the assumption that reshuffling the 
cost of litigation is a beneficial objective in itself: a ‘vital public service for the 
enforcement of rights.’921 This is a case of dividing the pie rather than first determining 
whether it is good to eat.  
 
Higgins acknowledges that defendants who are not ‘repeat players’ or who are rarely 
sued will be net losers. Perhaps a more accurate assessment would be that QOCS 
works for volume insurers, eg motor insurers, which is the assumption upon which 
Jackson based it. The whole system is geared to settling claims, irrespective of the 
merits, rather than allowing them to proceed to trial. Genn argues that the civil courts 
are beneficial to society and economic wellbeing in protecting rights. However, she 
complains that official pressure to divert disputes to private resolution have brought 
about a decline in the civil justice system and undermined the public function of 
                                                          
920 Woolf Report (n. 4) Chapter 11 
921 Andrew Higgins ‘A defence of qualified one-way cost shifting’ C.J.Q. 2013, 32(2), 198-212 
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adjudication.922 Genn cites the PL case of Donoghue v Stevenson923 as an example 
of the public benefit of courts adjudicating private disputes. It is submitted here that 
whilst the role of the courts in dispute resolution is not denied, the system has been 
hijacked by the perceived need for low value personal injury litigation. This has led to 
one reform of procedure after another without at any stage considering the underlying 
need for this litigation. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Procedural changes introduced by the Jackson Reforms merely redistribute the cost 
of litigation throughout society without addressing whether there is a need for access 
to litigation on the current scale. 
 
The urgent necessity of dealing with low value motor and EL claims spiralling out of 
control, has led to the application of procedures tailored to such claims, most 
significantly QOCS, being applied more widely across liability cases. QOCS relies 
upon an insurance model that only really applies to motor insurance in which pooling 
of risks operates successfully because of the volume of insured persons and 
homogeneity of the pool. However, such procedures are particularly detrimental to PL 
which is treated substantively differently to EL, Public Liability and Motor Claims but 
which must fall into suit as ‘personal injury litigation’ when it comes to the Jackson 
Reforms. Where the reforms have introduced procedures that benefit ‘insurers’ on the 
whole these do not apply to PL claims. Thus PL claims suffer from the increased 
exposure that arises from improved ‘access to justice’ for lower value claims without 
the concomitant benefits of lower claimants’ costs in volume injury cases. 
 
The overriding aim of the PL Directive was to harmonise liability for defective products 
across the Member States. This objective is subverted by a civil procedure that 
practically removes liability from the equation. 
 
 
                                                          
922 Genn, Hazel (2012), ‘What Is Civil Justice For? Reform, ADR, and Access to Justice’ Yale Journal 
of Law & the Humanities: Vol. 24: Iss. 1,  Article 18 
923 Donoghue v Stevenson (n. 487) 
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Case Study 3: Compensation 
Hudson, Allen, Farmer and Ilford v Tubitsu UK924 
 
Letters of Claim 
 
Four occupants of a Tubitsu vehicle, Hudson, Allen, Ilford and Farmer, represented by 
one firm of solicitors, claim that they each suffered injuries when the vehicle was 
involved in an accident. Each letter of claim, in materially identical terms, indicates that 
‘the engine fell out, whilst driving, causing the vehicle to come to a crashing halt’.  
 
Each claimant suffered whiplash type injuries. There was no claim for loss of earnings. 
 
The claims were addressed to the dealer who supplied the vehicle and the dealer 
sought indemnity from Tubitsu UK, the importer of the vehicle into the UK. 
 
The claim against the dealer was that it ‘failed to maintain the vehicle’. Notwithstanding 
the vague and inappropriate basis of claim, legal liability would ultimately boil down to 
whether there was a manufacturing defect. 
 
Technical evidence 
 
The vehicle was subject to a recall campaign which advised that one of the engine 
mounting bolts might suddenly become loose and fall out. This would allow the 
transmission to slip out of position so that the alternator pulley fouled the body panel 
next to it. In extreme cases a drive shaft could pull out and the alternator pulley could 
break so that the vehicle would lose power. 
 
The vehicle was repaired under warranty and the repairing dealer’s notes indicated 
 
‘CHECK FOR LOUD ENGINE NOISE FOUND TOP G/BOX MOUNT 
BOLT STRIPPED THREADS IN MOUNT AND MAKE ENGINE AND BOX 
DROP AND N/S DRIVE SHAFT RUBBING AWAY ON SUBFRAME AND 
                                                          
924 See Appendix 3 for verbatim extracts from the key documents in the case. The only alteration is to 
the parties’ names for anonymity 
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ALTERNATOR PULLY IS UP AGAINST INNERWING CAUSING BELT 
TO SHRED ..REQ A NEW GEARBOX MOUNT + BOLT + ALTERNATOR 
+ BELT + DRIVESHAFT …’ 
 
Thus it was reasonably clear that the defect identified in the recall had occurred. 
However the effect of the defect was disputed by Tubitsu who explained that the 
vehicle would not stop suddenly or dramatically. There would be a noise from under 
the bonnet and a loss of power. 
 
The claimants’ solicitor relied on a telephone attendance with the recovery company 
which had collected the car, which stated that the ‘engine was on the deck’. There was 
an issue as to whether the deck meant the ground or whether it meant that the engine 
was touching the tray under the engine.  
 
Medical Evidence 
 
Hudson, Allen and Ilford were all examined by an orthopaedic surgeon who advised: 
  
1. Hudson stated that the car engine fell down and the car suddenly stopped with a 
big jerk. Hudson suffered neck shoulder and back pain which had an effect on his 
social life as he was unable to play cricket for 2 months and had a month off college. 
Requests for details of his cricket club and college tutor were declined, which raised 
suspicions. 
 
On examination, Hudson’s shoulder and back were completely normal. Neck 
movements were all normal but painful at extremes. There was no bruising, swelling 
or deformity. The prognosis was complete resolution within 5-6 months with 3-4 
sessions of physiotherapy at £35 to £40 per session. 
 
Hudson mentioned one previous road traffic accident. In fact, his medical records, 
which his expert had not seen, indicated five road traffic accidents in the past 4 years. 
 
2. Allen told his consultant that the engine mount fell out of the car and the driver 
suddenly used the brakes.  
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Allen said that he suffered intermittent neck and back pain for which he self-medicated 
with pain killers. He claimed that he suffered from travel anxiety, mood changes, and 
‘social withdrawal and lack of concentration due to the accident for 2 weeks’.  
 
On examination there was no swelling bruising or deformity, with most movements 
being normal and pain free. There was some pain at extremes of neck rotation and 
50% limit of flexion of the back. Resolution was expected within 4-5 months. 
 
The consultant orthopaedic surgeon opined that the symptoms of travel anxiety, mood 
changes and social withdrawal and lack of concentration for 2 weeks were appropriate. 
 
3. Ilford told his consultant that the engine mount dropped very suddenly and the car 
stopped with a heavy jerk. He suffered neck, shoulder and back pain and self-
medicated with painkillers. Ilford reported to his consultant that the incident affected 
his ability to play cricket and go to the gym for 6 months in addition to causing 2 months 
of travel anxiety, social withdrawal due to discomfort and flashbacks.  
 
Neck, shoulder and back movements were normal but painful at extremes with no 
swelling, bruising or deformity. The consultant opined that the injuries were consistent 
with the history reported and Ilford sustained hyper-extension of the spine resulting in 
whiplash which he expected to resolve within 6-8 months. The psychological issues 
were appropriate as was the effect on his social and leisure activities. 
 
4. Farmer was examined by a trauma surgeon who reported that Farmer told him that 
the engine fell on the road and the car suddenly stopped. He reports that Farmer told 
him he suffered pain in his neck and shoulder immediately after the accident for which 
he needs analgesia. However, there was no swelling, bruising or deformity on 
examination.  
Neck examination was normal except for some limits in flexion; his shoulders and back 
were normal and pain free. The consultant advised that Farmer suffered a hyper-
extension flexion injury to the spine resulting in a whiplash injury without nerve root 
compression or bony injury.  
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Farmer stated he has difficulties with leisure activities and maintaining personal 
hygiene. He said that the accident left him with a loss of confidence for 8 weeks. The 
trauma consultant went on to say that the symptoms of travel anxiety, disturbances, 
social withdrawal and lack of concentration were appropriate.  
 
Outcome 
 
Whilst there were a number of inconsistencies in the evidence, the cost of defending 
the claims would have exceeded the potential sum for which the claims could be 
settled. However, liability was denied and disclosure was sought of documents which 
might cast further doubt on the claimants’ credibility. No such evidence ever 
materialised. Ultimately, having threatened to issue proceedings, it seems that the 
claimants lost interest in the case and the file was closed after the limitation period 
expired. 
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CHAPTER NINE - COMPENSATION 
 
Although the tort system is said to have a number of objectives which 
include deterrence, retribution and appeasement, there is little 
disagreement that the objective of providing 'compensation' is one of the 
most significant. 
 
         Law Commission 225, 1994925 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
  
In Chapter 2 it was noted that compensation may be looked at either in its narrow 
sense as an independent goal alongside deterrence, retribution, vindication and 
correction of wrongs; or in its wider sense as the means of achieving these other 
overriding goals of tort. Both schools of thought assume compensation is desirable. 
This chapter asks whether PL compensates in the narrow sense. This requires an 
examination of the domestic law of damages as applied across the whole of personal 
injury litigation. It is irrelevant here whether liability is strict or fault based. The issues 
are common to all tort claims not merely PL. 
 
Compensation means in practical terms an award of a sum of money – damages. Lord 
Woolf in the Court of Appeal in Heil v Rankin926 in summarising the ‘well established’ 
purpose of compensation referred back to the textbook summary given by Lord 
Blackburn in Livingstone v Rawyards Coal as  
 
that sum of money which will put the party who has been injured, or who 
has suffered, in the same position as he would have been in if he had not 
sustained the wrong for which he is now getting his compensation or 
reparation.927 
 
The primary function of compensatory damages is thus to make good loss: to repair 
or remediate damage. Where loss is ascertainable in monetary terms, Special 
Damages provide compensation in monetary worth. For example in a motor accident 
                                                          
925 Law Commission No. 225 Personal Injury Compensation: How much is Enough? A study of the 
compensation experiences of victims of personal injury; Item 11 of the Fifth programme of Law Reform: 
Damages 17 October 1994 HMSO page xviii 
<http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/judicial-
institute/files/Personal_Injury_Compensation_how_much_is_enough.pdf> accessed 9 January 2015  
926 Heil v Rankin and another [2001 ]QB 272 at 293 
927 Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co (1880) 5 App Cas 25, 39 
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in which the Claimant’s vehicle is damaged or destroyed, damages enable the 
Claimant to repair his car or, if destroyed, buy a like for like replacement. For the 
purpose of this thesis it is accepted that damages in tort fulfil this function.928 However, 
Atiyah explains  
 
Lawyers usually talk about compensation ‘for loss’; but as we will see, not 
all forms of compensation are concerned with ‘loss’ in any common sense 
of that word. To compensate a person is to make good an undesirable 
aspect of their circumstances or situation in life which falls below some 
pre-determined benchmark of acceptability.929 
 
Atiyah is alluding to General Damages for Pain and Suffering and Loss of Amenity and 
suggests they are designed to make something good.  This Chapter will argue that 
general damages for pain and suffering and loss of amenity are a critical factor in 
determining whether PL (and indeed tort liability generally) is desirable because  
 
(1) In smaller claims, general damages tend to form the larger part of the claim.  
(2) Small (so-called ‘attritional’) claims constitute the majority of claims and represent 
‘a substantial proportion of the total sums paid out’.930 The exact amounts will depend 
of course on the precise definition of ‘small’. 
(3) Establishing pain and suffering and loss of amenity, of sufficient seriousness that 
it would give rise to general damages, acts as a ‘gatekeeper’931 to all personal injury 
claims.  
 
Having established the significance of general damages for pain and suffering and 
loss of amenity, it is therefore of interest to ask why they are awarded and whether 
they put the claimant back into ‘the same position as he would have been in if he had 
not sustained the wrong.’ In short, do these damages fulfil a genuine compensatory 
function - or are they doing something else? Is this form of compensation socially 
desirable? It is argued in this chapter that general damages are capable neither of 
achieving a restitutio in integrum nor needed for this purpose in the majority of cases, 
in particular claims at the lower end of the injury spectrum.  
                                                          
928 More controversially, whether they do so efficiently is dealt with in Chapter 8 above on Distributive 
Justice. 
929 Peter Cane (ed), Atiyah’s Accidents Compensation and the Law (n. 72) p. 411 
930 Peter Cane (ed), Atiyah’s Accidents Compensation and the Law (n. 72) p. 27  
931 James M. Fischer, ‘The Puzzle of the Actual Injury Requirement for Damages’, 42 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 
197 (2008) p. 220 
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9.1 The Importance of General Damages for Pain and Suffering and Loss of 
Amenity  
 
9.1.1 The make-up of small claims 
 
In 97 out of 132 cases  in the PL Claims Survey at Appendix 4 (almost three quarters 
of all cases surveyed) it was found that non-pecuniary loss claimed (or potentially to 
be claimed) exceeded pecuniary loss.  
 
Where there is no loss of earnings or serious property damage, the most significant 
(or only) claim will be for general damages for pain and suffering and loss of amenity. 
It has been suggested that ‘in settlements in general the largest component by far is 
the payment for pain and suffering’.932 The Law Commission also found that in cases 
where the claimant makes a complete recovery ‘most, if not all, of the award will 
consist of damages in respect of pain and suffering’.933 
 
In Australia it has been found that general damages account for 45 per cent of the total 
cost of public liability personal injury claims between $20,000 and $100,000.934 In the 
USA it has been suggested that the proportion is as much as 55% to 60% of personal 
injury damages in medical malpractice claims.935 Given that in the latter case these 
figures are based on jury awards, this is at least some evidence that society (as 
represented by a jury) places considerable importance in compensating pain and 
suffering and loss of amenity. 
 
                                                          
932 Richard Lewis, ‘Increasing The Price Of Pain: Damages, The Law Commission And Heil v Rankin’ 
The Modern Law Review, Vol. 64, No. 1 (Jan., 2001) 100-111 p. 103 
933 Law Commission Consultation Paper 140 Damages for Personal Injury: Non-Pecuniary Loss’ (1995) 
p. 14 [2.13]  
<http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/cp140_Damages_Personal_Injury_Non-
pecuniary_Loss_Consultation.pdf > accessed 26 December 2014 
934 Trowbridge Consulting Limited, Practical Proposals for Reform Report to the Insurance Issues 
Working Group of Heads of Treasuries 30 May 2002 p. 85.  
935 Giovanni Comandé, ‘Towards A Global Model For Adjudicating Personal Injury Damages: Bridging 
Europe And The United States’ Temple International & Comparative. Law Journal. 19.02.2005 241-347 
p. 244 footnote 1 (citing Neil Vidmar et al. ‘Jury Awards for Medical Malpractice and Post-Verdict 
Adjustments of Those Awards’, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 265, 296 (1998)) 
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Case Study 3, Hudson and others v Tubitsu, is typical of UK low value claims. 
Assuming that the claimants were injured just as they claim, they would each be 
entitled to general damages for pain and suffering and loss of amenity. Their solicitor 
has expressly stated that there is no claim for loss of earnings. General damages are 
in practice assessed by reference to the Judicial College Guidelines936 as 
supplemented by case law. In the case of Hudson and others the figure would be in 
the region of £2,500 to £3,500 each. There would be almost no claim for special 
damages beyond a few pounds for over the counter painkillers. Damages could be 
increased by the recommendation to have physiotherapy sessions. However, the 
largest part of each of the claims is plainly the general damages for pain and suffering 
and loss of amenity because by the very nature of the claims, the injuries are minor, 
and therefore do not usually lead to significant consequential loss.  
 
9.1.2 Low value claims form a substantial part of the overall cost of claims 
 
The vast majority of the claims listed in the PL Claims Survey (Appendix 4) that could 
reasonably be quantified were worth less than £5,000. 
Table 6 PL Claims Survey (Appendix 4) claim values 
Value Number of cases 
≤ £5,000 86 
£5,001 - £10,000 19 
£10,001 - £50,000 19 
> £50,000 7 
TOTAL 131 
 
 
It is unsurprising that minor injuries are suffered more frequently than serious ones. 
Such minor injuries form the ‘everyday battleground between insurers and 
claimants’937   according to Lewis who emphasises the ‘disproportionate importance 
of PSLA [pain and suffering and loss of amenity] in the award of damages’ and 
considers extraordinary the failure to focus on pain and suffering and loss of amenity 
                                                          
936 Guidelines for the Assessment of General Damages in Personal Injury Cases (n. 73) 
937 Richard Lewis, ‘Increasing The Price Of Pain: Damages, The Law Commission And Heil v Rankin’ 
(n. 932) 
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in the ‘post-Thalidomide era’, when the future of tort was under close scrutiny. It 
remains a significant part of the ‘burgeoning cost of bodily injury claims’938 which in the 
20 years to 2010 (in the field of UK motor claims) were estimated to have increased 
from 20% to 50%.939 The simple point is that injury claims have increased in cost and 
general damages constitute a large proportion of the cost of injury claims.  
 
In its review of damages for non-pecuniary loss, the Law Commission940 referred to 
the work of the Legal Aid Board Research Unit (LABRU),941 which carried out an 
analysis of 762 legally aided cases (of which 8 were categorised as PL). It divided 
them into 6 categories from ‘minor’ (full recovery within a year) to severe (severe 
permanent disability). ‘Nearly two-thirds of claimants suffered only 'minor' injuries and 
fully recovered within two years. Only around one claimant in twenty suffered 'severe' 
injury.’942 
 
9.1.3 Actionable injury acts as a gatekeeper 
 
Recognised physical or mental illness 
 
The starting point for a personal injury claim is ‘real damage as distinct from purely 
minimal damage’943 which amounts to medically recognised physical injury, in order 
‘to exclude imaginary or fraudulent claims’.944 Whilst mental injury unaccompanied by 
physical injury may prove sufficient, the threshold is high. The test is whether the 
claimant has suffered ‘not merely grief, distress or any other normal emotion, but a 
positive psychiatric illness’.945 It is not unusual to experience feelings of anger, 
disappointment and upset as a result of even a minor accident: see for example case 
                                                          
938 HC 591 The Cost of Motor Insurance, Parliamentary copyright Prepared 11th November 2010 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmtran/writev/591/cmi03.htm> 
accessed 4 October 2012 
939 HC 591 The Cost of Motor Insurance (n. 938) 
940 Law Commission Consultation Paper 140 (n. 933); and Law Commission No. 257 Damages for 
Personal Injury: Non-Pecuniary Loss, Item 2 of the Sixth Programme of Law Reform: damages. 
<http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc257_Damages_Personal_Injury_Non-pecuniary_Loss.pdf 
> accessed 27 December 2014 
941 Pascoe Pleasence, Legal Aid Board Research Unit, Report of the Case Profiling Study, Personal 
Injury Litigation in Practice, Research Paper 3, (1998) ISBN 0 9529882 2 4 pp. 47-51 & pp. 59-62. 
942 Pascoe Pleasence, Report of the Case Profiling Study,(n. 941) p. 49 
943 Lord Evershed MR, Cartledge v E  Jopling & Sons Ltd [1963] AC 758 p. 774 
944 Giovanni Comandé, ‘Towards A Global Model For Adjudicating Personal Injury Damages: Bridging 
Europe And The United States’ (n. 935) pp. 262/263 
945 McLoughlin v O’Brian [1983] 1 AC 410 Lord Bridge p. 431 
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90 in the PL Claims Survey at Appendix 4, which describes the claimant’s children’s 
‘trauma, stress and distress’ at witnessing the family car on fire.  However, ‘… what 
Lord Bridge was concerned to discount in McLoughlin v O'Brien was ‘normal human 
emotions’, not significantly abnormal manifestations of non-physical sequelae.’946 It 
was not sufficient, for example, in Nicholls v Rushton947 that the claimant suffered 
‘severe shock and shaking up’ in the absence of physical injury. In the context of PL, 
a recent Canadian case, Mustapha v Culligan,948 reminiscent of Donoghue v 
Stevenson,949 involved husband and wife claimants who noticed a dead fly in a bottle 
of water delivered to them. Neither drank the water and the bottle was not opened. 
The wife was instantly sick but suffered no serious ill effects whereas the husband 
suffered a major depressive disorder and since the incident had been ‘unable to drink 
water or take showers’. The trial judge found Culligan negligent and that Mrs Mustapha 
had not suffered a ‘recognisable mental illness’ whereas Mr Mustapha had. Therefore 
Mr Mustapha was entitled to damages. The Ontario Court of Appeal overturned the 
judgment for Mr Mustapha on the basis that there was no breach of duty because the 
illness was not reasonably foreseeable in a ‘person of normal fortitude or sensibility’. 
Mr Mustapha appealed to the Canadian Supreme Court which dismissed the appeal, 
opting for ‘an objective rather than subjective assessment of the plaintiff, that is, a 
plaintiff is expected to be a person of ordinary fortitude, before damages for psychiatric 
injury will be awarded …’.950  
 
This is notably different from the approach in England where Lord Lloyd in Page v 
Smith951 cited Geoffrey Lane J as holding that there is no difference in principle 
between an eggshell skull and an ‘eggshell personality’.952 Mr Mustapha would have 
succeeded by showing that he suffered a recognisable mental illness (although, in any 
event, a breach of duty would not have to be proved under the PL Directive, merely a 
defect). 
 
                                                          
946 Bevan ‘Case Comment Hussain v Chief Constable of West Mercia’ J.P.I. Law 2009, 2, C79-84 
947 Nicholls v Rushton The Times 19 June 1992 –  see Kemp & Kemp [3-005] 
948 Mustapha v Culligan of Canada Ltd (2008) 293 D.L.R. (4th) 29 (Sup Ct (Can) 
949 Donoghue v Stevenson (n. 487) 
950 M.H. Ogilvie ‘The fly in the bottle and psychiatric damage in consumer law’  J.B.L. 2010, 2, 85-100 
p. 89 
951 Page v Smith [1996] A.C. 155 Lord Lloyd  p. 189  
952 Malcolm v Broadhurst [1970] 3 All E.R. 508 
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Where does the injury threshold lie? 
 
The threshold of actionability was defined in the House of Lords by Lord Hoffman, in 
the ‘pleural plaques’ litigation, as the requirement to demonstrate damage in the sense 
of ‘being worse off, physically or economically, so that compensation is an appropriate 
remedy.’953 In this group of cases claimants sought damages in respect of pleural 
plaques caused by inhaling asbestos fibres to which they were negligently exposed.  
 
Gore explains that the ‘route by which fibres reach the pleura has not been fully 
elucidated, but reach it they do, and there, they are associated with the causation of 
pleural consequences, one of which are so-called pleural plaques.’954 He notes that 
the House of Lords was unanimous in finding that these pleural plaques did not 
constitute an injury. As Lord Scott said: 
 
None of the appellants suffered from any disability or impairment of 
physical condition caused by the pleural plaques. The plaques were 
asymptomatic and were not the first stage of any asbestos related 
disease.955 
 
Gore argues that the ratio decidendi was that there was no injury. However, he says 
Lord Hope ‘holds there to be an injury, but one that is de minimis and does not cross 
the threshold into actionability.’956 Lord Hope takes the position that: 
It is well settled in cases where a wrongful act has caused personal injury 
there is no cause of action if the damage suffered was negligible. In strict 
legal theory a wrong has been done whenever a breach of the duty of care 
results in a demonstrable physical injury, however slight. But the policy of 
the law is not to entertain a claim for damages where the physical effects 
of the injury are no more than negligible. Otherwise the smallest cut, or the 
lightest bruise, might give rise to litigation the costs of which were out of 
all proportion to what was in issue.957 
 
Lord Hoffman asks: 
 
How much worse off must one be? An action for compensation should not 
be set in motion on account of a trivial injury. De minimis non curat lex. But 
whether an injury is sufficiently serious to found a claim for compensation 
or too trivial to justify a remedy is a question of degree. Because people 
                                                          
953 Johnston v NEI International Combustion Ltd [2008] 1 A.C. 281 Lord Hoffman p. 289 
954 Allan Gore, ‘What is actionable injury? The demise of the pleural plaques litigation’ J.P.I. Law 2008, 
1, 1-15 
955 Johnston v NEI International Combustion Ltd (n. 953) Lord Scott p. 306 
956 Allan Gore, ‘What is actionable injury? The demise of the pleural plaques litigation’ (n. 954) p. 7 
957 Johnston v NEI International Combustion Ltd (n. 953) Lord Hope p. 299 
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do not often go to the trouble of bringing actions to recover damages for 
trivial injuries, the question of how trivial is trivial has seldom arisen 
directly.958 
 
This perhaps displays a lack of familiarity with the everyday world of trivial claims, 
Lewis’s battleground - but not the daily fare of the Supreme Court. Gore concludes 
that the threshold for actionability is not satisfied by invisible physical changes that 
cause no symptoms which do not lead to other serious consequences. Nor is it 
sufficient to aggregate harmless changes with the risk of other serious diseases 
developing or ‘anxiety, even if genuine and foreseeable, as to future health and 
welfare, but falling short of frank psychiatric illness’.959 
 
In Case Study 3, Hudson and others v Tubitsu, the medical evidence supports actual 
physical injuries with symptoms, which although minor would be actionable. Once a 
physical injury has been established however, there may be a psychological element 
that should be recognised which falls short of an actionable psychiatric illness. This 
psychological element may enhance the symptomatology of the injury. In other words 
the cataloguing of subjective symptoms augments the seriousness of the physical 
injury. 
 
In Kathleen Mullins v Derek Gray, the claimant suffered a whiplash injury in a car 
accident. The judge at first instance found that she suffered a ‘psychiatric illness in the 
form of anxiety and depression’ but did not differentiate between the physical pain 
from which Mrs Mullins claimed she was suffering as a result of the accident and the 
exacerbation of her psychiatric state. The defendant argued in the Court of Appeal 
that since her psychiatric expert had stated in terms that she had not suffered from 
any psychiatric disorder, this element of the claim should not be permitted. Longmore 
LJ held that the defendant’s argument overlooked the fact that the claimant was not 
making any claim for psychiatric injury. 
 
Her claim was for the pain and suffering which she undoubtedly did suffer 
from the accident causing the whiplash injury. The fact that that pain and 
suffering was, as a matter of history, heightened by what has been called 
                                                          
958 Johnston v NEI International Combustion Ltd (n. 953) Lord Hoffman p. 289 
959 Allan Gore, ‘What is actionable injury? The demise of the pleural plaques litigation’ (n. 954) p. 10 
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her “enduring trait” or “anxious personality disorder” does not make it any 
the less a claim for pain and suffering caused by the injury.960 
 
Having established the significance of pain and suffering and loss of amenity, the key 
question is whether damages awards for pain and suffering and loss of amenity in PL 
claims achieve the goal of compensating. 
 
9.2 PL’s compensatory goal 
 
9.2.1 PL directive designed to compensate damage to health 
 
Council of Europe Resolution (75) 7961 recommended a set of principles for Member 
State Governments to take into account when legislating on damages for personal 
injury or death. These principles include the general provision 
 
… the person who has suffered damage has the right to compensation for 
this damage suffered so that he is restored to a situation as near as 
possible to that in which he would have been if the act for which 
compensation is claimed had not occurred.962 
 
The aim is thus to achieve a restitutio in integrum, consistent with Lord Blackburn’s 
dictum in Livingstone v Rawyards Coal.  Busnelli and Comandé argue 
 
compensation for personal injuries (damage to health) fulfils mainly a 
compensatory goal.963 
 
The purpose of the PL Directive should therefore be to put the claimant’s health back 
into the position it was in before the accident. However, it is argued here that this 
objective is not attained because: 
(i) Damages for pain and suffering and loss of amenity can never ‘compensate’ sensu 
stricto: therefore they must be doing something else; and 
                                                          
960 Mullins v Gray [2004] EWCA Civ 1483 
961 Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers Resolution (75) 7 on Compensation for Physical Injury or 
Death (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 14 March 1975 at the 243rd meeting of the Ministers' 
Deputies) 
<https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImag
e=1390303&SecMode=1&DocId=651122&Usage=2  > accessed 4 January 2015  
962 Resolution (75) 7 (n. 961) 
963D Busnelli and G Comandé,  W V Horton Rogers (ed.) Damages for Non-Pecuniary Loss in a 
Comparative Perspective Springer 2001 ISBN 3-211-83602-0 p. 137 
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(ii) The perceived need for damages for pain and suffering and loss of amenity in all 
injury cases is overstated. 
 
9.3 Damages for pain and suffering and loss of amenity can never ‘compensate’ 
sensu stricto: therefore they must be doing something else 
 
Where a claimant has been injured, he is entitled to damages for pain and suffering 
and loss of amenity. According to Cockburn CJ in Phillips v London & South Western 
Railway Co, heads of non-pecuniary damage include: ‘the bodily injury sustained;’ ‘the 
pain undergone;’ and ‘the effect on the health of the sufferer.’964 It is accepted that the 
level of compensation is linked to the level of pain suffered in the sense that awards 
increase in proportion to the seriousness of the injury. Where the claimant is 
unconscious and suffers no pain ‘he needs no monetary compensation in respect of 
pain…’.965  
 
Whilst ‘pain’ and ‘suffering’ are conceptually conjoined, they are two distinct 
components: 
 
Traditional definitions describe the term “pain” as a sudden affliction of the 
nerves related to a physical harm of the person who suffered the injury. 
The term “suffering”, on the other hand, describes an affliction not directly 
related to a physical harm — it is more an individual emotional 
response.966 
 
Loss of Amenity is discrete from pain and suffering. Sellers LJ distinguishes loss of 
amenity from loss of happiness or enjoyment:  
 
Physical incapacity may restrict activity in one form or another or alter the 
conduct of life, the manner or the extent of living. The inquiry may be taken 
as far as that, to ascertain the limitations and variations which a physical 
injury has imposed or may impose so as to compensate for that …967 
 
                                                          
964 H West and Son Ltd v Shephard [1964] AC, 326 at 345: citing Phillips  v. London & South Western 
Railway Co. per Cockburn C.J (1879) 4 Q.B.D. 406 p. 407 
965 H West and Son Ltd v Shephard (n. 964) Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest p. 349 
966 Giovanni Comandé, ‘Towards A Global Model For Adjudicating Personal Injury Damages: Bridging 
Europe And The United States’ (n. 935) p. 260 
967 Wise v Kaye [1962] 1 QB 638 Sellers LJ p. 652 
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The distinction is highlighted by cases where the claimant is in a coma. A comatose 
claimant may have minimal pain and suffering, if he is not sentient, but maximum loss 
of amenity.968 Lord Morris explained that loss of consciousness does not:  
 
eliminate the actuality of the deprivations of the ordinary experiences and 
amenities of life which may be the inevitable result of some physical 
injury.969 
 
It is said of loss of amenities that ‘the task of this head of damages is to compensate 
the plaintiff for the physical disability sustained as a result of the accident (or as it is 
sometimes said, “for the injury itself”), and for the effect of that disability on his 
enjoyment of life.’970 The very nature of the losses or deprivations described suggests 
that they are not capable of conversion into monetary terms and that a restitutio in 
integrum is not possible whether by money or any other means. 
 
9.3.1 Restitutio in integrum impossible 
 
Whilst compensation for pecuniary loss seeks to achieve a restitutio in integrum by 
replacing for the claimant the ‘pecuniary advantages of which he has been deprived’, 
restitutionary compensation for non-pecuniary losses is, ex hypothesi, impossible.971 
None of the claimants in Case Study 3 could be said to be put back in their pre-
accident position by damages. If they have ongoing pain, the best that can be done is 
to provide analgesics or possibly some physiotherapy as recommended by their 
consultants. These costs would be special damages. Compared with general 
damages of say £2,500 to £3,500 these costs would be very small. The more minor 
the injury, the more readily the claimant will return to his pre-accident condition through 
the natural healing process and the more effective analgesia is likely to be – therefore 
the less utility damages will have. 
 
It has been suggested that there are three recognised theoretical approaches to 
awarding general damages.  
                                                          
968 H West and Son Ltd v Shephard (n. 964) 
969 H West and Son Ltd v Shephard (n. 964) Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest p. 349 – applied in Lim Poh 
Choo Respondent v Camden and Islington Area Health Authority [1980] A.C. 174 
970 A Ogus, ‘Damages for Lost Amenities: For a Foot, a Feeling or a Function?’ (1972) 35 MLR 1. 
971 A Ogus, ‘Damages for Lost Amenities: For a Foot, a Feeling or a Function?’ (n. 970) p. 15 
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- First is the ‘conceptual’ approach in which the claimant’s injury is treated as the 
loss of an asset; 
- Second is the ‘personal’ approach which rejects the notion of objectively valuing 
a lost asset and instead assesses in monetary terms the claimant’s subjective loss 
of pleasure and happiness;  
- The third ‘functional’ approach is to pay the claimant the amount necessary to 
provide reasonable solace for his unhappy condition.972  
In none of these cases does money directly compensate the pain suffering or loss of 
amenity.  
 
Conceptual 
 
English Law adopts the conceptual ‘diminution in value’ approach,973 whereby a 
claimant is entitled to damages where a defendant deprives him of something capable 
of being used.974 The loss is considered from a proprietorial perspective: as a loss of 
a personal asset. A limb can be used for profit or pleasure and just as the loss of profit 
is compensated so, should the loss of pleasure – ‘irrespective of whether there is 
mental suffering or not.’975 
 
Mr Farmer in Case Study 3 would argue, that if he can establish that the accident 
caused him to miss a season playing cricket, then he has clearly lost something of 
value and so he is entitled to something to compensate him for this real loss. But it 
also must be accepted that money cannot repair the loss. A claimant’s health cannot 
be substituted by a sum of money. ‘Nonetheless, repugnant though such a concept is, 
this substitution must be made in order to compensate the victim.’976 In other words 
this is not strictly compensation to restore the claimant to his pre-accident condition 
but payment for loss of a right to the security to which all other members of society are 
entitled.977 A comparison may be made with other fields in which non-pecuniary 
damages are awarded, such as under the Human Rights Act 1998. Damages may be 
                                                          
972 A Ogus, ‘Damages for Lost Amenities: For a Foot, a Feeling or a Function?’ (n. 970) 
973 See Law Commission Consultation Paper 140 (n. 933) 
974 The Mediana [1900] AC 113 per Lord Halsbury p. 116 
975 H West and Son Ltd v Shephard (n. 964) Lord Devlin at 355 
976 Giovanni Comandé, ‘Towards A Global Model For Adjudicating Personal Injury Damages: Bridging 
Europe And The United States’ (n. 935) p. 310 
977 George P. Fletcher, ‘Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory’ (n. 67) p. 550 
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awarded for violations of the European Convention on Human Rights that have 
resulted in the suffering of intangible losses such as distress, frustration, 
inconvenience, humiliation, anxiety, and loss of relationship.978 In Anufrijeva v 
Southwark Lord Woolf stated: 
 
The code recognises the different role played by damages in human rights 
litigation and has significant features which distinguish it from the approach 
to the award of damages in a private law contract or tort action. The award 
must be necessary to achieve "just satisfaction"; language that is distinct 
from the approach at common law where a claimant is invariably entitled, 
so far as money can achieve this, to be restored to the position he would 
have been in if he had not suffered the injury of which complaint is 
made…979 
 
On the contrary, it is submitted that the reality of the situation is that damages under 
the conceptual approach represent not compensation but satisfaction. 
 
Personal 
 
From a practical viewpoint, the subjective personal approach is even more problematic 
and radical.980 In Wise v Kaye, Sellers LJ commented on the judgment of Diplock LJ 
in the same case expressing concern about ‘setting up happiness or unhappiness as 
the basis or yardstick of comparison … for the loss of a limb or any bodily faculty’.981 
His concern was about the difficulties inherent in an ‘investigation of the inner feelings 
and outward manifestations of conduct of and affecting a claimant’.982 In practical 
terms the courts are faced with this dilemma in many small injury claims in that they 
have to assess the medical evidence of a subjective reaction to an incident. Three out 
the four claimants in Case Study 3, Hudson and others v Tubitsu, submitted medical 
evidence reporting their own statements as to their psychological reaction to what was 
even on their own evidence a most minor incident.  Psychological claims were 
identified in 22 cases out of 132 (16.6%). However, this figure may be misleading 
because half of all cases were abandoned and it may be that had some of these 
                                                          
978 John Hartshorne ‘The Human Rights Act 1998 and damages for non-pecuniary loss’ E.H.R.L.R. 
2004, 6, 660-671 
979 Anufrijeva and Another v Southwark London Borough Council [2003] EWCA Civ 1406 Lord Woolf 
CJ [55] 
980 A Ogus, ‘Damages for Lost Amenities: For a Foot, a Feeling or a Function?’ (n. 970) p. 14 
981 Wise v Kaye (n. 967) Sellers LJ p. 649 
982 Wise v Kaye (n. 967) Sellers LJ p. 649 
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abandoned cases been pursued to the stage of obtaining medical evidence, 
psychological claims would have been introduced. There is a risk that by investigating 
whether there is any psychological element to a claim, a claimant’s solicitor will 
introduce the concept to a claimant who otherwise might have been untroubled by 
such considerations. In S v M a recent case dealt with by the Practice, the claimant’s 
orthopaedic expert commented when asked whether the Claimant should be seen by 
a psychologist: ‘In my view, the last thing I would want to do is get him involved with a 
psychologist or psychiatrist’. The claimant’s solicitor would no doubt argue that he has 
a duty to his client explore all potential elements of injury. 
  
It is not merely that happiness is difficult to measure or even that subjective loss of 
happiness is difficult to prove, but there is a conceptual difficulty with equating the 
status quo with happiness. Wealth and health do not assure happiness nor do poverty 
or disablement necessarily entail unhappiness983 although some would argue that 
from being a means to happiness, money ‘has come to be itself a principal ingredient 
of the individual's conception of happiness.’984  
 
The survival of claims for pain and suffering and loss of amenity after death of the 
injured party985 throws further confusion on the purpose of such damages. On the 
injured party’s death, his beneficiaries will have lost out on pecuniary loss to the estate. 
However, pain and suffering is personal to the sufferer. In case 109 in the PL Claims 
Survey at Appendix 4, the claimant commenced a claim arising from minor injuries 
that he suffered when his steering wheel came loose and he collided with a lamp post. 
The claim was abandoned and the claimant, who was elderly, subsequently died from 
natural causes entirely unrelated to the accident. The family of the deceased then 
received a recall notice in relation to the steering wheel of the subject vehicle and 
decided, as they were entitled to do, to pursue a claim in the deceased’s name for the 
injuries that he had suffered. The claim was settled. The survival of the claim for 
general damages does not make sense in terms of loss to the estate. Nor does it make 
sense in terms of remediation of pain – because the injured party is dead.  
                                                          
983 Wise v Kaye (n. 967) Sellers LJ pp. 652/653 
984 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism. < http://www.utilitarianism.com/mill4.htm  > accessed 13 January 
2013 
985 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 s 1 
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Substitute solace 
 
The functional approach, favoured in jurisdictions such as Canada, Australia986 and 
Spain,987 enables the claimant to purchase a ‘substitute sources of satisfaction’.988 It 
has been argued that whilst  
 
no money can actually replace the effects of an injury … the award of a 
substantial sum of money in damages can to some extent compensate for 
injuries which have been suffered; it may enable the recipient to travel on 
holiday or purchase some other pleasure which he otherwise would not 
have enjoyed.989 
 
Insofar as losses are irreparable, such ends displacing compensation is necessarily 
inadequate.990 Thus compensation for non-pecuniary loss is not the same as ‘the 
restoration of the object itself, but rather the provision of something else altogether.’991  
 
None of these theories achieves a restitutio in integrum. 
 
9.3.2 Valuation of damages is arbitrary 
 
Whichever theory is preferred to justify awarding general damages for pain and 
suffering and loss of amenity, the fundamental problem is how to value damages. ‘ … 
There is no reason, in logic or economics why for a specified period of suffering the 
award should be £100 rather than £1,000 or indeed any other figure.’992 Atiyah argues 
that ‘damages awarded for pain and suffering and loss of amenities … could be 
multiplied or divided by two overnight and they would be just as defensible or 
indefensible as they are today’.993 
 
                                                          
986 Ipp, Report Review of the Law of Negligence Final Report September 2002   
ISBN 0 642 74165 4 < http://www.amatas.com.au/assets/ipp_report.pdf > accessed 5 December 2014 
987 Miguel Martin-Casals, Jordi Ribot, and Josep Solé, W V Horton Rogers (ed.), Damages for Non-
Pecuniary Loss in a Comparative Perspective Springer 2001 ISBN 3-211-83602-0 197 -199 
988 Law Commission Consultation Paper 140 (n. 933) p.8 [2.3]  
989 Simon P. Browne, ‘Damages for personal injury: non pecuniary loss’ 2000 J.P.I.L. 47 
990 Robert E. Goodin, ‘Theories of Compensation’ Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Spring, 
1989), 56-75 p. 73 
991 Robert E. Goodin, ‘Theories of Compensation’ (n. 990) 
992 Harvey McGregor, McGregor on Damages (n. 132) [35-258] 
993 P Atiyah (Peter Cane (ed)), Atiyah’s Accidents Compensation and the Law (n. 72) p. 162 
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Moreover such compensation can never be adequate. In other words paying a person 
£100,000 for the loss of a leg can never be truly adequate in the sense of providing an 
equivalent to that which is lost. ‘It is an artificial sum and, increasingly, it is 
mechanically assessed.’994 Lord Morris pointed to the impossibility of money renewing 
‘a physical frame that has been battered and shattered.’995 However, the principle 
applies equally to small claims. In case study 3, Hudson and others v Tubitsu, whilst 
undoubtedly there is a sum of money that would have satisfied each of the claimants, 
it cannot be said that they would have been restored to their pre-accident condition – 
whether that sum was £5,000 or £500,000. Law Commission No. 225 Report Personal 
Injury Compensation: How much is Enough?996 contained a survey on how damages 
were spent. It is of limited value in that it lists a number of material items and notes 
how many surveyed claimants spent part of their damages on them. It is unclear how 
the damages are broken down between generals and specials and what the particular 
needs were of the individual claimants. 
 
It has been argued that if a claimant is willing to reject an offer, he must subjectively 
value his loss at a sum in excess of the offer. 
 
If I testify in a negligence suit that the loss of my little finger was a source 
of unbearable psychological agony, for which $100,000 would barely 
compensate me, I am likely to be disbelieved; not so if I refuse a bona fide 
offer of $100,000 for my little finger.997 
 
However, there may be other explanations for the rejection of an offer. In case study 
1, Martin v Kudo, Martin refused an offer of £7,500, notwithstanding the eventual 
agreement of damages (subject to liability) at £2,000. No doubt one important factor 
was Martin’s liability for his own lawyer’s costs. Another possible reason could be that 
a claimant’s lawyer has advised that he is entitled to more. In other words this does 
not prove that an injury has a value: it merely means that a claim has a value. This 
goes to the heart of this thesis in the sense that the claim may be a desirable creation 
of the legal system but 
 
                                                          
994 Richard Lewis ‘Increasing The Price Of Pain: Damages, The Law Commission And Heil v Rankin’  
 (n. 932) p. 102 
995 H West and Son Ltd v Shephard (n. 964) p. 346 
996 Law Commission 225 (n. 925) p. 173 [10.9]  
997 Richard A. Posner ‘A Theory of Negligence’ The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Jan., 1972), 
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Facilitating compensation may be an effect produced by a change in the 
law such as the [PL] Directive – and an effect we find attractive – but to 
provide a convincing justification for a rule of civil liability a rationale must 
be sufficiently detailed to explain its boundaries, and the simple facilitation 
of compensation argument does not do this.998 
 
 
9.3.3 Objective Valuation is Impossible 
 
Lord Halsbury recognised the difficulty in arithmetical calculation of damages and even 
suggested 
 
In truth, I think it would be very arguable to say that a person would be 
entitled to no damages for such things. What manly mind cares about pain 
and suffering that is past? But nevertheless the law recognises that as a 
topic upon which damages may be given.999 
However, an objectively identifiable unit of pain, capable of monetary valuation still 
remains elusive. There is no formula for conversion of pain into money1000 and awards 
are necessarily arbitrary.1001 Even under the functional theory, there remains the 
problem of the equivalence and proportionality of alternative sources of solace. The 
court would be faced with the invidious task of answering such bizarre questions as 
whether a particular holiday is the equivalent of a lost leg. The more serious the injury 
the more absurd these questions become.  
 
9.4 The reported need for damages for pain and suffering and loss of amenity is 
overstated 
 
9.4.1 Identifying the need for damages 
 
The Law Commission has already devoted considerable efforts to researching 
damages. In 1994 as part of the 5th programme of Law Reform it commissioned a 
survey of accident victims and published ‘Personal Injury Compensation: How much 
                                                          
998 Jane Stapleton, Product Liability (n. 9) p. 92 
999 The Mediana (n. 974) pp. 116/117 
1000 Heil v Rankin and another (n. 926); see also Mark Geistfield ‘Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: 
A Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries’ California Law Review, 
Vol. 83, No. 3 (May, 1995), 773-852 p. 781 
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is enough?1002 The context of this report must be explained because it is referred to 
by the later Law Commission reports on non-pecuniary loss. This survey was in 
relation to personal injury damages as a whole – not merely non-pecuniary loss. The 
broad objective was to ask accident victims who had received compensation how that 
their lives had turned out many years later. In order to organise the evidence, the 
survey divided claims into 4 bands: 
Band 1 £ 5,000-£19,999 
Band 2 £ 20,000-£49,999 
Band 3 £ 50,000-£99,999 
Band 4 £100,000 or more 
 
Thus the threshold for the lowest band was £5,000 which included general and special 
damages. The Law Commission then explained 
 
Since the vast majority of damages awards and settlements are for 
relatively small sums of money, the greatest number of insurance 
company cases from which the sample was selected fell in band 1, and 
the number of settlements decreased for each subsequent band. A simple 
random selection of cases from insurance company files would have 
resulted in a sample largely comprising small settlements. Therefore, band 
1 was significantly under-sampled, while larger awards (bands 2-4) were 
over-sampled to ensure sufficient numbers of cases of large settlements 
for analysis.  
 
This means that the survey was aimed at more serious cases than the day to day 
minor claims typified by Case Study 1, Martin v Kudo or Case Study 3, Hudson and 
others v Tubitsu. A case study referred to by the Law Commission as representing 
band 1 involved loss of major useful function of the hand in an accident involving 
unguarded machinery leading to pain, deformity and scarring and 90 weeks off work. 
Damages in total came to £19,370. Even ignoring inflationary increases on this 1994 
figure, 80% of the claims in the PL Claims Survey at Appendix 4 were quantified at 
less than this amount. The objectives of the survey included identifying the costs and 
expenses resulting from the injuries; and examining the respondents’ use of and 
satisfaction with their compensation.1003 
 
Genn, who authored the report, gives examples of the descriptions by accident victims 
of the ‘sometimes shocking evidence of unexpected, abrupt and often irrevocable 
                                                          
1002 Law Commission 225 (n. 925) 
1003 Law Commission 225 (n. 925) p. 7 
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physical damage’.1004 They frequently remembered every detail of their accident years 
later: such as a policeman left with permanent injuries after a car he signalled to stop 
ploughed into him; and a man blinded in a work accident when a 22 foot iron girder fell 
on his head. In short these are injuries that require monetary compensation. If tort is 
the mechanism for compensating accidents (as opposed to a no-fault or state funded 
scheme) then clearly damages provide needed compensation for the lost earnings, 
the accommodation modifications, medical treatment, care needs and many other 
expenses directly resulting from these serious injuries. 
 
The report also considered the adequacy of damages for non-financial loss and 
concluded:  
 
with the exception of those respondents who had made a full recovery from 
their injuries, there was a general view amongst those who were given in 
depth interviews that the damages received could not compensate them 
for their experiences of the accident or the losses they had sustained, both 
physically and emotionally. Indeed, a number of people said that no 
amount of money would be adequate compensation in this respect.1005 
 
The ambiguity of the last sentence of the quotation is ironic. However, nearly all 
respondents felt that damages should contain an element for pain and suffering.1006 
The reasons most frequently given were: 
 
the impact of pain on the victim's life: for example, the need to compensate 
victims who may be in constant pain for the rest of their lives, or who can 
no longer do their normal activities (work or leisure) because of the pain 
they suffered … ; 1007   
 
and 
 
accident victims are blameless, they do not deserve what happened to 
them, so they should be given money for pain and suffering which has 
been caused by another person1008 
 
Another response was that it softens the blow by making ‘victims’ feel a little better or 
making life a little easier after the ‘trauma’ of their accidents. It must be remembered 
                                                          
1004 Law Commission 225 (n. 925) p. 37 [3.1] 
1005 Law Commission 225 (n. 925) p. 208 [11.5]  
1006 Law Commission 225 (n. 925) p. 210 [11.6] 
1007 Law Commission 225 (n. 925) p. 210 [11.6] 
1008 Law Commission 225 (n. 925) p. 210 [11.6] 
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then that the context of these comments is generally in relation to serious accidents 
with life changing consequences. The interviewees may be described genuinely as 
victims. They clearly desire damages for their pain and suffering. The first response 
does not explain how the damages compensate the pain. The second response 
translates into correcting a wrong or perhaps even punishment of the defendant, rather 
than restoring the claimant to his pre-accident condition. 
 
Only the third response touches on restoring the claimant. The suggestion is that ‘by 
making life a little easier’ it might alleviate the pain and suffering. For example a person 
with pain in his legs might use the damages to pay for a car or taxis to reduce having 
to walk – and therefore he decreases his pain. However, this example might well be 
made into claim for special damages in appropriate circumstances. 
 
9.4.2 Obtaining the Views of Society 
 
Against this background, in 1995, The Law Commission launched a Consultation 
Paper on Damages for Personal Injury: Non-pecuniary loss.1009 This asked detailed 
questions on non-pecuniary damages, including whether such damages should be 
awarded at all and whether damages were too high or low. In response to the first 
question, the Law Commission answered that they do not seriously question that they 
should be available to recognise the ‘very real personal, as well as financial 
consequences for the individual concerned.’1010 
 
In reaching this conclusion they took account of the empirical survey discussed above 
at 9.4.1, Law Commission 225 Personal Injury Compensation: How much is enough? 
They observed that their report had ‘drawn a link between the views of victims on this 
question and the surprisingly high number of victims … who were still experiencing 
pain at the time of interview.’1011 
 
They also recognised the contrary arguments as: 
 
The moral offensiveness of monetary indemnification for this type of loss; 
                                                          
1009 Law Commission Consultation Paper 140 (n. 933) 
1010 Law Commission Consultation Paper 140 (n. 933) p. 81 [4.5] 
1011 Law Commission Consultation Paper 140 (n. 933) p. 82 [4.6] 
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The fact that no sum can ever adequately compensate serious personal 
injury; 
The cost of compensating non-pecuniary loss; 
That there is a punitive element underlying damages for non-pecuniary 
loss; 
And that these damages constitute a barrier to rehabilitation.1012 
 
The consultation was followed up in 1998 with the report on Damages for personal 
Injury: Non-Pecuniary Loss of Law Commission No 257.1013 There was widespread 
support for retaining damages for non-pecuniary loss. Law Commission 257 
concluded: 
 
we believe that the widely-held view amongst consultees that damages for 
non-pecuniary loss in cases of serious personal injury are too low, 
particularly so far as it reflects difficulty in explaining the tort system to 
victims, in itself demonstrates that those damages are too low. On the 
other hand, that half of consultees did not consider awards in respect of 
“minor” injuries to be too low, suggests that those awards are not too 
low.1014  
 
In assessing the strength of the Law Commission’s conclusion, it is necessary to 
understand how society’s views were canvassed; where the law Commission draws 
the line at serious or trivial injury; and whether the underlying research relied on was 
sufficiently robust. It is submitted, after considering these questions, that the time has 
come to revisit the question of whether damages for pain and suffering and loss of 
amenity are needed, not merely in the field of PL but across the board in personal 
injury. 
 
(1) Canvassing society’s views 
 
The Law Commission noted that one of the central messages from its consultees was 
that ‘the views of society as a whole should influence the level of damages for non-
pecuniary loss in personal injury cases’.1015 ‘The views of society as a whole’ is a loose 
term. All legislation is supposed to reflect society’s wishes but the process of 
determining what is best for society is delegated to Parliament. The use of ‘vox pop’ 
                                                          
1012 Law Commission Consultation Paper 140 (n. 933)  p.83 [4.7] 
1013 Law Commission No. 257 (n. 940) 
1014 Law Commission No. 257 (n. 940) p. 33 [3.25] 
1015 Law Commission No. 257 (n. 940) p. 23 [3.4] 
293 | P a g e  
 
to justify changes in the tort system is fraught with danger.1016 ‘Society as a whole’ 
must be asked the right questions; it must be established that there are no underlying 
false assumptions; the respondents would need to understand the technicalities of 
how general damages fit into the whole scheme of tort and how tort fits into the scheme 
of distributive justice. 
 
The Law Commission also said that it was influenced by Professor Genn’s 1994 study, 
Personal Injury Compensation: How Much Is Enough? As already explained, this study 
dealt with damages as a whole; and not merely non-pecuniary losses. Moreover, the 
emphasis was on serious injuries with long term consequence. The Report quotes 
directly from Professor Genn’s report in relation to the attitude of respondents to their 
compensation: 
 
Three main reasons were given by respondents for being dissatisfied with 
their damages....The most frequent reason mentioned was that the 
settlement represented inadequate compensation because their whole 
way of life had changed or their life was now ruined as a result of their 
accident …1017 
 
It is argued that the justification for compensating people in one realm for losses 
suffered in some other realm entirely1018 by paying ‘non-economic damages for 
personal injury appears to be a tentative response to an irrefutable demand by society 
for compensation for “limitations on the person’s life created by the injury.”’1019 This 
argument seems, however, to fall into the error of treating every claimant as a victim. 
The case cited by Comandé in support of this proposition was McDougald v. 
Garber.1020 This was a case in which the plaintiff ‘suffered oxygen deprivation which 
resulted in severe brain damage and left her in a permanent comatose condition.’ The 
arguments supporting general damages for a claimant in this condition should not 
necessarily be applied to a claimant such as Mr Hudson.  
 
 
                                                          
1016 Richard Lewis, ‘Increasing The Price Of Pain: Damages, The Law Commission And Heil v Rankin’  
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1017 Law Commission No. 257 (n. 940) p. 34 [3.28] 
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1020 McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372, 379 (N.Y. 1989) 
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(2) What is a serious injury and what is trivial? 
 
The Law Commission went on to define serious injury and found that the dividing line 
was ‘broadly speaking whether or not there has been a full recovery.’1021 Bearing in 
mind that damages for non-pecuniary loss tend to represent more than half of total 
damages awards at the lower end of the scale, the Law Commission concluded: 
 
We therefore propose to define a serious injury as being an injury in 
respect of which the award for pain and suffering and loss of amenity in a 
case on any facts involving that injury alone, and ignoring contributory 
negligence, would be more than £2,000.1022 
 
In a footnote to this passage, the Law Commission added: ‘Examples of such injuries 
are rib fractures, minor soft tissue and whiplash injuries, fractures’.1023 If these are 
serious injuries, it has to be wondered what moderate or minor injuries are. Lewis 
suggests that ‘the system overwhelmingly deals with small claims, the great majority 
leading to damages of less than £5,000’. In these cases, claimants suffer very little, if 
any, financial loss. They make a full recovery from their bodily injury and have no 
continuing ill effects.1024 This is entirely consistent with the PL Claims Survey at 
Appendix 4. Indeed having considered the Law Commission Report 257,1025 the Court 
of Appeal in Heil v Rankin1026 saw no need to increase awards which are at present 
below £10,000 (80% of all claims in the PL Claims Survey at Appendix 4). The 
inference is that the Court of Appeal regards general damages claims below £10,000 
as not being serious claims.  
 
(3) Office for National Statistics survey  
 
In seeking to canvass the views of society, the Law Commission also commissioned 
the Office for National Statistics to carry out a survey. The ONS carries out monthly 
omnibus surveys in which they interview a random and representative sample of the 
population. Interviewees were asked to consider four case studies ranging from a 
                                                          
1021 Law Commission No. 257 (n. 940) p. 36 [3.34] 
1022 Law Commission No. 257 (n. 940) p. 37 [3.38] 
1023 Law Commission No. 257 (n. 940) p. 37  footnote 54 
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 (n. 932) p.103 
1025 Law Commission No. 257 (n. 940)  
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whiplash case, which they valued at a maximum of £3,500, to a quadriplegic case, for 
which they considered a likely maximum award would be £140,000 and to give their 
own valuation of the general damages (having been told that these are in addition to 
any financial loss). The results appear in Appendix B to Law Commission Report 
257.1027 Based on this survey the Law Commission stated: 
 
These figures tend to suggest that the majority of the population would 
consider the current levels of damages for non-pecuniary loss in personal 
injury cases to be too low, at the very least by 50 per cent, and often by a 
much larger percentage.1028 
 
It was acknowledged by several consultees that the question of how damages are 
funded is relevant in considering how much is desirable but this was felt to be outside 
the terms of reference of the Law Commission’s review. It was nevertheless a valid 
point that should have impacted on the questions and answers. The underlying 
assumption was that compensation should be awarded and that the system was 
efficient at delivering it, and that the only issue was whether the current tariff was 
sufficient. This is to disregard evidence that the cost of compensation had been 
increasing at 15% per year recently (written in 2002) and that ‘this seems a 
fundamentally inefficient way of delivering compensation.’1029 The assumption that 
individual compensation is desirable is questioned by Goodin: 
 
Giving someone who has been crippled monetary damages does not help 
him up the stairs to the City Council chambers, whose meetings he used 
regularly to attend. Building him a wheelchair ramp does. 'The importance 
of these facts is that they suggest that public expenditure of money to 
overcome difficulties of this kind may be a higher priority than more private 
compensation for disabilities as such.'1030 
 
The Law Commission acknowledged a submission by Piers Ashworth QC: 
 
It is the rare bird who, if asked whether he would like more money, says 
“no”. Equally, most people if asked whether the levels of social security 
benefits or state pensions were adequate would say that they should be 
greatly increased. But if the same people were asked whether they would 
                                                          
1027 Law Commission No. 257 (n. 940) Appendix B 
1028 Law Commission No. 257 (n. 940) p. 45 [3.58] 
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be prepared to pay twice as much tax in order to fund greatly increased 
benefit, many would have second thoughts. 
 
The Law Commission’s response was that the ONS survey stated expressly to 
interviewees:  
 
Generally, negligent people who cause an injury to someone else do not 
themselves pay the compensation. Instead, it is paid by their insurance 
company. If the amounts of compensation awarded by the courts change 
significantly, this is likely to lead to a change in the premiums charged by 
insurance companies…1031   
 
The survey was remarkably simplistic, yet unless interviewees were merely expected 
to pluck a figure from the ether, it must have been assumed that they had a good 
working knowledge of how general and special damages fit together; what is covered 
by each; the supposed purposes of the award of general damages; and the extent to 
which premiums are likely to increase. If, hypothetically, they had been told that 
insurance premiums would double or perhaps even increase tenfold, it is questionable 
whether the same replies would have been given. Reliance on the survey was 
criticised by the Court of Appeal in Heil v Rankin: 
…  
if the survey was to be helpful we would expect the person interviewed to 
have much more information than he or she was given. We are also 
concerned about question five. The reference to the increase in the 
change in premiums charged by insurance companies was not sufficiently 
explicit. It would also have been preferable for there to have been some 
indication of the significance of an increase in damages on the resources 
of the NHS1032 
 
Finally, it was acknowledged that ‘that a substantial minority surveyed did not support 
higher levels of damages.’1033  
 
(4) Time for fresh research into need for damages 
 
A desire for compensation may easily be elevated to a perceived need. It is interesting 
to consider what a claimant needs to restore him to his pre-accident condition. In terms 
of pain and suffering he needs relief from pain. This may or may not be possible from 
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case to case but it is informative that in Case Study 3, Hudson and others v Tubitsu, 
the medical reports on all four claimants (prepared by two different consultants) 
contain at several points, the phrase ‘There is a need for analgesia.’ So far as pain is 
concerned, this is arguably the principal need, as expressed objectively by the 
consultants. The more minor the injury, the more typically it might be expected that 
analgesia will go a long way towards restoring the claimant to a pain free condition, 
excepting abnormal pain conditions which arise from time to time. The cost of 
analgesics could be incurred by the claimants in buying over the counter medicines or 
in paying prescription charges, in which case these would be recoverable as special 
damages. It follows that in the cases of Hudson et al, the general damages must be 
compensating the loss of amenity rather than the pain. In Mr Ilford’s case he said that 
he could not play cricket or go to the gym for 6 months. Again wasted gym membership 
or cricket club subscriptions would be special damages. It is in reality the loss of a right 
to be able to enjoy one’s amenities that is being compensated. Before it is determined 
that society has a need to enforce such rights, it would be helpful to understand the 
cost to society of such claims. This requires a large scale research project across a 
large volume of small claims breaking down and analysing the elements of loss and 
injury claimed and calculating the cost insofar as possible in terms of insurance 
premiums.   
 
Conclusions 
 
The previous chapters have considered the role of compensation in its wider sense as 
a means of achieving deterrence, retribution, vindication and satisfaction or correcting 
wrongs. The question considered in this chapter is whether compensation 
compensates in the narrow sense of making good loss or damage: that is, in some 
way, repairing an injury and putting the claimant back into the position he was in before 
the injury occurred. It is concluded that the major element of injury claims is the award 
for ‘pain and suffering and loss of amenity’. This is because small claims typically 
consist principally of general damages for pain and suffering and loss of amenity with 
very little by way of special damages for pecuniary loss. Moreover, most claims are 
small claims. The net result, both within the PL Claims Survey at Appendix 4 of cases 
handled by the Practice and more widely on published figures relating to personal 
injury claims generally, is that damages for pain and suffering and loss of amenity 
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comprise the largest part of damages in injury claims. This is why this chapter has 
focused on this aspect.  
 
Pain and suffering and loss of amenity is the quintessence of non-pecuniary loss. 
Money cannot compensate non-pecuniary loss. It is impossible therefore, ex 
hypothesi, for damages to compensate pain and suffering and loss of amenity. 
Therefore compensation cannot be said to fulfil this socially beneficial purpose. 
 
The theoretical bases of compensation for non-pecuniary loss include valuing the loss 
objectively, measuring the claimant’s subjective loss of happiness and evaluating 
substitute solace for the loss. However, none of these restores the claimant to his pre-
accident condition. Instead they are artificial and arbitrary in their conversion to 
monetary terms. They are awarded by convention. Convention needs to be challenged 
as it should not simply be assumed that awarding compensation is socially beneficial 
without clearly defining the purposes and boundaries. Money is incapable of providing 
real compensation for the injury. 
 
Society appears to desire compensation but on closer scrutiny the reasons typically 
given to justify awards of general damages are suspect, resting on public 
misperceptions as to the role of such awards based on emotional responses to injuries 
of maximum severity with life changing consequences. These bear no relationship to 
the majority of claims that pass across the desks of lawyers and claims management 
companies. The rhetoric tends to focus on the former claims: Lord Diplock, for 
example, explaining the purpose of damages for loss of amenity stated: 
 
I suspect that its social purpose is to relieve the horror and anguish which 
ordinary human beings who constitute society cannot but feel when 
contemplating the state to which the victim has been reduced.1034 
 
Further research is needed across a large volume of small claims to break down and 
analyse the elements of loss and injury claimed and calculate the cost of these claims. 
 
 
  
                                                          
1034 Fletcher v. Autocar and Transporters Ltd. [1968] 2 QB 322 Diplock LJ pp. 352/353 
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CHAPTER TEN - COMMODIFICATION OF COMPENSATION 
INTRODUCTION 
The failure to question the need for damages for pain and suffering and loss of amenity 
has led inexorably to routine payments of conventional sums. This in turn has resulted 
in the ‘commodification of compensation’.1035 The focus has inevitably been on 
reducing the transactional cost of delivering the commodity of compensation. A 
negative consequence of the way in which claims are brought has been that low value 
claims are highly susceptible to moral hazard and thus to abuse.  PL in common with 
other areas of personal injury, such as motor claims, has become an easy target for 
the ‘have a go’ culture. This particular vulnerability to systemic abuse, it is argued, 
outweighs any social benefit. The introduction of a clear threshold would provide a 
simple method of excising a large swathe of injury claims that are of no benefit to 
society. 
 
10.1 Pain and Suffering and Loss of Amenity has become a mere conventional 
payment that is susceptible to moral hazard and abuse 
 
Because the quantification of damages for pain and suffering and loss of amenity is 
so artificial, it has developed into a purely conventional payment. This has led to a set 
of known criteria that need to be reproduced to succeed in a claim, or to put it another 
way, to have a claim ‘rubber-stamped’. This introduces an unacceptable degree of 
moral hazard in pursing minor claims. 
 
10.1.1 What is an injury worth? 
 
The basis of quantification of damages for pain and suffering and loss of amenity is 
imprecise. It is guided by dicta indicating that damages should be ‘such that the 
ordinary sensible man would not instinctively regard them as either mean or 
extravagant, but would consider them to be sensible and fair in all the 
                                                          
1035 Jonathan Ilan, ‘The Commodification of Compensation? Personal Injuries Claims In an Age of 
Consumption’ Social & Legal Studies 2011 20(1) 39–55 
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circumstances’;1036 or a ‘full and fair value of the loss, that is to say what it is worth 
according to current social standards … ’.1037  
 
A problem in evaluating damages for pain and suffering is that there is no market for 
pain and suffering or loss of amenities.1038 By contrast, even unique property has a 
market value. If the owner received damages for the loss of the Mona Lisa, whilst he 
could not replace it, he could at least buy another masterpiece coming on the market. 
His compensation would be within the same ‘realm’1039 as his loss.  
 
It has been argued that a market is ‘nothing more than the sum of subjective 
evaluations which we deem as a whole, an average objective indicator or a best-
informed result.’1040 The inference is that a quasi–market is created by a history of 
settlements or judgments. However, this is not strictly correct. Settlements are not 
based on the subjective valuation of pain and suffering. Settlements are based on a 
number of elements including liability risks, the inconvenience and cost of having to 
deal with litigation and precedent awards. These awards set a benchmark but that 
does not mean they are the market value of pain. It is simply not possible to overcome 
the artificiality of quantifying pain in monetary terms. Pain (or more precisely the 
removal of pain) is not a tradable commodity. The fact that awards may have been 
regularly updated by reference to the Retail Price Index, as argued by Lord Goldsmith 
for the Association of British Insurers in Heil v Rankin1041 does not disguise the fact 
that there had to be a starting point for damages before applying increases in line with 
the Retail Price Index, and that starting point was arbitrary. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1036 Fletcher v Autocar and Transporters Ltd (n. 1034) Salmon LJ pp. 363/364 
1037 P Havers, ‘Case Comment General damages raised by up to one-third’ J.P.I. Law 2000, 2/3, 123-
128 p. 125 citing Munkman Damages for Personal Injury and Death 10th edition (1996) ISBN-10: 
040605360X ISBN-13: 978-0406053602 
1038 Ipp Report (n. 986) p. 186 [13.21]; Giovanni Comandé, ‘Towards a Global Model for Adjudicating 
Personal Injury Damages: Bridging Europe and the United States’ (n. 935) p. 302 
1039 Robert E. Goodin, ‘Theories of Compensation’ (n. 990) p. 63 
1040 Giovanni Comandé, ‘Towards A Global Model For Adjudicating Personal Injury Damages: Bridging 
Europe And The United States’ (n. 935) p. 303 
1041 Heil v Rankin and another (n. 926) p. 291 
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10.1.2 A conventional sum 
 
The result of the impossibility of calculating the award in any meaningful way is that it 
is a conventional sum rather than an amount that is demonstrably necessary or useful, 
arrived at ‘by speculative processes which receive judicial approbation only because 
the system must be made to work’.1042 The court is faced with performing an ‘artificial 
task of converting into monetary damages the physical injury and deprivation and 
pain’.1043  
 
The arbitrariness of the award is heightened by the fact that general damages, like 
special damages, depend on the claimant’s circumstances, which are a matter of pure 
chance. A claimant may have an ‘egg-shell skull’ or an ‘eggshell personality’.1044 Minor 
negligence can cause the gravest injury and great culpability a minor injury.1045  
 
The claimant in case 89 in the PL Claims Survey at Appendix 4 whilst receiving no 
serious physical injury was so affected by seeing a child in her car suffer a serious 
‘scalping injury’, as a result of the parcel shelf being displaced in a multi-car collision 
on the motorway, that she herself suffered from exacerbation of pre-existing ME and 
anxiety about seeing similar vehicles on the road. The claim did not reach the stage 
of medical evidence but it was reported that the claimant had been flagging down 
similar cars to warn the drivers of the perceived dangers of the parcel shelf causing 
injury in an accident. In fact the parcel shelf was much like the parcel shelf on any 
other similar vehicle and the injury was a freak accident arising from the combination 
of collisions in which the vehicle was involved. Had the defendant been liable, 
damages would undoubtedly have been greater than normal because of the claimant’s 
particular susceptibility. 
 
Yet the rules of quantification may appear contradictory or inconsistent. Factors that 
increase the claimant’s need for compensation, (such as an eggshell skull or eggshell 
personality) are taken into account, but factors that diminish the claimant’s need (such 
                                                          
1042 Woodhouse Report, (n. 733) p. 77 [170] 
1043 Heil v Rankin and another (n. 926) p. 293 citing Lord Pearce in H West & Son Ltd v Shephard (n. 
964) p. 364 
1044 Page v Smith (n. 951) Lord Browne-Wilkinson p. 182 G 
1045 H West and Son Ltd v Shephard (n. 964) Lord Devlin p. 362-363  
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as an independent income or first party insurance) are disregarded,1046 as are savings 
in the cost of the amenities lost.1047 
 
10.1.3 Convention has transformed quantifying damages into a rubber-stamping 
exercise – rather than actually compensating anything 
 
In Case Study 3, Hudson and others v Tubitsu, all four claimants suffered relatively 
similar physical injuries, but not all of them suffered psychological damage. Of the 
three who did, the symptoms, according to their evidence, varied from loss of 
confidence, travel anxiety and social withdrawal to sleep disturbance and flashbacks. 
These symptoms would probably fall short of a real psychiatric illness such as suffered 
by the claimant described in 10.1.2 above but would help to demonstrate that the 
claimants suffered a real physical injury. In routine small cases such as this, the typical 
award ‘is an artificial sum and, increasingly, it is mechanically assessed.’1048 In other 
words, in practice there is an element of rubber stamping of claims by reference to 
pre-set tariffs. 
 
10.1.4 Tariffs create a relative scale but no universal calibration  
 
Whilst tariffs create a relative scale, there is no universal tariff applicable throughout 
the EU. This suggests that the awards do not compensate pain and suffering in the 
narrow sense because if they did, the amounts would be the same regardless of the 
jurisdiction. It would be illogical to suggest that different sums make the same injury 
good in different States. 
 
It is arguably possible to compare one pain with another1049 or loss of amenity through 
one injury with loss of amenity through another.  
 
When physical pain is over, leaving a permanent physical disability behind, 
the consequent "loss of amenities of life" can also be compensated only 
                                                          
1046 Ronen Avraham ‘Accident law for egalitarians’ (n. 118)  
1047 Law Commission Consultation Paper 140 (n. 933) p.30 [2.38] 
1048 Richard Lewis ‘Increasing The Price Of Pain: Damages, The Law Commission And Heil v Rankin’ 
(n. 932) p. 102  
1049 See the Pain rating scale of the British Pain Society  
< https://www.britishpainsociety.org/static/uploads/resources/files/pain_scales_eng.pdf  > accessed 18 
June 2015 
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by an arbitrary or conventional sum. Again, looked at in isolation, there is 
no rational ground for saying that £5,000 rather than £1,000 or £20,000 is 
the right award, in the case of a particular plaintiff for the loss of a leg below 
the knee: but once you premise that £5,000 is the right award for this "loss 
of an amenity of life " you can assert that the loss by the same plaintiff of 
a leg amputated above the knee should be compensated by a sum greater 
than £5,000 in the same proportion as the disability, which is of the same 
kind, is increased by reason of the amputation having taken place at a 
higher point in the limb. Here one is comparing like with like.1050 
 
Without a mathematical formula for assessing pain, the court must do its best. This 
means, once one accepts the artificiality of the valuation process, ‘complete 
adherence to the fiction by establishing a detailed and reliable tariff system.’1051 A tariff 
can take the form of a list of precedents such as summarised in the Judicial College 
Guidelines1052 and case law in England; or a scale of rates expressed as percentage 
disability as in the French Barème.1053 
 
The result of the procedural and theoretical differences across Europe is that whilst 
most jurisdictions award damages for non-pecuniary loss, ‘European nations are 
predicted to award vastly different amounts for pain and suffering damages to victims 
with the same injury.’1054 
 
One of the first projects of the European Centre of Tort and Insurance Law (ECTIL), 
founded in February 1999 as a research institute for comparative legal studies, was a 
comparative study of non-pecuniary damages across European Member States, 
presented at a Symposium in 2000.1055 The study examines non-pecuniary loss in 
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Poland and Spain. 
Non-pecuniary loss was found to be recoverable in some shape or form in all the 
jurisdictions surveyed but with considerable variations.1056 
                                                          
1050 Wise v Kaye (n. 967) per Diplock LJ p. 664 
1051 A. I. Ogus. ‘Damages for Lost Amenities : for a foot, a feeling or a function’  (n. 970) p. 12 
1052 Guidelines for the Assessment of General Damages in Personal Injury Cases (n. 73) 
1053 Barème indicatif des déficits fonctionnels séquellaires en droit commun: see Giovanni Comandé, 
‘Towards A Global Model For Adjudicating Personal Injury Damages: Bridging Europe And The United 
States’ (n. 935) p. 286: see also W V Horton Rogers (ed.) Damages for Non-Pecuniary Loss in a 
Comparative Perspective (n. 963) p. 90 
1054 Stephen D. Sugarman ‘A Comparative Law Look at Pain and Suffering Awards’ Depaul Law Review  
Vol. 55: 2006 399 p. 413; see also W V Horton Rogers (ed.), Damages for Non-Pecuniary Loss in a 
Comparative Perspective (n. 963) 
1055 W V Horton Rogers (ed.) Damages for Non-Pecuniary Loss in a Comparative Perspective (n. 963) 
1056 W V Horton Rogers (ed.), Damages for Non-Pecuniary Loss in a Comparative Perspective (n. 963) 
p. 246 
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There have been attempts to improve the uniformity and rationality of tariffs such as 
the Pisa personal injury research project which proposed a monetary National 
Orientation Schedule that implements a Normalized Values Schedule. This was 
basically a points based percentage disability system derived from nationwide data. 
‘This approach has shown its suitability to provide uniform nationwide common ground 
for monetary assessments of [non-pecuniary damages]’.1057  
 
More significantly the Draft Report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and the Internal 
Market of the European parliament with ‘recommendations to the Commission on a 
European disability rating scale’1058 argued that assessment methods for personal 
injury compensation are derived from different judicial practices and ‘schools of 
thought’ across Europe and ‘to facilitate free movement of persons within the internal 
market, assessment practices in the Member States should to some extent be 
harmonised’ (recital 3); this requires a ‘unit and a system’ (recital 6); and disability 
should be defined consistently as 
 
the definitive reduction of physical and/or mental potential which can be 
identified or explained medically, together with the pain and mental 
suffering known by the doctor to be a normal concomitant of the sequela  
plus the everyday consequences which commonly and objectively 
accompany that sequela (recital 7) 
 
The proposed rating worked on a percentage disability rating against a theoretical 
100% maximum. The scale did not provide ‘off the shelf figures’ but a process for 
quantification based on a uniform clinical approach (recital 16).  
 
The response of the Pan-European Organisation of Personal Injury Lawyers to the 
draft proposal was that it would be ‘unrealistic because it would compel most Member 
States to fundamentally alter their redress systems as well as the laws of procedure 
                                                          
1057 Giovanni Comandé, ‘Towards A Global Model For Adjudicating Personal Injury Damages: Bridging 
Europe And The United States’ (n. 935) p. 311 
1058 Draft Report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market of the European parliament 
2003/2130 (INI) 
<  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/committees/juri/20031001/505310EN.pdf  > accessed 7 
January 2015 
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and evidence.’1059 The problem remains, however, that even if it is possible to establish 
a relative scale of damages, there is no consistency in the limits of the scales. There 
are no natural universal fixed reference points. 
 
The Hodges Report1060 as the first assessment of the application of the PL Directive 
noted: 
 
34. The issue of damages is said to be of particular significance since the 
variation in awards of damages for the same injuries between Member 
States can be large. Commentators accept that whilst there may be good 
reasons for divergences in the level of damages awarded in different 
Member States, given divergences in local standards of living and the 
availability and cost of healthcare and social security, divergences in the 
methods of quantification of damages are more difficult to justify. The 
bases upon which damages are awarded are frequently difficult to 
calculate and in some Member States unprincipled and lacking in any 
consistency. 
 
Howells observes how ‘bizarre’ it is that the EU did not seek to harmonise whether 
pain and suffering damages could be recovered under the PL Directive.1061  Indeed, it 
seems strange that there was no attempt at harmonisation of the quantum of non-
pecuniary damages, when the PL Directive states that the approximation of laws is 
necessary ‘because the existing divergences may distort competition and affect the 
movement of goods within the common market and entail a differing degree of 
protection of the consumer’1062 and the overall goal of the legislation was to progress 
towards harmonisation.1063 Faure explains: 
 
…harmonization in Europe is more an approximation of administrative 
regulations to reduce differences as far as possible. But, in the absence of 
regulation, differences will remain. The essence of a directive is indeed 
that the Member States may themselves choose the methods of 
implementing the duties placed upon them by a directive.1064 
 
                                                          
1059 The Pan-European Organisation of Personal Injury Lawyers PEOPIL’S RESPONSE TO THE 
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COMMISSION ON A EUROPEAN DISABILITY SCALE - 2003/2130 
(INI) January 2004 
<http://www.peopil.com/peopil/userfiles/file/BaremeMedicalTablesHarmonisationofdamagesJan2004.
pdf> accessed 9 December 2012 
1060 McKenna Report (n. 44) p. 12 [34] 
1061 Geraint Howells, ‘PL – A History of Harmonisation’ Chapter 35 (n. 675) at p 646  
1062 PL Directive Recital 1 
1063 PL Directive Recital 18 
1064 Michael Faure, ‘Defining Harmonization, Codification and Integration of Environmental Law: A 
Search for Definitions’ European Environmental Law Review June 2000 174 
306 | P a g e  
 
Without unifying legislation on damages, Member States were only required to focus 
on harmonising liability. Quantification of damages would remain untouched and any 
pre-existing divergences between Member States would survive. There are even 
material differences within the separate jurisdictions of the UK.1065 If the goal was 
harmonisation of PL, the mere harmonisation of liability deals with only one side of the 
equation and is therefore ineffective. It is easy to attribute this anomaly to quirks in the 
different judicial and procedural systems but on a deeper analysis a plausible 
explanation is that damages for non-pecuniary loss do not in fact compensate in the 
narrow sense. There is no fixed sum of money that ‘makes good’ pain suffering and 
loss of amenity. The sums awarded are nothing more than a matter of convention and 
different states have developed different tariffs based on arbitrary datum points.  
 
10.1.5 Proof and moral hazard 
 
As each member State has its own legal system there are procedural differences in 
how ‘tariffs’ are applied or used including particularly the number and disciplines of 
experts permitted to be called.1066 
 
In the UK, pain and suffering and loss of amenity are matters to be proved by medical 
evidence. The Pre-Action Protocol for Personal Injury Claims1067 encourages the 
claimant to nominate a medical expert. The defendant may object if he has grounds, 
for example if the expert’s CV suggests the injury is outside his field; otherwise the 
claimant will obtain a report and the defendant is not entitled to rely on his own expert 
evidence within that particular speciality unless the claimant agrees; the court permits 
or the report is amended and the claimant will not disclose the original.1068 
 
If proceedings are then issued, the CPR provides that the court is under an obligation 
to restrict expert evidence to ‘that which is reasonably required to resolve the 
proceedings’ (CPR 35.1). In cases in the small claims track or the fast track, if 
permission is given for expert evidence, it will normally be given for evidence from only 
                                                          
1065 Simon P. Browne, ‘Damages for personal injury: non pecuniary loss’ (n. 989) 
1066 Wall v Mutuelle de Poitiers Assurances [2014] 1 W.L.R. 4263 
1067 Pre-Action Protocol for Personal Injury Claims 7.2 et seq  
< http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/protocol/prot_pic > accessed 14 June 2105    
1068 Pre-Action Protocol for Personal Injury Claims 7.6 et seq (n. 1067) 
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one expert on a particular issue who becomes a single joint expert. The Practice 
Direction requires the court to consider whether it is proportionate to allow separate 
experts for the parties. The practical result is that in smaller PL claims, the defendant 
will normally have to accept that medical evidence is given by the claimant’s expert 
and the defendant is restricted to asking written questions. The court may not even 
allow experts to attend court to give oral evidence. (CPR 35PD.7). 
 
In Case Study 1, Martin v Kudo, the claimant’s expert wrote: 
 
For neck problem I recommend referral to a rheumatologist. For shoulders … 
rheumatologist. For elbows … rheumatologist. For back … rheumatologist. For 
right knee … rheumatologist. For left knee …  rheumatologist. For ankles … 
rheumatologist. For right foot … rheumatologist. For left foot … rheumatologist. 
For left foot … rheumatologist. 
 
The report gave the claimant’s alleged injuries an air of credibility. These are 
sufficiently serious medical problems that the claimant needed to be referred to a 
specialist. The expert went on to say ‘…In my opinion some of the symptoms are not 
related to the accident.’ The best Kudo could do was to ask which symptoms were and 
which were not related to the accident. 
 
The same process would have applied in Case Study 3, Hudson and others v Tubitsu, 
if it had reached the stage of proceedings. The defendant is at a serious disadvantage. 
Moreover, the claimant’s expert evidence is heavily dependent on what the claimant 
has told the expert, as discussed above.  Although in some cases medical tests might 
catch out an untruthful claimant, it may be difficult to contradict what the claimant has 
reported. Here Mr Farmer has reported various aches and pains that are consistent 
with the accident circumstances he has described. Typically, with more serious 
orthopaedic injuries there is independent corroborative evidence, such as X-Rays 
showing broken bones, or MRI scans revealing tears and breaks. Minor injuries, 
however, rely heavily on the claimant’s subjective reporting. 
 
This means that small PL cases are subject to considerable moral hazard on the part 
of the claimant.  Mr Hudson’s case is a good example. Mr Hudson tells his medical 
expert he has had an accident; he describes pain and psychological symptoms; the 
expert produces a report, which is more or less proforma for whiplash type accidents, 
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describing the reported injuries, which fit the template for a whiplash type injury, which 
attracts a conventional sum in damages for this type of injury; the prospects for 
challenging the medical evidence are not promising and so quantum is rubber-
stamped. Mr Hudson’s claim may be genuine but it is apparent how easy it would be 
to fabricate it or exaggerate it. 
 
In practice outright fraudulent fabrication of claims has not been a material issue in the 
Practice. There have been some notable exceptions such as case 99 in the PL Claims 
Survey at Appendix 4, in which the claimant’s medical report was a collection of 
inappropriate medical terms linked by very little that made grammatical sense.1069 Far 
more common is the suspected exaggeration of symptoms to push a minor incident 
over the threshold such as cases 49, 122 and 123 in the PL Claims Survey at Appendix 
4. These all involved alleged ‘jolting’ injuries. The technical evidence in Case Study 3, 
Hudson and others v Tubitsu, suggested that this might have been such a case but it 
was never tested, as when challenged, the claimants did not pursue the claim. 
  
10.1.6  Plans to tackle moral hazard 
 
In December 2014 plans to tackle ‘unjustified personal injury claims’ were published 
by the Ministry of Justice.1070 This reflected a concern that there had been an increase 
in fraudulent and grossly exaggerated claims. The plan involved amending the Pre-
Action Protocol for Low Value Personal Injury Claims in Road Traffic Accidents and 
the Civil Procedure Rules, to provide that where a Claim Notification Form sent on or 
after 6 April 2015 is in respect of a soft tissue injury, the claimant must obtain medical 
evidence sourced via a special internet portal. From 2016 the medical experts will have 
to be accredited under a new process. At the same time the claimant’s legal 
representatives must carry out checks for any previous claims by the claimant. There 
are also fixed costs provisions aimed at reducing the cost of obtaining medical reports. 
Soft tissue injury has a specific definition: 
 
                                                          
1069 See page 140 above 
1070 < https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/330722/fact-
sheet-unjustified-personal-injury-claims.pdf  > accessed 24 January 2015; these plans are now given 
effect by amendments to the RTA Protocol – see < http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-
rules/civil/protocol/pre-action-protocol-for-low-value-personal-injury-claims-in-road-traffic-accidents-
31-july-2013 > accessed 14 June 2015 
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‘Soft Tissue Injury Claim’ means a claim brought by an occupant of a motor 
vehicle where the significant physical injury caused is a soft tissue injury 
and includes claims where there is a minor psychological injury secondary 
in significance to the physical injury.1071 
 
The overall objective is to cut down fraud and prevent medical experts from forming 
unethically close bonds with lawyers who generate their work. The Impact Assessment 
explains that the numbers of whiplash claims arising from motor accidents has 
increased significantly whilst the numbers of road traffic accidents has decreased and 
forecasts a reduction of 10% in road traffic accident soft tissue claims as a result of 
the reforms.1072  
Whilst this development recognizes the problem of fraudulent whiplash claims it does 
not address the deeper underlying issues highlighted in this Chapter and more widely 
in this thesis, particularly the lack of social desirability of low value claims for pain and 
suffering and loss of amenity.  This reform implicitly accepts that there is a fundamental 
need for compensation for pain and suffering and loss of amenity. It simply targets the 
outright fraudulent claims in one area, road traffic accidents, and introduces a level of 
bureaucracy in obtaining medical evidence. There is no reason to believe that Mr 
Hudson’s claim in Case Study 3 would be more difficult to bring. It is not clear why an 
accredited medical expert should say anything materially different to Mr Hudson’s 
consultant Mr Andrews. It will not affect the rubber stamping of routine low value 
claims. The problem is far wider than outright fraud. There is no doubt that the ease 
of ‘access to justice’ has led to a ‘have a go’ culture in relation to low value claims.  
 
10.2 PL has become an easy target for the ‘have a go’ culture; 
 
The experience of the Practice suggests that the increased moral hazard and the ease 
and low risk of bringing PL claims has generated a compensation or ‘have a go’ culture 
in this field of claims. According to some, ‘compensation culture’ is merely a perception 
                                                          
1071  Whiplash Reform Proposal  Annexe A  to the letter of 4 August 2014 from Lord Faulks QC, Minister 
of State for Justice < http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/civil-justice-reforms/lord-faulks-letter-annex-
a.pdf > accessed 24 January 2015 
1072 Impact Assessment: Reforming medical examination and reporting in motor accident soft tissue 
injury claims, IA No: MoJ 163 16 September 2014 < http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/civil-justice-
reforms/annex-e-impact-assessment.pdf  > accessed 24 January 2015 
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brought about by a general of concern over rising insurance premiums, levels of 
compensation and legal costs.1073 It is said to be a media creation and ‘on balance it 
looks as if the British continue to be nation of ‘lumpers’ rather than litigators’.1074 
According to Lewis and Morris there is no evidence that the system has been ‘flooded 
with an increasing number of personal injury claims in recent years’: 
 
In particular, the majority of injured people still do not go on to claim 
compensation despite being encouraged to do so through widespread “no-
win no-fee‟ advertising. The exception arises in the context of road traffic 
accidents, where there is a strong culture of claiming.1075 
 
There is evidence that the figures used to support the debate are misleading with 
claims below £2500 not being required to be reported until 1997 so that possibly half 
of all claims were not reported; and the CRU figures from 2000 to 2005 showed that 
tort claims had declined.1076 However, it has to be pointed out first that these data may 
not be representative of a trend and are out of date. The period 2000 to 2005 broadly 
covers the first five years of operation of the Woolf Reforms. There would have been 
a surge of claims as access to justice was opened up. Existing untapped claims were 
targeted. This reserve would have dried up as the three year limitation period expired. 
Thus one might expect a bulge in claims followed by a levelling off as the existing 
reserves were depleted. What has happened since then is a steady increase which 
seems to have levelled out around 1 million claims per annum: 
 
  
                                                          
1073 Lee McIlwaine, ‘Tort reform and the "compensation culture"’ J.P.I. Law 2004, 4, 239-249 
1074 K Williams, ‘State of fear: Britain's "compensation culture" reviewed’. Legal Studies. (2005) 25 (3), 
499-515. 
1075 Richard Lewis and Annette Morris, ‘Tort Law Culture in the United Kingdom: Image and Reality in 
Personal Injury Compensation’ Journal of European Tort Law 3 (2), 230-264 
1076 Richard Lewis, Annette Morris and Ken Oliphant, ‘Tort personal injury claims statistics: Is there a 
compensation culture in the United Kingdom?’ (2006) 14 Torts Law Journal 158-175 p. 161 
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Table 7 Cases Registered with CRU from 2010/11 to 2013/14 (plus 2006 to 2010 
from archive) 
 
 
 
Source DWP Transparency data Number of cases registered to CRU Updated 24 April 
20141077 
 
Regardless of the terminology, the Practice sees far more low value claims today than 
20 or even 10 years ago. This is clear evidence of a compensation culture in the sense 
that claimants are sufficiently motivated and empowered to bring minor claims which 
they would not have bothered to bring 20 years ago. Lord Young’s Report Common 
Sense Common Safety was predicated on the basis that ‘I believe that a 
‘compensation culture’ driven by litigation is at the heart of the problems that so beset 
health and safety today.’1078 The report has been criticised1079 on the ground that it 
failed to include any empirical evidence to contradict the report of the House of 
Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee which did not support the proposition that 
there was a compensation culture.1080 Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, Lord Chief 
Justice, gave evidence to the Committee that there was none, based on the statistics 
                                                          
1077 DWP Website, Transparency data, Number of cases registered to CRU: 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/306064/cases-
registered-cru-2013-14.csv/preview  > accessed 28 January 2015 
1078 Lord Young Common Sense Common Safety: A report by Lord Young of Graffham to the Prime 
Minister following a Whitehall-wide review of the operation of health and safety laws and the growth of 
the compensation culture. Cabinet Office October 2010  
< https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/common-sense-common-safety-a-report-by-lord-
young-of-graffham > accessed 1 May 2013 19:15 
1079 James Goudkamp, ‘The Young Report: an Australian perspective on the latest response to Britain's 
"compensation culture"’ P.N. 2012, 28(1), 4-26 
1080 House of Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee, Compensation Culture: Third Report of 
Session 2005-2006, vol 1, HC 754-I (London: The Stationery Office, 2006) p. 13 [31] 
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gathered by the Compensation Recovery Unit of the Department of Work and 
Pensions. It may be that as the years have passed, the picture has become clearer, 
so that by late 2012 the Centre for Policy Studies Report wrote of the number of 
complaints and claims increasing in every sector of public life; ‘misuse of tort to 
compensate for every misfortune’; and the explosion of litigation gaining ‘formidable 
momentum’.1081 The report cautioned that ‘a litigious climate inexorably leads to the 
diminishing of the ethos of public service and a decline in the quality of care in health 
and in the education of our children.’1082 This resonates with the Better Regulation 
Taskforce report of 2004, which sought to explode the ‘urban myth’ of compensation 
culture, suggesting that it was a ‘perception’1083 but found that ‘more people have been 
encouraged to "have a go" at claiming redress for a wrong they feel they have 
suffered’.1084 The report concluded that ‘Redress for a genuine claimant is hampered 
by the spurious claims arising from the perception of a compensation culture. The 
compensation culture is a myth; but the cost of this belief is very real.’1085  
 
In the early days of the Consumer Protection Act 1987 almost all reported cases failed 
on the grounds of causation.1086 Mildred’s premise is that “claimants have found it 
difficult to succeed.” The reality is that they have failed publicly in a few cases that 
went to court, the percentage of cases reaching court being very small. 
 
Johnston comments, citing Cases, Materials and Text on Consumer Law1087 that whilst 
other European courts were willing to infer a defect, the UK courts required a ‘more 
detailed explanation for why a defect exists’.1088 Johnston gives as a prime example 
the case of Foster v Biosil1089 in which Cherie Booth QC held, in relation to a breast 
                                                          
1081 Frank Furedi and Jennie Bristow, The Social Cost of Litigation Centre for Policy Studies, September 
2012 Printed by IMS Ltd, Ellis Square, Selsey – Chichester – PO20 0AF ISBN No. 978-1-906996-39-0 
p. i 
1082 Frank Furedi and Jennie Bristow, The Social Cost of Litigation (n. 1081) p. 70 
1083 David Arculus and Teresa Graham, Better Routes to Redress (n. 240) p. 3 
1084 See David Arculus and Teresa Graham, Better Routes to Redress (n. 240) p. 5 
1085 See David Arculus and Teresa Graham, Better Routes to Redress (n. 240) p. 3 
1086 see Mildred, ‘Pitfalls in Product Liability’ (n. 211) citing Richardson v LRC Products Ltd [2000] 
P.I.Q.R. P164 (QBD); Foster v Biosil (2001) 59 B.M.L.R. 178 (CC (Central London)); Tesco Stores Ltd 
v Pollard [2006] EWCA Civ 393; (2006) 103(17) L.S.G. 23 (CA (Civ Div)); Piper v JRI (Manufacturing) 
Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1344; (2006) 92 B.M.L.R. 141 (CA (Civ Div)); Worsley v Tambrands Ltd [2000] 
P.I.Q.R. P95 (QBD) 
1087 Droushout (ed), Cases, Materials and Text on Consumer Law (Hart Publishing, 2010) p. 468 
1088 Christopher Johnston QC, ‘A personal (and selective) introduction to PL law’ (n. 674) pp. 11/12 (and 
footnote 46) 
1089 Foster v Biosil (n. 1086) 
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implant which leaked silicone, that it was for the claimant not merely to prove a defect 
but also the cause of the defect – on the basis that defect as used in the development 
risks defence ‘implied a technical defect in the manufacture or design’.1090 This has 
always been a controversial case because it does not reflect the wording of the PL 
Directive which provides: 
 
The injured person shall be required to prove the damage, the defect and 
the causal relationship between the damage and the defect1091 
 
 As Mildred rightly explains: 
 
That the fact of a rupture of an implant after five months' use without 
surgical damage on implantation and necessitating removal did not imply 
a defect would surely appear extraordinary to the commonsensical 
observer.1092 
 
However, these early difficulties do not reflect the everyday experience of the Practice 
in dealing with routine claims. It is usually a matter of fact, not a complicated legal 
analysis. In other cases the defect is readily apparent and it is simply a question of 
whether it caused the injury. Defect and causation are not difficult to prove in the 
majority of cases. Problems usually only arise in complex products such as 
pharmaceuticals and other bioactive products, which is a good reason for treating 
pharmaceutical PL separately rather than trying to design a legal system around a 
complicated product when it will more often be applied to a simple product. 
 
Even in the cases on the Directive the results turn on findings of fact rather than fine 
points of law. Such findings are a matter for the judge on the day. Indeed most cases 
in practice turn on facts. The same would apply even if the law provided for absolute 
liability. The claimant would still have to bring himself factually within the ambit of the 
legislation. As Mildred concludes:  
 
Anecdotally the Act has been useful for encouraging swift settlement of 
small claims, particularly in relation to food.1093   
 
                                                          
1090 Foster v Biosil (n. 1086) p. 181 
1091 PL Directive (n. 2) Article 4 
1092 Mildred, ‘Pitfalls in Product Liability’ (n. 211) p. 144 
1093 Mildred, ‘Pitfalls in Product Liability’ (n. 211) p. 149 
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This is closer to the experience of the Practice: an increasing volume of small injury 
claims to be presented and paid. It may be that the debate about compensation culture 
is influenced by the sense that the term has a pejorative ring to it. Ilan seeks to justify 
compensation claiming as ‘no more necessarily ‘deviant’ than the manner in which 
contemporary society is configured.’1094 His point is that it is a feature of the 
consumerist society that claims have become ‘commodified’. This is indisputable and 
the key reasons for this are funding and marketing. 
 
10.2.1 Funding 
 
It is less likely, in the experience of the Practice, that any of the claims in Case Study 
1, Martin v Kudo, or Case Study 3, Hudson and others v Tubitsu, would have been 
brought before the Woolf Reforms improved access to justice. The funding changes 
have made it possible to pursue these claims without risk to the claimant and before 
the Jackson reforms, claimants’ lawyers could obtain disproportionately large 
remuneration.1095 These funding changes included recoverable After The Event 
Insurance; referral fees for third parties (often insurers) sending claims details to 
claimant lawyers; and conditional fee agreements with recoverable success fees.1096 
Whilst referral fees were banned as a result of the Jackson reforms, some insurers 
entered into joint ventures with claimant legal practices so that they could continue to 
generate claims.1097 
 
 
10.2.2 Marketing 
 
Relentless television advertising has encouraged people to bring claims and it is 
accepted that ‘certain adverts have given the impression of easy money’.1098 The 
                                                          
1094 Jonathan Ilan, ‘The Commodification of Compensation? Personal Injuries Claims In an Age of 
Consumption’ (n. 1035) 
1095 The Jackson Report (n. 6) and the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 
1096 See Adrian Zuckerman, ‘The Jackson Final Report on Costs: plastering the cracks to shore up a 
dysfunctional system’ (n. 820) p. 264 
1097 John Hyde, ‘The spirit of the referral fee ban? It doesn’t exist.’ Law Society Gazette 7 November 
2013 
 <http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/practice/the-spirit-of-the-referral-fee-ban-it-doesnt-
exist/5038640.fullarticle > accessed 10 January 2015 
1098 Lee McIlwaine, ‘Tort reform and the "compensation culture"’ (n. 1073) p. 243 
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farming of claims is a sophisticated industry now regulated by the Claims Management 
Regulation Unit of the Ministry of Justice.1099 However, many still seem to operate 
outside their supervision by bombarding mobile phones with automated cold calls and 
texts, fishing for any possibility of an accident in breach of the Claims Management 
Services Rules.1100 What is abundantly clear is that ‘society’ perceives that there is a 
need for low value injury claims: otherwise injured people would not pursue these 
claims. However, the perception of need is inculcated rather than innate. The 
claimants are exhorted to claim by their lawyers and their expectations are falsely 
raised. In a memorable case handled by the Practice J v A the claimant cut the top of 
her finger when her vacuum flask ‘exploded’. The evidence she gave was that she 
filled the flask with hot water and tea bags and the glass liner simply shattered, slicing 
the top off her finger. This was, in the claimant’s solicitor’s view, a case of res ipsa 
loquitur. However, the reality is that the clamant must show that a defect caused the 
injury. The inference was that there must have been a defect for the glass to shatter. 
It was not until disclosure that the true picture became clear. One of the claimant’s 
contemporaneous photographs showed the flask with a pile of shattered glass which 
had formed the lining of the flask next to it. More significantly, however, lying in the 
pile of glass was a long handled metal spoon - which the claimant had been using to 
stir the tea when she broke the glass liner. The claimant cannot be expected to know 
the law relating to PL but evidently her solicitor must have encouraged her to pursue 
the claim.  
 
This is not an isolated example. It is in the nature of products that they are often broken 
in an accident and the question to be answered is whether the product broke so as to 
cause the accident or whether it broke as a result of the accident. For example in case 
21 in the PL Claims Survey at Appendix 4 the claimant was seriously injured when her 
car overturned on a bend in the road. The nearside front wheel was found broken from 
the axle. The claimant’s own disclosed expert report said that it was not possible to 
say whether the wheel failed and caused the accident or whether it failed in the 
collision with a tree as the car left the road because the claimant lost control. Thus the 
                                                          
1099   See < https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/claims-management-regulator#role > accessed 10 
January 2015 
1100 Claims Management Services Regulation - Conduct of Authorised Persons Rules 2014 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/380623/CMR_Conduc
t_of_Authorised_Persons_Rules_Oct14a.pdf   > accessed 23 April 2015 
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threshold for bringing a claim under the PL Directive was not met. Yet the claimant’s 
solicitor encouraged the claimant to pursue the claim until it was eventually abandoned 
as hopeless. The claimant cannot be criticised for pursuing the claim if her solicitor 
advised her to do so. 
  
10.3 Should the threshold for actionability be raised? 
 
10.3.1 Australian experience of introducing thresholds 
 
In Australia in 2002 a former New South Wales Supreme Court Judge David Ipp QC 
was appointed to chair a Panel of Eminent Persons1101 to reform tort law. The panel 
produced the ‘Ipp Report’ on 30 September 2002 which set out the terms of reference 
explaining: 
 
The award of damages for personal injury has become unaffordable and 
unsustainable as the principal source of compensation for those injured 
through the fault of another1102 
 
The Panel was tasked with inquiring into the application, effectiveness and operation 
of common law principles defining liability for injury and developing and evaluating 
‘principled options to limit liability and quantum’.1103 
 
Although there was a need for radical steps as a pragmatic response to an insurance 
crisis,1104 it is clear that the Panel applied principles that are in harmony with the 
observations of this Chapter: 
 
we do not think that changes in the law should be recommended merely 
for the sake of reform or to reduce liability. As elsewhere in this Report 
(and as required by our Terms of Reference), we have sought to identify 
changes that can be justified in terms of principle.1105 
 
These principles were: 
 
                                                          
1101 Which also included Professor Peter Cane 
1102 Ipp Report (n. 986) p. ix 
1103 Ipp Report (n. 986) p. ix  
1104 James Goudkamp, ‘The Young Report: an Australian perspective on the latest response to Britain's 
"compensation culture"’ (n. 1079) p. 6 
1105 Ipp Report (n. 986) p. 181 
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- that resources devoted to compensation should be allocated to support the most 
needful: whereas personal injury law treats the less seriously injured relatively more 
generously than the more seriously injured. (13.2 p. 181) 
 
- whilst the full compensation principle applies to economic losses it is merely assumed 
to be the basis for non-economic loss. However, it is not sacrosanct or beyond 
consideration for revision. Many legislative provisions compromise this principle to 
‘reflect community attitudes’ (13.3 p. 181) 
 
- the amounts awarded in tort are so disproportionately larger than amounts payable 
by way of social welfare, that the differentiation cannot be justified purely in terms of 
fault. (13.4 p. 182) Under strict UK PL law fault does not even enter into the equation.  
 
- the smaller the claim, the more it costs as a proportion of the amount in issue to bring 
the claim. (13.5 p. 182) 
 
- without denying the suffering that some claimants live with, it is more important to 
compensate financial loss than non-economic loss (as the social welfare system 
does). The smaller the claim, the greater the proportion attributable to general 
damages. (13.6 p. 182) 
 
From this the Panel concluded that imposing a threshold1106 for awards of general 
damages would be an effective and appropriate way of significantly reducing the 
number and cost of smaller claims.  
 
13.44 Therefore, the Panel recommends the adoption of a threshold for 
general damages in terms of 15 per cent of a most extreme case. Such a 
threshold provision has been the subject of judicial interpretation in NSW, 
and the Panel understands that it is now well understood in practice and 
is regarded as reasonably fair. 
 
                                                          
1106 Ipp Report (n. 986) p. 188 ‘A threshold should be distinguished from a deductible. For instance, 
imposing a deductible of $10,000 would mean that no compensation would be payable for the first 
$10,000 of any claim (for general damages). But a threshold of $10,000 would have the effect that no 
compensation would be payable in respect of any claim (for general damages) worth less than $10,000.’  
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13.45 The Panel has been informed that, in practice, cases that are 
assessed as below the threshold of 15 per cent of a most extreme case 
are typically cases of soft-tissue injury, which heals relatively rapidly.1107 
 
The Law Council of Australia raised the concern that application of thresholds 
eliminates all claims below the margin, not only trivial ones.1108 This may discriminate 
against the elderly, children, pensioners, and stay at home parents who may have 
suffered no economic loss. But that is not discriminatory. Nobody can recover low 
value general damages and so no-one is worse off than anyone else. In so far as some 
claimants will recover special damages, this is because they have actually suffered 
pecuniary loss. The person who has not suffered financial loss is not discriminated 
against because the sufferer of financial loss recovers damages to make good his 
loss.  
 
The Law Council of Australia also argues that thresholds discourage rehabilitation as 
it is in the interest of the injured person to stay injured and lose earnings. However it 
is submitted that it makes no difference whether there is a threshold or not. The longer 
a person is off work, the more his loss of earnings claim will be, and probably the 
higher his general damages for loss of amenity will be.  
 
Ultimately a number of reforms were introduced including new thresholds to create a 
‘resulting statutory chaos’.1109 This is a result of the different states having their own 
legislative powers. This has the unfortunate consequence that plaintiffs recover 
different sums for the same injuries in different states. This emphasises the importance 
of unifying legislation at EU level. 
 
10.3.2 Effect of introduction of thresholds in Australia 
 
The Civil Liability Act 2002 of New South Wales provides: 
 
                                                          
1107 Ipp Report (n. 986) p. 192 
1108LCA Brief June 2004  
<http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/lawcouncil/images/LCA-
PDF/Briefs_Fact_Sheets_and_Publications/Thresholds_for_General_Damages_-_Jun_2004.pdf    > 
accessed 24 January 2015 
1109 James Goudkamp, ‘The Young Report: an Australian perspective on the latest response to Britain's 
"compensation culture"’ (n. 1079) 
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16 Determination of damages for non-economic loss  
(1) No damages may be awarded for non-economic loss unless the 
severity of the non-economic loss is at least 15% of a most extreme case.  
(2) The maximum amount of damages that may be awarded for non-
economic loss is $350,000, but the maximum amount is to be awarded 
only in a most extreme case. 
 
The Act then sets out a table of proportions of the maximum amount that apply to 
claims by reference to the severity of the non-economic loss as a proportion of the 
most extreme case. Goudkamp reports that some data are available by which to judge 
the impact of the imposition of a threshold in the New South Wales District Court (the 
equivalent of the English County Court in the most populous State). ‘In 2001, filings 
were 20,784. This figure fell to 12,686 in 2002 and then to 7,912 in 2003. In 2004, only 
6,789 claims were filed.’1110  
 
It is indicated that although there are no reliable data, anecdotal evidence suggests 
that insurance premiums have returned to pre-reform levels. However, there may be 
many factors that affect premiums and it is not possible to pinpoint a single cause. 
One of the problems with the reforms in Australia is that they were multifarious and 
wide ranging, in addition to varying widely from State to State, and concern has been 
expressed that they have gone too far.1111 It is clear that the imposition of the threshold 
has effectively cut off a considerable number of low value claims, which is the precise 
intention of the provision.  
 
10.3.3 Concern about restricting rights 
 
The concern about thresholds is that they provide an artificial barrier to enforcing a 
right. Society should therefore not impose thresholds lightly. However, thresholds are 
used widely in the law to restrict individuals’ rights for the greater good, limitation 
periods being a prime example. More significantly the concept is not alien to PL. Two 
important thresholds were built into the PL Directive. The first is article 9 which 
provides that damage includes damage to property of a type ordinarily intended for 
private use or consumption and used by the injured person mainly for his own private 
                                                          
1110 James Goudkamp, ‘The Young Report: an Australian perspective on the latest response to Britain's 
"compensation culture"’ (n. 1079) p. 13 
1111 See James Goudkamp, ‘The Young Report: an Australian perspective on the latest response to 
Britain's "compensation culture"’ (n. 1079) p. 13 
320 | P a g e  
 
use or consumption ‘with a lower threshold of 500 ECU’.1112  The reason for the 
threshold is expressly stated in recital 9 to the PL Directive as ‘to avoid litigation in an 
excessive number of cases’.1113 
 
There is no explanation, in the Travaux Preparatoires to the PL Directive, for why this 
threshold only applies to property claims. There is no logical reason why the same 
considerations should not apply to minor injury claims. The threshold is expressed in 
ECU (European Currency Units which were replaced on 1 January 1999 by the Euro 
at parity). It has not been possible to identify how this figure was arrived at. The 
equivalent in the Consumer Protection Act 1987 under section 5(4) is £275. There is 
some divergence between Member States as to whether the threshold is applied as a 
kind of ‘deductible’ when the damage exceeds the limit or as a ‘franchise’ where the 
full amount is recoverable provided that the damage exceeds the threshold.  
 
It may be that the absence of a threshold for injury claims simply arose because initially 
non-pecuniary claims were excluded under article 4 of the August 1974 first draft (in 
contrast with the Strasbourg Convention); ‘Article 4 ...Compensation of non-pecuniary 
damage shall be excluded’,1114 on the grounds, according to the explanatory 
memorandum, that non-pecuniary damage, if taken into account, ‘would unduly 
broaden its extent’. 
 
Article 18 of the Directive provides for the Council to examine and if necessary revise 
the limits every five years after taking account of economic trends. The property 
damage threshold has never been changed. The threshold set in 1987 would be a little 
more than double the original sum if adjusted for inflation (by applying the RPI for 
example). This would still fall below even the most minor injury claim. Nevertheless 
there is scope for this element to be reviewed. Indeed the penultimate recital states  
 
Whereas the harmonization resulting from this cannot be total at the 
present stage, but opens the way towards greater harmonization; whereas 
it is therefore necessary that the Council receive at regular intervals, 
                                                          
1112 PL Directive Article 9 
1113 PL Directive Recital 9 
1114 Preliminary Draft PL Directive (n. 24) p. 167 
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reports from the Commission on the application of this Directive, 
accompanied, as the case may be, by appropriate proposals.1115 
 
The second threshold in the PL Directive is Article 11 which provides  
 
Member States shall provide in their legislation that the rights conferred 
upon the injured person pursuant to this Directive shall be extinguished 
upon the expiry of a period of 10 years from the date on which the producer 
put into circulation the actual product which caused the damage…1116 
 
When considering the draft PL Directive, the Law Commission was concerned that a 
10 year prescription period was arbitrary and capable of ‘working hardship and 
injustice to persons injured in the later stages of a product’s life’.1117 However, they 
were satisfied that it would be irrelevant to perishable goods and was needed in the 
interests of fairness in relation to durable goods, recognising difficulties in the burden 
of proof as time elapses. The Law Commission concluded that it was necessary that 
a producer should be able to ‘close his books on a product’ so as to enable him to 
assess risks and keep insurance premiums down. ‘There is thus some saving, albeit 
marginal, which redounds to the general benefit of the public.’1118 
 
The Scottish Law Commission on the other hand felt that ‘if strict liability was justified, 
one of its principal justifications must be that liability should subsist for as long as the 
product can be regarded as defective’. They concluded  
 
It may be that insurance premiums in respect of such products may be 
higher if there is no cut-off period, but altogether to deprive an injured 
person of a right or a remedy in these circumstances seems too high a 
price to pay.1119 
 
The defendant in case 128 in the PL Claims Survey at Appendix 4 relied on the 10 
year limitation period to obtain summary judgment. The claimant in that case crashed 
her car into a wall in a small car park and, having subsequently received a recall notice 
relating to jamming cruise controls, argued that this was the cause of the accident. 
Technical evidence showed that the two were unrelated and in all probability the 
sticking throttle she experienced was due to lack of maintenance of the cable on an 
                                                          
1115 PL Directive Recital 18 
1116 PL Directive Article 11 
1117 Law Com. No. 82 Liability for Defective Products (n. 252) p.47 [151] 
1118 Law Commission 82 (n. 252) p. 47  [151 – 153] 
1119 Law Commission 82 (n. 252), pp. 47-48 [154 & 155] 
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old car. Her solicitors dropped the case and she continued on her own until the 
defendant obtained summary judgment. The imposition of a ten year time limit might 
be considered fair in the sense that the vehicle had had ten years and 92,997 miles of 
use and abuse since it left the factory. 
 
When the Law Commission reviewed damages for non-pecuniary loss it specifically 
asked the question ‘Should there be a threshold for the recovery of damages for non-
pecuniary loss?’1120 The Law Commission considered the arguments in favour of a 
threshold: this would reduce the cost of tort compensation in damages and costs; 
cases which are most vulnerable to exaggeration would be excluded from the tort 
system: and there is less of a case for compensating small injuries than large ones.  
 
The Law Commission concluded by way of criticism that these arguments tended to 
be pragmatic rather than principled. However, the legal system must fulfil a practical 
function. To ignore pragmatism in favour of idealistic (and arguably misguided) 
principles is of no utility to society. The alternative of introducing an opaque and 
artificial costs regime to increase the difficulty in pursuing low value claims is an 
entirely pragmatic step and one that lacks the justification of transparency. In any 
event the imposition of thresholds is not lacking in principle. It is a fundamental 
principle that individual freedom must be subject to the rights of society as a whole, as 
part of the individual’s social contract: 
 
The function of the “de minimis” doctrine (as it is frequently cited) is to 
place “outside the scope of legal relief the sorts of intangible injuries, 
normally small and invariably difficult to measure, that must be accepted 
as the price of living in society.”1121 
 
The Law Commission identified a number of counter-arguments:1122 
 
‘(1) Even if the tort system is too expensive, costs should be reduced by other methods 
than interfering with basic common law principles’. 
 
                                                          
1120 Law Commission No. 257 (n. 940) p. 10 [2.25]-[2.28] 
1121 Jeff Nemerofsky, ‘What is a "Trifle" Anyway?’ Gonzaga Law Review  [Vol. 37:2 2001/02]  315-341 
pp. 323/324 
1122  Law Commission No. 257 (n. 940) pp. 10-11 [2.26] 
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This misses the point that this is not simply about the cost of tort. The point argued 
here is that it fails to compensate in the narrow sense. 
 
‘(2) A threshold might itself lead to exaggeration.’ 
 
This is true but there is already a de facto threshold to be overcome. The Judicial 
College guideline for minor injuries values ‘injuries where there is a complete recovery 
within seven days’ at up to £550.  Injuries where there is a complete recovery within 
28 days are valued at £550 to £1,100. Theoretically, therefore, the threshold currently 
stands at £550. The reality is different. Only 5 of the claims for injuries in the PL Claims 
Survey at Appendix 4 settled for less than £1,000 and in two of these, NHS charges 
took the final payment over £1,000.  
 
The current limit for a personal injury claim to remain in the small claims track is that 
the personal injury element must not exceed £1,000.1123 A successful claimant in the 
small claims track is only entitled to very limited costs. It is therefore more attractive to 
a claimant if the claim exceeds £1,000, so that it falls into the fast track.1124 Thus 
exaggeration is a risk (and a fact) with the current system. By increasing the threshold 
to a significant sum, claimants will not be able to exceed the margin by modest 
exaggeration and so attempts to mislead are more likely to be detected. 
 
‘(3) As minor injuries typically do not cause pecuniary loss, to refuse non-pecuniary 
damages would mean some wrongs went uncompensated’. 
 
This assumes that non-pecuniary loss can be compensated by damages. It has been 
shown in Chapter 9 that in fact damages fail to compensate minor injuries. 
 
‘(4) The Pearson Commission’s recommendation that a threshold be introduced 
should be seen in the context of its wide terms of reference, and its view that tort 
damages should be seen as a supplement to no-fault compensation from the state’. 
 
                                                          
1123 CPR 26.6 (1) (a) (ii) 
1124 CPR 26.6 (4)(a) 
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Whilst it is true that the Pearson Commission recommended a package of reforms, it 
would be inaccurate to suggest that introducing a threshold was somehow a quid pro 
quo for no-fault liability. The Pearson Commission saw the need for a threshold (a 
three month time period rather than a monetary amount) as a matter of principle. They 
made it clear that they found payments for minor non-pecuniary loss ‘wasteful’. It was  
 
… hard to justify payments for minor or transient non-pecuniary loss, such 
as may equally be incurred through sickness or some everyday mishap. 
We find it impossible to justify their use as bargaining counters. The 
emphasis in compensation for non-pecuniary loss should in our view be 
on serious and continuing losses, especially loss of faculty.1125 
 
‘(5) There are already disincentives to small claims, for example in costs rules’  
 
It is submitted that costs disincentives are entirely lacking in legal principle. If 
legislation is to take away rights then it should be clear that this is what it does. 
 
‘(6) An exclusion, on the Pearson model, of damages for non-pecuniary loss in the first 
three months after the accident would in many cases exclude compensation when a 
victim’s pain is at its worst.’ 
 
It is correct that a time-based threshold would affect the period immediately after the 
injury. The Law Commission’s reference here to a ‘victim’ is telling. It is submitted that 
the role of a threshold should be to remove trivial claims. Although the Pearson 
Commission expressed their proposal for a threshold as a temporal measure, it was 
made clear that their intention was simply to exclude minor claims as explained above. 
It is also important to note that the Pearson Commission postulated two alternative 
temporal thresholds. The first, which they preferred, was a complete bar to recovery 
of non-pecuniary damages for the first three months after the injury. The second 
permitted recovery for the first three months if the injury persisted beyond this period. 
 
There are many ways of defining a threshold including a monetary limit, a time period, 
a verbal threshold (which has the advantage that it is less susceptible to 
                                                          
1125 Pearson Commission (n. 191) pp. 89/90 [383-384] 
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exaggeration)1126 or a set of specific conditions (or a combination of these). For 
example Sugarman proposes 
  
For injuries causing less than six months of disability, only those suffering 
a serious disfigurement or impairment (later defined in some detail) would 
have access to the tort system for the payment of general damages.1127 
 
A difficulty in defining a threshold in connection with the PL Directive is that there is no 
harmonisation of non-pecuniary damages and so ideally this deficiency would need to 
be addressed at the same time. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The need for damages for minor injuries has been manufactured by the litigation 
industry. Too many claimants are induced to bring claims that they would not otherwise 
bring, typically at the lower end of the scale. Access to justice for those claims has 
opened a door to automatic compensation for the most minor of injuries. PL seems to 
be particularly vulnerable because strict liability is too often misinterpreted by claimant 
lawyers unused to PL claims as liability emanating from the mere happening of an 
accident. It will be argued by some that they are simply exercising their rights and it 
should make no difference how they are apprised of these rights. 
 
In both Case Study 1, Martin v Kudo, and Case Study 3, Hudson and others v Tubitsu, 
the claimants were represented by solicitors. It is not possible to know from a 
defendant’s perspective precisely what advice was being given to the claimants or why 
one proceeded to trial and the other abandoned the case. The hope would be that the 
legal profession would be giving proper advice on the legal merits of the case. Whilst 
the position is often not clear cut, claimants’ solicitors must from time to time face an 
ethical dilemma as to whether to advise the client to drop the case because it is bad 
in law – or to carry on pursuing a bad case because the likelihood is that the innocent 
defendant will pay something to dispose of the nuisance. The Practice has never had 
                                                          
1126 James M. Anderson, Paul Heaton, Stephen J. Carroll, ‘The U.S. Experience with No-Fault 
Automobile Insurance A Retrospective’ p. 105 
<http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG860.pdf > accessed 23 
November 2014 
1127 Stephen D. Sugarman, ‘Serious Tort Law Reform’, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 795, 807, 823-25 (1987) 
p. 807 
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to face this issue as a defendant. Such low value claims are highly susceptible to moral 
hazard given the lack of extrinsic evidence of injury.  
 
Procedural reforms indirectly seek to control the numbers of claims by putting the 
financial viability of claiming in issue. It is concluded that this is an uncertain and 
disingenuous way to tackle the problem. It would be fairer for legislation, at EU level, 
to impose a value threshold below which claims could not be brought on the basis that 
the arguments for retaining damages for pain and suffering are more persuasive in 
relation to larger claims. The financial cost to society of such claims requires a further 
detailed research project. It would be a worthwhile exercise. Only then can sensible 
limits be set and the amounts saved from overcompensating individuals for minor 
injuries reassigned to the higher priority of socially beneficial public expenditure on 
projects that improve safety and the wellbeing of society as a whole.1128  
                                                          
1128 Robert E. Goodin ‘Theories of Compensation’ (n. 990) p. 73 
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PL CLAIMS SURVEY: Data Analysis  
  
Facts and figures 
 
The survey reviewed 132 cases from the Practice’s archives. These were all PL cases 
that are closed. There were no particular criteria for acceptance other than that they 
were archived and could be retrieved. Some older files have been destroyed but the 
remaining archived boxes stretch back 10 years or more. The sample represents 
approximately 10 cases per year ranging from the smallest soft tissue injuries to 
paraplegic and fatal cases. 
 
The factors reviewed included: 
 
1. Outcomes 
 
Out of 132 cases 66, exactly half, were abandoned. Three more were discontinued 
formally after proceedings and a further three were won in court by the defendant, two 
at trial and one by summary judgment. 
 
On the other side of the scales 58 claims were settled with an additional two cases 
won at trial or by summary judgment. 
 
The significance of this finding is that in half the cases claimants began claims and 
then abandoned them. In each case the potential defendant had to set in motion a 
process of investigation often involving insurers, technical staff sometimes including 
external consultants and in-house or external lawyers. This is a cost that has not been 
expressly taken into consideration in the various reviews of damages (Law 
Commissions 225 and 257; Pearson Commission, and of civil procedure (Woolf 
Reforms and Jackson reforms) discussed in this thesis. Similarly the reports to the 
European Commission on the PL Directive (see section 1.5 above) have failed to take 
into account the hidden cost of claims being brought and not merely lost but 
abandoned even if for perfectly legitimate reasons. 
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58 cases were settled and only two reached court. This might be considered a success 
of the system as settling cases must be more efficient than having to go to trial 
because the costs of counsel, solicitor and experts of both sides are usually 
considerable. However this must be balanced by two factors. First in more than half of 
these settlements nuisance offers were made (almost a quarter of all cases). This term 
is used to denote a case in which the defendant is not liable or believes strongly that 
it is not liable, but it considers the cost of defending and the risks inherent in the 
litigation system too great to run the defence to trial. It includes cases in which the 
defendant simply does not want the publicity of fighting cases in court. 
 
Notably in cases where the defendant felt that there was fraud afoot, it was inclined to 
fight (cases 62 and 99). 
 
2. Moral hazard  
 
56 cases, almost half of all claims were considered to be at risk of moral hazard, 
meaning that the circumstances of the accident or the nature of injuries rendered them 
vulnerable to exaggeration. That is not to say that claimants habitually fabricate or 
exaggerate their injuries but that the nature of injury claims and the mode of proof 
means that Claimants who wish to do so can manufacture actionable injuries without 
difficulty. The more minor the injury the easier it is to exaggerate it.  Breakages of 
bones, lacerations and broken tendons and ligaments can be detected by diagnostic 
equipment. However, soft tissue injuries and mental injuries (or psychological effects 
of physical injuries) rely almost entirely on the claimant’s report of the pain and 
disability caused by the accident. 37 of the 86 lowest value cases (up to £5,000) were 
considered to exhibit moral hazard. Conversely only 19 cases (14.4% of all the cases 
in the survey where moral hazard was identified as a potential issue) related to cases 
valued at more than £5,000. Thus there appears to be a correlation between low value 
cases and cases involving moral hazard. This is unsurprising because when deciding 
whether a case contained potential moral hazard an obvious factor was whether there 
was a soft tissue injury.  
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3. Value  
 
It was possible to ascribe a value to 131 cases in the sample. Case number one was 
ignored as it was not possible on the limited information available to make a plausible 
estimate of quantum. The method of valuation was to take the settlement sum in 
respect of the element recoverable under the Consumer Protection Act where 
settlement was achieved. In cases which were not settled, if there was a valuation on 
the file this was used. For example the fee earner may have assessed the value for 
reporting on quantum. Where there was no evaluation, a rough evaluation was made 
using the 12th edition of the Judicial College Guidelines on the Assessment of Personal 
Injury Damages. The post Jackson figures have been used for consistency. These are 
10% higher than the pre-Jackson figures but the difference is not material in the 
context of the research which is the subject of this thesis. Where there is a range of 
figures the approach has been reasonably generous to the claimant assuming the 
higher end of the bracket. If a less generous approach had been taken a few more 
cases would have fallen into the lowest value bracket, but the numbers are not 
material. 
 
Where cases were abandoned, the quantum was still evaluated as if there were 100% 
liability as the purpose of this criterion was to assess the size of claims without 
considering liability. 
 
The values of cases confirmed existing wider research cited (see 9.1.2 above) on 
personal injury generally, in that the majority of claims were in the lowest value band 
as set out in table 6 above. The overwhelming majority of valued cases, 65.6%, were 
quantified at less than £5,000 and only 5.3% of claims exceeded £50,000. 
 
This strongly supports the argument that the rationale for general damages cited by 
Genn1129 of ‘victims’ descriptions of their life changing injuries, does not apply to the 
majority of PL cases (or at least those handled by the Practice). 
 
 
                                                          
1129 Law Commission 225 (n. 925) 
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4. Transactional costs 
 
Given the number of small claims, a feature of concern was the disproportionality 
between the value of cases and the transactional costs. In this case the value of the 
claim was the value at final outcome. Therefore if a settlement was achieved, the 
settled sum relating to damages for injury was taken as the value. Where a case was 
abandoned or lost, the value was nil. This value of outcome was then compared with 
the expense of costs for legal and expert fees expended by all parties. The simple task 
was to assess whether the fees exceeded the value of the case. It did so in 119 out of 
132 cases: that is 90% of cases. It was this concern which led to the Jackson review. 
It is presumably because this statistic is so notable that the focus of the Jackson review 
was entirely on the cost of litigation and Jackson LJ’s remit did not stretch to 
considering the social desirability of the litigation as a whole.  
 
5. Causation 
 
Causation was in issue in 95 out of 132 cases (72%), indicating that notwithstanding 
strict liability under the PL Directive, liability does not automatically follow and liability 
still has to be proved. 
 
6. Regulatory 
 
There were regulations in place in relation to 100% of the products which were the 
subject of the sample claims. Most of the claims were in the motor manufacturing 
sector but there were also fireworks, medical products and electrical goods. Moreover 
the General Product Safety Regulations would impose safety requirements where 
there was no product specific legislation. This supports the proposition that PL is 
unnecessary for the purpose of regulating safety. 
 
7. Confidentiality/damages 
 
There were no cases in which a claimant refused to sign a confidentiality agreement 
when reaching settlement. This supports the argument that Claimants typically want 
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money rather than public vindication of their rights by naming and shaming the 
manufacturer. 
 
8. Insurer control 
 
An interesting aspect of PL is that in none of the cases was an Insurer in ultimate 
control of the claim. It is certainly the experience of the Practice that when dealing with 
volume personal injury litigation, insurers may take complete control of claims and 
settle them without reference to their insured. However, in PL cases the insured 
manufacturer typically takes a serious interest in claims. It is also typically involved in 
investigations. It may be the expert on the product concerned and may have to help 
an independent expert with some of the proprietary technology.  
 
9. Mental injury  
 
It was the author’s perception that mental injuries are claimed more frequently now 
than perhaps 10 or 15 years ago but there was no evidence to support this in the 
survey. There were 22 cases out of 132 (16.6%) in which a specific mental injury was 
claimed and these are spread fairly evenly over the period covered by the survey. 
However, this should be distinguished from the mental element of minor soft tissue 
injuries which is an integral part of the value of the claim. It is also unknown whether 
some of the cases that were abandoned early on would have produced claims for 
psychological injury had they advanced further, particularly those where lawyers had 
not yet been involved. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN:  CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has sought to answer the primary question as to whether PL Claims are 
socially desirable by reference to three PL case studies and a survey of 132 archived 
PL claims that constitute a representative random sample of PL cases handled by the 
Practice. Whilst the sample is scientifically small the cases span a period of 13 years 
or so (older files having been destroyed and recent files still being open). More 
importantly the author’s legal practice has provided a window through which  
(i) failings can been seen in a strict liability based European Directive; 
(ii) deficiencies are revealed in tort itself as a mechanism for compensating injured 
persons; and 
(iii) the newly reformed domestic civil procedure put in place to distribute rights is 
shown to be flawed. 
 
11.1 Findings 
 
According to the most recent report of the EU commission on the PL Directive: 
 
In general, the Directive is seen as achieving a balance between consumer 
protection and the producers’ interests. Most contributions to this report 
confirm the fact that Directive 85/374/EEC is an instrument that offers the 
real possibility of filing a claim for appropriate remedy and compensation 
for damage caused by a defective product.1130 
 
The general assessment has been that there is nothing wrong with the PL Directive 
and so there is no need to fix anything. This thesis argues the contrary position: that 
there is much that is wrong and that the time has come to consider radical reforms. 
This Chapter first summarises the findings leading to this conclusion. The second part 
of this chapter sets out the conclusions reached as to the way forward. This will involve 
considerable work to be done by way of investigation and economic scrutiny. It would 
be unrealistic to expect this thesis to be able to go further than identifying the general 
scope of this work.  
 
 
 
                                                          
1130 Fourth report on the application of Council Directive 85/374/EEC (n. 59) 
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11.1.1 Do PL claims achieve the socially desirable goals of tort? 
 
The question posed by this thesis is whether PL claims are socially desirable.  The 
question was tackled by first asking whether PL claims achieve the socially beneficial 
goals of tort. Social desirability was tested by using as a benchmark the widely 
accepted goals of tort identified as deterrence, corrective justice, vindication and 
retribution, overarching distributive justice and compensation.  
 
 
Deterrence  
 
There is no evidence in the case studies or the PL Claims Survey to support the EU 
Commission’s claim that the Directive helps to increase the level of protection against 
defective products by complementing the regulatory measures and checks to prevent 
the marketing of defective products and thereby protects consumers.1131 Consumer 
safety is a separate and effective limb of EU policy.1132 All of the products in the PL 
Claims Survey were subject to strong regulation.1133 
 
Damages awards in the UK are not at the level of US awards and provide no punitive 
incentive on manufacturers.1134 Group litigation has not emulated class actions and 
has had little effect on litigation in the UK. Although contingency fees are now 
permissible in the UK the EU Commission has recommended a ban on the use of such 
funding for collective redress.1135 
 
Cautious behaviour is not rewarded by a strict liability regime or where insurance 
meets any claims. 
 
The world of routine PL claims has nothing to do with deterrence. It deals with 
predominantly small claims, two thirds of those in the PL Claims Survey worth less 
                                                          
1131 Green Paper (n. 45) 
1132 See p. 96 
1133 See p. 327 
1134 See p. 63 
1135 See p. 70 
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than £5,0001136 which have increased in volume in line with small injury claims 
generally. 
 
Corrective Justice  
 
It was found that strict liability formed an unsatisfactory basis for corrective justice 
because there is no clear wrong to right. Wrong has to be assumed without regard to 
the particular circumstances of the case, especially the social value or ‘sozialadäquat’ 
of the product.1137 
 
Settlements in the PL Survey had no correlation with wrong. Payments were made in 
cases where there was a clear defect, even though the supplier might merely have 
been an importer with no way of checking the functionality and safety of the product. 
A fault based system with an innate conception of wrong at the heart of it is a fairer 
and more predictable guide to socially desirable behavioural norms. Payments were 
also made on a nuisance basis where there was no defect, because of the penal cost 
of defending a claim.  
 
Vindication and Retribution 
  
Private law remedies are inappropriate for establishing the recognition of public rights. 
There are social organs and institutions better designed for this purpose.1138 
Retribution falls within the province of the criminal law. It has a declining (if not extinct) 
role in modern society and civil liability’s instrumental character is in any event ill-
equipped to dispense the non-utilitarian purpose of enabling victims to exact revenge 
on supposed culprits. 
 
Distributive Justice 
 
The second question asked was why strict liability was perceived to be necessary. It 
was explained why strict liability for defective products was an inappropriate means of 
                                                          
1136 See p. 275 
1137 See p. 135 
1138 See p. 137 
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dispensing distributive justice for claimants and defendants alike because the grounds 
for adopting strict liability were deeply flawed. They followed a highly suspect legal 
theory which rose to prominence in the US in the 1960s but which was largely 
discredited and abandoned by the late-1980s, precisely when the PL Directive was 
introduced in Europe.1139  
 
Unprecedented tragedies in the 1960s and 1970s led to an emotive clamour for some 
form of collective redress based on a legal theory which could overcome the problems 
of proof of fault and causation. Strict liability was selected without sufficient thought as 
to whether it was capable of achieving these aims. It was not. Even if fault is removed 
from the equation, causation remains the dominant issue in PL claims and was in 
dispute in nearly three quarters of all the cases in the PL Claims Survey. The 
arguments in favour of strict liability lead more obviously to no-fault liability.1140 
 
Finally it was shown that the reforms to civil procedure which followed the Jackson 
Report on ‘civil litigation costs’ whilst aimed at the acute problem of the 
disproportionate cost of litigation, failed to address the question of whether the 
underlying litigation is socially desirable. The most significant reform, Qualified 
One-Way Costs Shifting is a comprehensive transfer of the costs of personal injury 
litigation onto the artificial social group of ‘defendants’.  Unfortunately QOCS has been 
shown to be fundamentally unsound in so many ways that it does not constitute a fair 
redistribution of rights.1141 Instead it substitutes an ‘absurd’ system of shifting the 
claimant’s litigation risk to the defendants with a different method of doing the same 
thing.1142 It was also argued that whilst the Jackson reforms will discourage the pursuit 
of minor claims by making them financially less viable for lawyers this is a 
disingenuous way of withdrawing rights. If distributive justice demands that individuals’ 
rights should be restricted in the greater interests of society as a whole, then the law 
should be transparent about this. 
 
                                                          
1139 See p. 176 
1140 See p. 220 
1141 See p. 241 
1142 Adrian Zuckerman ‘The Jackson Final Report on Costs: plastering the cracks to shore up a 
dysfunctional system’ (n. 820) p. 267 
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An area highlighted by this thesis, upon which there has been a remarkable dearth of 
academic discussion, is the concept of gambling present in the current civil litigation 
process. Compensation should be based on need. There should be certainty. It should 
not become a game or a sport in which there are winners and losers.1143 
 
Compensation  
 
Compensation is the most conspicuous purpose of PL and to a degree it achieves this 
goal. However, this is where the third fundamental question arises: does PL actually 
compensate injury? 
 
It is widely assumed that compensation is a worthy goal in itself and debate over the 
past 20 years has focused on the cost of delivery. This thesis has considered how 
compensation is awarded in practice and concentrated on general damages which 
make up the largest part of all compensation paid. In almost three quarters of all cases 
in the PL Claims Survey, it was found that non-pecuniary loss claimed (or potentially 
to be claimed) exceeded pecuniary loss. This is typical of small claims, which make 
up the vast majority of injury claims.  
 
It was concluded that whatever jurisprudential basis was adopted to explain general 
damages for pain and suffering and loss of amenity, there was a gap between theory 
and practice. In many small claims, damages simply represent a windfall for the 
claimant And the litigation industry: the rhetoric explaining the need for such damages 
being based on life changing injuries and being totally inapposite to the bumps and 
scrapes of everyday life.1144 Claims for such minor injuries are subject to moral hazard 
due to the lack of extrinsic evidence of injury. These claims have become a commodity: 
an artificial form of money distribution generated by the litigation industry in the name 
of ‘access to justice’.1145 
 
Research is urgently needed to quantify the overall cost to society of these low value 
claims (not merely in the field of PL). 
                                                          
1143 See p. 52 
1144 See p. 291 
1145 See p. 299 
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Thus it can be said that PL Claims fall a long way short of satisfying the test of social 
desirability. 
 
11.2 Conclusions 
 
11.2.1 The PL Directive 
 
The PL Directive has been shown to be of very little benefit to society. Harmonising 
the basis of liability alone is of no practical use. The usefulness of the PL Directive is 
limited to providing an extra-contractual right of action to those injured using products 
which they have not purchased and to bystanders.  
 
These claimants will usually have a concomitant right of action in negligence. Thus the 
real advantage of a right of action under the PL Directive is that it is based on strict 
liability. Yet the putative justifications for strict liability as the common basis of liability 
for defective products are deeply flawed. There is no reasonable justification for strict 
liability, fault providing a more rational basis of liability (assuming a tort based system) 
and no-fault providing a fairer distribution. 
 
It has also been argued that there is no reason to treat PL as a special class of liability. 
The logical conclusion, therefore, is that the PL Directive serves no practical purpose 
and should be repealed. 
 
11.2.2 Civil Liability as a whole 
 
However there is a wider ranging and more radical conclusion following from the fact 
that PL is practically a sub-set of personal injury generally. The time has come to re-
examine Atiyah’s 1997 conclusion that the ‘whole system of legal liability needs a good 
hard look’.1146 He ventured ‘a few tentative suggestions about such an extensive 
subject as reforming the whole system of civil liability’ the most significant of which was 
that ‘the action for personal injuries should simply be abolished and first party 
                                                          
1146 Atiyah, P S, The Damages Lottery (n. 13) p. 173 
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insurance should be left to the free market.’1147 This thesis, by reference to a specialist 
PL practice of 15 years (and a further 15 years of PL experience before that) goes 
some way towards validating Atiyah’s unorthodox conception. However Atiyah saw 
first party insurance alone as filling the space left by tort. Whilst this thesis supports 
investigating the potential for developing the first party insurance market, it is 
concluded that compensation should be based on need and a basic level of 
compensation should be guaranteed by the state. This means investigating the 
possibility of introducing a no-fault scheme along the lines of the NZ Accident 
Compensation Scheme discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
11.2.3 The optimal no-fault scheme 
 
The optimal no-fault scheme should be based on need. If a person is injured why 
should it matter whether that injury is caused by a car or a pharmaceutical or the 
claimant’s own carelessness in tripping over a natural hazard? 
 
Atiyah ruled out a scheme providing compensation at the level of civil liability as too 
costly.  Although a specific costing exercise needs to be undertaken, this undoubtedly 
remains so. The New Zealand ‘prototype’ has demonstrated this. The solution 
therefore has to be to apply limits on recoverability. This is most conveniently done by 
introducing a threshold at the bottom end and a compensation ceiling at the top end. 
This is an efficient and manageable way of controlling expenditure.  
 
This is where Atiyah’s first party Insurance market can fill the void by offering cover for 
injuries at the lower end of the scale (no doubt at considerable cost) and top up cover 
above the ceiling. To make such a scheme work would be a real financial challenge. 
The starting point would be a data gathering exercise on the cost of the existing civil 
liability system.  
 
Reliable data would be required on injury claims paid and premiums charged across 
typical liability sectors. As this thesis has identified, the cost of claims started and 
abandoned must not be left out of consideration. In addition a detailed investigation of 
                                                          
1147 Atiyah, P S, The Damages Lottery (n. 13) p. 189 
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the New Zealand Accident Compensation Scheme would be required, to learn from its 
successes and problems, in addition to other more limited schemes for medical injury 
and motor liability that already exist around the world. To this end the Report of the No 
Fault Compensation Review Group Report1148 is a good starting point. 
 
Such a scheme would resolve many of the failings of civil litigation identified in this 
thesis as applying not only to PL claims but across the full range of injury litigation.  
 
- Compensation based on need can cover not merely injury for which a 
responsible person can be identified but also persons injured by disease,1149 
unavoidable accidents that are no-one’s fault; and accidents that are the 
claimant’s own fault. Considerations of blame would be irrelevant and so this 
would be true to the ideals expressed to support strict liability. 
- There is certainty of compensation and any form of gambling is removed from 
the process.  
- The inequality of distribution is corrected:  
- compensation is not limited to the fortunate few winners 
- transactional costs are reduced significantly if the current legal process 
is  abandoned 
- threshold provisions eradicate the large volume of low value high moral 
hazard claims currently within the litigation system. 
- Whilst it would be necessary to remove insurers’ rights of subrogation to make 
such a scheme work, a right of recovery could be preserved by insurers against 
any party whose reckless or deliberate act caused the injuries for which 
compensation is to be paid. Such liability would be uninsurable as is currently 
the case. This satisfies the requirements of corrective justice and deterrence. 
- A no–fault scheme must operate alongside effective regulation to ensure an 
appropriate level of deterrence and punishment for behaviour tending to expose 
consumers to unacceptable risks. This may require a review of sanctions to be 
conducted. 
                                                          
1148 No Fault Compensation Review Group Report and Recommendations (n. 778) pp. 25-27 
1149 See generally: Stapleton, J, Disease and the Compensation Debate (n. 747)  
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- The primary focus should be on rehabilitation rather than arbitrary sums of 
money being paid for pain and suffering and loss of amenity. 
- Mass disasters should be dealt with by the state (whether within the scheme or 
outside it) and the state can control its exposure through risk transfer as 
necessary. 
 
11.2.4 Social Welfare 
 
Whilst Atiyah was against utopian all-embracing state schemes as he saw 
‘paternalism’ as the root cause of over-dependence on welfare, this is a political 
judgement. If taken to its logical conclusion it would mean that education, health and 
pensions would all have to be removed from the public sector. Such a scheme has 
been ‘more aptly described as a supplementary social security and public healthcare 
system than as an injury compensation scheme.’1150 Despite his grave doubts about 
such wholescale schemes providing the answer to the compensation needs of society, 
Atiyah supported a no-fault scheme for motor accidents and applauded the fact that 
New Zealand had proved that the damages action is not indispensable.  
 
A first party insurance scheme could provide funding for claims below the threshold 
and more importantly above the ceiling. This would provide opportunities for the 
insurance industry to replace their role in personal injury liability insurance. 
 
Again, politics are beyond the scope of this work but it can be said that a mixed scheme 
involving state funded core compensation and private sector first party insurance 
meets two key objectives of the EU. The first is protection of the consumer (the state 
based no-fault scheme) and the second is competition (insurers competing on 
premiums and benefits). 
 
11.2.5 Obstacles 
 
Such sweeping proposals face a number of obstacles, even assuming that after 
rigorous financial examination a scheme is viable. First, there is the legal profession 
                                                          
1150 Thomas Douglas, ‘Medical Injury Compensation: Beyond ‘No-Fault’ Medical Law Review, 17, 
Spring 2009, pp. 30–51 at p. 39. 
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which can be expected to resist changes that would decimate the personal injury 
litigation business.  Such opposition should not be allowed to interfere with 
developments in the law that are beneficial for society. The legal profession is there to 
serve society not to create an artificial industry to support itself. Lawyers should have 
the skills to turn their attention to other areas of law where their help may be more 
useful. There will no doubt still be a role for the medical profession and for the 
insurance market in the field of compensation.  
 
A greater obstacle is the position of the UK within the EU. It is less complicated for a 
country such as New Zealand to make wide scale changes to its legal process than a 
nation which had ceded part of its legislative power to the EU. The EU is both a 
problem and a potential solution. It would require intricate examination of any potential 
UK based scheme to ensure that the UK complied with existing Europe wide 
legislation. Insofar as the UK offered a greater degree of protection than the minimum 
required by EU law it is conceivable that a partial UK scheme could work. There are 
already medical no-fault schemes in Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland and 
France.1151 A wider scheme would require rewriting of EU law. 
 
This work has also highlighted the unrealistic aspirations of the EU in seeking to 
harmonise legislation by introducing a common liability standard when the Member 
States have widely divergent methods of quantifying damages. The EU needs to tackle 
the issue of harmonisation of compensation and of procedures which have quasi-
substantive effects. This is a considerable challenge but surely not impossible: after 
all 19 of the 28 Member States have managed to agree to a common currency. 
 
A better solution would be for Europe wide legislation to require all Member States to 
introduce no-fault compensation schemes. This would be an opportunity to promote 
true harmonisation of laws where to date there has been a complete failure of 
harmonisation due to differences between the Member States’ systems most 
particularly as to damages.  
 
                                                          
1151 See generally on the relative merits of variations on the no-fault theme Thomas Douglas, ‘Medical 
Injury Compensation: Beyond ‘No-Fault’ (n. 1150) 
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The most significant obstacle is cost. The wider the scheme the fairer it becomes but 
the greater the cost. However, the solution to this problem is to apply a suitable 
‘excess’ (whether defined in value or words) to the scheme or more accurately a 
‘franchise’ (so that the excess is not applicable where the claim is larger than a specific 
amount). This encourages cautious behaviour while reducing the overall cost.  The 
overall cost of claims at the lowest level is substantial. Yet the PL Claims Survey 
supports the proposition that the lowest level of claim represents the least needful of 
compensation.  
 
11.3 Final Comments 
 
These conclusions are not novel in that the no-fault argument periodically comes in 
and out of focus. However, this thesis supports the conclusion that the time has come 
to give it serious consideration on a large scale. Almost 20 years have passed since 
first publication of The Damages Lottery. This is a significant period in which the 
successes and failures of the New Zealand system in practice can be reappraised 
against the post-Woolf traditional civil liability system of the UK. The fact that no-fault 
has received a mixed reception in the past should not deter the fresh investigation of 
an advancement that provides a fairer distribution of rights than the current system 
whilst adopting the pragmatic yet principled concept of thresholds pioneered in 
Australia. Such a system discards  
 
- outgrown concepts both of fault and so called strict liability (which remain 
largely to support the litigation industry which has grown around them rather 
than performing an efficient compensatory function);  
- uncertainty and inconsistency in the security of awards;  
- discrimination against those who suffer injury and disease through natural 
causes and  
- a system of gambling at society's expense that rewards the lucky minority (and 
sometimes fraudsters and chancers).  
 
Instead of seeing personal injury as a game between claimants and defendants, it 
considers what injured persons need and ensures that there is a dependable response 
to that need. It defines and ignores minor injuries that do not give rise to real needs 
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and in return it provides a reliable safety net for those who have suffered material 
injuries. This is desirable for society as a whole. 
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APPENDIX 1   
 
Case Study 1: Martin v Kudo (GB) Motor Company 
 
Extracts of key documents from the file 
 
1. Kudo’s Inspection Report 
 
…vehicle was presented to yyy Garage to carry out a parking brake test using a roller 
brake test machine to confirm the efficiency of the parking brake. The qualified M.O.T. 
engineer carried out this test and confirmed that the parking brake efficiency was 26%, 
this being 10% above the required legislation. 
 
…  both the left hand and right hand rear park brakes operated correctly with no 
imbalance, thus enabling the parking brake to exceed the efficiency level laid down by 
legislation. 
 
The park brake adjustment/travel was checked against the specifications using a 
calibrated spring balance … the Kudo specification being 4-6 clicks at 20Kgf. 
 
… The incline was measured and found to be a 4 degree incline. The park brake was 
applied in the following sequence and the result noted. 
 
Park lever clicks 
 
Result 
1 Vehicle Moved 
2 Vehicle Moved 
3 Vehicle Moved but park brake could be felt to be operating 
4 Vehicle held stationary 
 
2. Letter of Claim 
 
‘The circumstances of this incident are that our client's vehicle was parked on an 
incline with the handbrake applied and whilst he was at the rear of the vehicle with his 
daughter and wife the vehicle began to roll backwards. 
 
The reason why we are alleging negligence is that there appears to be a fault with the 
handbrake and as such the mechanism was unsafe and not fit for purpose. 
 
Our client has suffered an injury to his back as a result of the incident and has also 
suffered time off work due to the injury... 
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We have instructed xxx Consultants Ltd to provide an in depth engineer's report and 
enclose a copy of this for your information.’ 
 
3. Martin’s Expert Engineer 
 
… as a result of this unplanned occurrence that the Claimant suffered personal injuries 
to his back and furthermore a great deal of distress to his family. 
 
It is the Claimants case that hand brake had held the car for approximately 30 seconds, 
which was just long enough for the Claimant and his family to vacate the vehicle and 
commence unloading the boot. 
 
… I pulled the hand brake lever up and obtained the following results: - 
 
    1 Click ... Effort Required ... 5.56Kgf 
2 Clicks ... Effort Required ... 6.21 Kgf 
3 Clicks ... Effort Required ... 10.23Kgf 
4 Clicks ... Effort Required ... 16.74Kgf 
5 Clicks ... Effort Required ... 24.71 Kgf 
6 Clicks ...  Effort Required ... 30.00Kgf 
 
… I requested the Claimant to park his car on an incline which measured 15 degrees. 
I requested the Claimant to apply his handbrake in what I consider to be a normal 
handbrake application … With the handbrake applied the car was then left for 
approximately 10 minutes on the incline to observe for any movement. No movement 
of the car was detected. 
 
To achieve the optimum braking effort from new brakes will require the use of the 
brakes so that both of the friction surfaces marry together. With this in mind it is my 
opinion that whilst the immediate contact achieved with new components should meet 
reasonable braking requirements further brake performance can only be achieved 
when completion of the bedding-in process or acceptable buffing of the pad and disc 
has taken place. 
 
In this case the Claimant suffered injuries to his back, and but for his quick thinking at 
the material time the accident could have been more horrific than what it was. 
 
At the material time the Claimant simply parked his car and applied the hand brake in 
the same way as he has always done in his 11 years of safe, accident free driving. 
…  I could find no mechanical fault with the foot brake on the rear wheels nor the 
parking brake which operated both near side and off side rear brakes as designed to 
do so, however, to apply of the park brake fully became more difficult the further the 
hand brake was pulled past the fourth click which as stated required 16.74Kgf to apply. 
This position on the hand brake would not fully hold the vehicle on our 15 degree 
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slope, a further click requiring 24.71Kgf was required to fully retain the car in its 
position.  
 
Based on the balance of probability if the vehicle where to be parked on an even 
steeper incline four clicks would not solely hold the vehicle and a further click of the 
hand brake would be required which as stated required a force of 30Kgf for it to be 
achieved.  
 
… the Claimant stated that both the 5th and 6th clicks very difficult to apply. 
 
Information in the form of a Technical Information … sheet from Kudo relates to the 
poor performance of the parking brake on the particular model vehicle as that of the 
Claimants.  
These defects present within the Claimants vehicle were as shown in the Technical 
Information were known to the Defendants and as a consequence the Defendants 
have allowed the vehicle to be used by the Claimant resulting in the Claimant suffering 
a personal injury.  
 
In this regard I believe the Claimant will be able to rely on the General Product Safety 
Regulations 2005, This General Product Safety Directive is to ensure that all products 
intended for or likely to be used under normal or reasonable conditions are safe. 
 
In addition I believe the Claimant will be able to rely on the Vosa Code of Practice on 
Safety Defects.  
 
It is my opinion that in order to achieve 26% efficiency from the hand brake would 
require a great deal of strength to apply. This in my opinion would be far in access 
(sic) of some people's capabilities to achieve, the Claimants wife being one example. 
 
What is interesting in this case is that the Kudo Vehicle Quality Engineer … had 
concerns about the efficiency of 281 - 372N of force needed to apply the hand brake 
after adjustment had been made. He goes on to say that in his opinion this is much 
too high for some people to apply and release. 
 
 
4. Defendant’s expert 
 
Once the car started to move, it would have been relatively difficult for anybody to stop 
it moving by pulling up the parking brake lever, because parking brakes are not 
designed or intended to be used to bring moving vehicles to a standstill. 
 
Mr Xxx’s Engineer’s Response includes references to the Manual Handling Operations 
Regulations 1992 and comments which aim to connect the action of pulling on a 
parking brake lever with guidance on lifting weight limits during manual handling tasks. 
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In my view, references to manual handling guidance and Regulations are irrelevant to 
this matter. 
 
… in his Engineer’s Response he said “What I was most taken aback with during my 
inspection was the amount of physical effort I had to apply to the handbrake lever in 
order to achieve the maximum braking result”. In fact, he never established the amount 
of physical effort he had to apply in order to achieve “the maximum braking result”, 
because he never equated his physical effort with the parking brake’s efficiency.  
 
 
Mr Xxx of Xxx Engineering Consultants Limited…established little more than that, in 
essence, it got harder to pull up the lever (i.e. more force was required), the greater 
the number of the notch on the ratchet that was reached. That is entirely what I would 
expect with this system, because pulling the lever upwards tensions the parking brake 
cables. 
 
5. Kudo Technical Instruction 
 
Some customers may complain that excessive pulling force is needed on the 
handbrake lever, to hold the vehicle on an incline. Please confirm if the vehicles 
parking brake meets the Ministry Of Transport requirements prior to carrying out this 
procedure. If the parking brake performance does not meet the MOT standard 
requirement then please continue with the procedure below. 
 
6. Kudo Response 
 
The Kudo specification for the park brake for this vehicle is "4-6 notches @ 20kg force". 
Your client's vehicle was tested … at the time of this inspection the vehicle was parked 
on an incline of approximately 4 degrees. The park brake was applied and the following 
sequences and results were noted. 
 
Park lever clicks Result 
1 Vehicle moved 
2 Vehicle moved 
3 Vehicle moved but park brake could be felt to be operating 
4 Vehicle held stationary 
 
During the examination of the vehicle [your expert] confirmed that on applying the park 
brake in accordance with the handbook "no movement of the car was detected" 
 
[your expert] confirms that …he … "could find no mechanical fault with the park brake” 
… 
The bulletin clearly states that the procedure described should only be undertaken if 
the parking brake performance does not meet the required MOT standard. As a result 
383 | P a g e  
 
of your client's complaint his vehicle was taken to a qualified MOT tester … for a brake 
test to be carried out … (See copy invoice and report attached). The report shows that 
the park brake achieved 26% efficiency which exceeds the legal requirement of 16%. 
 
7. Particulars of Claim 
 
1. Defendants were responsible as the manufacturers of Kudo motor vehicles in the 
United Kingdom. 
 
2. …purchased by the Claimant's wife… 
 
3. … the vehicle was parked on an incline with the handbrake applied but the 
handbrake failed so that the vehicle began to roll backwards and the Claimant (and 
his wife) who was behind it putting their 2 year old daughter into a pram attempted 
physically to arrest the roll of the vehicle and in doing so suffered injury but not before 
it had crushed the pram and damaged a vehicle parked behind it. 
 
4. That incident occurred because the handbrake fitted to the vehicle by the 
Defendants at manufacture was defective. 
 
Particulars 
 
… handbrake … requires a total of 5 clicks on the ratchet to be able to hold it on a 15° 
slope but the force which is required in order to apply that necessary fifth click is 
24.7IKgf; 
 
… because the 2 friction surfaces forming the relevant part of the handbrake 
mechanism had not undergone any buffing or bedding in procedure 
 
5. …will rely in support … internal email … did not provide an answer why the 
efficiency reduced so much between the vehicle being new and covering thousands 
of miles … such would not help smaller or weaker customers to apply the necessary 
amount of effort needed to hold the vehicle on a 12° slope and in his opinion the force 
… was way too much to ask some people to apply. 
 
6. Vehicle accordingly contained a defect from manufacture for which the Defendants 
are in law liable to the Claimant under Section 2 of the Consumer Protection Act 1987. 
 
7. Alternatively… Defendants as manufacturers …owed to the Claimant a duty of care 
in tort… which was breached 
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8. Particulars 
 
… fitted a handbrake to the vehicle which required force in order to enable it to achieve 
the required efficiency of retaining the vehicle on a slope which was beyond the 
capacity of many driver (sic); failed to subject the relevant part of the handbrake 
mechanism of the vehicle to any or any adequate buffing; failed to recall the vehicle 
 
Particulars of Injuries 
 
Soft tissue injuries to the neck, back, upper limbs and lower limbs. Pain, discomfort 
and restriction of movement. Shock and upset. 
 
Particulars of Special Damage 
 
Damage to pram         £ 90.00 
Miscellaneous travel expenses, telephone calls, postal charges etc   £ 
50.00 
Loss of earnings (details awaited from Claimant's employer)    £ TBA 
 
 
8. Defence 
 
1. … As part of that inspection, the vehicle was examined by an independent MOT 
test station and the handbrake was found to be working correctly and within 
specification.   
2.  Claimant was negligent in that he: 
a. Failed to apply the handbrake properly; 
b. Failed to ensure the handbrake was fully engaged; 
c. Failed to ensure that the vehicle was stationary before exiting it; 
d. Failed to follow paragraph 252 of the Highway Code in that he parked on a 
hill without applying the handbrake firmly, selecting a forward gear and 
turning the steering wheel away from the kerb; 
 
… It is averred that the handbrake design complies with the requirements of COUNCIL 
DIRECTIVE of 26 July 1971on the approximation of the laws of the Member 
States relating to the braking devices of certain categories of motor vehicles 
and of their trailers (71/320/EEC), which provides:.  
“ANNEX II  
Braking Tests and performance of braking systems...  
2. PERFORMACE OF BRAKING SYSTEMS...  
2.1. Vehicles of categories M and N...  
2.1.3. Parking braking systems  
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2.1.3.3. If the control is a manual control, the force applied to it shall not exceed 
400 N in the case of category M1 vehicles...” 
 
3. The Directive therefore permits a design which requires up to 400N of input force 
(equivalent to approximately 40.8 Kgf). 
 
9. Claimant’s expert’s letter 
 
I have reported on facts that I have either been provided with or I have found through 
engineering practices and experience. 
 
no reference has been made to the Technical Bulletins or email correspondence from 
Kudo which makes specific reference to the handbrake and the fundamental problem 
there was with the handbrake that they clearly knew about  i.e. that the brakes had not 
been 'buffed' or 'bedded in' properly.  
 
The parking brake fitted to the material vehicle is only applied when the vehicle has 
come to a complete stop. This is why it is imperative for the brake shoes and drum to 
be bedded in together before the vehicle is first used by a member of the public. If they 
are not then the type of accident that has occurred in this case could quite easily occur 
again. 
 
The Claimant says that the hand brake was applied by himself in what he describes 
as his "normal way". He complains that it was just was not capable of holding the 
vehicle stationary on the gradient that the Claimant had parked it on at the material 
time. 
 
VOSA Individual Vehicle Type Approval Manual … states … "The parking brake 
system must be capable of being operated and released whether the vehicle is 
stationary or moving". The fact that the Claimants wife attempted to stop the vehicle 
moving with the park brake without exerting excessive force would indicate in my 
opinion that the parking brake fitted to the Claimants vehicle did not conform to VOSA's 
Type Approval Manual requirements. 
 
… how do we know how much effort the NT [Nominated Tester] put into pulling the 
hand brake to its maximum, did he use one hand or two, it would be my opinion, based 
on the balance of probability, that the NT would have been an individual who is far 
stronger than the Claimant's wife… It is in my experience as a qualified MOT Manager, 
Quality Controller and Nominated Tester, that in most cases of testing hand brakes 
NT's do have a tendency to use both hands …  
 
I would now like to draw attention to the Health and Safety Executive's (HSE) 
Guidelines (L22) to the Manual Handling Operations Regulations 1992. This well 
respected publication provides guidelines for manual handling operations whilst 
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seated. The basic guideline figure for handling operations carried out whilst seated is 
5kg for men and 3kg for women … I therefore question the figure quoted in the 
Technical Information for a 'manual control' of 40kgf or 400N maximum as compared 
to the HSE maximum guideline figures.  
 
The Council Directive … states:- "The parking brake system shall enable the vehicle 
to be held stationary on an up or down hill gradient even in the absence of the 
driver...... The driver shall be able to achieve this braking action from his driving seat. 
" … This would entail applying the force to the handbrake whilst in a seated position. 
Therefore maximum guideline figures should not exceed 6kg. If one looks at this piece 
of legislation and the amount of maximum force required (400N) it is my opinion that 
this is beyond the capability of most people.  
 
… the Claimant's representatives were not present during any investigation work, or 
testing of the material vehicle. It could well be that the parking brake shoes had been 
'buffed in' prior to the brake test being carried out however this is a matter of evidence. 
 
 
10. Claimant’s GP’s report 
 
… had a road traffic accident about 5 years ago which caused injuries to his back and 
neck. He had physiotherapy and his symptoms became better after three and a half 
years after his accident. He was not fully recovered at the time of this accident. The 
back problem was exacerbated by this accident. 
 
INJURIES SUSTAINED (As described to me at the time of examination) 
 
pain in his neck a few months after the accident… pain is still moderate and is 
intermittent pain in his thoracic spine immediately after the accident, this has not 
improved and is still severe… lumbo-sacral spine… pain has become worse and is 
now radiating toward his legs… moderate pain in both shoulders immediately after the 
accident. This has not improved yet… mild pain in both elbows a few months after the 
accident… became moderate six months later…. became severe… Developed mild 
pain in right knee 6 months after the accident. This got worse and is now severe and 
exacerbates with walking. Developed moderate pain in left knee on the same day as 
the accident. This got worse after six months and is now severe and intermittent. 
Developed moderate pain in ankles 12 months after the accident. This got worse and 
is now severe. Developed moderate pain in both heels 12 months after the accident. 
This got worse and is now severe. Developed mild pain in balls of toes, mainly in big 
toes 3 months after the accident. This got worse and is now moderately severe. After 
the accident he went home. 
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EFFECTS ON WORK 
 
…  main occupation is as a Financial Advisor for 70 hours per week. He did not take 
time off from work immediately after the accident, but, has now been on sick leave, 
since 18th June 2008. 
 
His ability to do DIY has been moderately restricted. At start it was worse and is now 
severe. His ability to lift heavy items has been moderately restricted. At start it was 
worse and is now severe at times. His ability to look after his children has been 
moderately restricted. At start it was worse and is now severe. His sex life has been 
moderately restricted. It has not yet improved. His ability to manage his personal care 
has been moderately restricted. The problem has improved and is now mild to 
moderate … states that he was unable to play football … states that he was unable to 
play golf … states that playing tennis has been severely restricted … unable to play 
snooker 
 
NECK 
 
Forward flexion, extension, right rotation, left rotation, right lateral flexion and left 
lateral flexion were normal with full range of movements. There was no bony 
tenderness. There was no muscle spasm. There was soft tissue tenderness on 
paravertebral muscle … There is no clinical evidence of any neurological deficit. 
 
UPPER LIMBS 
 
Right shoulder was normal with full range of movements. Left shoulder was full range 
of movements but appeared painful. Right elbow movement was full range of 
movements but appeared painful on the lateral epicondyle. Left elbow movement was 
full range of movements but appeared painful on the lateral epicondyle. Right wrist 
movement was full range of movements but appeared painful. Left wrist movement 
was full range of movements but appeared painful. Right hand movement was normal 
with full range of movements. Left hand movement was normal with full range of 
movements. 
 
 
 
 
BACK 
 
Back movements were 51 - 75% of the normal and appeared painful. Left straight leg 
raising was normal with full range of movements. Right straight leg raising was normal 
with full range of movements. There was no bony tenderness. There was no muscle 
388 | P a g e  
 
spasm. There was soft tissue tenderness on the paravertebral muscles on the 
lumbosacral spine. 
 
There is no clinical evidence of any neurological deficit. 
 
LOWER LIMBS 
 
Right hip movement … normal … full range. Left hip movement …. normal with full 
range …. Right knee movement … 76 - 99% … appeared painful. Left knee movement 
… 76 - 99% … appeared painful. Right ankle movement … full range … appeared 
painful. Left ankle movement … full range … appeared painful. Right toe movement 
… full range … appeared painful. Left toe movement … full range … appeared painful. 
 
SUMMARY 
 
…In my opinion some of the symptoms are not related to the accident. 
 
OPINION AND PROGNOSIS 
 
For neck problem I recommend referral to a rheumatologist. For shoulders … 
rheumatologist. For elbows … rheumatologist. For back … rheumatologist. For right 
knee … rheumatologist. For left knee …  rheumatologist. For ankles … rheumatologist. 
For right foot … rheumatologist. For left foot … rheumatologist. For left foot … 
rheumatologist.  
 
In my opinion, perseverance of travelling will improve self confidence in travelling and 
hence will also help him with his psychological recovery. Final prognosis will depend 
on the Rheumatologist’s assessment as a lot of symptoms occurred few months after 
the accident. 
 
11. Defendant’s costs letter 
 
We refer to Mr Xxx’s “Response”/Supplemental Report of 26 August 2010.  
 
Paragraph 3: Mr Xxx refers to the technical bulletin relating to handbrakes on this 
type of model. The simple fact is that the Claimant’s car complied with braking 
efficiency requirements and the maximum application force permissible for a hand 
operated handbrake according to the specific EU Directive governing handbrake 
design.  
 
Paragraph 7: Mr Xxx says that the handbrake did not comply with the Directive. There 
is absolutely no basis for this. His own measurements set out in his initial report 
confirm that it did comply. He cannot simply make up facts because the true facts do 
not suit his argument.  
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Paragraph 8: The requirement for a parking brake to be capable of operation and 
release whether the vehicle is stationary or moving has nothing to do with the legal 
requirement as to the ability of the brake to hold the vehicle on a gradient (rather than 
stop a moving vehicle). They are separate issues. The brake has to be capable of 
being pulled on while the vehicle is moving. This vehicle complies. The regulation is 
there to prohibit a braking system in which there is a mechanical lock which can only 
be selected when the vehicle is stationary.  
 
Paragraph 10: Mr Xxx’s speculation about the size and strength of the MOT tester is 
irrelevant. The vehicle complied with the directive on Mr Xxx’s own measurements. It 
is not for Mr Xxx to make up evidence as to the possible or probable size of the tester 
compared with the Claimant’s wife or whether he may have used one or two hands to 
pull the brake on. This is not expert evidence.  
 
Paragraph 12/14: Mr Xxx’s reference to the Manual Handling Operations Regulations 
1992 is completely irrelevant. There is a specific Directive dealing with handbrakes on 
vehicles. He may “question the figure quoted” but it is stipulated clearly in the Directive 
as pleaded. It is not for Mr Xxx to say that he doesn’t like the figure set out in the 
relevant applicable legislation and so he will apply a different regulation that applies to 
something else. If you propose to run the case that notwithstanding compliance with 
the Directive the brake is “defective” (which is not admitted) you will need to plead this 
specifically in a Reply. This will be met by the absolute defence under section 4(1)(a) 
of the Consumer Protection Act 1987  
 
4 Defences.  
(1)In any civil proceedings by virtue of this Part against any person (“the person 
proceeded against”) in respect of a defect in a product it shall be a defence for him to 
show—  
(a) that the defect is attributable to compliance with any requirement imposed by or 
under any enactment or with any Community obligation  
 
Paragraph 15: Mr Xxx speculates as to whether the brakes might have been buffed 
in before the test was carried out. As he rightly says this is a matter for evidence. No 
such allegation has been pleaded, nor has any evidence been put forward to suggest 
that the test was anything other than proper. Again, this is not expert evidence: it is 
inappropriate mischievous conjecture.  
 
Paragraph 17: The time between the incident and Mr Xxx’s tests is irrelevant. The 
brake would no doubt have been applied many times but it is not pleaded nor has any 
evidence been put forward to suggest that the brakes had been buffed. However 
surprised he was at the physical effort required to apply the brake, he measured the 
forces and they comply with the Directive.  
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We remind Mr Xxx of his duty to the court set out in his signed pro-forma declaration.  
“I understand that my duty in writing report and giving evidence is to the Court, rather 
than the party who engaged me”.  
 
It is clear that Mr Xxx has lost any sense of objectivity. He is setting out to try to prove 
the Claimant’s case rather than assessing the actual evidence. In doing so he is 
ignoring the simple basic fact that the handbrake complied with the maximum 
application force permissible for a hand operated handbrake set out in the specific EU 
Directive on the requirements for handbrakes. Mr Xxx’s own measurement of the 
forces required to pull on the handbrake, as set out in his disclosed report, confirmed 
that this vehicle complied comfortably with the requirements.  
 
Moreover, the vehicle was checked at an MOT station 4 days after the incident and 
was found to be within the manufacturer’s specification and satisfactorily above the 
MOT parking brake efficiency requirement. There is therefore no defect upon which 
your client can base his case.  
 
Mr Xxx ought properly to concede that on his own measurements the vehicle complies 
with the appropriate EU Directive. Instead he has embarked on a completely spurious 
argument based on speculation and irrelevance with no legal or factual basis. This has 
the consequence that our client is forced to incur disproportionate costs in defending 
a very small claim with no legal basis. This is a complete waste of time and costs. We 
put you on notice now that will be drawing this to the attention of the court and seeking 
appropriate costs sanctions. In this regard please ensure that your expert is made 
aware of the judgment of the Honourable Mr Justice Peter Smith in Phillips v Symes 
(Costs No.2) [2004] EWHC 2330, Ch D. 
 
12. Offers 
 
17 May 2010: Kudo’s solicitor to Martin’s solicitor.  We…offer pursuant to part 36 
…£2,000 [plus] costs to be the subject of a detailed assessment if not agreed… 
27 May 2010: Martin’s solicitor to Kudo’s solicitor. …our client has rejected the offer 
of £2,000… 
5 July 2010: Kudo’s solicitor to Martin’s solicitor. …our Part 36 offer dated 17 May 
2010 is formally withdrawn. 
4 August 2010: Kudo’s solicitor to Martin’s solicitor. …you have rejected our offer 
without even having taken your client’s expert’s instructions upon our letter of 5 July 
2010 despite this letter clearly setting out a fundamental flaw in the basis of his 
claim….we put you on notice …we intend to seek wasted costs of the CMC against 
your firm at trial… 
6 August 2010: Kudo’s solicitor to Martin’s solicitor. We are instructed to extend time 
for acceptance of our client’s offer to bear its own costs if your client discontinues … 
4 October 2010: Kudo’s solicitor to Martin’s solicitor. …we are instructed to offer the 
sum of £5,000 …inclusive of costs… 
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5 October 2010: Martin’s solicitor to Kudo’s solicitor. We…ask you to provide a 
breakdown of your offer between damages and costs… 
6 October 2010: Kudo’s solicitor to Martin’s solicitor. …the offer is made on an all 
inclusive basis and, if accepted, the precise breakdown between damages and costs 
is a matter for you and your client. 
15 December 2010: Martin’s solicitor to Kudo’s solicitor. …your offer is unacceptable 
and fails to compensate our client sufficiently both for his injuries and his costs and 
disbursements…Total disbursements £4,038.88… 
15 December 2010: Martin’s solicitor to Kudo’s solicitor. The Claimant will accept the 
sum of £2,000 in respect of his claim…If the offer is accepted …the defendant will be 
liable for the claimant’s costs. 
1 March 2011: Kudo’s solicitor to Martin’s solicitor. …we are instructed to offer the 
sum of £7,500 … inclusive of both damages and costs. 
 
 
13. Judgment 
 
IT IS ORDERED THAT 
1. Claim dismissed.  
2. The Claimant must pay the Defendant's costs assessed at £20,000.  
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APPENDIX 2  
 
Case Study 2: Vaughan v Cranwell 
 
Extracts of key documents from the file 
 
1. AAIB DRAFT REPORT 
 
Following a pleasure flight in the local area, as part of the birthday celebrations for his 
passenger, the pilot made a high-speed low-level pass adjacent to the runway 
threshold, in front of a group of onlookers. Witnesses saw the aircraft pitch up abruptly, 
climb to a height of around 200 ft and roll inverted, prior to entering a vertical dive. The 
aircraft did not recover from this dive; it impacted the ground in a near vertical attitude 
and caught fire. The impact was not survivable. 
 
Examination of the wreckage failed to reveal any technical reason for the accident. It 
was, however, established that the passenger in the rear seat was only using the lap 
strap elements of his seven point harness. It was possible, therefore, that in the final 
inve1ted manoeuvre, that the rear seat occupant could have inadvertently restricted 
pilot's movement of the flight controls whilst inverted, precipitating a loss control of the 
aircraft at a critical moment. Other possibilities were that one or both occupants 
became incapacitated following the rapid onset of positive g, or that an intentional 
aerobatic manoeuvre was mis-handled. 
 
… 
 
[the aircraft] was equipped with seven-point seat harnesses in both cockpits, each 
comprising two shoulder straps, a crotch strap and two lap straps. When all are 
employed, the two shoulder straps, which have slotted metal fittings at their free ends, 
are inserted on to the tongues of the upper lap belt buckle. When the lap belt is 
fastened, the shoulder straps are secured. The single crotch strap locates similarly on 
the lower lap belt buckle. When all belts are assembled, the harness is adjusted to 
securely restrain the occupant. 
 
Several of the harness attachment points to the aircraft's structure, in both cockpits, 
were found to have failed in overload and were consistent with being occasioned 
during the impact 
… 
 
The front cockpit harness was found with the lap straps fastened and the shoulder 
straps in place. The crotch strap had not been used. The harness in the rear cockpit, 
however, was found with the two lap belts fastened, but neither the two shoulder straps 
nor the crotch strap had been inserted … It had not been necessary for the emergency 
services to release the seat belts during the recovery operation, due to the failures of 
the attaching structure and melting of the belt fabric. 
 
 … 
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Civil Aviation Authority Safety Sense Leaflets 
 
The CAA publishes a series of Safety Sense leaflets (SSLs). Leaflet 2b, entitled 'Pilots 
- it's YOUR decision’ states: 
 
'Audiences: are you impressing anyone? 
In the review of fatal accidents, more than ha{f of the low flying and 
aerobatic accidents involved an 'audience' - seldom at a formal air show, 
but more often to impress friends on the ground, at the clubhouse, or even 
passengers taken for a flight. The temptation to 'show off', to impress those 
watching, proved fatal in too many cases. 
 
… 
 
It was not established why the passenger did not secure his shoulder and crotch straps 
to the dual lap belt element of his harness. It may have been that he found them 
uncomfortable when he boarded and strapped in for the first attempt at the flight, or 
that he simply did not wish to be constrained. His action was contrary to acknowledged 
good practice and would have deprived him of the maximum restraint possible in the 
case of a survivable accident. The accident to [ … ] was not survivable and, therefore, 
the unsecured shoulder straps were not a direct causal factor in the passenger's 
demise. 
 
Whilst it was beyond doubt that the passenger's shoulder harness was not fastened 
at the time of the accident, it is not known whether the pilot would have been aware of 
this fact. On the first boarding of the aircraft, the passenger had fastened his shoulder 
straps, and the pilot, quite naturally, may have assumed that he would do likewise on 
the second boarding. It is considered very unlikely indeed that the pilot would have 
carried out any aerobatic manoeuvres, but particularly roll the aircraft inverted, had he 
known the passenger's shoulder straps were unfastened. There is considerable 
evidence that, from the outset, the pilot did not intend to conduct aerobatics during the 
flight. He elected not to use parachutes, replacing them with cushions, and witnesses 
recalled that the passenger indicated that he did not wish to fly aerobatic manoeuvres. 
In addition, the opinion of several experienced [… aircraft …] display pilots was that to 
decelerate from the high speed run in to a power-on inverted stall, in a properly 
controlled fashion, would have required a climb of considerable height, more than the 
few hundred feet mentioned by witnesses. However, it is notable that the aircraft's 
speed, determined as 340 kph (183 kt), was close to its design manoeuvring speed of 
360 kph (194 kt). Had the pilot intended to fly an aerobatic manoeuvre at low height, 
such as a roll or barrel roll, maximising entry speed would have provided for the 
greatest possible margin of error. 
 
The likely consequences of rolling the aircraft inverted with the rear seat passenger 
secured only by the lap straps were considered. In a positive g inverted manoeuvre 
(such as a barrel roll), a passenger not experienced in, or apprehensive of, aerobatics, 
might feel discomfort at the possibility of 'falling out' of his harness. It is possible that 
such discomfort might be expressed by shouting a (distracting) warning and/or 
grabbing at the aircraft's structure or controls in an attempt to feel more secure. 
However, the consequences in negative g flight could be much more serious. It is 
possible, in such circumstances, that an occupant who was not properly secured by a 
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shoulder harness might fall toward the canopy, particularly so if the lap belts were not 
fastened tightly. It is possible, even probable, that the occupant might grab at anything 
to hand, or restrict the movement of, or make an input to, the flight controls. Witness 
recollections of a noticeable yaw prior to the final pitching manoeuvre suggest that an 
inverted stall or a significant control input, or both, occurred. Should the passenger, in 
[the aircraft's] case, already have been 'following through' on the flying controls, then 
the potential for inadvertent interference with control of the aircraft at a critical moment 
is considered to be greater. 
 
… 
 
Conclusion 
 
It was not conclusively established why control of the aircraft was lost, following the 
fast run in and pull up to an inverted low level manoeuvre. In the absence of any pre-
existing technical defects being identified from the examination of the wreckage, the 
following causal factors could not be dismissed: 
 
• The passenger inadvertently interfered with the aircraft's flight controls 
as the aircraft became inverted, as a result of his shoulder and crotch 
straps being unsecured 
• Incapacitation of either or both the aircraft's occupants occurred following 
the rapid onset of positive g 
• Mis-handling of a low level aerobatic manoeuvre 
 
 
 
2. FINAL AAIB REPORT 
 
…The most likely cause of any restriction of the controls was that a buckle on the 
unsecured crotch strap may have become jammed in the flight controls. 
… 
 
3. INQUEST VERDICT 
 
‘Mr Cranwell was the pilot of a [ …] aircraft with dual controls.  The passenger in the 
rear seat had not secured his shoulder or crotch straps.  It is not known whether the 
pilot was aware of this.  Mr Cranwell requested permission for a low approach and go 
around.  Permission was given.  The aircraft was seen to come in at high speed, 
following which it climbed to about 200 feet and started to loop round, at which point 
the aircraft went inverted and struck the ground.  It caught fire and the pilot and 
passenger were both killed.  Subsequent investigations show that the rear seat strap 
could become trapped in the controls so as to prevent the pilot from controlling the 
aircraft.’ 
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4. AIR NAVIGATION ORDER 2005 (current at the time) 
 
 
53 – (1)… the commander of an aircraft registered in the United Kingdom 
shall take all reasonable steps to ensure – (a) before the aircraft takes off 
on any flight, that all passengers are made familiar with the position and 
method of use of… safety belts… safety harnesses…  
  
 
Public transport of passengers – additional duties of commander  
54 – (1) This article applies to flight for the purpose of the public transport of 
passengers by aircraft registered in the United Kingdom…  
(5) before the aircraft takes off on a flight to which this article applies, and 
before it lands, the commander shall take all reasonable steps to ensure that 
the crew of the aircraft are properly secured in their seats…  
 
 
5. PARTICULARS OF CLAIM  
 
8. Mr Cranwell was or should have been familiar with flying the aircraft. In particular, 
in October 2005 he had undergone a "spin and acrobatics" check with another co-
owner of the aircraft who was a former fast-jet pilot and instructor. 
 
9. Before arriving at [ … ] Airport, Mr Cranwell removed the aircraft's parachutes 
(typically carried as a safety precaution when acrobatics are planned) and replaced 
them with cushions. 
 
… 
 
14. Upon returning to the vicinity of [ … ] Airport, Mr Crossley reported by radio to the 
Bournemouth air traffic control tower and requested ''A LOW APPROACH AND GO 
AROUND AND THEN JOIN DOWNWIND" His intention was apparently to conduct a 
low level pass simulating part of a landing approach along or near to the runway centre 
line (in sight of the party going on at the Club) before rejoining the circuit for a real 
landing approach. There was no operational need to conduct the low-level pass and 
go-around. 
 
15. The aircraft made a pass over [ … ] Airport in a westerly direction, very close to 
the flying club at an altitude as low as about 50ft and a mean ground speed as much 
as about 340 kph. While still close the flying club, the aircraft was seen to enter another 
"zooming climb". At a height of approximately 100 - 200ft, the aircraft began to roll to 
the right. Once the aircraft reached the inverted position, it pitched nose downwards 
and yawed before crashing, almost vertically, into the ground at speed. The impact 
point was between the runway and airport buildings to the north. 
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PARTICULARS OF NEGLIGENCE 
 
(1) Failing to observe or heed Vaughan's expressed wishes for a pleasurable flight 
around the local area without aerobatics. 
 
(2) Failing properly to plan the flight (with or without acrobatics) so as to ensure the 
safety of the aircraft, its occupants and persons and property on the ground. 
 
(3) Failing to follow any such plan. 
 
(4) Failing to give any proper advance briefing or warning of the characteristics of the 
intended flight (and of any intended acrobatics) and/or failing to obtain Vaughan's 
agreement to any acrobatics in advance. 
 
(5) Failing, before arriving at [ … ] Airport or before the intended flight, to conduct a 
proper pre-flight check of the aircraft and, in particular, of any loose items which might 
foul the flight controls. 
 
(6) Failing to ensure, before takeoff, that the aircraft was equipped, secured and 
prepared for the flight (including any intended acrobatics) and, in particular, that any 
loose items (such as seatbelt straps/buckles and tools in the cockpit) were secured. 
 
(7) Performing acrobatics and/or abrupt flight manoeuvres such as conducting a low 
level pass over the airport near buildings and/or performing a zooming climb and/or 
rolling the aircraft and/or pitching the nose down and/or diving into the ground. 
 
(8) Conducting such manoeuvres at an altitude which was far too low in the 
circumstances. 
 
(9) Failing to give himself a margin for error or malfunction. 
 
(10) Flying the aircraft too fast, too low and/or too close to buildings, with landing gear 
retracted. 
 
(11) Failing to control the aircraft so as to avoid a crash. 
 
(12) Failing to fly within his own limits and training (including any appropriate margin 
of safety). 
 
(13) Subjecting himself and Vaughan to high g-forces. 
 
(14) Subjecting Vaughan to unexpected and/or potentially frightening manoeuvres. 
 
(15) Failing to heed guidance given by the CAA in its "Safety Sense" leaflets that "more 
than half of the low flying and aerobatic accidents involved an 'audience'- seldom at a 
formal air show, but more often to impress friends on the ground, at the clubhouse, or 
even passengers taken for a flight." 
 
(16) Allowing his flying to be influenced by the existence of an audience on the ground 
at the flying club and/or his passenger. 
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(17) Failing to pull out of the yaw/roll. 
 
(18) Diving into the ground. 
 
(19) Failing to conduct himself as a reasonably competent pilot of the aircraft would 
have done in all the circumstances. 
 
19. Further or alternatively, the maxim res ipsa loquitur will be relied upon. 
 
 
6. DEFENCE 
 
… 7. As to paragraph 6 the Deceased 
 
(a) Was a qualified and experienced pilot with over 20 years flying experience 
 
(b) Held a National Private Pilots Licence 
 
(c) Had 1545 recorded hours of flying experience 
 
(d) Was the holder of a twin engine rating 
 
(e) Had at various times been the co-owner of light aircraft as a member and/or 
shareholder of a syndicate/company owning such aircraft 
 
(f) As such was or ought to have been familiar with safety requirements and 
procedures for light aircraft -including those recommended in Safety Sense Leaflets 
published by the CAA. 
 
(g) Such safety requirements included the need to abide by any briefing given to 
passengers by the pilot in command. 
 
(h) Was aware that the aircraft had separate front and rear cockpits so that the pilot in 
command had limited visibility into the rear cockpit. 
 
(i) Was aware of the need to keep shoulder harnesses and lap straps securely 
fastened at all times. 
 
(j) Was aware that any loose items had the potential to interfere with flight controls (as 
appears from paragraph 18h of Flight Safety Sense leaflet 01 version e as published 
by the CAA and available in full online) and as such must not be permitted. 
 
(k) Was aware that the Aircraft was fitted with a 7 point lap crotch and shoulder harness 
should have been securely fastened at all times while seated in the Aircraft. 
 
(l) Was or ought to have been aware that if any part of the 7 point harness was not 
fastened and allowed to hang loose that it had the potential to interfere with flying 
controls. 
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… 20. Mr Cranwell and the Deceased re boarded the Aircraft once the engine was 
able to be started 
 
(a) but on this occasion the Deceased was assisted into the Aircraft by a friend 
 
(b) the friend noticed that the Deceased did not secure the shoulder straps of the 7 
point harness 
 
(c) the friend offered the Deceased assistance so to do 
 
(d) the Deceased declined stating that he would not require shoulder straps. 
 
21. It is to be inferred that Mr Cranwell was not aware of the decision by the Deceased 
not to wear shoulder straps still less as appears likely that he intended to allow them 
to hang down in a manner that was likely to and probably did interfere with the flight 
controls thereby causing the Aircraft to crash. 
 
… 
 
29. Hence, the crash and the tragic death of the Deceased and Mr Cranwell was 
caused or alternatively contributed to not by any negligence on the part of Mr Cranwell 
but by the Deceased and his own negligence. 
 
 
30. It was negligent of the Deceased having regard to the natters pleaded in paragraph 
7 above 
 
… 
 
(2) to disregard the safety briefing he was given 
 
(3) to refuse to fasten the harness 
 
(4) not to ensure the 7 point harness was securely fastened and if not fastened then 
secured in such a way as not to interfere with flight controls 
 
(5) as an experienced pilot to allow loose straps to remain unsecured 
 
(6) failing to use common sense when declining to fit shoulder straps even though he 
should have noted that Mr Cranwell did so 
 
(7) causing the crash in the manner described above 
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APPENDIX 3   
 
Case Study 3: Hudson, Allen, Farmer and Ilford v Tubitsu UK 
 
Extracts of key documents from the file 
 
1. Letters of claim Hudson, Allen, Farmer and Ilford 
 
We are instructed by the above named to claim damages in connection with a road 
traffic accident on ... 
 
The circumstances of the accident are that whilst our client was a passenger in [the 
vehicle] the engine fell out, whilst driving, causing the vehicle to come to a crashing 
halt … 
 
A description of our client’s injuries is as follows:- Whiplash type injuries … In 
accordance with the pre-action protocol we propose to instruct ABC medical to prepare 
a medical report … 
 
Our client has not instructed us to pursue any lost earnings … 
 
This claim is funded by way of a Conditional Fee Agreement with a success fee … 
 
 
2. Hudson Medical Report  by Mr Andrews, Orthopedic Surgeon 
 
… 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Mr Hudson is a 18 year old gentleman … 
 
HISTORY OF ACCIDENT 
 
Mr Hudson stated that he was travelling as a front seat passenger of a car. The car 
was going down hill when car engine fell down and car suddenly stopped with a big 
jerk. His body went forward and backward. The client was wearing three-pointed 
seatbelt … An airbag was available … However it was not activated during the impact 
… 
He stated that he did not perceive warning prior to the accident. As a result he was 
unable to brace his torso in order to minimise the force of the deceleration … No 
emergency services attended the scene of the accident. 
 
… 
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INJURIES SUSTAINED 
 
1. Neck pain 
2. Shoulder pain 
3. Back pain 
 
IMMEDIATE AND SUBSEQUENT TREATMENT 
 
Mr Hudson stated that he self-medicated with over the counter painkillers. 
 
EFFECT ON SOCIAL, LEISURE AND DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES 
 
Unable to play cricket for 2 months 
 
CONSEQUENTIAL LOSS 
 
Mr Hudson is currently a student at college and has taken 1 month off his college. 
 
PROGRESSION OF SYMPTOMS 
 
1. Neck pain 
 
Mr Hudson stated that he developed neck pain immediately after the accident. The 
neck pain was located in the back of the neck. The neck pain was associated with 
stiffness of the neck muscles ... He advised me that he is now experiencing intermittent 
pain which is triggered by movements. There is a need for analgesia. 
 
2. Shoulder pain 
 
Mr Hudson told me that he developed shoulder pain 2 hours after the accident. The 
pain was located in the back trapezius muscle area. There was associated stiffness of 
the muscles. There was restriction of the movements. 
 
3. Back pain 
 
Mr Hudson stated that he developed back pain 2 hours after the accident. The back 
pain was not associated with stiffness of the back muscles … He told me that the back 
pain has fully recovered. 
 
ACCIDENTS BEFORE THIS ACCIDENT 
 
He told me that he had been involved in previous road traffic accident 1 year ago … 
he sustained low back, shoulder and neck pain and was fully recovered … 
 
… 
 
PRESENT COMPLAINT 
 
1. Intermittent neck pain 
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… 
 
OBSERVATION MADE IN RELATION TO THE CLAIMANT’S GENERAL DYNAMIC 
MOVEMENT 
 
Gait: Normal … 
Posture: Normal … 
Rising from sitting position: Without any assistance … 
 
1. Neck 
 
On inspection of the neck there is no swelling, bruising or deformity. Contour is normal. 
There is tenderness of left Para spinal muscles on palpation. 
 
Neck movements 
 
i) Flexion is within normal limits and is painful at extreme 
ii) Extension is within normal limits and is painful at extreme 
iii) Right lateral rotation is within normal limits and is painful at extreme 
iv) Left lateral rotation is within normal limits and is painful at extreme 
v) Right lateral flexion is within normal limits and is painful at extreme 
vi) Left lateral flexion is within normal limits and is painful at extreme 
vii) Axial rotation of neck is within limits and is painful at extreme 
Sensations, power and reflexes of the upper limbs are entirely normal. 
 
2. Shoulders and upper limbs 
 
No swelling, bruising or deformity on inspection. Alignment and contour of the 
shoulders was within the normal limits. There is no obvious tenderness of muscles on 
palpation. 
 
Movements of the bilateral shoulder joints 
 
i) Flexion is within normal limits and is pain free 
ii) Extension is within normal limits and is pain free 
iii) Abduction is within normal limits and is pain free 
iv) Adduction is within normal limits and is pain free 
v) External rotation is within normal limits and is pain free 
vi) Internal rotation is within normal limits and is pain free 
The power, sensations and reflexes of the upper limbs are in tact. 
 
3. Back 
 
No swelling, bruising or deformity on inspection. Alignment and contour of the back 
was within the normal limits. There is no obvious tenderness of muscles on palpation. 
 
Movements of back: 
i) Flexion is within normal limits and is pain free 
ii) Extension is within normal limits and is pain free 
iii) Right lateral flexion is within normal limits and is pain free 
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iv) Left lateral flexion is within normal limits and is pain free 
v) Right lateral rotation is within normal limits and is pain free 
vi) Left lateral rotation is within normal limits and is pain free 
vii) Bilateral straight leg raise test is positive 
The power, sensations and reflexes of lower limbs are in tact. 
 
OPINION, PROGNOSIS & CONCLUSION 
…  
 
This accident resulted in injuries to his neck, shoulder and back. I believe that these 
injuries are consistent with the history mentioned earlier. 
 
In my opinion it is likely that he has sustained a hyper-extension flexion injury to the 
spine resulting in a whiplash injury without nerve root compression or bony injury. 
… 
 
I would expect full resolution of the whiplash injury symptoms within the 5-6 months 
from the date of accident with the help of palliative treatment such as analgesia and 
physiotherapy … 
 
EFFECT ON SOCIAL, LEISURE AND DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES 
 
The client advised me that he was unable to continue his usual social and leisure 
activities the details are documented earlier in the report for 2 months.  
In my opinion it is appropriate considering the circumstance of the accident and the 
injuries sustained as the result of the accident. 
 
EDUCATION LOSS 
 
Mr Hudson is currently student who took 1 month off college following the accident. 
On the balance of probability it is appropriate considering the circumstances of the 
accident. 
 
RECOMMENDATION 
 
In my opinion, further referral for physiotherapy is indicated after considering his 
symptoms and sign at the time of consultation. 
In my opinion he would benefit from 3-4 sessions of physiotherapy, according to my 
knowledge the approximate price is £35 to £40 per physiotherapy session.  
 
PROSPECTS ON THE OPEN JOB MARKET 
 
… his job prospects will not be hampered … 
 
During the preparation of the Report I found Hudson to be a co-operative and reliable 
witness. 
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3. Allen Medical Report  by Mr Andrews, Orthopedic Surgeon 
 
… 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Mr Allen is a 24 year old gentleman … unemployed. 
 
 
HISTORY OF ACCIDENT 
 
Mr Allen stated that he was travelling as a back seat passenger of a car. Engine mount 
fell out of their car driver suddenly use the brakes. The client's head hit against the 
front seat. 
 
… He stated that he did not perceive warning prior to the accident. As a result he was 
unable to brace his torso in order to minimise the force of the deceleration … 
 
… 
 
INJURIES SUSTAINED 
 
1. Neck pain 
2. Back pain 
 
IMMEDIATE AND SUBSEQUENT TREATMENT 
 
Mr Allen stated that he self-medicated with over the counter painkillers. 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL CHANGES ARISING SINCE THE ACCIDENT 
 
Mr Allen stated that the accident had left him with a loss of confidence in travelling as 
a passenger for 2 weeks. 
Mr Allen describes symptoms of travel anxiety for 2 weeks. 
He stated that he experienced mood changes, social withdrawal and lack of 
concentration due to the accident for 2 weeks. 
 
… 
 
PROGRESSION OF SYMPTOMS 
 
1. Neck pain 
 
Mr Allen stated that he developed neck pain next morning after the accident. The neck 
pain was located in the back of the neck. The neck pain was associated with stiffness 
of the neck muscles … He advised me that he is now experiencing intermittent pain 
which is triggered by movements of the head, bending. There is a need for analgesia. 
 
2. Back pain 
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Mr Allen stated that he developed back pain few hours after the accident. The back 
pain was associated with stiffness of the back muscles … He is now experiencing an 
intermittent back pain which is triggered by movements. There is a need for analgesia. 
 
ACCIDENTS BEFORE THIS ACCIDENT 
 
He told me that he had never been involved in any previous road traffic accidents. 
There are no ongoing claims. 
 
… 
 
OBSERVATION MADE IN RELATION TO THE CLAIMANT'S GENERAL DYNAMIC 
MOVEMENTS 
 
Gait: Normal and without any assistance 
Posture: Normal for the claimant's age group 
Rising from sitting position: Without any assistance or significant difficulty 
 
1. Neck 
 
On inspection of the neck there is no swelling, bruising or deformity. Contour is normal. 
 
There is tenderness of lower cervical spine on palpation. 
 
 
 
Neck movements 
 
i) Flexion is within normal limits and is pain free 
ii) Extension is within normal limits and is pain free 
iii) Right lateral rotation is within normal limits and is pain free 
iv) Left lateral rotation is within normal limits and is pain free 
v) Right lateral flexion is within normal limits and is pain free 
vi) Left lateral flexion is within normal limits and is pain free 
vii) Axial rotation of neck is within limits and is painful at extreme 
Sensations, power and reflexes of the upper limbs are entirely normal. 
 
2. Shoulders and upper limbs 
 
No swelling, bruising or deformity on inspection. Alignment and contour of the 
shoulders was within the normal limits. There is no obvious tenderness of muscles on 
palpation. 
Movements of the bilateral shoulder joints 
i) Flexion is within normal limits and is pain free 
ii) Extension is within normal limits and is pain free 
iii) Abduction is within normal limits and is pain free 
iv) Adduction is within normal limits and is pain free 
v) External rotation is within normal limits and is pain free 
vi) Internal rotation is within normal limits and is pain free 
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The power, sensations and reflexes of the upper limbs are intact. 
 
3. Back 
 
No swelling, bruising or deformity on inspection. Alignment and contour of the back 
was within the normal limits. There is tenderness of Para vertebral muscles. 
 
Movements of back: 
i) Flexion is limited by 50% and painful 
ii) Extension is within normal limits and is pain free 
iii) Right lateral flexion is within normal limits and is pain free 
iv) Left lateral flexion is within normal limits and is pain free 
v) Right lateral rotation is within normal limits and is pain free 
vi) Left lateral rotation is within normal limits and is pain free 
vii) Bilateral straight leg raise test is positive 
The power, sensations and reflexes of lower limbs are intact. 
 
OPINION, PROGNOSIS & CONCLUSION 
Mr Allen is a 24 year old gentleman who was involved in a road traffic accident … as 
the back seat passenger of a car. I have examined him approximately 2 months after 
this accident. This accident resulted in injuries to his neck and back. I believe that 
these injuries are consistent with the history mentioned earlier. 
 
In my opinion it is likely that he has sustained a hyper-extension flexion injury to the 
spine due to the use of emergency brake resulting in a whiplash injury without nerve 
root compression or bony injury. 
 
… 
 
I would expect full resolution of the whiplash injury symptoms within the 4-5 months 
from the date of accident with the help of palliative treatment such as analgesia and 
physiotherapy … 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL 
 
Mr Allen describes the symptoms of travel anxiety, mood changes and social 
withdrawal and lack of concentration for 2 weeks, which in my opinion is appropriate 
following the accident of this nature and injuries sustained. 
 
RECOMMENDATION 
 
… 
 
In my opinion he would benefit from 3-4 sessions of physiotherapy, according to my 
knowledge the approximate price is £35 to £40 per physiotherapy session. 
 
… 
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4. Farmer  Medical Report by Mr Hall, Trauma Consultant 
 
… 
 
HISTORY OF ACCIDENT 
 
Mr Farmer informed me that he had been involved in a road traffic accident on the ... 
The client was a driver of a car. The car was going straight. Car speed … was 30mph. 
The engine fell on the road and the car was suddenly stopped. An airbag was available 
as a safety feature but was not activated … 
 
 
IMMEDIATE AND SUBSEQUENT TREATMENT 
 
The claimant advised me that he self-medicated with over the counter painkillers. 
 
INJURIES SUSTAINED 
1. Neck pain 
1. Shoulder pain 
2. Back pain 
 
…  
 
EFFECT ON SOCIAL, DOMESTIC AND LEISURE ACTIVITIES 
 
Mr Farmer stated that the accident had an effect on his leisure activities such as. 
• He also told me that he faced difficulties to maintain his personal hygiene. 
• Unable to play sports 
 
… 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL SYMPTOMS 
 
Mr Farmer stated that the accident had left him with a loss of confidence for initial 8 
weeks. 
The accident had left him shocked and shaken. 
He stated that he experienced sleep disturbances due to physical discomfort and 
flashbacks of the accident. 
He stated that he has been more cautious and aware of his surroundings since the 
accident. 
… 
 
ACCIDENTS BEFORE THIS ACCIDENT 
He told me that he had been involved in previous road traffic accidents on 2004, and 
in 2006. 
 
… 
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DETAILS OF SYMPTOMS 
 
Neck pain Mr Farmer stated that he developed neck pain immediately after the 
accident. The neck pain was located in the back of the neck. The neck pain was 
associated with stiffness of the neck muscles … He advised me that he is now 
experiencing intermittent pain which is triggered by movements of the head, lifting and 
bending. There is a need for analgesia. 
 
Left shoulder pain Mr Farmer told me that he developed shoulder pain immediately 
after the accident … He advised me that he is now experiencing intermittent pain which 
is triggered by movements, lifting and bending. There is a need for analgesia. 
 
Back pain Mr Farmer stated that he developed back pain immediately after the 
accident. The back pain was associated with stiffness of the back muscles … He is 
now experiencing an intermittent back pain which is triggered by movements, lifting 
and bending. There is a need for analgesia. 
 
EXAMINATION 
Mr Farmer is a 24 year-old man who walked into the room with a normal gait. He did 
not seem to be in any pain or discomfort.  
 
… 
 
 
OBSERVATION MADE IN RELATION TO THE CLAIMANT'S GENERAL DYNAMIC 
MOVENMENTS 
Gait: Normal and without any assistance 
 
Posture: Normal for the claimant's age group 
 
Neck 
On inspection of the neck there is no swelling, bruising or deformity. Contour is normal. 
There is tenderness of left Trapezium muscle 
 
Neck movements 
 
i) Flexion is limited and is painful 
ii) Extension is within normal limits and is pain free 
iii) Right lateral rotation is within normal limits and is pain free 
iv) Left lateral rotation is within normal limits and is pain free 
v) Right lateral flexion is limited and is painful 
vi) Left lateral flexion is limited and is painful 
 
Sensations, power and reflexes of the upper limbs are entirely normal. 
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Shoulders and upper limbs 
 
No swelling, bruising or deformity on inspection. Alignment and contour of the 
shoulders was within the normal limits. There is no obvious tenderness of muscles on 
palpation. 
 
Movements of the bilateral shoulder joints 
 
i) Flexion is within normal limits and is pain free 
ii) Extension is within normal limits and is pain free 
iii) Abduction is within normal limits and is pain free 
iv) Adduction is within normal limits and is pain free 
v) External rotation is within normal limits and is pain free 
vi) Internal rotation is within normal limits and is pain free 
 
The power, sensations and reflexes of the upper limbs are intact. 
 
Back 
 
No swelling, bruising or deformity on inspection. Alignment and contour of the back 
was within the normal limits. There is tenderness over paravertebral muscles. 
 
Movements of back: 
 
i) Flexion is limited and is painful 
i) Extension is within normal limits and is pain free 
ii) Right lateral flexion is limited and is painful 
iii) Left lateral flexion is limited and is painful 
iv) Right lateral rotation is within normal limits and is pain free 
v) Left lateral rotation is within normal limits and is pain free 
vi) Bilateral leg raise test is positive 
 
The power, sensations and reflexes of lower limbs are intact. 
 
OPINION, PROGNOSIS & CONCLUSION 
 
Mr Farmer is a 24 year old gentleman who was involved in a road traffic accident on 
… as the driver of a car. I have examined him approximately 4 months after this 
accident. This accident resulted in injuries to his neck and back. I believe that these 
injuries are consistent with the history mentioned earlier. 
 
In my opinion it is likely that he has sustained a hyper-extension flexion injury to the 
spine resulting in a whiplash injury without nerve root compression or bony injury. 
…. 
I would expect full resolution of the whiplash injury symptoms within the 12 months 
from the date of accident with the help of analgesia. 
… 
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PSYCHOLOGICAL 
 
Mr Farmer describes the symptoms of travel anxiety, disturbances, social withdrawal 
and lack of concentration which in my opinion is appropriate following the accident of 
this nature and injuries sustained. 
These symptoms do resolve in time as the memory of the accident fades and in my 
opinion, on the balance of probability I would expect a full recovery within 2 months 
from the date of the accident. 
 
EFFECT ON SOCIAL, LEISURE AND DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES 
The client advised me that he was unable to continue his usual social and leisure 
activities, the details are documented earlier in the report, for 8 weeks. In my opinion 
it is appropriate considering the circumstance of the accident and the injuries 
sustained as the result of the accident. 
 
 
5. Ilford Medical Report  by Mr Andrews, Orthopedic Surgeon  
 
HISTORY OF ACCIDENT 
 
Mr Ilford stated that he was travelling as a back seat passenger of a car. He told me 
that the engine mount dropped very suddenly car stopped with heavy jerk and client 
went forward and backward. The client was wearing a three-pointed seatbelt anchored 
to the vehicle's chassis with a headrest fitted to his car seat. An airbag was available 
as a safety feature. 
However it was not activated during the impact … Despite experiencing physical 
discomfort he confirmed that he got out of the damaged vehicle without assistance. 
 
… 
 
INJURIES SUSTAINED 
 
1. Neck pain 
2. Right Shoulder pain 
3. Back pain 
 
IMMEDIATE AND SUBSEQUENT TREATMENT 
 
The claimant advised me that he self-medicated with over the counter painkillers. 
 
EFFECT ON SOCIAL, LEISURE AND DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES 
 
The accident had an effect on his leisure activities such as: playing cricket and gym 
for 6 months. 
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PSYCHOLOGICAL CHANGES ARISING SINCE THE ACCIDENT 
 
Mr Ilford stated that the accident had left him with a loss of confidence in travelling as 
a passenger for 2 months. 
Mr Ilford describes symptoms of travel anxiety for 2 months. 
He stated that he experienced social withdrawal and lack of concentration due to 
physical discomfort and flashbacks of the accident for 2 months. 
In general, other than reactive anger, feeling of injustice and inconvenience arising as 
a result of the accident, he did not suffer from any significant personality changes in 
terms of panic attacks, depression since the accident. 
 
CONSEQUENTIAL LOSS 
 
Mr Ilford is currently a Labour Worker and he took 2 months off from work following 
his accident. 
 
PROGRESSION OF SYMPTOMS 
 
1. Neck pain 
 
Mr Ilford stated that he developed neck pain immediately after the accident. The neck 
pain was located in the back of the neck. The neck pain was associated with stiffness 
of the neck muscles … He advised me that he is now experiencing intermittent pain 
which is triggered by movements of the head, lifting and bending. There is a need for 
analgesia. 
 
2. Right shoulder pain 
 
Mr Ilford told me that he developed right shoulder pain immediately after the accident. 
The pain was located in the back of trapezius muscle. There was associated stiffness 
of the muscles. There was restriction of the movements. 
He advised me that he is now experiencing intermittent pain which is triggered by 
movements, lifting and bending. There is a need for analgesia. 
 
3. Back pain 
 
Mr Ilford stated that he developed back pain immediately after the accident. The back 
pain was associated with stiffness of the back muscles … He is now experiencing an 
intermittent back pain which is triggered by movements, lifting and bending. He is 
having difficulties bending to pick up food products at work. There is a need for 
analgesia. 
 
ACCIDENTS BEFORE THIS ACCIDENT 
 
He told me that he had never been involved in any previous road traffic accidents. 
There are no ongoing claims. 
 
… 
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PRESENT COMPLAINT 
 
1. Intermittent neck pain. 
2. Intermittent right shoulder pain. 
3. Intermittent back pain. 
 
… 
 
OBSERVATION MADE IN RELATION TO THE CLAIMANT'S GENERAL DYNAMIC 
MOVENMENTS 
 
Gait: Normal and without any assistance 
Posture: Normal for the claimant's age group 
Rising from sitting position: Without any assistance or significant difficulty 
 
1. Neck 
 
On inspection of the neck there is no swelling, bruising or deformity. Contour is normal. 
There is tenderness of Paravertebral muscles. 
Neck movements 
 
i) Flexion is within normal limits and is painful at extreme 
ii) Extension is within normal limits and is painful at extreme 
iii) Right lateral rotation is within normal limits and is painful at extreme 
iv) Left lateral rotation is within normal limits and is painful at extreme 
v) Right lateral flexion is within normal limits and is painful at extreme 
vi) Left lateral flexion is within normal limits and is painful at extreme 
vii) Axial rotation of neck is within limits and is painful at extreme 
 
Sensations, power and reflexes of the upper limbs are entirely normal. 
 
2. Shoulders and upper limbs 
 
No swelling, bruising or deformity on inspection. Alignment and contour of the 
shoulders was within the normal limits. There is tenderness of Trapezius muscles 
Movements of the right shoulder joint 
 
i) Flexion is within normal limits and is painful at extreme 
ii) Extension is within normal limits and is painful at extreme 
iii) Abduction is within normal limits and is painful at extreme 
iv) Adduction is within normal limits and is painful at extreme 
v) External rotation is within normal limits and is painful at extreme 
vi) Internal rotation is within normal limits and is painful at extreme 
The power, sensations and reflexes of the upper limbs are intact. 
 
3. Back 
 
No swelling, bruising or deformity on inspection. Alignment and contour of the back 
was within the normal limits. There is tenderness of Paravertebral muscles. 
Movements of back: 
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i) Flexion is within normal limits and is painful at extreme 
ii) Extension is within normal limits and is painful at extreme 
iii) Right lateral flexion is within normal limits and is painful at extreme 
iv) Left lateral flexion is within normal limits and is painful at extreme 
v) Right lateral rotation is within normal limits and is painful at extreme 
vi) Left lateral rotation is within normal limits and is painful at extreme 
vii) Bilateral straight leg raise test is positive 
 
The power, sensations and reflexes of lower limbs are intact. 
 
OPINION, PROGNOSIS & CONCLUSION 
 
Mr Ilford is a 26 year old gentleman who was involved in a road traffic accident … as 
the back seat passenger of a car. I have examined him approximately 7 months after 
this accident. This accident resulted in injuries to his neck, right shoulder and back. I 
believe that these injuries are consistent with the history mentioned earlier. 
 
In my opinion it is likely that he has sustained a hyper-extension flexion injury to the 
spine resulting in a whiplash injury without nerve root compression or bony injury. 
 
… 
 
I would expect full resolution of the whiplash injury symptoms within the 6-8 months 
from the date of examination with the help of palliative treatment such as analgesia 
and physiotherapy. 
 
… 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL 
 
Mr Ilford describes the symptoms of travel anxiety, social withdrawal and lack of 
concentration for 2 months, which in my opinion is appropriate following the accident 
of this nature and injuries sustained. 
 
EFFECT ON SOCIAL, LEISURE AND DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES 
 
The client advised me that he was unable to continue his usual social and leisure 
activities, the details are documented earlier in the report, for 6 months. In my opinion 
it is appropriate considering the circumstance of the accident and the injuries 
sustained as the result of the accident. 
 
 
WORK LOSS 
 
Mr Ilford is currently a Labour worker who took 2 months off work following the 
accident. On the balance of probability it is appropriate considering the circumstances 
of the accident. 
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RECOMMENDATION 
 
In my opinion, further referral for physiotherapy is indicated after considering his 
symptoms and signs at the time of consultation 
In my opinion he would benefit from 6-8 sessions of physiotherapy, according to my 
knowledge the approximate price is £35 to £40 per physiotherapy session. 
 
 
6. Extract from Recall Notice 
 
On certain Tubitsu vehicles, the No. 4 engine mount bolt may loosen ... If the vehicle 
is continuously driven under such condition, the No. 4 engine mount bolt may loosen 
and fall out or break, allowing the transmission to be out of position and the alternator 
pulley may interfere with the body panel near the engine. In extreme cases, the 
driveshaft may become detached and/or the alternator pulley may break. If this occurs 
the vehicle will immediately lose power, come to a stop and be inoperable. Should this 
occur, there is an increased risk of an accident. 
 
7.  Driver Statement 
 
The accident happened on Doncaster Rd, I was driving towards Sheffield when the 
engine fell out of the car and the car came to a sudden stop. 
 
8.  Job Card  AB Recovery Services 
 
‘Fault Reported: Spark from Engine … 
 
Unsafe to drive due to engine leaning on inner wing … 
 
… veh recoverd in non runner. found bolt in top g/box mount sheared 
causing engine to drop. n/side driveshaft rubbing onto subframe  
and alternator dropped onto inner wing shredding belt and distorting  
pulley ... 
 
WORK DONE 
 
CHECK FOR LOUD ENGINE NOISE FOUND TOP G/BOX MOUNT BOLT STRIPPED 
THREADS IN MOUNT AND MAKE ENGINE AND BOX DROP AND N/S DRIVE 
SHAFT RUBBING AWAY ON SUBFRAME AND ALTERNATOR PULLY IS UP 
AGAINST INNERWING CAUSING BELT TO SHRED ... REQS NEW GEAR BOX 
MOUNT + BOLT + ALTERNATOR + BELT + DRIVESHAFT … 
 
…. Work carried out under warranty :- 
RECOVERD IN LOUD NOISE FROM ENGINE AREA 
 
 
9.  Claimants’ Solicitor’s attendance note  with recovery agent  
 
‘… the engine was on the deck …’ 
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APPENDIX 4    
 
PL Claims Survey  
Attached as Excel Spreadsheet file Appendix 4 PL survey anonymised spreadsheet 
12.4.15 
 
 
 
 
